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When to expect violations of causal faithfulness and why it matters 
 
Holly Andersen 
Simon Fraser University 
holly_andersen@sfu.ca 
 
 
Abstract: I present three reasons why philosophers of science should be more concerned 
about violations of causal faithfulness (CF). In complex evolved systems, mechanisms 
for maintaining various equilibrium states are highly likely to violate CF. Even when 
such systems do not precisely violate CF, they may nevertheless generate precisely the 
same problems for inferring causal structure from probabilistic relationships in data as do 
genuine CF-violations. Thus, potential CF-violations are particularly germane to 
experimental science when we rely on probabilistic information to uncover the DAG, 
rather than already knowing the DAG from which we could predict the right experiments 
to ‘catch out’ the hidden causal relationships.  
 
Wordcount, including references, abstract, and footnotes: 4973 
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1. Introduction 
Several conditions must be met in order to apply contemporary causal modeling 
techniques to extract information about causal structure from probabilistic relationships 
in data. While there are slightly different ways of formalizing these requirements, three of 
the most important ones are the causal Markov, causal modularity, and causal faithfulness 
conditions. Potential failures of the first two of these conditions have already been the 
subject of discussion in philosophy of science (Cartwright 1999, 2002, 2006; Hausman 
and Woodward 1999, 2004; Steel 2006; Mitchell 2008; Woodward 2003, 2010). I will 
address failures in the third condition, causal faithfulness, and argue that failures of this 
condition are likely to occur in certain kinds of systems, especially those studied in 
biology, and are the most likely to cause trouble in experimental settings.  
Faithfulness is the assumption that there are no precisely counterbalanced causal 
relationships in the system that would result in a probabilistic independence between two 
variables that are actually causally connected. While faithfulness failures have been 
discussed primarily in the formal epistemology literature, I will argue that violations of 
faithfulness can impact experimental techniques, inferential license, and issues 
concerning scientific practice that are not exhausted by the formal epistemology 
literature. 
In particular, a formal methodological perspective might suggest a distinction 
between genuine and merely apparent failures of CF, such that supposed examples of CF-
violating systems are not ‘really’ CF-violating, but merely close. But as I will argue, this 
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distinction is not epistemically justifiable in experimental settings: we cannot distinguish 
between genuine and merely apparent CF violations unless we already know the 
underlying causal structure; without this information, merely apparent and genuine CF 
violations will be indistinguishable. Violations of CF faithfulness are particularly 
germane to experimental science, since CF is the assumption that takes us from 
probabilistic relationships among variables in the data to the underlying causal structure. 
In contrast, for instance, the Causal Markov condition takes us from causal structure to 
predicted probabilistic relationships. Going from data to underlying causal structure is the 
most common direction of inference from the epistemic vantage point of science. Rather 
than beginning by knowing the true causal graph of the system in question to predict 
probability distributions, experiment moves from probabilistic relationships to the 
underlying causal structure.  
This means that failures of CF arguably have the most potential for wreaking 
havoc in experimental settings, and have interesting methodological consequences for the 
practice of science: we should expect to find epistemic practices that compensate for CF-
violations in fields that study systems where faithfulness is likely to fail. Thus, these 
conditions are of interest not only to those working on formal modeling techniques, but 
also to broader discussions in philosophy of science, especially those that concern 
epistemic practices in the biological, cognitive, or medical sciences. 
 
2. Violations of the Causal Faithfulness Condition 
Violation of CF occurs when a system involves precisely counterbalanced causal 
relationships. These causal relationships appear “invisible” when information about 
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conditional and unconditional probabilities is used to ascertain a set of possible causal 
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) that are consistent with data from that system. More 
precisely: 
 
Let G be a causal graph and P a probability distribution generated by G. <G, P> 
satisfies the Faithfulness Condition if and only if every conditional independence 
relation true in P is entailed by the Causal Markov Condition applied to G. (Spirtes, 
Glymour, and Scheines 2000, 31) 
 
One can think of faithfulness as the converse of the Causal Markov condition: 
faithfulness says that given a graph and associated probability distribution, the only 
independence relations are those that follow from the Causal Markov condition 
alone and not from special parameter values… (Woodward 2003, 65) 
 
Informally, variables should only be probabilistically independent if they are 
causally independent in the true causal graph; when causal relationships cancel each other 
out by having precisely counterbalanced parameter values, the variables are 
probabilistically independent, but not causally independent. Thus, in systems that have 
CF-violating causal relationships, the probabilistic relationships between variables 
include independencies that do not reflect the actual causal relationships between those 
variables.  
Probabilistic relationships are used to generate possible causal graphs for the 
system. There may be multiple distinct causal graphs which all imply the observed set of 
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probabilistic relationships. The candidate graphs can then be used to generate further 
interventions in the system that will distinguish between the graphs; if two candidate 
graphs make different predictions for the consequences of an intervention on variable A, 
then performing this intervention on A should return an answer as to which of the 
candidates graphs matches the observed results. The use of probabilistic data to generate 
candidate causal graphs that can then be used to suggest further interventions can save 
huge amounts of time and energy by focusing on a few likely candidates from an 
indefinitely large number of candidate causal structures. 
DAGs of causal faithfulness violations may take several forms. For example:  
 
Figure 1a      Figure 1b 
                         
 
Some authors (Pearl 2000, Woodward 2010) rely on a stronger constraint, causal 
stability, which requires that probabilistic independence relationships be stable under 
perturbation of parameter values across some range, to eliminate “pathological” (i.e. CF-
violating) parameter values.  
 
Definition 2.4.1 Stability:  
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Let I(P) denote the set of all conditional independence relationships embodies in P. 
A causal model M = <D, Θ> generates a stable distribution if and only if P(<D, 
Θ>) contains no extraneous independences – that is, if and only if I(P(<D, Θ>)) ⊆ 
I(P(<D, Θ`>)) for any set of parameters Θ`. (Pearl 2000) 
 
Violating causal stability would require a system to respond to changes in one parameter 
value with compensating changes in another parameter, so that the values remain exactly 
counterbalanced for some range of values.  
The potential for CF-violations to reduce the reliability of methods for extracting 
causal structure from data is well-known in formal epistemology. However, I will argue 
that philosophers of science in general should pay more attention to such violations; 
understanding the difficulties that CF-violations pose will enhance our ability to 
accurately characterize features of experimental practice, and should be included in 
normative considerations regarding evidence and inference. The main arguments in this 
paper can be summarized in three brief points: 
 
(1) Even if CF-violating systems are measure 0 with respect to the set of causal 
systems with randomly distributed parameter values, this does not imply that we 
will only encounter them with vanishing probability. CF-violating systems may be 
of particular interest for modeling purposes compared to non-CF-violating systems, 
in particular because certain kinds of systems may have structural features that 
render CF-violating parameter values more likely. 
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(2) As an example of point 1, structural considerations regarding dynamically 
stable systems that are the result of evolutionary processes should lead us to expect 
CF-violations in various biological systems. For systems that have evolved to 
maintain stable equilibrium states against external perturbation, we should also 
expect violations of the stronger condition, causal stability. I briefly present an 
example of this: mechanisms for salinity resistance in estuary nudibranchs. 
 
(3) ‘Apparent’ CF-violations in equilibrium-maintaining systems can be generated 
in certain experimental conditions even though the actual causal relationships in 
question may not be exactly balanced. Some measurement circumstances will result 
in a data set that violates CF, even if the actual system being measured does not 
genuinely violate CF. We should be as concerned with merely apparent as with 
genuine CF-violations, since both kinds of violations lead to the same difficulties 
for moving from probabilistic relationships in data to accurate DAGs of systems.  
 
These three points highlight why philosophers of science in general should be concerned: 
causal systems may not genuinely violate CF, but yet pose the same problems for 
experimental investigations as if they did. Apparent CF-violations occur when systems do 
not in principle violate CF but appear to due to measurement issues connected with data-
gathering. In both genuine and merely apparent CF-violations, probabilistic relationships 
in the data will suggest a set of candidate causal graphs that are inaccurate; as a result, 
further interventions will yield conflicting answers. Scientists could in principle ‘catch 
out’ these merely apparent CF-violations if they knew exactly how to test for them. But to 
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do this, they would need the DAG, and this is the information that they lack when 
proceeding from the data to underlying causal structure. When we have incomplete 
knowledge of the causal structure of the system under investigation, we lack this ability 
to distinguish between merely apparent and genuine CF-violations. Both raise the same 
problems. 
 
3. The measure of CF-violating systems 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000) offer a proof that CF-violating systems are 
Lebesgue measure 0 with respect to possible causal systems, while non-CF-violating 
systems are measure 1. “The parameter values—values of the linear coefficients and 
exogenous variances of a structure—form a real space, and the set of points in this space 
that create vanishing partial correlations not implied by the Markov condition have 
Lebesgue measure 0” (41). From this, they conclude that we are vanishingly unlikely to 
encounter CF-violating systems, and so proceed on the initial presumption that any given 
causal system is not CF-violating. This proof may be part of the reason why 
comparatively little attention has been paid to causal faithfulness compared to the causal 
Markov and modularity conditions. However, the fact that CF-violating systems are 
measure 0 in this class does not imply that we will not encounter them with any 
frequency.  
To motivate this, consider an analogy with rational numbers. They are also 
measure 0 with respect to the real numbers, while irrational numbers are measure 1. And, 
there are circumstances under which we are vanishingly unlikely to find them. If a 
random real number were to be chosen from the number line, the probability that we will 
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draw an irrational number is so overwhelming as to warrant ignoring the presence of 
rational numbers. However, this does not imply that rational numbers are unlikely to be 
encountered simpliciter: bluntly put, we don’t ‘encounter’ the numbers by randomly 
drawing them from the number line. Rational numbers are encountered overwhelmingly 
more often than one would expect from considering only the proof that they are measure 
0 with respect to real numbers. 
The Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines proof assumes that all parameter values 
within the range of a continuous variable are equally probable (Zhang and Spirtes 2008). 
Without this assumption, one can’t presume that the CF-violating values are vanishingly 
unlikely. For instance, this assumption does not hold for systems that involve 
equilibrium-maintaining causal mechanisms. Such mechanisms work to maintain 
counterbalanced parameter values, rendering it much more likely that parameter values 
will result in CF-violations.  
It is true that if causal systems took on parameter values randomly from their 
range, we would expect to encounter CF-violating systems with vanishingly small 
probability, and in that scenario, we could safely ignore CF-violations as a real possibility 
on any given occasion. However, some systems survive, and become scientifically 
interesting targets for investigation, precisely because they achieve long-term dynamic 
equilibrium using mechanisms that rely on balanced parameter values. In such systems, 
the parameter values are most certainly not indifferently probable over their range. In 
fields like biology, neuroscience, medicine, etc., we are disproportionately interested in 
modeling systems that involve equilibrium maintaining mechanisms. This suggests that 
our modeling interests are focused on CF-violating systems in a way that is 
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disproportionate to their measure when considered against all possible causal systems. 
Thus, we cannot conclude from the fact that CF-violating parameter values have measure 
0 with respect to all possible parameter values that we will not encounter such violations 
on a regular basis. 
Zhang and Spirtes (2008) discuss some circumstances in which systems may 
violate CF. However, their discussion makes it seem like CF-violations occur primarily in 
artificial or constructed circumstances. One such example is homeostatic systems, which 
maintain equilibrium against some range of perturbations, such as thermostats 
maintaining a constant temperature in a room. Zhang and Spirtes demonstrate that CF can 
be replaced with two distinct subconditions, that, taken together, provide almost the same 
inferential power as causal faithfulness. If systems violate only one of these 
subconditions, such violations can be empirically detected. This is an extremely useful 
result, and increases the power of Bayes’ nets modeling to recover DAGs from data. 
However, this result should not be taken as resolving the problem.  
In particular, their use of a thermostat as example of a homeostatic system does 
not do justice to the incredibly complex mechanisms for homeostasis that can be found in 
various biological systems. Considering these more sophisticated examples provides a 
clearer view of the potential problems involved in modeling such systems under the 
assumption of causal faithfulness.  
 
4. Evolved dynamical systems and equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms 
The tendency for evolved systems like populations, individual organisms, 
ecosystems, and the brain to involve precisely balanced causal relationships can be easily 
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explained by the role these balanced relationships play in maintaining various 
equilibrium states (see, for instance, Mitchell 2003, 2008). Furthermore, the mechanisms 
by which organisms maintain internal equilibrium with respect to a huge variety of states 
will need to be flexible. They need to not simply maintain a static equilibrium, but 
respond to perturbation from the outside by maintaining that equilibrium. This means that 
many mechanisms for equilibrium maintenance will have evolved to keep an internal 
state fixed over some range of values in other variables, not merely for a single precise 
set of values. Any system that survives because of its capacity to maintain stability in the 
face of changing causal parameters or variable values will be disproportionately likely to 
display CF-violating causal relationships, and, more strongly also violate causal stability. 
An intriguing example is nudibranchs, commonly known as sea slugs (see 
especially Berger and Kharazova 1997). Many nudibranchs live in ecosystems such as 
reefs, where salinity levels in the water change very little. These nudibranchs are 
stenohaline: able to survive within a narrow range of salinity changes only. In cases 
where salinity levels vary over narrow ranges, nudibranchs respond to changes in salinity 
levels by a cellular mechanism for osmoregulation, where cells excrete sodium ions or 
take in water through changes in cell ion content and volume. This mechanism provides 
tolerance, but not resistance, to salinity changes, because it maintains equilibrium by 
exchanging ions and water with the surrounding environment. In cases of extremely high 
or low salinity, this mechanism will cause the animal to extrude too much or take in too 
much (this is why terrestrial slugs die when sprinkled with salt). 
Euryhaline nudibranchs, found in estuary environments where saline levels may 
vary dramatically between tides and over the course of a season or year, display a much 
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higher level of resistance to salinity changes. There is a pay-off, in the form of increased 
food sources with reduced competition for nudibranchs that are able to withstand the 
changing saline levels. But in these environments, the osmoregulatory mechanism for 
salinity tolerance is insufficient. A further mechanism has evolved in nudibranchs (and in 
molluscs more generally) for salinity resistance in conditions of extreme salinity 
variations in the external environment. These two mechanisms for salinity regulation in 
euryhaline nudibranchs are fairly independent. The osmoregulation mechanism is 
supplemented with an additional mechanism which involves hermeticization of the 
mantle, which prevents water and ion exchange with the outside environment.. This can 
accommodate changes in salinity that take place over fairly short periods of time, since 
salinity levels can change dramatically over the course of an hour. Instead of maintaining 
blood salinity at the same level as the outside environment, this additional mechanism 
allows the organism to maintain an internal salinity level that differs from that of its 
environment. Mantle hermeticization and osmoregulation are distinct mechanisms, but in 
contexts of extremely high or low salinity, they will both act such that the variables of 
external and internal salinity are independent 
Further, there are two distinct mechanisms in muscle cells that work in coordination 
in extreme salinity cases to maintain a balance of ions inside the muscle cell. The 
concentration of these ions, especially sodium and potassium, can change dramatically in 
low or high salinity levels. There are two ion pumps in the cell that maintain overall ion 
concentration at equilibrium across a fairly substantial range of salinity variation in the 
external environment. Even though external salinity has several causal effects on the 
internal ion balance of a cell, these two variables will be probabilistically independent for 
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a range of external salinity values (in particular, for the range in which the organisms are 
naturally found). 
 
The ion balance of muscle cells during adaptation to various salinities could not be 
achieved by virtue of the Na/K-pump alone, removing sodium and accumulating 
potassium. As it is clear from the data obtained, the concentration of both ions 
drops at low salinity and increases at high salinity. Therefore, the effective ion 
regulation in molluscan cells can be provided only by cooperative action of two 
pumps – the Na/K-pump and Na,Cl-pump, independent of potassium transport. 
(Berger and Karazova 1997, 123-4) 
 
There are several points that this example illustrates. The first is that of the 
comparative probability that a complex system, such as an organism like a nudibranch, 
will display CF-violating causal relationships in the form of mechanisms that maintain 
equilibrium. Consider the (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000) proof that assumes that 
all parameter values are equally likely. We can see how this falls apart in the case of 
evolved systems. Let’s grant that, in some imaginary past history, all the parameter 
values for mechanisms such as these two ion pumps were equally likely. This would have 
resulted in a vast number of organisms that ended up very rapidly with internal ion 
imbalances and then (probably rather immediately) died. The organisms that managed to 
stick around long enough to leave offspring were, disproportionately, those with 
mechanisms that were precisely counterbalanced to maintain this internal equilibrium. 
Having CF-violating mechanisms would be a distinct advantage. The same applies for 
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other important equilibrium states –organisms with less closely matched values are less 
capable of maintaining that equilibrium state. Insofar as these are important states to 
maintain, it becomes extremely probable that. Over time, those with the closest matches 
for parameter values will be more likely to survive. Thus, even if we grant the 
assumption (already unlikely in this context) that all parameter values start out as equally 
likely, we can see how rapidly the CF-violating ones would come to be vastly 
overrepresented in the population. 
The second point it illustrates is how such sophisticated equilibrium-maintaining 
mechanisms can violate CF in a much more problematic way than the comparatively 
simplistic thermostat example considered by Zhang and Spirtes.
1
 Finally, note that the 
two ion pump mechanisms are not balanced merely for a single external salinity value: 
they are balanced for a range of values. Thus, this example violates not merely CF but 
also the stronger condition of causal stability.
2
 
I am certainly not claiming that all causal relationships in such systems will 
violate CF or causal stability. But it is possible that, for any given system that involves 
equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms, and especially for those with sophisticated evolved 
equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms, there will be at least some causal relationships in 
                                                        
1 Note that a DAG representing the two mechanisms for the ion pumps, connecting 
external salinity levels as a variable to a variable representing internal ion balance 
in muscle cells, is not of the triangular form that is potentially detectable using the 
methods in Zhang and Spirtes (2008). 
2 This example also provides weight to the Russo‐Williamson thesis, that 
information about probabilistic relationships requires supplementation with 
information about underlying mechanisms in order to justify causal claims. These 
examples suggest how investigation into mechanisms for equilibrium‐maintenance 
compensate for the methodological issues that CF violations generate; we would 
expect the Russo‐Williamson thesis to hold particularly of systems liable to violate 
CF.  
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the system that violate either or both of these conditions. This changes the stance we take 
at the beginning of an investigation: rather than starting from the assumption that CF-
violations are vanishingly unlikely, and only revisiting this assumption in the face of 
difficulties, we should start investigations of such systems with the assumption that it is 
highly likely that there will be at least one such spurious probabilistic independence. 
 
5. Apparent CF-violations and their experimental consequences 
Consider a possible response to the argument in the previous section. One might 
be concerned that the examples I offer do not involve genuine CF-violations–when 
examined more closely, it may turn out that the causal relationships in questions are not 
exactly balanced, but merely close. This response might involve the claim that even in the 
case of biological systems, CF is not genuinely violated, because there are slight 
differences in parameter values that could be identified, especially if one performed the 
right interventions on the systems to ‘catch out’ the slight mismatch in parameter values. 
Or, by taking recourse to causal stability, one might say that while the equilibrium state 
of some systems involves precisely counterbalanced causal relationships, in the case of 
perturbation to that equilibrium, these relationships will be revealed. Perturbation of 
systems that return to equilibrium would thus be a strategy for eliminating many (or 
most) merely apparent CF-violations. 
Answering this challenge brings us to the heart of why CF-violations deserve 
broader discussion. Considered from a formal perspective, there is a deep and important 
difference between systems that actually violate CF, or causal stability, and those that do 
not. This fact motivates a response to merely apparent CF-violations that takes them to be 
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not methodologically problematic in the same way that genuine ones are. But the ways in 
which merely apparent CF-violations can be ‘caught out’ generally will require 
information about the DAG for the system, in order to predict precisely which variables 
should be intervened on, within what parameter ranges, in order to uncover closely-but-
not-exactly matched parameter values. While it is in principle possible to do this, it 
requires knowing precisely which intervention to perform, and it is this information that 
will be lacking in a large number of experimental situations where we don’t already have 
the DAG for the system, since that is what we are trying to find. 
Thus, a particular data set drawn from a target system for which investigators are 
seeking the DAG may have spurious conditional independencies between variables (i.e. 
violate CF) even though in the true DAG, those parameters are not precisely balanced. In 
other words, depending on how the data is obtained from the system, the data set may 
violate CF even though the system itself doesn’t. How could this happen? There are a 
soberingly large number of ways in which a data set can be generated such that a merely 
apparent CF-violation occurs. The point to note here is that merely apparent violations 
will cause exactly the same problems for researchers as would genuine CF-violations. 
There are methodological issues in dynamically complex systems such that a non-CF-
violating system may nevertheless result in a dataset that is CF-violating. Here are some 
ways in which this may happen. 
The first is quite obvious: parameter values that are not exactly opposite may 
nevertheless be close enough that their true values differ by less than the margin of error 
on the measurements. Consider the parameter values in diagram 1a. A genuine CF-
violation will occur if a=-bc. However, an apparent CF-violation will occur if a±ε1=-
San Diego, CA -17-
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bc±ε2. Concerns about the precision of measurements and error ranges are well-known, 
but it is useful to consider them here with respect to the issue of causal faithfulness as 
another way to flesh out their role in investigatory practices. 
Two other ways in which apparent CF-violations may occur concern temporal 
factors which may play a key role in the ‘catching’ of equilibrium-balanced causal 
relationships. Temporal factors can distinguish systems with or without causal stability, 
for instance, a CF-violating system that is fragilely balanced.  
Consider the time scale of a system that involves balanced causal relationships for the 
purposes of restoring and maintaining some equilibrium state: this may be on the order of 
milliseconds for some cellular processes, tens to hundreds of milliseconds for many 
neurological processes, minutes to days for individual organisms. After a perturbation 
takes place, the system will re-establish equilibrium during that range of time. In order to 
successfully ‘catch’ the counterbalanced causal relationships in the act of re-
equilibrating, the time scale of the measurements must be on a similar or shorter time 
scale. If the time scale of measurements is long with respect to the time scale for re-
establishing equilibrium, these balanced causal relationships will not be caught.  
This basic point about taking state change data from dynamic processes has 
particular implications for CF-violations. For processes that re-equilibrate after 50 ms, for 
instance, a measurement device that samples the process at higher time scales, such as 
500ms, will miss the re-equilibration. Thus, even though the system does not violate 
causal stability, it will behave as if it does, as it will appear that there is a conditional 
independence between two variables across some range of values, namely, the range 
between the initial state and the state to which the system was perturbed. In particular, if 
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we do not know what the time scale is, or is likely to be, for re-equilibration, we cannot 
ensure that a persisting probabilistic independence between two variables in question is 
genuine or a consequence of an overly fast re-equilibration timescale. 
Not only does comparative time scales matter for apparent CF-violations; there 
are also possibilities for phase-matched cycles that that will make a non-CF-violating 
oscillating system appear to violate CF. Some systems develop equilibrium mechanisms 
that result in slight oscillations above and below a target state. If the measurements from 
this system are taken with a frequency that closely matches that of the rate of oscillation, 
then the measurements will pick out the same positions in the cycle, essentially rendering 
the oscillation invisible. This would constitute an apparent CF-violation as well. 
Predicting possible CF-violations, real or apparent, requires information about the 
dynamic and evolved complexity of the systems in question, the particular equilibrium 
states they display, the time scale for re-establishment of equilibrium compared with the 
time scale of measurement, and/or the cycle length for cyclical processes. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To summarize briefly: some kinds of systems, especially those studied in the so-
called ‘special sciences’, are likely to display the kinds of structural features that lead to 
CF-violations, such as mechanisms for equilibrium maintenance across a range of 
variable values. Some systems that do not have CF-violating DAGs may nevertheless 
generate CF-violating data sets. When we are considering the inferences made from 
probabilistic relationships in data to a DAG for the underlying system, and do not already 
have the DAG in hand, we cannot distinguish between genuine and merely apparent CF-
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  19 
violations; both will cause the same epistemic difficulties for scientists, which is why 
merely apparent CF-violations deserve broader attention. 
It’s important to note that I am not discounting the extraordinary achievements in 
formal epistemology and causal modeling that have marked the last two decades of 
research on this topic. The steps forward in this field have been monumental, including 
the development of methods by which to reduce some of the issues arising from CF-
violations (such as Zhang and Spirtes 2008). Rather, my goal is to clarify the ways in 
which apparent CF-violations can arise, the kinds of structural features a system might 
display that would increase the likelihood of CF-violation, and to bring this issue from 
discussion in formal epistemology into consideration of scientific practice more broadly. 
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Abstract
The thesis that the practice and evaluation of science requires social value-
judgment, that good science is not value-free or value-neutral but value-laden,
has been gaining acceptance among philosophers of science. The main pro-
ponents of the value-ladenness of science rely on either arguments from the
underdetermination of theory by evidence or arguments from inductive risk.
Both arguments share the premise that we should only consider values once
the evidence runs out, or where it leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion
of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical pri-
ority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather
than good evidence. The problem of wishful thinking is indeed real—it would
be an egregious error to adopt beliefs about the world because they comport
with how one would prefer the world to be. I will argue, however, that giving
lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is a mistake, and unnec-
essary for adequately avoiding the problem of wishful thinking. Values have a
deeper role to play in science than proponents of the underdetermination and
inductive risk arguments have suggested.
1 Introduction
This paper is part of the larger project of trying to understand the structure of
values in science, i.e., the role of values in the logic of scientific practice. This is
1
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distinct from the project of strategic arguments that try to establish that science
is value-laden while assuming premises of the defenders of the value-free ideal of
science. It is becoming increasingly hard to deny that values play a role in scientific
practice—specifically non-epistemic, non-cognitive, or contextual values, e.g., moral,
political, and aesthetic values (I will use the term “social values” to refer to such
values in general). What is less clear is what parts of scientific practice require
values or value-judgments. This is not primarily a historical or sociological question,
though historical and sociological data is frequently brought to bear. Ultimately it is
a normative question about the role that value-judgments ought to play in science; it
is a question about the proper ideal of scientific practice. As such, we must consider
both ethical questions about how the responsible conduct of science requires value-
judgment and epistemological questions about how the objectivity and reliability of
science is to be preserved.
There are a number of phases of inquiry where values might play a role: (1) in
determing the value of science itself and (2) the research agenda to be pursued, (3) in
framing the problem under investigation and (4) the methods of data collection and
characterization, (5) in choosing the hypothesis, explanation, or solution to propose,
(6) in the testing or certification of a proposed solution, and (7) in choices about
application and dissemination of results. Various accounts have allowed values in
some stages while excluding it in others, or have argued for specific limits on the
role for values at each stage. In this paper, I will focus on the testing phase, where
theories are compared with evidence and certified (or not) as knowledge, as this is
the most central arena for discussion value-free vs. value-laden science. Traditionally,
philosophers of science have accepted a role for values in practice because it could be
marginalized into the “context of discovery,” while the “context of justification” could
be treated as epistemically pure. Once we turn from the logical context of justification
to the actual context of certification1 in practice, the testing of hypotheses within
concrete inquiries conducted by particular scientists, we can no longer ignore the role
of value-judgments.
There are two main arguments in the literature for this claim: the error argument
from inductive risk and the gap argument from the underdetermination of theory by
evidence. While both of these arguments have been historically very important and
have successfully established important roles for values in science, they share a flawed
1I use “context of certification” following Kitcher (2011), as referring to actual practices of accep-
tance. While I won’t emphasize it in this paper, I also follow Kitcher in thinking that certification
is a social practice that results in accepting a result as part of public knowledge (as opposed to
merely individual belief).
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premise, the lexical priority of evidence over values.2 While this premise serves an
important aim, that of avoiding the problem of wishful thinking, I will argue that
there are several problems with this premise. We should seek an alternative ideal for
science that provides a role for values at a more fundamental level and broader scope,
but nevertheless preserves an important feature of science: the ability to surprise us
with new information beyond or contrary to what we already hope or believe to be
true.
2 Underdetermination: The Gap Argument
Underdetermination arguments for the value-ladenness of science extend Duhem’s
and Quine’s thoughts about testing and certification. The starting point for this ar-
gument may be the so-called Duhem-Quine Thesis (or Duhem-Neurath-Quine Thesis
(Rutte, 1991, p. 87)) that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation because of the need
for auxiliary assumptions in order for theories to generate testable hypotheses. This
is generally taken to imply that no theory can be definitively falsified by evidence,
as the choice between rejecting the theory, altering the background assumptions,
or even (though more controversially) rejecting the new evidence itself as faulty is
underdetermined by each new item of evidence—call this “holist underdetermina-
tion”(Stanford, 2009).
Another form of underdetermination—“contrastive underdetermination” (ibid.)—
depends on the choice between identically confirmed rival hypotheses. As all of the
evidence available equally supports either hypothesis in such cases, that choice is
underdetermined by the evidence. If the evidence we’re talking about is just all the
evidence we have available to us at present, then we have transient underdetermina-
tion, which might be relatively temporary or might be a recurrent problem. If instead
the choice is underdetermined by all possible evidence, we have permanent under-
determination and the competing theories or hypotheses are empirically equivalent.
The global underdetermination thesis holds that permanent underdetermination is
ubiquitous in science, applying to all theories and hypotheses.3
The many forms of underdetermination argument have in common the idea that
some form of gap exists between theory and observation. Feminists, pragmatists,
2Strictly speaking, both arguments can be taken as strategic arguments, compatible with any
positive approach to the role of values in scientific inquiry. For the purposes of this paper, I will
instead take the arguments as attempts to articulate a positive ideal. The gap and error arguments
are perfectly serviceable as strategic arguments.
3For discussion of forms of underdetermination, see Kitcher (2001); Magnus (2003); Stanford
(2009); Intemann (2005); Biddle (2011).
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and others have sought to fill that gap with social values, or to argue that doing
so does not violate rational prescriptions on scientific inference. Call this the gap
argument for value-laden science (Intemann, 2005; Elliott, 2011). Kitcher (2001)
has argued that permanent or global underdetermination is needed to defeat the
value-free ideal of science, and these forms of underdetermination are much more
controversial. Transient underdetermination, on the other hand, is “familiar and
unthreatening,” even “mundane”(Kitcher, 2001, p. 30-1)
Kitcher is wrong on this point; transient underdetermination is sufficient to es-
tablish the value-ladenness of scientific practice (Biddle, 2011). What matters are
decisions made in practice by actual scientists, and at least in many areas of cutting
edge and policy-relevant science, transient underdetermination is pervasive. Perhaps
it is the case that in the long run of science (in an imagined Peircean “end of inquiry”)
all value-judgments would wash out. But as the cliche´ goes, in the long run we’re
all dead; for the purposes of this discussion, what we’re concerned with is decisions
made now, in the actual course of scientific practices, where the decision to accept or
reject a hypothesis has pressing consequences. In such cases, we cannot wait for the
end of inquiry for scientists to accept or reject a hypothesis, we cannot depend on
anyone else to do it, and we must contend with uncertainty and underdetermination.
Actual scientific practice supports this—scientists find themselves in the business of
accepting and rejecting hypotheses in such conditions.
So what is the role for social values under conditions of transient underdetermi-
nation? Once the existing evidence is in, a gap remains in definitively determining
how it bears on the hypothesis (holist case) or which competing hypothesis to ac-
cept (contrastive case). In this case, it can be legitimate to fill the gap with social
values. For example, among the competing hypotheses still compatible with all the
evidence, one might accept the one whose acceptance is likely to do the most good
or the least harm. E.g., in social science work involving gender or race, this might
be the hypothesis compatible with egalitarianism.
A common response is that despite the existence of the gap, we should ensure
that no social values enter into decisions about how to make the underdetermined
choice (e.g., whether or not to accept a hypothesis). Instead, we might fill the gap
with more complex inferential criteria (Norton, 2008) or with so-called “epistemic”
or “cognitive” values (Kuhn, 1977; Laudan, 1984). Proponents of the gap argu-
ment have argued that this at best pushes the question back one level, as choices
of epistemic criteria or cognitive values (Longino, 2002, p. 185), and application of
cognitive values itself may not be entirely determinate (Kuhn, 1977). Ensuring that
no values actually enter into decisions to accept or reject hypotheses under condi-
tions of transient underdetermination may turn out to be impossible (Biddle, 2011).
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Another attempt to avoid a role for social value-judgments—withholding judgment
until transient underdetermination can be overcome or resolved by application of
cognitive factors along—is unreasonable or irresponsible in many cases, e.g. where
urgent action requires commitment to one or another option (ibid.).4
What distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate uses of values to fill the gap is a
matter of controversy, sometimes left unspecified. With some exceptions,5 underde-
terminationists insist that values only come into play in filling the gap (e.g., Longino,
1990, p. 52, 2002, p. 127; Kourany, 2003).
3 Inductive Risk: The Error Argument
While underdeterminationist arguments for values in science are probably more well
known, and may have a history going back a paper of Neurath’s from 1913 (Howard,
2006), the inductive risk argument for values in science is older still, going back to
William James’ (1896) article “The Will to Believe.”6 Heather Douglas has revived
Rudner’s (1953) and Hempel’s (1965) version of the argument for the value-ladenness
of science. In simplified form, the argument goes like this:
In accepting or rejecting hypotheses, scientists can never have complete certainty
that they are making the right choice—uncertainty is endemic to ampliative infer-
ence. So, inquirers must decide whether there is enough evidence to accept or reject
the hypothesis. What counts as enough should be determined by how important the
question is, i.e., the seriousness of making a mistake. That importance or seriousness
is generally (in part) an ethical question, dependent on the ethical evaluation of the
consequences of error. Call this argument for the use of value-judgments in science
from the existence of inductive risk the error argument (Elliott, 2011).
According to the error argument, the main role for values in certification of sci-
entific hypotheses has to do with how much uncertainty to accept, or how strict to
make your standards for acceptance. In statistical contexts, we can think of this as
the trade-off between type I and type II error. Once we have a fixed sample size (and
assuming we have no control over the effect size), the only way we can decrease the
probability that we wrongly reject the null hypothesis is to increase the probability
4Proponents of the inductive risk argument make a similar point.
5These exceptions either use a somewhat different sort of appeal to underdetermination than the
gap argument, or they use the gap argument as a strategic argument. One example is the extension
of the Quinean web of belief to include value-judgments (Nelson, 1990), discussed in more detail
below.
6This connection is due to P.D. Magnus (2012), who refers to the inductive risk argument as the
“James-Rudner-Douglas or JRD thesis” for reasons that will become immediately apparent.
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that we wrongly accept the null hypothesis (or, perhaps more carefully, that we fail
to reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact false), and vice versa. Suppose we are
looking for a causal link between a certain chemical compound and liver cancers in
rats,7 and you take H0 to be no link whatsoever. If you want to be absolutely sure
that you don’t say that the chemical is safe when it in fact is not (because you value
safety, precaution, welfare of potential third parties), you should decrease your rate
of type II errors, and thus increase your statistical significance factor and your rate
of type I errors. If you want to avoid “crying wolf” and asserting a link where none
exists (because you value economic benefits that come with avoiding overregulation),
you should do the reverse.
Douglas emphasizes at length that values (neither social nor cognitive values)
should not be taken as reasons for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, reasons on a
par with or having the same sort of role as evidence in testing.8 This is an impermis-
sible direct role for values. In their permissible indirect role, values help determine
the rules of scientific method, e.g., decisions about how many false positives or false
negatives to accept. Values are not reasons guiding belief or acceptance; they instead
guide decisions about how to manage uncertainty.9
Rudner (1953) anticipated the objection that scientists should not be in the busi-
ness of accepting or rejecting hypothesis, but rather just indicating their probability
(and thus not having to make the decision described above). This response wrongly
assumes that inductive risk only occurs at the final step of certification; in reality,
this gambit only pushes the inductive risk back a step to the determination of prob-
abilities. Furthermore, the pragmatic signal that accompanies a refusal to assent
or deny a claim in practical or policy circumstances may be that the claim is far
more questionable that the probabilities support. Simply ignoring the consequences
of error—by refusing to accept or reject, by relying only on cognitive values, or by
choosing purely conventional levels for error—may be irresponsible, as scientists like
anyone else have the moral responsibility to consider the foreseeable consequences of
their action.
7Douglas (2000) considers the actual research on this link with dioxin.
8Strictly speaking, this is an extension of the error argument, and not all who accept the argu-
ment (especially for strategic purposes) need accept this addition.
9In Toulmin’s (1958) terms, values cannot work as grounds for claims, but they can work as
backing for warrants.
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4 A Shared Premise
These two arguments against the value-free ideal of science share a common premise.
The gap argument holds that values can play a role in the space fixed by the ev-
idence; if the gap narrows (as it would with transient underdetermination), there
are fewer ways in which values can play a role, and if the gap could ever be close,
the conclusion would be value-free. (An exception are those views that add values
into the radically holistic interpretation of Quine’s web of belief, such that values,
theories, and evidence are all equally revisable in the light of new evidence.) The
inductive risk argument allows values to play a role in decisions about how to man-
age uncertainty—not directly by telling us which option to pick, but indirectly in
determining how much uncertainty is acceptable.
Both arguments begin from a situation where the evidence is fixed and take
values to play a role in the space that is left over. The reason that values must
play a role is that uncertainty remains once the evidence is in. In a relatively weak
version of this argument, social values fill in the space between evidence and theory
because something has to, so it might as well be (and often is) social values. In more
sophisticated versions, we must use social values to fill the gap because of our general
moral obligation to consider the foreseeable consequences of our actions, including
the action of accepting a hypothesis. The arguments of these two general forms all
assume the lexical priority of evidence over values. The premise of lexical priority
guarantees that even in value-laden science, values do not compete with evidence
when the two conflict. This is often defended as an important guarantor of the
objectivity or reliability of the science in question.
5 Why Priority?
Why do proponents of value-laden science tend to be attracted to such a strict
priority of evidence over values? Perhaps some such restriction is required in order
to guarantee the objectivity of science. In order for our science to be as objective as
possible, maybe it has to be as value-free as possible (though this may not be very
value-free at all). That is, we want as much as possible to base our science on the
evidence because evidence lends objectivity and values detract from it. Even if this
view of objectivity were right, however, it would be a problematic justification for
opponents of the value-free ideal of science to adopt. With arguments like the gap
and inductive risk arguments, they mean to argue that values and objectivity are not
in conflict as such. It would thus create a serious tension in their view if one premise
depended on such a conflict. If it is really objectivity that is at stake in adopting
7
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lexical priority, we need a more nuanced approach.
I think the central concern concern is that value judgments might “drive inquiry
to a predetermined conclusion”(Anderson, 2004, p. 11), that inquirers might rig the
game in favor of their preferred values. As Douglas (2009) puts it, “Values are not
evidence; wishing does not make it so”(p. 87). In other words, a core value of science
is its ability to surprise us, to force us to revise our thinking. Call the threat of
values interfering with this process the problem of wishful thinking.
Lexical priority avoids this problem insofar as what we value (which involves
the way we desire the world to be) is only a consideration after we take all of the
evidence (which fixes the way the world is) into account. In Douglas’s more nuanced
approach, even once the evidence is in, social values (and even most cognitive values)
are not allowed to be taken directly as reasons to believe anything; they only act as
reasons for accepting a certain amount of evidence as “enough.”
An alternative explanation may be that the adoption of lexical priority has rhetor-
ical value.10 Suppose, along with the defenders of the value-free ideal, that there is
such a thing as objective evidence which constrains belief. Even so, there is (at least
transient) underdetermination, and a gap that must bridged by social values. Thus
not only is the value-free ideal impossible to realize, it may lead to unreasonable and
irresponsible avoidance of the role for values in filling the gap. Such an argument
can undermine the value-free ideal and establish that there is a major role for values
in science, and in the context of these goals, I freely admit that this can be a worth-
while strategy. But as we turn instead to the positive project of determining more
precisely the role(s) of values in the logic of scientific practice, the premises of such
an immanent critique are unfit ground for further development. We no longer need
to take the premises of our opponents on board, and we may find that they lead us
astray.
While following the basic contours of my argument so far, one might object to
characterizing of evidence as “prior” to values.11 What the gap and inductive risk
arguments purport to show is that there is always some uncertainty in scientific
inference (perhaps, for even more basic reasons, in all ampliative inference), and
so there will always be value-judgments to be made about when we have enough
evidence, or which among equally supported hypotheses we wish to accept, etc. The
pervasive need for such judgments means that value-freedom does not even make
sense as a limiting case; both values and evidence play a role, and neither is prior to
the other. This mistakes the sense of “priority” at work, however. Where priority
matters is what happens when values and evidence conflict; in such circumstances,
10Note redacted for purposes of anonymous review.
11Note redacted for purposes of anonymous review.
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lexical priority means that evidence will always trump values. In Douglas’s stronger
version of lexical priority, values allow you to determined what level of evidence you
need to accept a hypothesis (p = 0.05 or p = 0.01 or. . . ), but they cannot give you
a reason to reject the hypothesis,12 no matter what.
6 Problems with Priority
The versions of the gap and inductive risk arguments that presuppose the lexical
priority of evidence make two related mistakes. First, they require a relatively un-
critical stance towards the status of evidence within the context of certification.13
The lexical priority principle assumes that in testing, we ask: given the evidence,
what should we make of our hypothesis? Frame this way, values only play a role at
the margins of the process.
This is a mistake, since evidence can turn out to be bad in all sorts of ways: un-
reliable, unrepresentative, noisy, laden with unsuitable concepts and interpretations,
or irrelevant for the question at hand; the experimental apparatus could even have
a cord loose. More importantly, we may be totally unaware of why the evidence is
bad; after all, it took a great deal of ingenuity on the part of Galileo to show why
the tower experiment didn’t refute Copernicus, and it took much longer to deal with
the problem of the “missing” stellar parallax. While some epistemologists stick to an
abstract conception of evidence according to which evidence is itself unquestionable,
reflection on cases like this has lead many philosophers of science to recognize that
we can be skeptical about particular pieces or sets of evidence based on its clash with
hypotheses, theories, or background assumptions that we have other good reasons
to hold on to. As critics of strict falsificationism and empiricism have shown, we
already have reason to adopt a more egalitarian account of the process of testing and
certification, independent of the question about the role of values. We might get off
to a better start if we thought about how to fit values into this sort of picture of
testing.
12It seems possible that we could use our extreme aversion to some hypothesis to raise the required
level of certainty so high as to be at least practically unsatisfiable by human inquirers, and so in
effect rule out the hypothesis on the basis of values alone while remaining in the indirect role. While
it isn’t clear how to do it, it seems to be that Douglas means to rule this sort of case out as well.
13As Douglas (2009) makes clear, she does not take the status of evidence as unproblematic as
such. But any issues with the evidence are to be taken into account by prior consideration of values
in selection of methods and characterization of data. It would seem that value judgments in the
context of certification cannot be a reason to challenge the evidence itself. The following points are
intended to show that this restriction is unreasonable.
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Second, the attitude about values that lexical priority takes reduces the idea of
value judgment to merely expression of preferences rather than judgment properly so
called—in effect, they deny that we can have good reasons for our value judgments. It
is crucial to distinguish between values or valuing and value judgments or evaluations
(Dewey, 1915, 1939; Welchman, 2002; Anderson, 2010). Valuing may be the mere
expression of a preference, but value judgments are reflective decisions about values,
and properly speaking must be made on the basis of reasons (and judgments can
be better or worse because they are made on the basis of good and bad reasons).
Value judgments may even be open to a certain sort of empirical test, because they
hypothesize relationships between a state or course of action to prefer and pursue
and the desirability or value of the consequences of pursuing and attaining them
(Dewey, 1915; Anderson, 2010). Value judgments say something like “try it, you’ll
like it”—a testable hypothesis (Anderson, 2010). The evidence by which we test
value judgments may include the emotional experiences that follow on adopting those
values (Anderson, 2004).
If value judgments are judgments properly so called, adopted for good reasons,
subject to certain sorts of tests, then it is unreasonable to treat them in the manner
required by the lexical priority of evidence. Just as the good (partly empirical)
reasons for adopting a theory, hypothesis, or background assumption can give us
good reasons to reinterpret, reject, or maybe even ignore evidence apparently in
conflict with them (under certain conditions), so too with a good value judgment.
If evidence and values pull in opposite directions on the acceptance of a hypothesis,
then we should not always be forced to follow the (putative) evidence.
7 Avoiding Wishful Thinking without Priority
If we reject the lexical priority assumption and adopt a more egalitarian model of
testing, we need to adopt an alternative approach that can avoid the problem of
wishful thinking.
(An alternative principle to lexical priority is the joint necessity of evidence and
values, which requires joint satisfaction of epistemic criteria and social values. This
is the approach taken by Kourany (2010). On such a view, neither evidence nor
values takes priority, but this principle leaves open the question of what to do when
evidence and values clash. One option is to remain dogmatic about both epistemic
criteria and social values, and to regard any solution which flouts either as a failure,
which appears to be Kourany’s response.
Alternatively, we can adopt the rational revisability of evidence and values
in addition to joint necessity and revisit and refine our evidence or values. On this
10
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -32-
principle, both the production of evidence and value formation are recognized as
rational but fallible processes, open to revision. Such a view might include the radical
version of Quinean holism which inserts values into the web of belief. The adoption
of these two principles alone does not prevent wishful thinking, but adding some
basic principles like minimal mutilation may overcome the problem. (cf. Kitcher,
2011)
Instead of Quinean holism, we might instead adopt a form of pragmatist func-
tionalism about inquiry (Brown, 2012) which differentiates the functional roles of
evidence, theory, and values in inquiry. This retains the idea that all three have to
be coordinated and that each is revisable in the face of new experience, while intro-
ducing further structure into their interactions and According to such an account,
not only must evidence, theory, and values fit together fit together in their functional
roles, they must do so in a way that actually resolves the problem that spurred the
inquiry.
8 Conclusion
The lexical priority of evidence over values is an undesirable commitment, and un-
necessary for solving the problem it was intended to solve. The key to the problem
of wishful thinking is that we not predetermine the conclusion of inquiry, that we
leave ourself open to surprise. The real problem is not the insertion of values, but
dogmatism about values (Anderson 2004). Rather than being the best way to avoid
dogmatism, the lexical priority of evidence over values coheres best with a dogmatic
picture of value judgments, and so encourages the illegitimate use of values. A better
account is one where values and evidence are treated as mutually necessary, func-
tionally differentiated, and rationally revisable components of certification. Such an
account would allow that evidence may be rejected because of lack of fit with a
favored hypothesis and compelling value-judgments, but only so long as one is still
able to effectively solve the problem of inquiry.
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Abstract
There has been a long-standing and sometimes passionate debate between physicists over
whether a dynamical framework for quantum systems should incorporate not completely
positive (NCP) maps in addition to completely positive (CP) maps. Despite the
reasonableness of the arguments for complete positivity, we argue that NCP maps should
be allowed, with a qualification: these should be understood, not as reflecting ‘not
completely positive’ evolution, but as linear extensions, to a system’s entire state space,
of CP maps that are only partially defined. Beyond the domain of definition of a
partial-CP map, we argue, much may be permitted.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom has it that any evolution of a quantum system can be represented by a
family of completely positive (CP) maps on its state space. Moreover, there seem to be good
arguments that evolutions outside this class must be regarded as unphysical. But orthodoxy is
not without dissent; several authors have argued for considering evolutions represented by
maps that are not completely positive (NCP).
The debate has implications that have the potential to go deep. The possibility of
incorporating NCP maps into our quantum dynamical framework may illuminate much
regarding the nature of and relation between quantum entanglement and other types of
quantum correlations (Devi et al., 2011). If the use of NCP maps is illegitimate however, such
investigations must be dismissed without further ado.
In the following, we will argue for the proposition that NCP maps should be allowed—but
we will add a caveat: one should not regard NCP dynamical maps as descriptions of the ‘not
completely positive evolution’ of quantum systems. An ‘NCP map’, properly understood, is a
linear extension, to a system’s entire state space, of a CP map that is only defined on a subset
of this state space. In fact, as we will see, not much constrains the extension of a partially
defined CP map. Depending on the characteristics of the state preparation, such extensions
may be not completely positive, inconsistent,1 or even nonlinear.
The paper will proceed as follows: in Section 2 we review the essential aspects of the theory
of open quantum systems and in Section 3 we present the standard argument for complete
positivity. In Section 4 we consider the issues involved in the debate over NCP maps and in
1Strictly speaking, when an inconsistent map is used this should not be seen as an
extension but as a change of state space. This will be clarified below.
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Section 5 we present our interpretation of the debate and what we believe to be its resolution.
2 Evolution of a Quantum System
Consider a quantum system S that is initially in a state ρ0S , represented by a density operator
ρˆ0S . If the system is isolated, its evolution will be given by a one-parameter family of unitary
operators {U t}, via
ρˆtS = U
t ρˆ0S U
†t. (1)
Suppose, now, that the system interacts with another system R, which may include some
piece of experimental apparatus. We take R to include everything with which S interacts.
Suppose that S is prepared in a state that is uncorrelated with the state of R (though it may be
entangled with some other system, with which it doesn’t interact), so that the initial state of
the composite system S +R is
ρˆ0SR = ρˆ
0
S ⊗ ρˆ
0
R. (2)
The composite system will evolve unitarily:
ρˆtSR = U
t ρˆ0SR U
†t, (3)
where now {U t} is a family of operators operating on the Hilbert space HS ⊗HR of the
composite system. It is easy to show (see, e.g., Nielsen and Chuang 2000, §8.2.3) that, for
each t, there will be a set {Wi(t)} of operators, which depend on the evolution operators {U t}
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and the initial state of R, such that
ρˆtS =
∑
iWi(t) ρˆ
0
S W
†
i (t);
∑
iW
†
i (t)Wi(t) = I.
(4)
This is all in the Schrödinger picture, in which we represent a change of state by a change in
the density operator used. We can also use the Heisenberg picture, which represents a state
change via a transformation of the algebra of operators used to represent observables:
ρtS(A) = ρ
0
S(A
t), (5)
where
At =
∑
i
Wi(t)A
0W †i (t). (6)
In addition to unitary evolution of an undisturbed system, we also associate state changes
with measurements, via the collapse postulate. In the case of a von Neumann measurement,
there is a complete set {Pi} of projections onto the eigenspaces of the observable measured,
and the state undergoes one of the state transitions Ti given by
Tiρˆ =
Pi ρˆ P i
Tr(Pi ρˆ)
, (7)
The probability that the state transition will be Ti is Tr(Pi ρˆ). When a measurement has been
performed, and we don’t yet know the result, the state that represents our state of knowledge
of the system is
T ρˆ =
∑
i
Pi ρˆ Pi. (8)
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Note that this, also, has the form (4).
One can also consider selective operations, that is, operations that take as input a state and
yield a transformed state, not with certainty, but with some probability less than one, and fail,
otherwise. One such operation is the procedure of performing a measurement and keeping the
result only if the outcome lies in a specified set (for example, we could do a spin measurement
and select only ‘+’ outcomes); the operation fails (does not count as preparing a state at all) if
the measurement yields some other result. A selective operation is represented by a
transformation of the state space that does not preserve norm. A selective operation T ,
applied to state ρ, produces a final state T ρ with probability T ρ(I), and no result otherwise.
Unitary evolution, evolution of a system interacting with an environment with which it is
initially correlated, and measurement-induced collapse can all be represented in the form (4).
The class of state transformations that can be represented in this form is precisely the class of
completely positive transformations of the system’s state space, to be discussed in the next
section.
3 Completely Positive Maps
We will want to consider, not just transformations of a single system’s state space, but also
mappings from one state space to another. The operation of forming a reduced state by tracing
out the degrees of freedom of a subsystem is one such mapping; as we will see below,
assignment maps used in the theory of open systems are another.
We associate with any quantum system a C∗-algebra whose self-adjoint elements represent
the observables of the system. For any C∗-algebra A, let A∗ be its dual space, that is, the set
of bounded linear functionals on A. The state space of A, K(A), is the subset of A∗
consisting of positive linear functionals of unit norm.
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For any linear mapping T : A → B, there is a dual map T ∗ : A∗ → B∗, defined by
T ∗µ(A) = ρ(T A) for all A ∈ A. (9)
If T is positive and unital, then T ∗ maps states on A to states on B. Similarly, for any
mapping of the state space of one algebra into the state space of another, there is a
corresponding dual map on the algebras.
For any n, let Wn be an n-state system that doesn’t interact with our system S, though it
may be entangled with S. Given a transformation T of the state space of S, with associated
transformation T of S’s algebra, we can extend this transformation to one on the state space
of the composite system S +Wn, by stipulating that the transformation act trivially on
observables of Wn.
(T ∗ ⊗ In)ρ(A⊗B) = ρ(T (A)⊗B). (10)
A mapping T ∗ is n-positive if T ∗ ⊗ In is positive, and completely positive if it is n-positive
for all n. If S is a k-state system, a transformation of S’s state space is completely positive if
it is k-positive.
It can be shown (Nielsen and Chuang, 2000, §8.2.4) that, for any completely positive map
T ∗ : K(A)→ K(B), there are operators Wi : HA →HB such that
T ∗ρ(A) = ρ(
∑
iW
†
i AWi);
∑
iW
†
i Wi ≤ I.
(11)
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This is equivalent to a transformation of density operators representing the states,
ρˆ→ ρˆ′ =
∑
i
Wi ρˆ W
†
i . (12)
The standard argument that any physically realisable operation on the state of a system S
must be completely positive goes as follows. We should be able to apply the operation T ∗ to
S regardless of its initial state, and the effect on the state of S will be the same whether or not
S is entangled with a “witness” system Wn. Since S does not interact with the witness,
applying operation T ∗ to S is equivalent to applying T ∗ ⊗ In to the composite system
S +Wn. Thus, we require each mapping T ∗ ⊗ In to be a positive mapping, and this is
equivalent to the requirement that T ∗ be completely positive.
To see what goes wrong if the transformation applied to S is positive but not completely
positive, consider the simplest case, in which S is a qubit. Suppose that we could apply a
transformation ρ0S → ρ1S that left the expectation values of σx and σy unchanged, while
flipping the sign of the expectation value of σz.
ρ1S(σx) = ρ
0
S(σx); ρ
1
S(σy) = ρ
0
S(σy); ρ
1
S(σz) = −ρ
0
S(σz). (13)
Suppose that S is initially entangled with another qubit, in, e.g., the singlet state, so that
ρ0SW (σx ⊗ σx) = ρ
0
SW (σy ⊗ σy) = ρ
0
SW (σz ⊗ σz) = −1. (14)
If we could apply the transformation (13) to S when it is initially in a singlet state with W ,
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this would result in a state ρ1SW of S +W satisfying,
ρ1SW (σx ⊗ σx) = ρ
1
SW (σy ⊗ σy) = −1; ρ
1
SW (σz ⊗ σz) = +1. (15)
This is disastrous. Suppose we do a Bell-state measurement. One of the possible outcomes is
the state |Ψ+〉, and the projection onto this state is
|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| =
1
4
(I + σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy − σz ⊗ σz) . (16)
A state satisfying (15) would assign an expectation value of −1/2 to this projection operator,
rendering it impossible to interpret this expectation value as the probability of a Bell-state
measurement resulting in |Ψ+〉.
Note that the set-up envisaged in the argument is one in which it is presumed that we can
prepare the system S in a state that is uncorrelated with the active part of its environment R.
This set-up includes the typical laboratory set-up, in which system and apparatus are prepared
independently in initial states; it also includes situations in which we prepare a system in an
initial state and then put it into interaction with an environment, such as a heat bath, that has
been prepared independently.
4 The Debate Concerning Not Completely Positive Dynamical Maps
The early pioneering work of Sudarshan et al. (1961), and Jordan and Sudarshan (1961), did
not assume complete positivity, but instead characterised the most general dynamical
framework for quantum systems in terms of linear maps of density matrices. After the
important work of, for instance, Choi (1972) and Kraus (1983), however, it became
increasingly generally accepted that complete positivity should be imposed as an additional
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requirement. Yet despite the reasonableness of the arguments for complete positivity, the
imposition of this additional requirement was not universally accepted. Indeed, the issue of
whether the more general or the more restricted framework should be employed remains
controversial among physicists. At times, the debate has been quite passionate (e.g.,
Simmons, Jr. and Park, 1981; Raggio and Primas, 1982; Simmons, Jr. and Park, 1982).
The issues involved in the debate were substantially clarified by an exchange between
Pechukas and Alicki which appeared in a series of papers between 1994 and 1995. Pechukas
and Alicki analysed the dynamical map, Λ, for a system into three separate components: an
‘assignment map’, a unitary on the combined state space, and a trace over the environment:
ρS → ΛρS = trR(UΦρSU †), (17)
with S,R representing the system of interest and the environment (the ‘reservoir’)
respectively, and the assignment map, Φ, given by
ρS → ΦρS = ρSR. (18)
Since the unitary and the partial trace map are both CP, whether or not Λ itself is CP is
solely determined by the properties of Φ, the assignment map. Φ represents an assignment of
‘initial conditions’ to the combined system: it assigns a single state, ρSR, to each state ρS . My
use of inverted commas here reflects the fact that such a unique assignment cannot be made in
general, since in general the state of the reservoir will be unknown. It will make sense to use
such a map in some cases, however; for instance if there is a class Γ of possible initial states
S +R that is such that, within this class, ρS uniquely determines ρSR. Or it might be that,
even though there are distinct possible initial states in Γ that yield the same reduced state ρS ,
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the evolution of ρS is (at least approximately) insensitive to which of these initial states is the
actual initial conditions.
When Φ is linear:
Φ(λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2) = λΦ(ρ1) + (1− λ)Φ(ρ2), (19)
consistent:
trR(ΦρS) = ρS, (20)
and of product form, one can show that Φ is of necessity CP as well. Pechukas (1994)
inquired into what follows from the assumption that Φ is linear, consistent, and positive.
Pechukas showed that if Φ is defined everywhere on the state space, and is linear, consistent,
and positive, it must be a product map: ρS
Φ
−→ ρSR = ρS ⊗ ρR, with ρR a fixed density
operator on the state space of the reservoir (i.e., all ρS’s are assigned the same ρR). This is
undesirable as there are situations in which we would like to describe the open dynamics of
systems that do not begin in a product state with their environment. For instance, consider a
multi-partite entangled state of some number of qubits representing the initial conditions of a
quantum computer, with one of the qubits representing a ‘register’ and playing the role of S,
and the rest playing the role of the reservoir R. If we are restricted to maps that are CP on the
system’s entire state space then it seems we cannot describe the evolution of such a system.
Pechukas went on to show that when one allows correlated initial conditions, Λ, interpreted
as a dynamical map defined on the entire state space of S, may be NCP. In order to avoid the
ensuing negative probabilities, one can define a ‘compatibility domain’ for this NCP map; i.e.,
one stipulates that Λ is defined only for the subset of states of S for which ΛρS ≥ 0 (or
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equivalently, ΦρS ≥ 0). He writes:
The operator Λ is defined, via reduction from unitary S +R dynamics, only on a
subset of all possible ρS’s. Λ may be extended—trivially, by linearity—to the set
of all ρS , but the motions ρS → ΛρS so defined may not be physically realizable
... Forget complete positivity; Λ, extended to all ρS , may not even be positive
(1994).
In his response to Pechukas, Alicki (1995) conceded that the only initial conditions
appropriate to an assignment map satisfying all three “natural” requirements—of linearity,
consistency, and complete positivity—are product initial conditions. However, he rejected
Pechukas’s suggestion that in order to describe the evolution of systems coupled to their
environments one must forego the requirement that Λ be CP on S’s entire state space. Alicki
calls this the “fundamental positivity condition.” Regarding Pechukas’s suggestion that one
may use an NCP map with a restricted compatibility domain, Alicki writes:
... Pechukas proposed to restrict ourselves to such initial density matrices for
which ΦρS ≥ 0. Unfortunately, it is impossible to specify such a domain of
positivity for a general case, and moreover there exists no physical motivation in
terms of operational prescription which would lead to [an NCP assignment of
initial conditions] (Alicki, 1995).
It is not clear exactly what is meant by Alicki’s assertion that it is impossible to specify the
domain of positivity of such a map in general, for does not the condition ΦρS ≥ 0 itself
constitute a specification of this domain? Most plausibly, what Alicki intends is that
determining the compatibility domain will be exceedingly difficult for the general case. We
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will return to this question in the next section, as well as to the question of the physical
motivation for utilising NCP maps.
In any case, rather than abandoning the fundamental positivity condition, Alicki submits
that in situations where the system and environment are initially correlated one should relax
either consistency or linearity. Alicki attempts to motivate this by arguing that in certain
situations the preparation process may induce an instantaneous perturbation of S. One may
then define an inconsistent or nonlinear, but still completely positive, assignment map in
which this perturbation is represented.
According to Pechukas (1995), however, there is an important sense in which one should
not give up the consistency condition. Consider an inconsistent linear assignment map that
takes the state space of S to a convex subset of the state space of S +R. Via the partial trace it
maps back to the state space of S, but since the map is not necessarily consistent, the traced
out state, ρ′S , will not in general be the same as ρS; i.e.,
ρS
Φ
−→ ΦρS
trR−−→ ρ′S 6= ρS. (21)
Now each assignment of initial conditions, ΦρS , will generate a trajectory in the system’s
state space which we can regard as a sequence of CP transformations of the form:
ρS(t) = trR(UtΦρSU
†
t ). (22)
At t = 0, however, the trajectory begins from ρ′S , not ρS . ρS , in fact, is a fixed point that lies
off the trajectory. This may not be completely obvious, prima facie, for is it not the case, the
sceptical reader might object, that we can describe the system as evolving from ρS to ρSR via
the assignment map and then via the unitary transformation to its final state? While this much
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may be true, it is important to remember that Φ is supposed to represent an assignment of
initial conditions to S. On this picture the evolution through time of ΦρS is a proxy for the
evolution of ρS . When Φ is consistent, trR(UΦρSU †) = trR(UρSRU †) and there is no issue;
however when Φ is inconsistent, trR(UΦρSU †) 6= trR(UρSRU †), and we can no longer claim
to be describing the evolution of ρS through time but only the evolution of the distinct state
tr(ΦρS) = ρ′S . And while the evolution described by the dynamical map ρ′S(0)
Λ
−→ ρ′S(t) is
completely positive, it has not been shown that the transformation ρS(0)
Λ
−→ ρS(t) must
always be so.
What of Alicki’s suggestion to drop the linearity condition on the assignment map? It is
unclear that this can be successfully physically motivated, for it is prima facie unclear just
what it would mean to accept nonlinearity as a feature of reduced dynamics. Bluntly put,
quantum mechanics is linear in its standard formulation: the Schrödinger evolution of the
quantum-mechanical wave-function is linear evolution. Commenting on the debate,
Rodríguez-Rosario et al. (2010) write: “giving up linearity is not desirable: it would disrupt
quantum theory in a way that is not experimentally supported.”
5 Linearity, Consistency, and Complete Positivity
We saw in the last section that there are good reasons to be sceptical with respect to the
legitimacy of violating any of the three natural conditions on assignment maps. We will now
argue that there are nevertheless, in many situations, good, physically motivated, reasons to
violate these conditions.
Let us begin with the CP requirement. Pace Alicki, one finds a clear physical motivation for
violating complete positivity if one notes, as Shaji and Sudarshan (2005) do, that if the system
S is initially entangled with R, then not all initial states of S are allowed—for instance,
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ρS = trRρSR cannot be a pure state, since the marginal of an entangled state is always a mixed
state. Such states will be mapped to negative matrices by a linear, consistent, NCP map. On
the other hand the map will be positive for all of the valid states of S; this is the so-called
compatibility domain of of the map: the subset of states of S that are compatible with Λ.
In light of this we believe it unfortunate that such maps have come to be referred to as NCP
maps, for strictly speaking it is not the map Λ but its linear extension to the entire state space
of S that is NCP. Λ is indeed CP within its compatibility domain. In fact this misuse of
terminology is in our view at least partly responsible for the sometimes acrid tone of the
debate. From the fact that the linear extension of a partially defined CP map is NCP, it does
not follow that “reduced dynamics need not be completely positive.”2 Alicki and others are
right to object to this latter proposition, for given the arguments for complete positivity it is
right to demand of a dynamical map that it be CP on the domain within which it is defined.
On the other hand it is not appropriate to insist with Alicki that a dynamical map must be CP
on the entire state space of the system of interest—come what may—for negative probabilities
will only result from states that cannot be the initial state of the system. Thus we believe that
‘NCP maps’—or more appropriately: Partial-CP maps with NCP linear extensions—can and
should be allowed within a quantum dynamical framework.
What of Alicki’s charge that the compatibility domain is impossible to “specify” in
general? In fact, the determination of the compatibility domain is a well-posed problem (cf.
Jordan et al., 2004); however, as Alicki alludes to, there may be situations in which actually
determining the compatibility domain will be computationally exceedingly difficult. But in
other cases3—when computing the compatibility domain is feasible—we see no reason why
2This is the title of Pechukas’s 1994 article.
3For examples, see Jordan et al. (2004); Shaji and Sudarshan (2005).
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one should bar the researcher from using a Partial-CP map whose linear extension is NCP if it
is useful for her to do so. Indeed, given the clear physical motivation for it, this seems like the
most sensible thing to do in these situations.
There may, on the other hand, be other situations where proceeding in this way will be
inappropriate. For instance, consider a correlated bipartite system S +R with the following
possible initial states:
x+ ⊗ ψ+, x− ⊗ ψ−, z+ ⊗ φ+, z− ⊗ φ−. (23)
The domain of definition of Φ consists of the four states {x+, x−, z+, z−}. Suppose we want
to extend Φ so that it is defined on all mixtures of these states, and is linear. The totally mixed
state of S can be written as an equally weighted mixture of x+ and x−, and also as an equally
weighted mixture of z+ and z−.
1
2
I =
1
2
x+ +
1
2
x− =
1
2
z+ +
1
2
z−. (24)
If Φ is defined on this state, and is required to be a linear function, we must have
Φ(
1
2
I) =
1
2
Φ(x+) +
1
2
Φ(x−)
=
1
2
x+ ⊗ ψ+ +
1
2
x− ⊗ ψ−, (25)
Φ(
1
2
I) =
1
2
Φ(z+) +
1
2
Φ(z−)
=
1
2
z+ ⊗ φ+ +
1
2
z− ⊗ φ−, (26)
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from which it follows that
1
2
x+ ⊗ ψ+ +
1
2
x− ⊗ ψ− =
1
2
z+ ⊗ φ+ +
1
2
z− ⊗ φ−, (27)
which in turn entails that
ψ+ = ψ− = φ+ = φ−, (28)
so Φ cannot be extended to a linear map on the entire state space of S unless it is a product
map.
It would be misleading to say that assignment maps such as these violate linearity, for much
the same reason as it would be misleading to say that Partial-CP maps with NCP linear
extensions violate complete positivity. It is not that these maps are defined on a convex
domain, and are nonlinear on that domain; rather, there are mixtures of elements of the
domain on which the function is undefined. But since we cannot be said to have violated
linearity, then pace Rodríguez-Rosario et al., in such situations we see no reason to bar the
researcher from utilising these ‘nonlinear’ maps, for properly understood, they are
partial-linear maps with nonlinear extensions.
Pace Pechukas, there may even be situations in which it is appropriate to use an inconsistent
assignment map. Unlike the previous cases, in this case the assignment map will be defined on
the system’s entire state space. This will have the disadvantage, of course, that our description
of the subsequent evolution will not be a description of the true evolution of the system, but in
many situations one can imagine that the description will be “close enough,” i.e., that
trR(UtρSRU
†
t ) ≈ trR(Utρ
′
SRU
†
t ). (29)
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6 Conclusion
Bohr warned us long ago against extending our concepts, however fundamental, beyond their
domain of applicability. The case we have just looked at is an illustration of this important
point. The debate over the properties one should ascribe to the extension of a partially-defined
description is a debate over the properties one should ascribe to a phantom.
Whether or not we must use a map whose extension is nonlinear, or a map whose linear
extension is NCP, or an inconsistent map, is not a decision that can be made a priori or that
can be shown to follow from fundamental physical principles. The decision will depend on
the particular situation and on the particular state preparation we are dealing with.
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Abstract   (100   words):  
Traditionally, the cognitive values have been thought to be a collective pool of 
considerations in science that frequently trade against each other.  I argue here that a finer 
grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions.  I separate 
the values into three groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and 
genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe 
theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships.  This allows us to 
clarify why these values are central to science and what role they should play, while 
reducing the tensions among them.
Introduction
The value of cognitive values (also called theoretical virtues or epistemic values) has 
been underdeveloped in philosophy of science.  They have largely been considered 
together in one group, and when examined in this light, they seem to trade off against one 
another, creating as much tension as guidance for scientific inference.  Although some 
work has examined a particular value in greater depth and attempted to ground a 
justification for its importance in an epistemic argument (e.g. Forster & Sober 1994), for 
the most part, the values have been justified collectively and historically, i.e., that some 
set of values is (by and large) what has been important to scientists in their practice, and 
that that should be good enough for philosophers of science (e.g., Kuhn 1977).  
This paper will attempt a more robust justification.  Through the tactic of organizing the 
conceptual terrain of cognitive values, I will argue that there are at least three distinct 
groups of values that normally get lumped together.  Once the values are divided into 
these groups, it is clearer why the values are important and what their value to science 
and to scientists is.  Justifications, clarifying the value of cognitive values, then follow. 
Creating these divisions requires finer grained appraisals of the values than has been 
customary.  For example, internal consistency will be considered distinct from external 
consistency.  Simplicity has two distinct aspects as well, as does scope.  This paper does 
not make the claim that the terrain mapped here provides a complete account of these 
values, but the kind of complexity presented can be a starting point for further 
discussions and amendments.  
Another benefit of clarifying the terrain is that the supposed tensions among the values 
prove to be far less common and problematic than is often presumed.  Once the bases for 
the values becomes clearer, their functions in science become clearer, and thus which 
should be important when is clarified.  In addition, as we will see, the values within a 
group are shown to often pull together rather than against each other.
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Finally, organizing the terrain and mapping the value of cognitive values will also enable 
us to address the criticisms raised concerning the canonical distinction between 
epistemic/cognitive and non-epistemic/non-cognitive values (e.g. Rooney 1992) and 
criticisms over what should count as a cognitive/epistemic value (e.g. Longino 1996).
First, I will provide a brief overview of how the standard view on cognitive values 
developed.  Then, I will offer a more nuanced terrain for those values than has been 
traditionally offered.  I will proceed to show how both tensions among the values are 
reduced (albeit not eliminated) and how the justifications for the various values are 
clarified.  Finally, I will draw implications from this re-organization of the terrain.
A Brief History of Cognitive Values
Philosophers of science have long referred to and discussed various qualities of scientific 
claims deemed important in science.  In the 20th century, philosophers such as Duhem 
(e.g., 1906, 171, 217), Popper (e.g., 1935, 61-73, 122-128) and Levi (1960, 354; 1962, 
49) famously described a range of qualities (and sometimes provided reasons for the 
importance of those qualities).  But it was not until Kuhn’s 1977 paper that these qualities 
became widely known as values, and the discussion was framed in terms of values 
internal to science.  For Kuhn (1977), McMullin (1983), Laudan (1984), and Lacey 
(1999), the values were a collective (if evolving) set.  And there were clear tensions and 
tradeoffs among the various values or virtues thought relevant at any given time.  One 
might gain scope in a theory, but lose precision.  One might gain simplicity, but lose 
scope.  Understanding the history of science meant understanding how scientists made 
those trade-offs (or shifted their interpretation of those values) in the course of scientific 
debate.
But the collective pool of these values turns into a problematic swamp when one attempts 
to find a grounding for the values.  This problem was worsened by the tendency of 
philosophers, in an attempt to make the values appear less overwhelming, to collapse 
various attributes together.  Thus, although some distinguished internal consistency 
(minimal logical consistency of a theory) from external consistency (broader 
considerations of whether a theory fit with prevailing scientific views), other 
philosophers collapsed the two, and considered consistency tout court (e.g., Kuhn 1977, 
357 vs. McMullin 1983, 15)  This makes it harder to see how to justify consistency. 
While internal consistency can be viewed as a minimal requirement of empiricism 
(Duhem 1906, 220; Popper 1935, 72), external consistency is nothing of the sort, and is 
valuable only insofar as one’s confidence in the rest of scientific theory is high.   Or 
consider how explanatory power can be viewed either as an ability of a theory to 
elucidate particular pieces of evidence with great detail or as an ability of a theory to 
bring under one conceptual umbrella multiple disparate areas (which can also be 
conflated with scope).  Both are clearly valuable, but for quite different purposes and 
reasons.
It is time to extricate ourselves from this swamp.  Laudan (2004) made the first steps in 
this direction when he divided theoretical virtues into those that were genuinely epistemic 
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(truth indicative) and those that were cognitive (valued by scientists for other reasons). 
He suggested that few of the traditional theoretical virtues  (construed as the swampy 
collective described above) have genuine epistemic (that is, truth-indicative) merit.  Two 
that did (on his view) were internal consistency and empirical adequacy.  Laudan’s 
distinction is a good start on the problem, but I will go further here, dividing up the 
terrain of cognitive values further in an attempt to elucidate their strengths, their 
purposes, and their justifications.
The Terrain of Cognitive Values
Two distinctions will help further our project.  First, following both Laudan (2004) and 
Douglas (2009), we can distinguish between ideal desiderata and minimal criteria.  We 
might prefer one grand, simple, unified theory of great scope that explains everything, but 
in practice we are willing to settle for less.  (Indeed, some arguments for pluralism 
suggest we should be happy with a complex plurality of perspectives.  See, e.g., Kellert, 
Longino & Waters 2006; Mitchell 2009.)  In contrast, there are some virtues or values 
that any acceptable scientific theory must instantiate (e.g. internal consistency).  We 
might accept a theory that falls short on these criteria out of shear desperation, but we 
would know something was wrong and work furiously to correct it.  
Second, it is important to note that in discussing the set of cognitive values, philosophers 
have lumped together two different kinds of things in science to which cognitive values 
can apply.  By “apply”, I mean that which the values are thought to describe, or the object 
of instantiation for the value (i.e., what has the value).   The object of instantiation can 
either be a theory per se or the theory in relation to the evidence thought to be relevant to 
it.   There are thus two different directions for assessment when using cognitive values: 
are we describing the theory itself or the theory in relation to the available evidence?
To see how crucial these two different targets for cognitive values can be, consider the 
value of scope.  If we are talking about a theory with scope (and just the theory), the 
theory might have the potential to apply to lots of different terrain or to wide swaths of 
the natural world (i.e. the claims it makes are of broad scope), but whether it in fact does 
so successfully can still be up in the air.  Any proposed grand unified theory can be 
considered to have scope in this sense—it has broad scope, but not in relation to any 
actual evidence yet gathered under that scope.  Contrast that with a theory that already 
does explain a wide range of evidence and phenomena—so that the scope applies to a 
theory in relation to broadly based evidence (e.g. evidence from different phenomena or 
evidence gathered in different ways).  Here the value of the cognitive value is quite 
different, and brings with it an epistemic assurance from the diversity of evidence 
supporting the theory.   
A similar point can be made with regards to simplicity.  A simple theory (that is, just a 
simple theory, and not where simplicity is describing a relation to evidence) might be 
prima facia attractive, but unless we think the world actually is simple, we have little 
reason to think it true.  A simpler theory, all other things being equal, is not more likely 
to be true.  Contrast this with a theory that is simple with respect to the complex and 
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diverse evidence that it captures.  The simpler theory, in relation to the evidence it 
explains, is more likely to not be overfit to the evidence and thus more likely to be 
predictively accurate.  (Forster & Sober 1994)  In such a case, simplicity has genuine 
epistemic import. 
With these two distinctions in mind—1) what we want our values for (minimal criteria 
vs. ideal desiderata) and 2) to what the value applies (the theory per se vs. the theory with 
respect to evidence)—we can turn to the terrain for such values.  There are three groups 
into which we can divide the cognitive value terrain:  
Group   1:    Values that are minimal criteria for adequate science 
There are values that are genuinely truth assuring, in the minimal sense that their absence 
indicates a clear epistemic problem.  If a claim or theory lacks these values, we know that 
something is wrong with our empirical claim.  Thus, these are truly minimal criteria, 
values that must be present if we are to be assured we are on the right track.  These values 
include internal consistency (which is about the theory per se) and empirical adequacy 
(as measured against existing evidence, not all possible evidence, and thus is about the 
theory with respect to evidence).  Philosophers as diverse as Duhem (1906), Popper 
(1935), Laudan (2004), and Douglas (2009) have noted these values as minimal criteria. 
This group could be divided along the lines of Group 2 and 3 below using the second 
distinction (regarding the instantiation of the value), but because it is so small, I leave 
them together here.  Because both of these minimal criteria have clear epistemic import 
(theories failing these criteria are not good candidates for our beliefs), keeping them in 
the same group helps clarify their function.  
Group   2:    Values that are desiderata when applied to theories alone 
There are values that, when instantiated solely by the theory or claim of interest, give no 
assurance as to whether the claims which instantiate them are true, but give us assurance 
that we are more likely to hone in on the truth with the presence of these values than in 
their absence.  As such, these might be considered strategic or pragmatic values.  Douglas 
(2009) emphasizes the term cognitive values, as an aid to thinking; Dan Steel has called 
them extrinsic epistemic values (2010).  These include scope, simplicity, and (potential) 
explanatory power.  When theories (or explanations or hypotheses) instantiate these 
values, they are easier to work with.  Simpler claims are easier to follow through to their 
implications.  Broadly scoped claims have more arenas (and more diverse areas) of 
application to see whether they hold.  Theories with potential explanatory power have a 
wide range of possible evidential relations.  (I say potential because if the theory has 
actual, known explanatory power, that implies that evidence is already gathered under its 
umbrella and this would bring us to the next category of values.)  It is easier to find flaws 
in the claims and theories that instantiate these values.  It is easier to gather potentially 
challenging (and thus potentially strongly supporting) evidence for them.  In this sense, 
all of these values fall under the rubric of the fruitfulness of the theory.
Group   3:     Values that are desiderata when applied to theories in relation to evidence 
San Diego, CA -59-
Finally, we should consider values that might sound similar to pragmatic cognitive values 
(group 2), but because they qualify the relationship between theory and evidence, rather 
than just theory itself, they provide a different kind of assurance.  Whereas group 1 
assured us that we have a viable scientific theory (genuine epistemic assurance), and 
group 2 assured us that if we were on the wrong track, we should find out sooner than 
otherwise, group 3 provides a particular kind of genuine epistemic assurance.  It provides 
assurance against ad hocery, and thus assures us that we are not making a particular kind 
of mistake.   One of our most central concerns in science is that we have made up a 
theory that looks good for a particular area, but all we have done is make something that 
fits a narrow range of evidence.  If our theories are ad hoc in this way, they will have 
little long term reliability or traction moving forward.  Instantiation of these values in the 
relation between the theory and the evidence that supports it provides assurance that we 
have not just made something up.  If a diverse range of evidence can be explained, or the 
theory fits well with other areas of science (and, crucially, the evidence that supports 
them), or the theory makes successful novel predictions, we gain precisely the assurance 
we need.  For this reason, these values have genuine positive epistemic import.  These 
values include unification (in terms of explanatory scope, simplicity, external 
consistency, and coherence), novel prediction, and, modifying these values with an 
additional layer, precision.  (I discuss this group further below.)
What does this map of the terrain clarify?  First, with this map we can see that the values 
do have justifications independent of scientists’ historical reliance on them.  We can 
articulate reasons why a scientist should care about these values and clarify what they are 
good for.  There are clear epistemic reasons (independent of any particular objectives of 
science at any particular period) for demanding that scientific theories be internally 
consistent and empirically competent.  And there are good epistemic reasons for 
preferring scientific theories which have a broad range of evidence that support them or 
that instantiate other values in group 3 (more on this below).  Finally, there are good 
pragmatic reasons for scientists to run with a simpler, broader, or more fruitful theory 
first (group 2) if one is trying to decide where to put research effort next.
Second, as I will argue below, the idea that the values are in a collective pool and pull 
against each other is misguided.  Having this map makes it clearer what the purposes of 
the values are, and shows that the tensions among the values are not as acute or 
problematic as they appear when they considered as a collective pool.  
Reducing the Tensions among the Values
There are two possible sources of tensions within the terrain I have mapped above.  The 
first arises from tensions among the groups of values.  The second arises from tensions 
within each group.  I will address each of these in turn as I argue that tensions with this 
map have been reduced, albeit not eliminated.
Among the groups, one reduction in tension should be immediately clear.
Minimal criteria do not (or at least, should not) pull against pragmatic fruitfulness 
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concerns of group 2 or the epistemic assurance concerns of group 3.  Minimal criteria 
come first, and both must be met.  Indeed, one cannot tell whether one has an empirically 
competent theory without minimal internal consistency.  Now, in practice, scientists may 
still choose to pursue the development of a theory with characteristics of group 2 even in 
the face of failings in group 1 (minimal criteria).  But this must be done with the full 
acknowledgement that the theory is inadequate as it stands, and that it must be corrected 
to meet the minimum requirements as quickly as possible.  Although philosophers like to 
quip that every scientific theory is “born falsified,” no scientist should be happy about it.
Once the remaining values are divided into the pragmatic cognitive values (instantiated 
by theories only—group 2) and the epistemic anti-ad hocery assuring values (instantiated 
by the relations between theories and evidence—group 3), the two groups have less 
problematic tension within each than has been generally thought.
Consider the possible tensions within the pragmatic cognitive values—group 2.  Recall 
that within this group, the values describe theories or claims on their own, independent of 
the evidence which may or may not support them.  In this group, all of these values are 
ultimately about the fruitfulness of the theory, the ease with which scientists will be able 
to use the theory in new contexts (not necessarily successfully), to devise new tests for 
the theory, and thus refine, revise, or if need be overhaul completely, the theory.  It is true 
that some scientists will find scope an easier handle with which to further test a theory, as 
they will find it more amenable to apply the theory in a new arena to which the broadly 
scoped theory is applicable, and some scientists will find simplicity an easier handle with 
which to devise further tests.  So some tensions may remain around the issue of what will 
be fruitful for different scientists.  But this need not create any epistemic worries, for 
three reasons.  First, the proof will be in the pudding for fruitfulness, and the pudding is 
relatively straightforward to assess.  If the theory cannot be used to devise additional 
tests, if the scientists are unable to use the aspects of the theory that instantiate the value 
they prefer, then the value is of no further use in that case.  We will be able to tell readily 
if the instantiation of a pragmatic-based value in fact proves its worth.  Second, because 
this category of values does not provide direct epistemic warrant, but is instead focused 
on the pragmatic issue of the fruitfulness of a theory, there is little reason to be concerned 
about divergent scientific perspectives on these values.  None of these pragmatic values 
provides a reason to accept a theory as well-supported or true or reliable at the moment. 
Group 2 values are simply not epistemic.  Third, social epistemological approaches to 
science (e.g. Solomon 2001, Longino 2002) have made it quite clear that having diverse 
efforts in scientific research is a good thing for science.   It has been argued that diversity 
of efforts in science is crucial for the eventual generation of reliable knowledge.  So 
having diverse views about what makes a theory fruitful is likely to be good for science. 
In sum, the values in this group are pragmatic, they are easily assessable by external 
criteria (are more new tests being produced?), their diversity supports a diversity of 
epistemic effort, and yet, they do not have direct epistemic import.   Whatever tensions 
arise here can play out in diverse efforts of scientific practice.
Consider next the possible tensions within group 3.  Because these values do have 
genuine epistemic import, tensions among them would be central to the problem of 
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scientific inference and the epistemic assessment of scientific theories.  But when 
examining these values as instantiated by the relation between theories and the evidence 
that supports them, there is less tension among these values than might be initially 
supposed.  For example, while simplicity, scope, and explanatory power are often thought 
to pull against each other when considering theories alone (group 2), they pull together 
when considering a theory in relation to evidence (group 3).  A theory that has broad 
scope over diverse evidence is also simple with respect to that diverse evidence, unifies 
that diverse evidence, and has explanatory power over that evidence.  Indeed, it is this set 
of relations that Paul Thagard has formalized under his conception of “coherence.” 
(Thagard 2000)  Scientists might disagree over which evidence is more important to 
unify or explain under a particular rubric, either because of different purposes or because 
of different views on the reliability of the evidence under consideration.  But that is a 
disagreement over which instantiation of a cognitive value is more important, not a 
disagreement based on tensions among values.
Yet there are still some tensions in group 3.  For example, predictive accuracy (or the 
value of the novel prediction) might pull against the considerations captured by 
coherence.  And indeed, when faced with such a tension, scientists can legitimately 
disagree, some scientists finding greater epistemic assurance in the successful novel 
prediction and other scientists finding greater epistemic assurance in the successful 
unification of evidence or the explanatory power/coherence of a theory.  When we have 
both together, both successful explanation of the available evidence and a surprising 
prediction (use novel or temporally novel), we have Whewell’s consilience (Fisch 1985), 
which is perhaps the strongest epistemic assurance we have available to us.  When 
consilience is on the table, it is hard for other theories to compete.  But we are not always 
so lucky.  Hence genuine epistemic tension is possible here.
There is an additional qualifier for the value considerations of group 3.  Whether we are 
considering the relation between theory and evidence that is some form of coherence or 
some form of prediction, the precision or tightness of fit between the theory and evidence 
also matters.  The more precise the explanatory relations between theory and evidence, or 
the more precise the prediction and the evidence that tests it (having just one or the other 
is not helpful), the more we gain the epistemic assurance of group 3.  This assurance is 
that we have not just made our theories up, that they have some empirical grip on the 
world—they are fundamentally anti-ad hocery assurance.  The more precision we have in 
the relations between theory and evidence, the more assurance we get.  The more 
successful predictions we have, the more assurance we get.  The more coherence or 
explanatory power over diverse evidence we have, the more assurance we get.  Because 
there are these different sources of this kind of assurance, there will be tensions among 
them in practice.  But hopefully why these tensions arise, and what should be done about 
them, will be clearer.
So what of tensions between the values of group 2 and group 3?  These two groups aim at 
different purposes, and thus any apparent conflict can be managed.  It is particularly 
important to note that group 2, the pragmatic cognitive values, have no bearing on what 
should be thought of as our best supported scientific knowledge at the moment.  Just 
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because a theory looks fruitful (whether because of its innate simplicity, scope, or 
potential explanatory power) is no reason to think it more reliable now than any other 
narrower or more complex theory.  If one needs epistemic assurance, particularly for an 
assessment of our best available knowledge at the moment, group 3 is where one should 
look (after the requirements of group 1 are met).  When one needs to figure out what 
should be said about the state of knowledge now, pragmatic fruitfulness (group 2) 
concerns have no bearing.  When one wants to justify future research endeavors, such 
pragmatic concerns are central.  
In sum, there are no tensions among the groups:  group 1 trumps groups 2 & 3, and 
groups 2 & 3 have different purposes.  Within the groups, there are no tensions within 
group 1, there are productive tensions within group 2, and there remain some tensions 
within group 3.  Thus, while tensions among values remain, they are much reduced from 
the traditional view.  With a clearer account of the bases for such values, we can see their 
function more clearly, and thus their purposes.  
 Implications
In earlier accounts of the theoretical virtues, the tensions among them were thought to 
explain how scientists at any given moment could rationally disagree with each other—
different scientists focused on different virtues.  Does my organization of the theoretical 
virtues dissolve this ready-made explanation for rational disagreement?  No-- there are 
still resources we can draw upon to explain disagreement.  So, for example, one can still 
see a tension between the explanatory scope of a theory (with respect to available 
evidence—group 3) and the predictive precision of its competitor.  Such a tension will 
likely continually arise in scientific practice.  Or, consider the tension between a well-
supported theory (with group 3 values supporting it) and an underdeveloped theory (with 
lots of group 2 values and thus lots of potential).  The explanations of divergent choices 
that we give, scientists being risk-takers with new theories or with staying with the older, 
more developed theories, still hold in the account given here, but with a sharper 
understanding of the source of the divergent choices.  Indeed, we should help scientists 
distinguish an epistemic assessment from a pragmatic fruitfulness assessment in their 
commitments to scientific theories.   Finally, one could also use the account of the place 
of social and ethical values given in Douglas 2009 to show how concerns over the 
sufficiency of evidence (driven by social or ethical values) could generate rational 
disagreement among scientists (as Douglas argues ethical values in the assessment of 
evidential sufficiency is a rational role for those values).  
So what has been gained by organizing and explicating the various values of cognitive 
values?  First, we can see more clearly where and why such values are indeed valuable. 
The justification need no longer rest on the contingency of the history of science 
(although it is certainly illuminated by the history of science).  This allows us to note why 
these values have seemed so central.  Groups 1 & 3 have genuine epistemic import, and 
thus do not bleed across the epistemic/non-epistemic boundary (although their 
instantiation depends on the available evidence which does depend on cultural values). 
The pragmatic group 2 can have clear cultural influences on it.  Rooney’s concerns 
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(1992) are thus illuminated.  It also allows us to assess proposals for alternative sets of 
values (e.g., Longino 1996).  We can consider alternative values under the groups 
proposed and see if they assist us in reaching our goals.  
Second, we can now address the reference often made to these values in other debates 
with greater conceptual clarity.  For example, when critics of the value of prediction (as 
opposed to accommodation) (e.g., Harker 2008, Collins 1994) attempt to reduce the value 
of novel prediction to accommodation plus a theoretical virtue (such as unification or 
explanatory power), we can see both what might motivate such an attempt (they are 
drawn to the power of group 3) and why it is misguided (the value of novel prediction 
can be in tension with the value of unification).  Finally, if this is indeed a step forward in 
the clarity of the terrain, there is perhaps hope for a renewed effort in a qualitative theory 
of scientific inference.  But that work must await another paper.
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Title: What is the “Paradox of Phase Transitions?”  
Abstract: 
I present a novel approach to the recent scholarly debate that has arisen with respect to the   
philosophical import one should infer from scientific accounts of “Phase Transitions,” by 
appealing to a distinction between “representation” understood as “denotation,” and “faithful 
representation” understood as a type of “guide to ontology.” It is argued that the entire debate of 
phase transitions is misguided for it stems from a pseudo-paradox that does not license the type 
of claims made by scholars, and that what is really interesting about phase transition is the 
manner by which they force us to rethink issues regarding scientific representation. 
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1. Introduction. 
“Phase Transitions” (PT) include a wide variety of common and not so common phenomena in 
which the qualitative macroscopic properties of a system or a substance change abruptly. Such 
phenomena include, among others, water freezing into ice or boiling into air, iron magnetizing, 
graphite spontaneously converting into diamond and a semi-conductor transitioning into a 
superconductor.  There exists a flourishing scholarly debate with respect to the philosophical 
import one should infer from the scientific accounts of phase transitions, in particular the 
accounts’ appeal to the “thermodynamic limit” (TDL), and regarding how the nature of PT is 
best understood. It has become standard practice to quote the authoritative physicist, Leo P. 
Kadanoff, who is responsible for much of the advances in real-space Renormalization Group and 
in understanding PT, in order to better ground the puzzlement associated with PT: 
The existence of a phase transition requires an infinite system. No phase transitions occur 
in systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom. (Kadanoff 2000, 238) 
If we add to the above that observations of boiling kettles confirm that finite systems do undergo 
PT, we conclude that rather odd paradox arises: PT do and do not occur in finite, and thus 
concrete and physical, systems. The above is taken as a basis for warranting such scholarly 
claims to the effect that PT are irreducible emergent phenomena (e.g. Lebowitz 1999, S346; Liu 
1999, S92; Morrison 2012, 143; Prigogine 1997, 45), which necessitate the development of new 
physical theory (Callender 2001, 550), and inducing a wide array of literature that argues to the 
contrary (e.g. Bangu 2009; Batterman 2005, 2011; Butterfield 2011; Menon and Callender 2011; 
Norton 2011; Wayne 2009). 
 In this paper I would like to build on the works of Mainwood (2006) and Jones (2006) to 
further investigate what exactly is the “paradox” of PT, which is meant to license the type of 
scholarly conclusions and discussions noted above. It seems to me that a natural condition of 
adequacy for the particular claim that PT are emergent phenomena, as well as the more general 
debate that arises, is that there really be a bona fide paradox associated with PT. In other words, 
it really must be the case that a phase transition “is emergent precisely because it is a property of 
finite systems and yet only reducible to micro-properties of infinite systems,” or more recently, 
that “the phenomenon of a phase transition, as described by classic thermodynamics cannot be 
derived unless one assumes that the system under study is infinite” (Lui 1999, S104; Bangu 
2009, 488). Accordingly, in Section 2 I describe the paradox and suggest that much of the debate 
revolving around PT stems from it. In doing so, I appeal to Contessa’s (2007, 52-55) distinction 
between “representation” understood as “denotation,” and “faithful representation” understood as 
a type of “guide to ontology” (Sklar 2003, 427). Afterwards, I will continue to argue for a 
negative and a positive thesis. My negative thesis is that there really is no paradox of phase 
transitions and that in order to get a bona fide paradox, i.e. a contradiction, one must undertake 
substantial philosophical work and ground a type of “Indispensability Argument,” akin to the 
kind appearing within the context of the Philosophy of Mathematics. Since none of the 
proponents of the PT debate undertake such work, and since indispensability arguments are 
highly controversial, I claim that the entirety of the debate, insofar as it is grounded in the 
paradox of PT, is utterly misguided and that the philosophical import that has been extracted 
from the case study of PT with regard to emergence, reduction, explanation, etc., is not 
warranted.  
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However, I also have a positive thesis. In Sub-section 2.1 I show how the paradox can be 
generalized and arises whenever a scientific account appeals to an “Essential Idealization”1 
(EI)—roughly, when a scientific account of some concrete physical phenomena appeals to an 
idealization in which, in principle, one cannot attain a more successful account of said 
phenomena by “de-idealizing” the idealization and producing a more realistic idealization. In 
doing so, I suggest in Section 3 that what is really interesting about phase transitions is the 
manner by which they illustrate the “Essential Idealization Problem,” which is tightly connected 
to issues arising in the context of scientific representation and scientific realism. The upshot is 
that, insofar as proponents of the phase transition debate have been contributing to the EIP, 
certain aspects of the debate have been fruitful. Consequently, I outline various possible 
solutions to the EIP and the paradox of PT, which have been extracted from Butterfield (2011) 
and Norton (2011). I suggest that, although such solutions pave the road for further work to be 
done, it is questionable whether they are conclusive and exhaustive. 
2. What is the “Paradox of Phase Transitions?” 
In his 2001 paper, “Taking Thermodynamic Too Seriously,” Craig Callender presents several 
allegedly true propositions that jointly induce a paradox concerning PT―that concrete systems 
can and cannot undergo PT:2 
1. Concrete systems are composed of finite many particles �. 
2. Concrete systems display PT. 
3. PT occur when the partition function � has a discontinuity. 
4. The partition function � of a system with finite many particles � can only display a 
discontinuity by appealing to the TDL. 
5. A system in the TDL has infinitely many particles.3 
 
Tenets 1-2 imply that concrete and finite systems display phase transitions while tenets 3-5 imply 
that only infinite systems can undergo a phase transitions. However, contra Bangu (2009), 
Callender (2001), Mainwood (2006), Jones (2006) and others, I contend that no contradiction 
arises by conjoining tenets 1-5. To see this, we must first distinguish between “concrete” phase 
transitions, on the one hand, and “abstract mathematical representations” of them, on the other 
hand.4 To be clear, a “concrete system” would include a physical thermal system of type we find 
in the world or in a lab, while “abstract mathematical” just refers to pieces of math, e.g. a set 
with function defined on it. Also, I take the term “representation” here to be stipulated denotation 
                                                          
1
 Butterfield (2011) and Mainwood (2006) use the term “Indispensible,” Jones (2006) uses 
“Ineliminable,” and Batterman (2005, 2011) uses “Essential.” 
2
 The paradox of PT presented here in not the exact version presented in Callender (2001, 549). 
Instead, I present the paradox in a manner that is more relevant to my discussion. Several 
authors, such as Mainwood (2006, 223) and Jones (2006, 114-7), have undertaken a similar 
approach.  
3
 For precise characterization of various forms of the TDL, see Norton (2011, sections 3 and 4) 
and reference therein. 
4
 The distinction between concrete and abstract objects is a well-known. Abstract objects differ 
from concrete ones in the sense that they are non-spatiotemporal and causally inefficacious. 
Paradigm examples include mathematical objects and universals. Cf. Rosen (2001). 
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that is agreed upon by convention.5 For instance, the notation “�” represents “the number of 
particles” (in a given system) in the sense that it denotes the number of particles. Second, notice 
that there are ambiguities with regards to whether the terms “PT” and “partition function” (“�”) 
in tenets 3 and 4 refer to concrete objects, or abstracts mathematical representations of them. As 
concrete objects, PT are concrete phenomena or processes that arise within concrete systems, 
while � is some sort of concrete property of such systems. As abstract mathematical 
representations, both PT and Z are just pieces of mathematics that allegedly denote concrete 
objects. To avoid confusion, note that by “abstract PT” I only mean PT in the sense that an 
abstract � displays a discontinuity. In the same manner, there is a clear ambiguity concerning the 
physical interpretation, i.e. the concreteness or abstractness, of the TDL. Thus, for example, if 
“PT” and “�” in tenets 3 and 4 refer to abstract mathematical representations, as opposed to 
concrete objects, then there is no paradox: Concrete and finite systems display PT while abstract 
and finite ones do not. Just because abstract mathematical representations of concrete systems 
with finite N do not display PT, does not mean that concrete finite systems do not display PT. 
Alternatively, if “PT” in tenets 3 and 4 do refer to concrete PT, it also does not immediately 
follow that there is a paradox. Rather, what follows is that concrete PT “occur” when abstract 
representations of them display various abstract properties, such as a discontinuity in � and an 
appeal to the TDL. One might wonder what explains this particular correlation between 
discontinuities in abstract representational partition function and concrete phase transitions. 
However, prima facie, there is no paradox. 
 The point is that without adding additional tenets that make a claim about the relation 
between, one the one hand, concrete PT occurring in physical systems and, on the other hand, the 
abstract mathematical representation of concrete PT, which arise in scientific accounts of PT, no 
paradox arises.  In the following sub-section I will add such additional tenets in hope to further 
shed light on the central philosophical issue that arises in the context of PT. To end, it is worth 
noting that, if my claim about there being no paradox is sound, then the entire the debate 
revolving around PT, insofar as it is grounded in the paradox of PT as it is stated above, is 
unmotivated and utterly misguided. In particular, notice that the various positions expressed with 
regards to the debate can be delineated by identifying which tenet of the paradox a particular 
proponent denies or embraces. Authors such as Lebowitz (1999, S346), Liu (1999, S92), 
Morrison (2012, 143) and Prigogine (1997, 45) can be read as embracing tenet 3 and identifying 
PT as a kind of non-reductive emergent phenomena. Contrasting attitudes have been voiced by 
Wayne (2009), where Callender (2001) and Menon and Callender (2011) explicitly deny that 
phase transitions are irreducible and emergent phenomena by rejecting tenet 3. Butterfield (2011) 
can be read as both denying and embracing tenet 3, in an effort to reconcile reduction and 
emergence. Norton (2011) can be understood as denying tenet 5. I refer the reader to Mainwood 
(2006, 223-237), who presents an exposition of this type of delineation―i.e. a classification of 
scholarly attitudes to the nature of phase transition grounded in the paradox. For my purposes 
what is important is to identify that the large majority, if not all, of the phase transition debate 
stems from the phase transition paradox. 
2.1 The bona fide Paradox of Phase Transitions and its Generalization 
                                                          
5
 Cf. Contessa (2007, 52-55) and references therein. 
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 The key ingredient necessary to engender a bona fide paradox is for a particular kind of 
correspondence relation to hold between abstract representations and concrete systems. To make 
this point clear we must appeal to a further distinction. While I take “representation” to be 
stipulated denotation, by “faithful representation” I mean a representation that allows agents to 
perform sound inferences from the representational vehicle to the target of representation 
(Contessa 2007, 52-55). That is to say, a faithful representation allows agents to make inferences 
about the nature of the target of representation. Thus, it acts as a kind of “guide to ontology”6 
since it accurately describes aspects of the target of representation. In other words, a faithful 
representation is one in which the vehicle and target of representation resemble each other in 
some manner, e.g. they share some of the same, or approximately same, properties and/or 
relations. The classic example here is a city-map, which is a faithful representation of a city 
because it allows us to perform sounds inferences from the vehicle to the target, i.e. from the 
map to the city. This is so because both the vehicle and the target share various properties. For 
instance, if two streets intersect in the map, then they also intersect in the city. That is to say, 
intersecting streets in the map correspond to intersecting streets in the city. Therefore, the map 
acts as a type of ontological guide accurately describing the city, e.g. there really are intersecting 
streets in the city. It is worth noting that my account potentially differs from Contessa (2007), 
who isn’t clear about the ontological aspect of faithful representations. Contessa (2007) 
differentiates from “epistemic representation,” from which valid inferences can be drawn, and 
faithful ones that permit sound inferences. Whether or not such inferences come with ontological 
baggage depends on whether they are about the target itself. On my account, faithful 
representations license sound inferences about the target itself and hence they the fix the 
ontology of the target. 
With this distinction in hand, if we add a tenet that says the abstract representational 
discontinuities representing phase transitions are faithful and hence correspond to concrete 
physical discontinuities we do get a genuine contradiction. This is so because if systems are 
composed of finite many particles, which is the case within the context of the atomistic theory of 
matter conveyed in tenet 2, then it makes no sense to talk of concrete discontinuities. The notion 
of concrete discontinuities presupposes that matter is a continuum so that there can be an actual 
discontinuity. Otherwise, an apparent discontinuity is actually the rapid coming apart of particles 
and not a real discontinuity. Consequently, adding a tenet as the one just described amounts to 
claiming that systems are not composed of finite many particles and so we get: Concrete systems 
are and are not composed of finite many particles �. 
 In a similar manner, one can engender a kind of paradox by reifying the TDL through an 
appropriate correspondence relation. For instance, one could add the tenet that an appeal to the 
TDL, which could be interpreted as a type of continuum limit faithfully representing an abstract 
system, in fact faithfully represents a concrete system. Thus, we deduce the claim that concrete 
systems are and are not composed of finite many particles � (in the sense that the ontology of 
concrete systems is both atomistic and that of a continuum, i.e. not atomistic). 
 The source of the problem of PT seems to be that the mathematical structure that 
scientifically represents concrete PT—a discontinuity in the partition function—is an artifact of 
an idealization (or an approximation)—the TDL—which is essential in the sense that when one 
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 Cf. Sklar (2003, 425). 
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“de-idealizes” said idealization, the mathematical structure representing PT no longer exist.7 
Accordingly, I would like to suggest that what is really interesting about PT is the manner by 
they might shed light on the nature of scientific representation and idealization. In particular, 
notice that once concerns regarding representations are incorporated, the paradox of PT can be 
generalized by making use of the concept of an EI: 
1. Concrete systems include a concrete attribute �. 
2. Concrete systems display a concrete phenomenon �. 
3. � is scientifically-mathematically represented by �’. 
4. �’ can only arise by appealing to an idealizing limit �. 
5. A system in the idealizing limit I includes an attribute �≈ such that � ≠ �≈. 
6. �′ faithfully represents �. 
 
Tenet 1 and 2 imply that concrete systems are � and display �. Tenets 3-5 imply that � is 
scientifically represented by �’, which presupposes �≈. Tenet 4 encompasses our EI since any 
de-idealization of � will render �’ nonexistent. So far there is no contradiction. But, when one 
adds the correspondence relation described by tenet 6, a bona fide paradox arises: Concrete 
systems are and are not � (since they are � and they are �≈and � ≠ �≈). What is important to 
notice is that tenets 1 and 2 are claims about concrete systems, wherein tenet 2 identifies the 
concrete phenomenon to be scientifically accounted for, while tenets 3-5 are claims about 
abstract scientific accounts of concrete systems, and it is tenet 6 that connects the abstract with 
the concrete via faithful representation, thereby engendering a genuine paradox. The question, of 
course, is why would one endorse tenet 6? The answer is that without tenet 6 the entire scientific 
account of the concrete phenomenon in question seems somewhat mysterious to anyone with 
non-instrumental sympathies. In particular, those with realist intuitions will want to unveil the 
mystery with a correspondence relation that tells us that our abstract scientific accounts gets 
something right about the concrete world. But how would one argue for a correspondence 
relation along the lines of 6? It seems to me that, given the “essentialness” aspect of the 
idealizing limit that arises in tenets 3 and 4, the only way to justify tenet 6 is by appeal to an 
indispensability argument.8 In other words, something of the sort: 
1) A scientific account of some concrete phenomena appeals to an idealization(s) and refers 
to idealized abstract objects. 
2) The idealization appealed to is essential to the scientific account in the sense that any de-
idealization renders the scientific account less successful and the idealized abstract object 
nonexistent. 
3) Hence, the idealization appealed to, and the idealized abstract objects made use of, are 
indispensible to the account. 
4) Thus, as scientific realists, we ought to believe that such abstract idealized objects do 
exist and are concrete. Further, the ontological import of such idealizations is true of 
concrete systems, on pain of holding a double standard. 
                                                          
7
 For a more precise statement to this effect see Butterfield’s (2011, 1123-1130) and Mainwood’s 
(2006, 216-218) discussion of Lee-Yang Theory and KMS states. 
8
 For a survey of the Indispensability Argument of mathematics and a defense see Colyvan 
(2001). 
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Said differently, and in the specific cases of PT, since reference to a discontinuity in � is 
indispensible to scientific accounts of PT, and since these discontinuities only arise by appealing 
to EI, we ought to believe in the existence of concrete discontinuities. 
 Thus, in contrast to many of the scholars engaged in the phase transition debate, which 
assume that there is a paradox and then continue to attempt to dissolve it by some manner or 
other, I claim that in order to get a genuine paradox one needs to justify a correspondence 
relation (such as the one appearing in tenet 6) by appealing to an indispensability-type argument. 
Since cogent indispensability-type arguments require serious philosophical work and are very 
much controversial, and since no author engaged in the phase transition debate has undertaken 
such work, it follows that much of the controversy revolving around phase transitions is not well-
motivated. That is to say, claims to the effect (i) that PT are or are not emergent, (ii) that they are 
or are not reducible to Statistical Mechanics (SM), and (iii) that they do or do not refute the 
atomic theory of matter, are grounded in a frail foundation that does not licensed such significant 
conclusions. 
One might worry that, contrary to my claims, a bona fide paradox of PT can arise on the 
epistemological level by conceding to a set of tenets from which it is possible to deduce that SM 
does and does not govern phase transitions. The idea here is to argue that “SM-proper” is not 
licensed to appeal to the TDL and so SM-proper does not govern PT. However, the objection 
continues, it is generally assumed that SM is the fundamental theory that governs PT. Thus, we 
have a paradox and the natural manner by which to dissolve it is to argue that SM-proper does 
indeed have the tools to account for PT (Callender 2001, Menon and Callender 2010), or else to 
claim that PT are emergent. In reply, it is far from clear to me that SM-proper is not licensed to 
appeal to the TDL, and so that it does not govern PT. In fact, there are reasons to think that the 
TDL is ‘part and parcel’ of SM-proper because (a) it is common practice to appeal to the TDL in 
modern approaches to SM, and (b) the TDL is used in SM not only to account for phase 
transitions but to account for, among others, the equivalence of SM ensembles, the extensivity of 
extensive thermodynamic parameters, Bose condensation, etc. (Styer 2004). In addition, (c) all 
the best scientifically accounts of PT, and these include mean field theories, Landau’s approach, 
Yang-Lee theory and Renormalization Group methods, represents PT as discontinuities by 
appealing to the TDL, and (d) the large majority of empirically confirmed predictions of SM, 
within the context of PT and beyond, appeal to the TDL. 
Moreover, even if it was the case the SM-proper is not licensed to appeal to the TDL, no 
contradiction would arise. Rather, it would just be a brute fact that SM-proper does not govern 
phase transitions and “SM-with-the-TDL” does. If then it is claimed that the ontologies of SM-
proper and SM-with-the-TDL are radically different so that indeed there is a paradox, we must 
notice that such a claim amounts to no more than reviving the paradox at the level of ontology, 
and hence my discussion in this section bears negatively on this claim. 
Last, the claim that PT are emergent because SM-proper cannot account for them seems 
to replace one problem—PT are not governed by the fundamental theory—with another 
problem—PT are emergent. How does dubbing PT “emergent” illuminate our understanding of 
them or of their scientific accounts? How is this philosophically insightful? Accordingly, I 
endorse Butterfield’s (2011) description of emergence as novel and robest mathematical 
structure that arises at a particular limit, as opposed to a failure of intertheoretic reduction of 
some sort. It is worthwhile to note that the insistence on the indispensibility of taking such limits 
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for the purpose of emergence understood in this manner has been repeatedly stressed by, e.g., 
Batterman (2005, 2010, 2011). 
3. The Essential Idealization Problem. 
The above discussion points to what I consider to be the central philosophical issues 
arising out of the debate concerning PT. First, the discussion regarding (i) the need for a 
correspondence relation between our abstract scientific-mathematical representations and 
concrete systems, (ii) the appeal to the concept of “faithful representation,” and (iii) the 
identification that the phase transition paradox can be generalized to any scientific account that 
appeals to EI, demonstrates that a solution to the following problem is needed: 
The Essential Idealization Problem (EIP) ― We need an account of how our abstract and 
essentially idealized scientific representations correspond to the concrete systems 
observed in the world and we need a justification for appealing to EI’s, i.e. an explanation 
of why and which EI’s are successful, which does not constitute a de-idealization 
scheme.9 
To this effect Batterman (2005, 2010, 2011) has made progress by explaining that it is not at all 
clear that traditional mapping accounts of scientific and mathematical representation work in 
cases of EI. In particular, this is so because the abstract mathematical structure doing the 
representational work does not “latch on,” and so is not partially isomorphic or homomorphic, to 
any concrete physical structures in the external word. Moreover, insofar as the physical world 
constrains scientific representations, there are reasons to think that consideration of scale size, in 
which the phenomenon of concern occurs, plays an important role in modeling and scientifically 
representing such phenomenon. 
Second, the discussion of indispensability makes it clear that the mystery revolving 
around the EIP is truly mysterious for those with scientific realist sympathies and, in fact, may 
threaten certain conceptions of realism. This follows because, insofar as arguments like the “no 
miracles argument” and “inference to best explanation” are cogent and give us good reason to 
believe the assertions of our best scientific accounts, including those about fundamental laws and 
unobservable entities, then in the case of accounts appealing to EI, these arguments can be used 
via an Indispensability Argument to reduce the realist position to absurdity. What is needed is a 
realist solution to the EIP and thus a realist account of PT. 
In fact, such potential solutions to paradox of PT can extracted from two recent 
contributions to the debate: Butterfield (2011) and Norton (2011). Although it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to treat these contributions thoroughly, I will end by discussing them shortly 
in effort to support my suggestion that, although such solutions pave the road for further work to 
be done, it is questionable whether they are conclusive and exhaustive. 
Butterfield (2011) grants that the TDL is “epistemically indispensable” for the emergence 
of the novel and robust mathematical structure that is used to represent PT, but denies that any 
paradox emerges because the limit is not “physically real.” Using the terminology expressed 
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 Mainwood (2006, 214-5) also identifies a similar problem but in a context that is different from 
mine, and his solution (238), endorsed by Butterfield (2011), misses the central issue discussed 
here. 
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here, the discontinuities in � play a representational role but not a faithfully representational one. 
The question arises, how come unfaithful representations work so well? To that end, Butterfield 
(2011, Section 3) appeals the distinction, also used by Norton (2011, Section 3), between “limit 
quantities” or “limit properties,” i.e. the limits of properties, and “limit system,” i.e. the system at 
the limit. He continues to argue that the behavior of certain observable properties of concrete 
finite systems, e.g. magnetization of a ferromagnet, smoothly approaches the behavior of the 
corresponding properties of abstract infinite systems. Moreover, it is the large � behavior, not 
the infinite �, which is physically real. 
Norton (2011) suggest that by viewing the TDL as an “approximation”—an inexact 
description of a target system, instead of an “idealization”—a novel system whose properties 
provide inexact descriptions of a target system, we can diffuse any problems that might arise. 
Within the context of our discussion, Norton’s idea is that no paradox can arise if the TDL is an 
approximation since approximations do not refer to novel systems whose ontology might be 
drastically different from the target systems, thereby engendering a paradox once we add an 
appropriate correspondence relation. In a similar manner to Butterfield (2011), his justification 
for appealing to such an approximation is pragmatic: the behavior of the non-analytic � 
belonging to an infinite system, is approached by an analytic Z corresponding to finite system 
with large �. 
From my viewpoint, this cannot be the whole story. First, both accounts seem to ignore 
that it is a mathematical structure that arises only in the limiting system that is doing the 
representational work for us. Moreover, the accounts seem to suggest that we must revise our 
definition of PT as occurring when the partition function has a discontinuity, and substitute it 
with something along the lines of “PT occurs when various thermodynamic potentials portray 
sufficiently extreme gradients.” The weakness of this suggestion is that we have substituted a 
precise characterization of PT, with a vague one.  But more problematic is the idea that we 
should be able to construct a finite � system that has a, say, Helmholtz free energy with an 
extreme gradient, which does evolve into a discontinuity once the TDL is taken.10 Second, the 
Butterfield-Norton approach outlined above seems incomplete for it does not give us an account 
of why it is that the concrete external world constrains us to model and scientifically represent 
certain phenomena with mathematical structures that only emerge in limiting systems whose 
ontology does not correspond to that of the fundamental theory. For this purpose, talk of 
“mathematical convenience,” “empirical adequacy,” and “approximation” (understood as a 
purely formal procedure) misses what seems to be the truly intriguing features of PT. My 
suggestion is that we can further advance our understanding of PT, and similar phenomena that 
gives rise to the EIP, by attempting to amend accounts like Butterfield’s (2011) and Norton’s 
(2011) with some of the key insights of Batterman (2005, 2011) regarding what mathematical 
techniques one must appeal to in order to properly represent certain kinds of phenomena. 
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 Mainwood (2006, 232) makes the same point. 
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Abstract
There are two notions of abstraction that are often confused. The material view implies 
that the products of abstraction are not concrete. It is vulnerable to the criticism that 
abstracting introduces misrepresentations to the system, hence  abstraction is 
indistinguishable from idealization. The omission view fares better against this criticism 
because it does not entail that abstract objects are non-physical and because it asserts 
that the way scientists abstract is different to the way they idealize. Moreover, the 
omission view better captures the way that abstraction is used in many parts of science. 
Disentangling the two notions is an important prerequisite for determining how to 
evaluate the use abstraction in science.
I. Introduction 
! The west pediment of the Parthenon is a physical object that exists in space and 
time, but it is also triangular. We say that the west pediment is concrete, but that 
triangles are abstract. What accounts for this difference? The received view in 
philosophy of science is that an object is abstract when it is not concrete (e.g. Cartwright 
1994). Call this the material view of abstraction. The problem with the material view is 
that it implies that abstract objects are not physical. However, scientists often work with 
systems that are abstract but also physically instantiated. For example, experiments 
conducted in greenhouses abstract away from properties such as the color of the plants 
in question and whether or not they are subject to herbivory. Nonetheless, the plants in 
these experiments are concrete particulars like the west pediment of the Parthenon and 
unlike triangles. Moreover, the material view blurs the distinction between abstraction 
and idealization, as idealized objects are not concrete. For example, assuming that a 
population is inﬁnite is common practice in models of population genetics, yet no actual 
population in the world is inﬁnite. In this sense, inﬁnite populations are like triangles 
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and unlike the west pediment of the Parthenon. The problem is that the main goal of 
proponents of the material view is to defend abstraction from critics who argue that 
both abstraction and idealization involve distortion, hence they are not distinct 
processes (e.g. Humphreys 1995). Unfortunately, the material view of abstraction 
undermines the force of their arguments against the critics.  
! Thomson-Jones defends a different view of abstraction where abstraction means 
the omission of irrelevant parts and properties from an object or system (Jones 2005).1  I 
will call this the omission view. Here, abstraction and idealization are distinct because 
idealization requires the assertion of a falsehood, while abstraction involves the 
omission of a truth (ibid). Thus, while both idealization and abstraction can result in the 
distortion of a system, the distortion is very different in each case. When we abstract, we 
do not describe the system in its entirety, so we are not telling the whole truth. 
However, when we idealize, we add properties to the system that it does not  normally 
possess. Therefore, our description of an idealized system contains falsehoods. 
! Both the material and omission views about abstraction are relevant to parts of 
scientiﬁc inquiry, but it is important to keep them distinct. If we fail to do so and lump 
abstraction together with idealization, we are in danger of trivializing an important 
aspect of science. I will argue that the notion of abstraction that is relevant to models, 
modeling, experiments, and target system construction (Godfrey-Smith 2006) is a 
version of the omission view. Speciﬁcally, this is the view that abstraction is the opposite 
of completeness. We start off with a complete object or system, one that has all its parts 
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1 Cartwright also defends this view in places, yet she uses the two notions interchangeably (Cartwright 
1994). This implies that she views the material and omission views as two different aspects of the same 
notion instead of two distinct notions of abstraction. 
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and properties. When we abstract, we omit the parts and properties that are irrelevant 
for our purposes. An important implication of this view is that the outcomes of the 
process of abstraction can be concrete and physical. 
II. The use of Abstraction in Science
! The material view of abstraction is intuitive and deeply entrenched. Prime 
examples of abstract objects are mathematical objects such as numbers and triangles, 
which are not physically instantiated. Examples of abstract objects in other disciplines 
are concepts and ideas which are not tangible (e.g., fairness, evil, superego). 
Interestingly, in many of these cases, we can arrive at these objects through the process 
of omission. For example, we can start off with two roses, omit properties such as color, 
smell, photosynthetic capacity, chemical composition and so on, until we arrive at the 
number two. Historically, philosophers writing on abstraction (e.g. Aristotle and Locke) 
have held versions of the material view but explained how we arrive at abstract objects 
with the omission view (Rosen 2009, Cartwright 1994). It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the two views of abstraction are often lumped together as aspects of the same 
notion. 
! However, the use of abstraction in science is often quite different. Scientists often 
omit a number of parts and properties from a system, yet do not treat the resulting 
systems as immaterial or intangible. In the remainder of this section I will give some 
examples systems used by scientists that are both abstract and concrete. The ﬁrst is an 
experiment from plant ecology, aimed at determining the cause of competition between 
two plants. In this experiment, Jarchow and Cook (2009) conducted a series of 
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experiments with the invasive aquatic cattail species Typha angustifolia and the native 
wetland species Bolboschoenus ﬂuviatilis, which inhabit North American lakes. They took 
specimens from both species back to the greenhouse and grew them in a single 
controlled environment.  The results showed that T. angustifolia had a competitive 
advantage over B. ﬂuviatilis because of allelopathy (the exudation of toxins from its 
roots). These toxins inhibit the growth of the native species (with a resulting 50% 
reduction in biomass) which allows the invader to soak up the limited nutrients in the 
soil. Above ground, the invader rapidly increases in size and shades the native species, 
which further reduces its growth rate. 
! It seems strange to think of this experiment as an abstract system, if we retain the 
idea that abstract objects are immaterial. The system of the plants in the greenhouse is 
as tangible and physically instantiated as the plants in the lake ecosystem. However, by 
bringing the plants into the greenhouse, the scientists are excluding all the other parts 
and properties of the lake ecosystem. The experiment, conducted in a simpliﬁed 
environment, allowed the scientists to identify the existence of competition between the 
two plants and to isolate the cause of the competitive advantage of T. angustifolia. They 
achieved this by being able to isolate the important factors from the system and 
omitting or parametrizing the other, irrelevant factors. In other words, the scientists 
started off considering a complete system with all its parts and properties (the lake 
ecosystem) and ended up with a system with fewer parts (fewer individuals from fewer 
species) and properties (the particular plants are not thought of as prey, or as 
contributing to the uptake of atmospheric CO2).  
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! Moreover, this example is not a one-off case. The very nature of experimentation 
in ecology is based on the idea that ecosystems are very complex and identifying the 
most important causal factors that lead to ecological phenomena involves controlling 
and parametrizing other factors. The same is true of experiments in evolutionary 
biology. Geneticists test mutation rates in populations of E. coli and Drosophila in 
controlled laboratory settings. The point of those experiments is to isolate the genetic 
factors that affect mutation rates, without the compounding or mitigating effects of 
developmental and environmental variation. Even further aﬁeld, experiments in 
psychology are conducted in controlled environments, with the aim of minimizing 
irrelevant effects. 
! Abstraction is also an important step in modeling. As with experimentation, 
when scientists model a particular phenomenon in a system, they do not model the 
entire system but a subset of parts and properties of that system. The identiﬁcation of 
which parts of the system are important and the omission of those parts that are not, is 
another example of the process of abstraction. 
! I will illustrate with an example from population ecology. The marmots of 
Vancouver Island (Marmota vancouverensis) are classiﬁed as critically endangered. It is 
estimated that their population has dropped 80%-90% since the 1980’s and currently 
consists of roughly 200 individuals (Brashares et al. 2010). Ecologists studying these 
social rodents wish to understand how to bring back the population from the brink of 
extinction. In order to that, they must understand the causes of the decline in the 
marmot population. A good place to start is to look at a standard model of population 
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growth and check if the actual marmot population deviates from the model (this was 
the exact strategy undertaken by Brashares and colleagues) (ibid). There are a number 
of models in ecology which measure population growth; the logistic growth model 
(originally developed in 1838 by Pierre Verhulst) is often used in the early stages of a 
study, because it is not entirely unrealistic (as it takes into account the effect of density 
on population growth) but at the same time it is quite simple (Fig 1). 
! Fig 1. Logistic Growth Model
!
                      
                    dN                N                   = rN (1-  )                        (1)                 dt                  K         
! (N) is the number of organisms in population. (r) is the intrinsic growth rate of the 
! population. (K) is the carrying capacity of the environment: the total number of organisms a 
! particular environment can support. 
!  This model measures how the growth rate of a population (N) is limited by the 
density of the population itself. (r) is the intrinsic growth rate, the maximum possible 
growth rate of the population. It is roughly equivalent to the number of deaths in the 
population subtracted from the number of births in that population.2  The second 
important component of the model is (K), the carrying capacity of the environment. (K) 
imposes the upper limit on population growth because it is the maximum number of 
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reproduce slowly and therefore have a low (r) whereas most insects and plants have high reproductive 
rates and therefore have a high value of (r).
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individual organisms that a particular environment can support. Factors that affect (K) 
are the environment’s resources, yet they vary across environments and species.3 !
! There are two sets of abstractions from the Vancouver Island (VI) ecosystem that 
need to occur so that the population growth of actual marmots can be compared with 
the prediction of the logistic growth model. The ﬁrst is the elimination of parts that are 
not relevant. This includes the elimination of all units that are not relevant for 
measuring the population growth of marmots. The other animals, most of the plants on 
VI, and inanimate parts such as the marmot burrows will be omitted. The only other 
parts of the system that will be included are the plants that the marmots feed on (for 
example, cow parsnips, Kinnikinnick-fruit and huckleberries). The second set of 
abstractions concerns the properties that are relevant for the experiment or model. 
Properties such as eye color, fur length and fur color will not be relevant, because they 
do not affect short-term population growth. On the other hand, properties such as sex, 
time spent foraging and metabolic rate are relevant because they determine (r) the 
intrinsic growth rate of the marmot population. 
! With these abstractions in place, scientists were able to ﬁgure out that the growth 
rate of the marmot population on VI was falling, despite being far from close to the 
carrying capacity of the island. The reason for this is a phenomenon known as the Alee 
effect (named after Warder Clyde Allee who ﬁrst described it). This effect occurs in 
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3 For example, in the case of plants, access to sunlight is very important, as are elements such as 
phosphorus and nitrogen. The amount and availability of each of these factors in the system will affect the 
(K) of plant populations. For many social mammals, space is very important as it affects the location of 
territory or the number  of nesting sites. For example, the size of beaver populations in an area is partly 
determined by where each family can build its dam (and each damʼs proximity to other dams).
San Diego, CA -83-
small populations when a fall in population density decreases the growth rate instead of 
increasing it. Brashares et al. found that this instance of the Allee effect was caused by a 
‘social meltdown’ (ibid). Unlike other marmots, VI marmots are very social and the 
decline in population leads to difﬁculty in ﬁnding mates, which reduces the growth rate 
even more. 
! This example is aimed at showing that abstraction is an integral part of modeling 
in science. In the paper, the logistic growth model is compared with the actual 
population of marmots, considered in isolation from the other parts of the ecosystem 
(ibid). There is no reason to think that the collection of marmots and the properties of 
their population is not concrete. Nonetheless, the population of VI marmots has fewer 
parts than the entire ecosystem on VI. In this second sense, it is more abstract that the 
entire VI ecosystem. 
! To recap the argument so far, there are two views of abstraction: the material 
view and the omission view. On the material view abstract objects are immaterial. On 
the omission view abstract objects are simply incomplete, and can be either material or 
immaterial. The two views are easily confounded because immaterial abstract objects 
result from the process of omission. However, there are a number of examples in science 
where the process of omission leads to physical objects or systems. Thus, the material 
view cannot account for all the objects or systems that arise from the process of 
omission. In contrast, the omission view accounts for all systems that result from 
omission, irrespective of whether or not they are concrete. Thus, if we want a single, 
uniﬁed notion of scientiﬁc abstraction, then we should opt for the omission view.
Abstract and Complete
8
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -84-
III. Abstraction and Idealization 
!
! In the introduction, I mentioned another criticism of the material view of 
abstraction, namely that abstraction and idealization are not distinct concepts and they 
can be used interchangeably to signify any distortion in the scientiﬁc representation of a 
phenomenon. This view, endorsed explicitly by some (Humphreys 1995) and implicitly 
by many more (McMullin 1985), implies that there is no real or interesting distinction 
between abstraction and idealization. The two processes are thought to be inextricably 
linked, if not identical, and attempting to separate them results in confusion. The main 
proponent of the material view of abstraction is Paul Humphreys, who argues that in 
order to talk about abstract systems we usually have to represent them in some manner, 
and this representation will not be concrete (Humphreys 1995). However, idealized 
systems are also representations that are not concrete. According to Humphreys, the 
two types of representations are, therefore, not easily distinguishable. 
! This diagnosis is quite apt. Cartwright (the main proponent of the material view) 
states that when we idealize, we start off with a concrete object and “mentally rearrange 
some of its inconvenient features -some of its speciﬁc properties- before we try to write 
down a law for it” (Cartwright 1994 187). In contrast, when we abstract, we strip away 
properties from a system “in our minds” (Cartwright 1994). Thus, for example, when 
we omit all the irrelevant properties from the west pediment of the Parthenon, we are 
left with the shape of a triangle. This shape cannot be a true triangle though, as it is not 
a perfect geometrical shape. This is because the west pediment contains imperfections 
which are retained in the process of abstraction. According to Cartwright, this does not 
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really matter, as we can pretend that the abstract shape is a true triangle. The 
imperfections are already present in the real system and are not the result of our 
abstraction. In addition, these imperfections are themselves insigniﬁcant, and for all 
intents and purposes the abstract triangle is close enough to a true triangle. Thus, 
despite the imperfections retained in the process of abstraction, we are close enough to 
the real systems that we are entitled to pretend that our abstract shape is a true triangle.
! The problem, as Humphreys points out, is that once we start pretending what a 
system is like, we blur the lines between abstraction and idealization. We cannot 
legitimately focus on the triangle’s geometrical properties because an imperfect concrete 
triangle will remain imperfect after we abstract. If we want our abstract triangle to have 
geometric properties, then we have to add them to abstract triangle. In the case of true 
abstraction all the properties of the abstract object already exist in the real world. Hence, 
as soon as we start pretending, we are adding properties to our system that the material 
triangle does not have. In other words we are misrepresenting, or distorting the system. 
If this is the case, then abstraction and idealization seem very similar. To put the point 
differently, adding geometrical properties to a triangle is very much like assuming that 
a population in biology is inﬁnite. No triangle in the actual world is perfect, just as no 
population of organisms in the world is inﬁnite. In both cases, misrepresenting the 
system by adding properties is extremely useful, as it helps us model the system with 
the use of mathematics. Nonetheless, misrepresentation of a system, according to 
proponents of the material view, counts as idealization.
Abstract and Complete
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! I agree with Humphreys that this is an important problem for the material view 
of abstraction. As soon as we disassociate abstract objects from concrete objects, then we 
are abstracting ‘in our minds’ and representing them imperfectly. However, this 
criticism loses its force when pitted against the omission view of abstraction. On this 
view, abstraction is ‘mere omission’, i.e., we only abstract properties that are irrelevant 
for our system (Jones 2005). In the case of the west pediment, these properties are the 
pediments color, the fact that it contains statues, that is made of marble. What we are 
left with is a  concrete shape that is also triangular. Importantly, this triangular shape is 
not a true triangle, it is simply approximates a true triangle. Mere omission cannot give 
rise to an immaterial true triangle from the imperfect and concrete pediment. 
! On the omission view, abstracting from the west pediment is like abstracting 
parts and properties from the VI ecosystem in order to explain the population size of 
the VI marmots. In the case of VI, the ideal population is represented by the model 
which is compared to the size of the actual population of marmots. Similarly, a true 
triangle can be compared to the actual approximately triangular shape of the west 
pediment. The difference between the material and omission views is that in the latter, 
there is no pretending. On the omission view, we can identify differences are between 
the abstract and ideal systems. Hence abstraction and idealization can be kept distinct. 
! A distinct criticism which does bear against the omission view attempts to 
assimilate abstraction to idealization because both fundamentally involve distortion.4 
The idea is that omitting aspects of a system results in the misrepresentation of the 
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view (Weisberg 2007, Frigg & Hartmann 2009) believe instead that there are different kinds of idealization 
in science and that abstraction is subsumed under one of these kinds of idealization.
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system. Consequently, abstraction is a special case of idealization. In other words, no 
parts or properties of a system are strictly speaking ‘irrelevant’, hence they cannot be 
omitted from without the system being distorted. Omission necessarily results in 
distortion, because systems in nature are irreducibly complex. For example, ecosystem 
ecology is subﬁeld of ecology that advocates holistic approach that views ecosystems as 
wholes or even individuals (Odenbaugh 2007). This is in direct contrast to the subﬁeld 
of population ecology, where population dynamics are thought to capture and explain 
ecological phenomena. The big difference between the two approaches is that 
population ecologists work with more abstract models, as they omit a number of factors 
(especially abiotic factors) as irrelevant. On the other hand, ecosystem ecologists think 
that omitting abiotic factors from complex ecosystems results in overly simplistic 
models. The problem with that is that various processes which involve abiotic factors 
are themselves omitted or misrepresented, which in turn gives a distorted view of the 
way an ecosystem functions. In other words, it is the omission of factors from the 
system that leads to its misinterpretation.
! Thomson-Jones attempts to avoid this problem by restricting abstraction to 
precisely those omissions that do not result in misrepresentation (Jones 2005). As stated 
above, a ‘mere omission’ does not misrepresent a particular feature of a system because 
it retains ‘complete silence’ with respect to whether the system contains the feature 
(ibid). So if an omission results in a misrepresentation, then it is not the type of omission 
that is part of abstraction. The problem is that the criticism presented here is much 
stronger. The criticism denies the possibility of ‘mere omission’ altogether.  
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! I agree with the critics that omission can be thought of as distortion. Still, I do not 
think that it should undermine the importance of abstraction in science. For the 
remainder of this section I will put forward some preliminary proposals which show 
how the omission view can help distinguishing between abstraction and idealization. 
The ﬁrst point is that denying the possibility of ‘mere omission’ altogether is too strong. 
Phenomena in the world have a very large number of parts and properties and 
scientists always omit some of them in their experiments and models. Some of these 
properties do not have an effect on the study. For example, one of the properties of the 
VI marmots is eye color. The paper does not make any reference to this property, 
because the scientists did not think that it was relevant for population growth. I think it 
is safe to say that the property of eye color which was present in the system, was 
‘merely omitted’ from the model. 
! The upshot is that abstraction and idealization are distinct processes that give 
rise to different types of phenomena. Therefore the norms that govern these processes 
should also be different. There is a substantial literature that deals with the 
methodology and evaluation of idealizations (see for example Giere 1988, Weisberg 
2007a). An idealization misrepresents a factor that is considered important for the 
phenomenon of interest, by adding properties to it or changing some of its properties. 
For example, scientists may assume that a population is inﬁnite, in order to construct an 
evolutionary model that is computationally tractable. In order to be successful, the 
idealized system must be informative about the real system, despite the 
misrepresentations. This can be achieved if the idealized system is to some extent 
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isomorphic to its real-world counterpart, or if it is sufﬁciently similar to it (van Fraassen 
1980, Weisberg 2007b). 
! The case of abstraction is different. Phenomena in nature have many more parts 
and properties than one can include in an experiment or model. Hence, when scientists 
abstract they want to preserve only those parts and properties that are relevant for the 
phenomenon they are studying. These omissions help them make sense of the 
phenomenon so they can study it. In many cases it might be impossible to study a 
phenomenon without omitting a large number irrelevant factors. As stated above, when 
abstracting, scientists aim for ‘mere omission’. Therefore, the evaluation of an 
abstraction should focus on whether the it is a case of ‘mere omission’ or not. To my 
knowledge, there is no account that fully speciﬁes a method for the evaluation of 
abstractions.5 It is usually left to the discretion of the scientist.  
! It unlikely that the methods used to evaluate idealizations (such as isomorphism 
or similarity) can be applied to the evaluation of abstraction. Abstract systems are 
already very similar to their real-world counterparts, because they are concrete and real. 
The differences between concrete systems at different levels of abstraction are much 
more ﬁne-grained than differences between idealized and real systems. Also, an abstract 
system can be to a large extent isomorphic to a complete system, yet lack a relevant 
property. For example, an experiment that looked at competition between T.angustifolia 
and B.ﬂuviatilis, which focused only on above-ground competition and did not take into 
account below-ground competition would be isomorphic to the real-world ecosystem, 
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Jones 2005, Weisberg 2007). Still, these accounts are focused on describing the process of abstraction 
and do not give a generalized account of how abstractions should be evaluated. 
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yet it would also be missing relevant aspects of complete system.6 Thus, it seems that a 
different method is needed for a full and generalized evaluation of abstraction in 
science. This account will have to wait for another paper. The purpose of this paper was 
to show that before any such account is possible, the omission view must be distanced 
from the material view of abstraction and hence from idealization.  
IV. Conclusion: Abstract and Complete
! The two notions of abstraction captured by the material view and the omission 
view respectively, are easily confused. The examples that are usually used to illustrate 
discussions of abstraction exacerbate the situation, as they are often taken from 
mathematics and mathematical objects are seen as paradigm examples of abstract 
objects. While the distinction might not be necessary in mathematics, it is very 
important for science, especially biology. Failing to distinguish between the two notions 
undermines the role that abstraction plays in scientiﬁc experimentation and modeling, 
as it is often subsumed under the concept of idealization. Keeping these two concepts 
separate will give us a more accurate picture of scientiﬁc methodology and will help in 
the formulation of a generalized account for the evaluation of the process of abstraction. 
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the effects of competition can be seen by looking at the differences in shoot biomass of the competing 
plants. Still, without the inclusion of below-ground competition and its effect on root biomass, the cause of 
competition could be missed. That is, if the scientists had not included the below-ground competition in 
their experiment, they could have overlooked the importance of allelopathy as the main cause of 
T.angustifoliaʼs competitive advantage. 
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Abstract 
I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Bechtel and 
Craver is unsatisfactory, since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the 
same level and is incompatible with Bechtel and Craver’s account of downward 
causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for 
analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more 
well‐defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that 
there is no distinct problem of downward causation.  
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1. Introduction 
The notion of “level” appears in several contexts in philosophy of science. For 
example, the debates on downward causation, mechanistic explanation, reduction, 
and emergence are conducted in the framework of levels. However, there is no 
agreement on the definition of a level, or on the criteria for distinguishing levels. 
Craver and Bechtel (2007) have recently presented a theory of “levels of 
mechanisms”, which has gained broad acceptance and is currently the most 
coherent and promising account of levels. They argue for levels of mechanisms, 
where the relata are mechanisms at higher levels and their components at lower 
levels. Importantly, these are not general levels of organization, but identified with 
regard to a certain mechanism. Craver and Bechtel claim that although levels of 
mechanisms is certainly not the only sense in which “level” is employed in 
neuroscience or philosophy, it captures the central sense in which explanations in 
neuroscience span multiple levels. They also employ this theory of levels to deal 
with the problem of downward causation, arguing that what appears as downward 
causation can be explained away as same‐level causation that has mechanistically 
mediated effects.  
In this paper, I will (1) show that the mechanistic account of levels is unsatisfying, 
(2) defend an alternative “deflationary” account of levels, where the notion of level 
is replaced with the more fundamental notions of composition and scale, and (3) 
explore the consequences this has for the debate on downward causation.  My focus 
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is on neuroscience and downward causation, but the general arguments I raise 
against levels apply more broadly.  
In the next section, I will briefly present the account of levels of mechanisms. In 
section 3, I will show that this account fails as a theory of levels, since it does not 
provide any plausible same‐level criterion. In section 4, I argue that we should get 
rid of the problematic notion of “level” altogether and replace it with notions such as 
scale and composition, which are far better understood. In section 5, I explore some 
of the consequences this has for the debate on downward causation.  
 
2. Levels of Mechanisms 
In most philosophical theories of levels, the core idea is that levels are 
compositional:  wholes are at a higher level than the parts that they are composed of 
(e.g., Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Wimsatt 1994; Kim 1999). The mechanistic 
account of levels retains this basic idea, with one important amendment: the relata 
are not just wholes and parts; they are behaving mechanisms and their active 
components. This means that the higher‐level entity is an active mechanism 
performing some function, and the lower‐level entities are components that 
contribute to the mechanism for this function.  
Craver gives the following characterization: “In levels of mechanisms, the relata are 
behaving mechanisms at higher levels and their components at lower levels. These 
relata are properly conceived neither as entities nor as activities; rather, they should 
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be understood as acting entities. The interlevel relationship is as follows: X’s Φ‐ing 
is at a lower mechanistic level than Ψ‐ing if and only if X’s Φ‐ing is a component in 
the mechanism for S’s Ψ‐ing. Lower‐level components are organized together to 
form higher‐level components.” (Craver 2007, 189) 
In a similar vein, albeit in more vague terms, Bechtel writes: “Within a mechanism, 
the relevant parts are … working parts—the parts that perform the operations that 
enable the mechanism to realize the phenomenon of interest. … It is the set of 
working parts that are organized and whose operations are coordinated to realize 
the phenomenon of interest that constitute a level” (Bechtel 2008, 146).  
Craver’s (2007, 165‐170) main example is the case of spatial memory and LTP (Long 
Term Potentiation), where he identifies four levels. On the top of the hierarchy, 
there is the level of spatial memory, which involves various types of memory and 
learning. The level of spatial map formation includes the structural and 
computational properties of various brain regions involved in spatial memory, most 
importantly the hippocampus. The cellular­electrophysiological level includes 
neurons that depolarize and fire, synapses that undergo LTP, action potentials that 
propagate, and so on. At the bottom of this hierarchy is the molecular level, where 
we find NMDA and AMPA receptors, Ca2+ and Mg2+ ions, etc. Entities at each lower 
level are components in a higher‐level mechanism: for example, the hippocampus is 
an active component in the spatial memory mechanism, synapses are active 
components in the hippocampal mechanism of memory consolidation, and finally, 
NMDA receptors are active components of the synaptic mechanism of LTP.    
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Importantly, Craver and Bechtel emphasize that levels of mechanisms are not 
general levels of organization in the vein of Oppenheim & Putnam (1958), 
Churchland & Sejnowski (1992) or Wimsatt (1994). “A consequence of this view is 
that levels are identified only with respect to a given mechanism; this approach does 
not support a conception of levels that extend across the natural world” (Bechtel 
2007).”How many levels there are, and which levels are included, are questions to 
be answered on a case‐by‐case basis by discovering which components at which size 
scales are explanatorily relevant for a given phenomenon” (Craver 2007, 191). 
Bechtel and Craver see this as a point in favor of the mechanistic account of levels, 
since accounts of general levels of organization are ridden with problems: it makes 
little sense to compare the “level” of glaciers and pyramidal cells, or black holes and 
microchips. However, the limitations Bechtel and Craver impose are quite extreme: 
in the mechanistic framework, it does not make sense to ask whether things that 
belong to different mechanisms are at the same level or not. We cannot even say 
that a certain molecule in a hippocampus is at a lower level than the hippocampus, 
unless the molecule is a component of some hippocampal mechanism (Craver 2007, 
191).  
Even within one mechanism, things that do not stand in a part‐whole relation may 
not be in a level‐relation to each other (see, e.g., Craver 2007, 193). One salient 
example of this is that there is no sense in which the subcomponents of different 
components of the mechanism are at the same or different level. For example, a 
component C1 of mechanism M is at one level lower than M, and a subcomponent S1 
San Diego, CA -97-
of C1 is one level lower than the component C1. Another component C2 of M is also 
one level lower than the mechanism M, and its subcomponent S2 is one level lower 
than the component C2. However, according to the mechanistic account, the 
question whether subcomponents S1 and S2 are at the same or different level makes 
no sense, since they do not stand in a part‐whole relation to each other. I return to 
this issue in the next section. 
To summarize, the key features of this account are the following: (1) Levels are 
“local” – they are always defined relative to one mechanism and the phenomenon of 
interest. (2) The relata are mechanisms at higher levels and components or “acting 
entities” or “working parts” at lower levels. (3) Things are assigned to different 
levels solely based on the part‐whole (or component‐mechanism) relation: wholes 
are at a higher level than their parts; parts are at a lower level than the wholes they 
belong to. In the next section, I show that these features lead to problems, 
particularly feature (3).  
 
3. Components, Mechanisms, and Problems 
Let us consider the mechanism for phototransduction (the conversion of light 
signals into electrophysiological information) in the retina. Components in this 
mechanism include rod and cone cells, which are morphologically and functionally 
distinct types of cells. However, the phototransduction cascade in both rods and 
cones involves similar components: G proteins (transducin), cyclic guanosine 
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monophosphate (cGMP), cGMP‐gated ion channels, and so on. The cGMP‐gated 
channels in rods and the same types of channels in cones are subcomponents of 
different components of the mechanisms for light adaptation. They do not stand in a 
part‐whole relation. Hence, according to the mechanistic account, there is no sense 
in which they are at the same or higher or lower level with regard to each other.  
However, this is quite implausible. cGMP‐gated ion channels in rods and cGMP‐gated 
ion channels in cones are same types of things with same properties, at the same 
scale, in the same system, and playing a corresponding role in their respective 
mechanisms (i.e., they are the same types of “acting entities”). If the mechanistic 
account implies that there is no sense in which these ion channels are at the same 
level, something seems to have gone wrong, or at least the levels metaphor is used 
in a way that is extremely unintuitive (I return to this in Section 4). 
Things get even more problematic when we consider subcomponents that are 
causally interacting with each other. For example, consider synaptic transmission 
between rod cells and (OFF‐type) bipolar cells. In the mechanism for synaptic 
transmission between these cells, active components of the rod cell include synaptic 
vesicles, which in turn have glutamate molecules as their subcomponents. The 
active components of the bipolar cells include (AMPA) glutamate receptors, which 
have “binding sites” as active components. When the rod cell is firing, the glutamate 
molecules in the vesicles are released, and they bind to the binding sites of the 
glutamate receptors.  
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This means that subcomponents (glutamate molecules) of one component (synaptic 
vesicles) are causally interacting with subcomponents (binding sites) of a different 
component (AMPA receptors).1 Yet, Craver and Bechtel explicitly state that there is 
no sense in which subcomponents of different components are at the same level. 
This is not only peculiar, but also in fundamental conflict with Craver and Bechtel’s 
(2007) account of cross‐level causation: they explicitly defend the view that there is 
no cross‐level or downward causation – causation is an intralevel matter, and effects 
can be then “mechanistically mediated” upwards or downwards in the mechanism. 
In other words, being at the same level is a necessary condition for causal 
interaction. However, we have now seen that if we follow Craver and Bechtel’s own 
theory of levels, there are clear cases where there are causal interactions between 
entities that are not at the same level. Thus, there is a fundamental conflict between 
the mechanistic theory of levels and the mechanistic account of downward 
causation.2  
                                                        
1 This is not an isolated example ‐ Fazekas and Kertesz (2011) have recently pointed 
out other examples and argued that, quite generally, if the components of a 
mechanism causally interact, also their subcomponents have to causally interact. 
2 I do not want to discuss the nature of causation here, and my main points hold 
independently of any particular theory of causation. However, the account of 
causation most naturally fitting the general framework here would be the 
interventionist theory of causation (e.g., Woodward 2003), which also Craver 
(2007) explicitly endorses. 
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These problems are related to the fact that the mechanistic account gives no 
satisfactory criterion for determining when things are at the same level. According 
to Craver, there is only a partial answer to this question: ”X and S are at the same 
level of mechanisms only if X and S are components in the same mechanism, X's Φ‐
ing is not a component in S's Ψ‐ing, and S's Ψ‐ing is not a component in X's Φ‐ing.” 
(2007, 192). In other words, what places two items at the same mechanistic level is 
that they are in the same mechanism, and neither is a component of the other 
(Craver 2007, 195). 
One way of interpreting this is that if any two components in the mechanism are not 
in a part‐whole relation with each other, they are at the same level. However, this 
would have some bizarre consequences. Consider components X and S in 
mechanism M. They are at the same level, since X is not component of S and S is not 
a component of X. Consider then a subcomponent S1 of S. It is also not a component 
of X, and X is not a component of S1. Then X and S1 are also at the same level, as well 
as all the further subcomponents of S1 and all their subcomponents! This would be a 
rather strange account of the same‐level relation.  
Supposedly the idea is rather that things that are components in a mechanism but 
not components in any intermediate component are at the same level. For example, 
rod A is at the same level as rod B, since they are components of the 
phototransduction mechanism and do not stand in a part‐whole relation, but a 
cGMP‐gated ion channel in rod B is not at the same level as rod A, because the cGMP‐
gated ion channel is a component of rod B, and not a “direct” component of the 
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phototransduction mechanism. Let us call such components that are components in 
the mechanism directly and not in virtue of being components in another 
component direct components.  
If no further restrictions are added, direct components can include things of 
radically different sizes with very different causal properties. For example, direct 
components in the mechanism for light transduction in rod cells include things such 
as the outer segment of the cell, which has the function of capturing photons and 
may contain billions of opsin molecules. On the other hand, direct components in the 
mechanism also include single photons hitting the cell, or Na+‐ions in the cell ‐ these 
are also not components in any intermediate component of the mechanism. It 
follows that rod outer segments are at the same level of mechanism as photons or 
Na+‐ions, even though they differ in scale with a factor of at least 107 .  
Thus, it seems that the same‐level criterion that Craver proposes is both too weak 
and too strong. It is too weak because it implies that in many cases things that are 
causally interacting and have very similar properties are not at the same level. It is 
too strong because it implies that in many cases things that are of radically different 
size and that interact at completely different force or time scales are at the same 
level. This (1) makes the criterion ineffective for distinguishing between interlevel 
and intralevel causation, and (2) streches the metaphor of “level” near the breaking 
point. 
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4. Levels: A Deflationary Account 
The main source for the problems outlined above is that the account of Craver and 
Bechtel is too limited as a theory of levels. It is not an undue exaggeration to say that 
the account of levels of mechanisms is in fact an account of mechanistic composition: 
it relies entirely on the component‐mechanism relation and simply labels whole 
mechanisms as being at higher “levels” and their components as being at lower 
“levels”. For this reason, it is difficult to define any reasonable same‐level relation in 
this framework: composition only relates parts and wholes, and not parts with other 
parts or wholes with other wholes.  
My suggestion is, first of all, to take the approach of Craver and Bechtel into its 
logical conclusion and to deflate the notion of mechanistic levels into simply 
mechanistic composition. We can simply reinterpret the mechanistic account of 
levels as an account of mechanistic composition, as long as we strip away the idea of 
being at the “same” mechanistic level and the related claims about same‐level 
causation. I fully agree with Craver and Bechtel in that explanations in neuroscience 
refer to robust properties and generalizations throughout the compositional 
hierarchy – for example, in the explanation for phototransduction we need to 
consider the 11‐cis‐retinal molecule changing shape, the rod photoreceptor cell 
hyperpolarizing, the retinal network computing, the eye converting light to 
electrophysiological signals, and so on.  
However, it is obvious from section 3 that this will not be sufficient as a framework 
for dealing with issues such as downward causation. Therefore, the second step of 
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my solution is to take into account the dimension of scale, which is largely 
independent from composition. In his discussion of levels, Craver (2007, ch. 5) 
acknowledges the importance of size scale, but argues that it is secondary to 
composition: components cannot be larger that the wholes they are part of, so in 
this sense the size dimension partly follows the compositional dimension. However, 
we have also seen above that composition and size often come apart: the direct 
components of a mechanism can be of radically different sizes, and similarity or 
difference of size does not imply that entities are in any way compositionally 
related. Composition and scale are largely independent dimensions (see also 
Richardson and Stephan 2007; Rueger & McGivern 2010).  
The most commonly discussed scale is size scale, but also other scales such as the 
temporal scale (the speed of interactions) or the force scale (the strength of 
interactions) may be just as important in understanding complex systems (see, e.g., 
Simon 1962; Rueger & McGivern 2010). For example, molecular interactions happen 
at a much faster time scale than interactions between neurons, which are again 
faster than interactions between brain areas. The force scale is particularly 
important when considering physical and chemical interactions: for example, the 
forces binding subatomic particles (quarks) together are much stronger than the 
forces binding atoms together, which are again stronger than the forces binding 
molecules together. For the sake of clarity, I focus here mostly on the size scale. 
One problem of the mechanistic account of levels was that its same‐level relation 
leads to results that seem arbitrary and unintuitive: for example, there is no sense in 
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which subcomponents of components are at the same mechanistic level, even when 
they are same types of things, while entities of radically different sizes can be at the 
same level. In my view, it is better to get rid of the idea of being at the “same level” 
altogether, and just to focus on how things are related on different scales (see also 
Potochnik & McGill 2012). For example, cGMP‐gated ion channel are obviously 
found at the same size (and temporal) scale than cGMP‐gated ion channels in cones, 
while rod outer segments are found at very different size (and temporal) scales than 
Na+ ions.  
One outcome of analyzing levels in terms of scale and composition is that we no 
longer need any distinct notion of level. If scale and composition are sufficient for 
analyzing explanations in neuroscience, the notion of “level” does not add anything 
to our conceptual toolkit. Explanations in neuroscience are “multilevel” only in the 
sense that they refer to robust properties and generalizations at various stages in 
the compositional hierarchy and at different (size) scales.  
This approach is also supported by neuroscientific practice. In contrast to what 
Craver (2007, ch. 5) suggests, levels talk is not very common in neuroscience, 
neither in journal articles nor in standard textbooks such as Kandel, Jessell and 
Schwartz (2000) or Purves et al. (2004). In many articles (see, e.g., Malenka & Bear 
2004) the term does not come up at all. When it does appear, it is most often 
referring to levels of processing, such as the different stages of visual information 
processing (the retina, the LGN, the visual cortex, and so on), which are something 
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very different from levels of mechanisms, and “levels” only in a metaphorical sense.3 
This supports my point that the notion of level does not pick up any distinct or 
important category.4 
If one insists on using the term “level” to refer to stages of composition or to 
different size scales (or to various other things – scale and composition are merely 
the senses most relevant in this context), one has to at least make clear in exactly 
which sense the term is used. However, the danger in this is that other intuitions 
about levels may creep in – for example, when talking of compositional stages as 
“levels”, one is easily lead to think that things can be at the “same level” of 
composition.  
 
5. Downward Causation and Levels 
 I have argued above that the idea of levels is thoroughly problematic, at least in 
philosophy of neuroscience, and that we should abandon the project of trying to 
define levels. Let us now turn to the issue of downward or top‐down causation that 
has been traditionally discussed in the framework of levels (e.g., Campbell 1974; 
                                                        
3 Of course, the word “level” often comes up in the trivial sense of “luminance level”, 
“level of oxygen”, “level of noise”, etc. 
4 Ladyman and Ross (2007, 54) reach a similar conclusion in the philosophy of 
physics.  
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Emmeche et al. 2000; Kim 1992, 1999; Craver and Bechtel 2007; Kistler 2009).5 The 
question is whether higher‐level causes can have lower‐level effects. In spite of 
various arguments to the effect that downward causation is not possible, the debate 
keeps resurfacing, partly because (neuro)scientists often rely on top‐down 
experiments and explanations that seem to imply some kind of downward 
causation.  
As we have seen above, Craver and Bechtel (2007) have proposed a novel solution 
to the problem of downward causation. They argue that what appears to be 
downward causation in top‐down experiments and elsewhere should be understood 
as normal same‐level causation that has “mechanistically mediated” effects 
downwards in the mechanism: there is no causation from higher to lower levels or 
the other way around.  
Considering the discussion in the previous two sections, it is clear that the reason 
why the solution of Craver and Bechtel does not work is that it relies on the 
distinction between same‐level and cross‐level causation. We have seen how 
difficult it is to define the same‐level relation, or levels in general, in a coherent and 
scientifically plausible way. The term “level” does not seem to pick up any distinct 
                                                        
5 In a recent article, Love (2012) discusses top‐down causation in terms of levels, 
but in a way that comes closer to my approach: he argues that there are many 
different kinds of level‐hierarchies and correspondingly many different kinds of top‐
down causation. 
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category in neuroscience. For this reason, basing the account of downward 
causation on the distinction between same‐level causation (which is supposed to be 
unproblematic) and cross‐level causation (which is supposed to be unacceptable) 
necessarily leads to problems.  
One possibility would be to try to reformulate Craver and Bechtel’s solution in terms 
of scale and composition. If we could distinguish between same‐ and different‐
“level” causation in terms of scale and composition, perhaps the solution could still 
work. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case. As I have already pointed out 
in the previous section, composition as such does not involve any same‐“level” 
relation. Regarding (size) scale, the problem is that there is absolutely no reason to 
restrict causation to things of same or similar size: elephants squash flies, the fission 
of uranium atoms causes cities to disintegrate, and so on. Therefore, we have to 
conclude that Craver and Bechtel’s approach downward causation is unsatisfactory. 
If we abandon the framework of levels and focus on scale and composition, what 
appears to be downward causation reduces to two categories: (1) Causes that act 
from the mechanism as a whole to the components of the same mechanism, and (2) 
causation between entities of different (size) scales. In my view, it is fairly clear that 
there can be no causation between things that are related by composition (category 
(1)), since composition is a form of non‐causal dependency. It does not seem right to 
say that, e.g., the retina as a whole causes a rod cell in that retina to fire. On the other 
hand, as the examples in the previous paragraph show, causation between things of 
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different size6 is in principle unproblematic (category (2)). In this way, putative 
cases of top‐down or downward causation can be analyzed away in terms of 
composition and scale.7 
One remaining problem for “downward” causation of category (2) is Kim’s 
argument against higher‐level causes. It might prima facie seem that getting rid of 
levels dissolves this problem, since it is often formulated in terms of levels: the 
argument states that a higher‐level property cannot be a genuine cause for a lower‐
level property, since (due to physical causal closure) the lower‐level property 
already has a sufficient lower‐level cause (see, e.g., Kim 1992; 1999). However, the 
idea of “levels” is not essential in Kim’s argument: what is at issue there is the 
tension created by two competing (and non‐causally correlated) causes for the same 
effect. Without the framework of levels, the argument does not disappear, but turns 
into the general causal exclusion argument (see, e.g., Kim (2002) Bennett (2008) for 
more).  
                                                        
6 Whether the same holds for other scales, such as the temporal or the force scale, is 
an open question that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
7 One way of interpreting Craver and Bechtel (2007) is that their main point is quite 
similar, namely that apparent causation from parts to wholes or wholes to parts can 
be analyzed away in terms of normal causal relations. If this is the case, it is 
unfortunate that the theory of levels and the distinction between “same‐level” and 
“different‐level” causation is so prominent in the paper, since this makes the account 
unnecessarily complex and confusing.  
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What Craver and Bechtel (2007) are considering, and what I have discussed in this 
section, is the intelligibility of causes acting from higher to lower levels. I have 
argued that downward causation is not intelligible in the sense of causation from a 
mechanism as a whole to the parts of that same mechanism, but causation from 
higher to lower scales is as such unproblematic. There may be real problems related 
to causation in neuroscience, such as the causal exclusion problem, but there is no 
distinct problem of downward causation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have argued that the account of “levels of mechanisms” is 
unsatisfactory as a theory of levels, since it does not include a plausible same‐level 
relation, leads to extremely unintuitive results, and is in conflict with the account of 
downward causation proposed by Craver and Bechtel. Generally speaking, there 
seems to be no need for a distinct notion or theory of levels in philosophy of mind or 
neuroscience; it is better to rely on more familiar and well‐defined notions such as 
scale and composition. With this approach, apparent cases of downward causation 
can be analyzed away. 
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1. Introduction  
Stem cells are defined as cells that can give rise to more cells like themselves, as well as more 
specialized, or differentiated, cells.1 These two cellular processes are termed, respectively, self-
renewal and differentiation.  A striking feature of stem cell biology is the sheer variety of stem 
cells: adult, embryonic, pluripotent, induced, neural, muscle, skin, blood, etc.  This diversity is 
exploited in political debates over stem cell funding, and complicates public discussions about 
stem cells and their therapeutic promise.  Stem cells derived from human embryos are cast as 
ethically dubious alternatives to so-called “adult stem cells” or, more recently “induced 
pluripotent stem cells.”2 A variety of “stem cell therapies” are touted by medical professionals – 
some backed by solid evidence, some experimental, and some purely “snake oil.”3 The 
multiplicity of stem cells, complexity of techniques and terminology, and the passionate nature 
of debate surrounding their source and potential is such that in some quarters, “the traditional 
notion of stem cells as a clearly defined class of intrinsically stable biological objects that can be 
isolated and purified, has begun to give way… the „stem cell‟ becomes a fleeting, ephemeral and 
mythical entity” (Brown et al 2006, 339-343).  
To distinguish reasonable hopes from misleading hype, it is necessary to clarify the stem 
cell concept and its application in various contexts.  Philosophers of science have a distinctive 
role to play here.  Bioethicists have approached stem cells as a human reproductive technology, 
framing debates in terms of moral status, personhood, life and human identity.  But this approach 
                                               
1
 See Melton and Cowan (2009, xxiv), Ramelho-Santos and Willenbring (2007, 35), the 2011 US 
National Institutes of Health stem cell information page, and the 2011 “Glossary” of the 
European Stem Cell network.  For history of the term, see Maienschein (2003), Shostak (2006).  
2
 This „oppositional‟ stance made possible the August 2010 injunction on federally-funded 
embryonic stem cell research in the US, which was imposed because competition for funds 
allegedly harmed adult stem cell researchers.  
3
 See „About stem cell treatment‟ at http://www.isscr.org/. 
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does not fully engage stem cell science, focusing instead on the fragment that manipulates 
human embryos.  This paper argues that the roots of stem cell controversy are not solely in 
ethics, but also the core concepts and methods of stem cell researchers.  I show that pluralism 
about stem cells, and disagreement about their potential, has conceptual and evidential grounds.  
This situation gives rise to a deep evidential challenge: the “stem cell uncertainty principle.”4 
When clearly stated, this principle makes explicit the uncertainty inherent in the basic stem cell 
concept.  Its constraints have important implications for progress in stem cell research, as well as 
public understanding of this science.    
 Section 2 explicates the general stem cell concept, focusing on processes of self-renewal 
and differentiation.  This analysis reveals the key variables and parameters that must be specified 
for the concept to apply in actual cases; that is, to classify cells (singly or in populations) as stem 
cells.  Section 3 summarizes the core experimental method for identifying stem cells, and shows 
how it dovetails with the general concept.  Stem cell experiments specify the key variables and 
parameters for particular cases.  The evidential challenge posed by these experiments is 
examined in Section 4.  Briefly: stem cell capacities are realized only in descendants.  So an 
individual stem cell can be identified only retrospectively; stem cell researchers literally don‟t 
know what they‟ve got until it‟s gone.  The problem cannot be avoided by focusing on cell 
populations or inventing new techniques.  Section 5 considers the implications of this result, and 
offers suggestions for how stem cell research can progress given its evidential constraints.  
Section 6 summarizes the conclusions and indicates their broader significance.   
Some basic tenets of cell theory are assumed throughout.  Every organism begins as a 
single cell, which, in multicellular organisms, gives rise to all the body‟s cells.  Cells reproduce 
                                               
4
 This term is from Nadir (2006). 
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by binary division.5 The life of a cell begins with a division event and ends with either a second 
division event yielding two offspring, or cell death yielding no offspring.  Generations of cells 
linked by reproductive division form a lineage.  Self-renewal is cell reproduction in which parent 
and offspring resemble one another.  Differentiation, along with growth, is the core phenomenon 
of development: the process by which parts of a developing organism acquire diverse, 
specialized traits over time.  These premises provide the background for further clarification of 
the stem cell concept.  
 
2. Stem cell concept  
Stem cells are defined as cells capable of both self-renewal and differentiation.  The simplest 
way to conceptualize a stem cell is in terms of a cell division event that includes both processes: 
one cell like the parent, the other more specialized (Figure 1a).  But this simple model does not 
capture the stem cell concept.  No two cells are the same or different in every respect.  At 
minimum, the cells involved in a division event (one parent and two offspring) differ in position 
and intercellular relations, and share some material parts, including DNA sequences.  
Comparisons that determine „stemness‟ must be made relative to some set of characters, such as 
size, shape, concentration of a particular molecule, etc.  Given a set of characters C={x, y, z…n}, 
values within and across cell generations can be compared, to determine relations of sameness 
and difference among cells in a lineage (Figure 1b).   
 
[FIGURE 1]  
                                               
5
 There are two modes of cell division: mitosis and meiosis.  In mitosis, the genome replicates 
once before the cell divides.  In meiosis, the genome replicates once, but two rounds of cell 
division follow, yielding four offspring cells with half the complement of DNA.  Stem cell 
phenomena involve mitosis, so the term “cell division” here refers to that mode only. 
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2.1 Stem cell capacities 
The above is still insufficient to define self-renewal and differentiation, which have temporal as 
well as comparative aspects.  The dynamic aspect of self-renewal is conceived as the number of 
division cycles in which parent and offspring cells are the same with respect to some set of 
characters C (Figure 2a).6 Differentiation involves change within a cell lineage over a time 
interval t2-t1.  The simplest way to conceive of cellular change is in terms of a single cell with 
some character X (e.g., shape or size), which has value x1 at time t1 and x2 at a later time t2.  But 
not every such change counts as differentiation.  A cell that changes character value from x1 to x2 
thereby differentiates only if the change is „directed‟ in at least one of two ways: toward more 
specialization or greater diversity.  These two „directions‟ correspond to two kinds of 
comparison: between cells of a developing lineage, and between developing and mature cells 
(Figure 2b).  The former become more heterogeneous over time, differentiating from one 
another.  More precisely, cells in lineage L diversify over time interval t2-t1, relative to a set of 
characters C, if and only if values of C vary more at t2 than t1.  The second comparison is 
between cells that have completed development and those that have not.  The diverse cells 
composing the body of a fully-developed organism are classified according to typologies that 
may extend to hundreds of cell types.  Each of the latter is defined by a cluster of character 
values, Cm.  A cell specializes over time interval t1-t2 just in case its character values are more 
similar to Cm at t2 than at t1.7 The relevant set of characters is determined primarily by attributes 
of mature cells that are the end-points of the process.  
                                               
6
 Cell cycle rate converts this to calendar time; in practice both measures are used. 
7
 In many cases, however, there is not one cell fate to consider, but a whole array, each with a 
characteristic complex of traits (Cm1, Cm2…Cmn).  So, in general, a cell specializes over t1-t2 if its 
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[FIGURE 2]  
 
These considerations support the following characterizations of the reproductive 
processes that define stem cells: 
 
(SR)  Self-renewal occurs within cell lineage L relative to a set of characters C for duration if 
and only if offspring cells have the same values for those characters as the parent cell(s).  
 
(DF)  Differentiation occurs within cell lineage L during interval t1-t2 if and only if character 
values of some cells in L change such that (i) cells of L at t2 vary more with respect to characters 
C than at t1, or (ii) cells of L at t2 have traits more similar to traits Cm of mature cell type(s) than 
at t1. 
 
Putting the two together yields a general definition of „stem cell‟: a stem cell is the unique stem 
of a branching structure organized by SR and DF, such that each branch terminates in exactly 
one mature cell type (Figure 2c).  This minimal, abstract model8 structurally defines a stem cell 
by position in a cell hierarchy organized by reproductive relations.   
 
2.2 Parameters 
                                                                                                                                                       
traits are more similar to some Cm at t2 than at t1.  The attributes of specialized mature cells are 
so various that it is awkward to conceive them as values of a single set of characters.  A cell can 
become more similar to an adult cell type either by changing values of a set of characters C (x1 to 
x2), or by changing its set of characters (C to C'). 
8
 „Model‟ here is used in Giere‟s sense (1988).   
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This minimal model covers every case of stem cells.  But on its own, it entails no predictions 
about cell phenomena.  Representational assumptions are needed to connect its objects to 
biological targets.  Three different representational assumptions are prevalent in stem cell 
biology today, interpreting the model‟s objects as: (i) single cells undergoing division; (ii) 
reproductively-related cell populations with statistical properties; or (iii) reproductively-related 
cell types.  In addition, applying the minimal stem cell model requires specification of its key 
parameters and variables: temporal duration and characters of interest. Whether a given cell 
counts as a stem cell depends, in part, on how these parameters are specified.  Table 1 
summarizes the parameters associated with the major stem cell types in use today.  
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
In general, the shorter the duration of interest, the lower the bar to qualify as a stem cell.  
Most stem cell research is concerned with longer intervals, so the bar to qualify as a stem cell is 
higher.  But there is no absolute threshold.  What counts as a stem cell varies with the temporal 
duration of interest.  Another variable is number of terminating branches in the cell lineage 
hierarchy.  Termini of these branches are cell fates, each distinguished by a “signature” cluster of 
character values, Cm.  The more terminating branches emanate from a cell, the greater its 
developmental potential.  The maximum possible developmental potential is totipotency: the 
capacity to produce an entire organism (and, in mammals, extra-embryonic tissues) via cell 
division and differentiation.  In animals, this capacity is limited to the fertilized egg and products 
of early cell divisions.  In the late-19th/early-20th century, such cells were referred to as stem 
cells, but terminology has since shifted.  The maximum developmental potential for stem cells in 
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the contemporary sense is pluripotency: ability to produce all (major) cell types of an adult 
organism.  Somewhat more restricted stem cells are multipotent: able to produce some, but not 
all, mature cell types.  Stem cells that can give rise to only a few mature cell types are 
oligopotent.  The minimum differentiation potential is unipotency: the capacity to produce a 
single cell type.  This classification of potencies, though imprecise, provides a convenient 
framework for comparing stem cells associated with different cell traits and fates (Table 1).  
Finally, applying the abstract model requires criteria to judge cells the same or different 
with respect to a set of characters.  Our only access to cells is via technologies that visualize, 
track, and measure them.  So character values attributed to cells are very closely associated with 
methods of detection.  Cells in adult organisms are distinguished by morphological, histological, 
and functional criteria, which figure prominently in typologies.  Undifferentiated cells are often 
characterized negatively, as lacking these traits.  Cell traits, fates, and technologies for 
distinguishing them are all closely entwined.  Specifying criteria for cell character values to 
count as the same or different amounts to specifying a set of methods for measuring those 
characters.  This brings us to concrete experiments that identify stem cells. 
 
3. Methods  
Methods for identifying stem cells share a basic structure of three stages (Figure 3a).  The 
starting point is a multicellular organism, the source of cells.  From this source, cells are 
extracted and values of some of their characters measured.  These cells (or a sample thereof) are 
then manipulated so as realize capacities for self-renewal and differentiation.  Each experiment 
involves two manipulations.  In the first, cells are removed from their original context (a 
multicellular organism) and placed in a new environment in which their traits can be measured.  
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Second, measured cells are transferred to yet another environmental context, which allows stem 
cell capacities to be realized.  Finally, the amount of self-renewal and differentiation is 
measured.  Stem cell experiments9 thus consist of two manipulations, each followed by 
measurement, of cells from an organismal source.  
 
[FIGURE 3]  
 
This basic method identifies stem cells by three sets of characters: of organismal source, 
of extracted cells, and of progeny cells (Figure 3b).  The characters included in the first and third 
sets are standardized and robust across a wide range of experiments.  For organismal source, 
these characters are species, developmental stage, and tissue or position within the organism.10 
Values of these characters are determined by choice of materials for an experiment: mouse or 
human; embryonic or adult; blood, muscle or a quadrant of the early embryo.  Values for the 
other two sets of characters are measured during an experiment.  For progeny cells, characters 
included are those of mature cell types: morphology, expression of specific genes and proteins, 
and function within an organism.  Exactly which characters comprise the set depends on the type 
of differentiated cells expected.  For blood cells, the relevant characters are associated with 
immune function; for neurons, electrochemical function; for germ cells, morphological and 
genetic traits of gametes.  Though the set of characters varies across experiments, for any 
particular experiment the characters of interest are established in advance: part of the standard set 
                                               
9
 Stem cell biology includes many kinds of experiment.  For brevity, I refer to experiments that 
aim to isolate and characterize stem cells as „stem cell experiments.‟  But this should not be 
interpreted as exhaustive of experiments in the field.   
10
 Another frequently-used organismal character is genotype or strain.  
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of morphological, biochemical and functional traits used to classify cells in multicellular 
organisms.   
In contrast, there are no such pre-established criteria for inclusion in the set of characters 
of extracted cells – i.e., presumptive stem cells.  These characters vary widely across 
experiments, shifting rapidly in response to technical innovations and new results within the 
field.  Yet measurement of their values is the linchpin of stem cell experiments.  Experiments 
aimed at isolating and characterizing stem cells succeed just in case they reveal the “signature” 
traits of stem cells from a given source.  Relations among values of these variables map features 
of organismal source and differentiated descendants onto a „stem cell signature,‟ entailing many 
predictions.  A predictive model of this sort would describe robust relations between the values 
of variable characters in these three domains.  We do not yet have such a model, however; 
„mapping‟ relations among source, signature, and progeny are largely unknown, even for the 
best-understood stem cells.  Indeed, the „stem cell signatures‟ we have are at best provisional.   
An important goal of stem cell research is to flesh out this speculative sketch.  But here the stem 
cell concept itself poses a serious challenge.  
 
4. Uncertainty  
Stem cell experiments involve two sets of measurements, both of which provide data about 
characters of single cells.  But no single cell persists through both sets of measurements.  Cells 
reproduce by division, so descendents and ancestors cannot co-exist.  The second set of 
measurements is of cells descended from those measured in the first.  Self-renewal and 
differentiation potential are measured after realization of these capacities in controlled 
environments: the second set of measurements.  A single stem cell, therefore, can be identified 
San Diego, CA -123-
 10 
only retrospectively.  At the single-cell level, stem cell researchers literally don‟t know what 
they‟ve got until it‟s gone.  
 There are three distinct evidential problems here.  First, self-renewal and differentiation 
potential cannot both be measured for a single cell.  To determine a cell‟s differentiation 
potential, that cell is placed in an environment conducive to differentiation, and its descendants 
measured.  To determine a cell‟s self-renewal ability, the cell is placed in an environment that is 
conducive to cell division without differentiation, and its descendants measured.  It is not 
possible to perform both experiments on a single cell.  Since stem cells are defined as having 
both capacities, stem cells cannot be identified at the single-cell level.  Second, the capacity for 
self-renewal cannot be decisively established for any stem cell.  An offspring cell with the same 
capacities as a stem cell parent has the same potential for differentiation and for self-renewal.  
Even if both could be measured for a single cell (which they cannot), it is the offspring of the 
offspring cell that indicates the latter‟s capacities.  The relevant data are always one generation in 
the future.  Experimental proof that a single cell is capable of self-renewal is infinitely-deferred.  
Third, in any experiment, differentiation potential is realized in a range of (highly artificial) 
environments.  But these data cannot tell us what a cell‟s descendants would be like in a different 
range of environments – in particular, physiological contexts.  There is, inevitably, an evidential 
gap between a cell‟s capacities, unmanipulated by experiment, and their realization in specific, 
highly artificial, contexts.  For all three reasons, claims that any single cell is a stem cell are 
inevitably uncertain.  This uncertainty admits diverse, even arbitrary, operational criteria for self-
renewal, and underpins perennial debate over the extent of differentiation potential in stem cells 
from adult organisms.   
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These evidential limitations of stem cell experiments have been likened to the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle, which states that a particle‟s mass and velocity cannot be simultaneously 
measured.  In physics, the procedure used to determine the value of one alters the value of the 
other.  The analogy suggests that measurement itself is the problem; e.g., “…we cannot 
determine both the function of a cell and its functional potential…[because] our determination of 
a cell‟s function at a given point in time interferes with an accurate determination of its 
developmental potential” (Nadir 2006, 489), and we cannot rule out the possibility that “the 
investigator might be forcing the stem-cell phenotype on the population being studied” (Zipori 
2004, 876).  But for stem cell biology, the problem is not measurement of cells per se, but their 
transfer to different environmental contexts.  Stem cell capacities are realized and measured in 
cells descended from „candidate‟ stem cells, in different environments (for differentiation 
potential).  Potten and Loeffler (1990) articulate the issues incisively: 
 
The main attributes of stem cells relate to their potential in the future.  These can 
only effectively be studied by placing the cell, or cells, in a situation where they 
have the opportunity to express their potential.  Here we find ourselves in a 
circular situation; in order to answer the question whether a cell is a stem cell we 
have to alter its circumstances and in so doing inevitably lose the original cell and 
in addition we may see only a limited spectrum of responses… Therefore it might 
be an impossible task to determine the status of a single stem cell without 
changing it.  Instead one would have to be satisfied with making probability 
statements based on measurements of populations (1009).   
 
It might seem that stem cell biologists can avoid these problems by shifting their focus to 
cell populations.  Representational assumptions (ii-iii) allow for exactly this (see §2 above).  
Two kinds of model, stochastic and compartmental, yield hypotheses about stem cell 
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populations.11 But experimental support for these hypotheses depends on hypotheses about single 
stem cell traits.  Here I address stochastic population models only; an analogous argument can be 
made for compartment models.12  Stochastic population models of stem cells are based on the 
following assumptions.  Any population of cells experiences some number n divisions over a 
period of time , such that the population grows, diminishes, or remains constant in size.  Any 
dividing cell in the population has a certain probability of undergoing each of three kinds of 
division: both offspring like the parent (p), one offspring like the parent (r) or no offspring like 
the parent (q), where p + r + q = 1.  Relations among p, r, and q values entail general predictions 
about cell population size (growth, decrease, or “steady-state”), and equations that predict mean 
and standard deviation in population size, probability of stem cell extinction, and features of 
steady-state populations are derived.13  In these equations, p is the fundamental parameter.  
Testable predictions require that its value be estimated.  This is done by estimating the 
coefficient of variation for stem cell number in populations of the same age produced by division 
from a single founding stem cell.  The data required for such an estimate are numbers of stem 
cells in replicate colonies, each originating from a single stem cell.  
Given such an estimate, a stochastic stem cell model predicts features of cell population 
kinetics, which can then be compared with experimental data.  But the hypothesis thereby tested 
is not that „founder‟ cells are stem cells.  Rather, it is that stem cell population size is regulated 
so as to yield predictable population-level results from randomly-distributed single-cell 
capacities.  Testing this hypothesis requires identifying stem cell populations.  Stochastic models 
make predictions, given the assumption that „founding elements‟ are stem cells.  All these 
                                               
11
 Terms from Loeffler and Potten (1997). 
12
 [reference removed for blind review] 
13
 Details in Vogel et al (1969).   
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predictions hinge on estimation of the fundamental parameter p, the probability that a stem cell 
undergoes self-renewal.  This parameter is estimated from the pattern of variation in a set of 
replicate colonies, initiated by a single “stem element.” But in order for experiments to be 
replicates, all the stem elements for the set of colonies must be assigned the same probability 
values for p and (1-p); i.e., the same capacities for self-renewal and differentiation.  So 
experimental test of a stochastic stem cell model depends on the assumption that the cell 
population measured is homogeneous with respect to these characters.  This is exactly the 
evidence that the stem cell uncertainty principle ensures we cannot get.  Stochastic population-
level stem cell models therefore do not avoid the evidential challenge above. 
To sum up: stem cell experiments, no matter how technically advanced at tracking and 
measuring single cells, cannot resolve stem cell capacities at the single-cell level.  This is 
because we cannot directly measure a single cell‟s capacity for self-renewal or differentiation, 
separately or together.  To measure both self-renewal and differentiation potential for a single 
cell, and to elicit the full range of a cell‟s potential, multiple „copies‟ of that cell are needed - a 
homogeneous cell population of candidate stem cells.  Thoroughgoing focus on cell populations 
cannot get around this problem, since evidence for population-level models of stem cells also 
depends on the assumption of a homogeneous „founder‟ stem cell population.  The „uncertainty 
principle‟ is an unavoidable evidential constraint for stem cell biology.   
 
5. Progress 
How, then, should stem cell biologists proceed?  In practice, the dominant strategy is to adopt a 
„single-cell standard;‟ that is, to assess progress not in terms of hypotheses, but experimental 
methods.  Better experimental methods improve our access to single cells.  Current “gold 
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standards” for stem cell experiments are articulated in exactly these terms.  These standards are 
implemented somewhat differently for stem cells with different potencies.  For „tissue-specific‟ 
stem cells, the gold standard is a single-cell transplant leading to long-term reconstitution of an 
animal‟s tissue or organ.  An ideal pluripotent stem cell line behaves as a single cell, exhibiting 
the same traits in the same culture environment, so self-renewal or differentiation capacities can 
be realized on demand.14 But across the entire field, technologies that enhance our ability to 
isolate or track single cells are quickly adopted and reported as advances.15 Post-genomic and 
micro-imaging technologies are increasingly important in stem cell biology, for this reason.  But 
the single-cell standard dates back to post-WWII experiments with cultured cells and 
transplantable tumors in inbred mice.  The first method for measuring stem cells was announced 
as “a direct method of assay for [mouse bone marrow] cells with a single-cell technique” (Till 
and McCulloch 1961, 213). 
 This approach is evidentially well-founded.  The single-cell standard, applied across 
many stem cell types (i.e., experimental contexts), supports the assumption of homogeneity on 
which all stem cell models depend.  An experiment that meets the standard begins with a single 
cell in a controlled environment, with all relevant signals that could impact the cell taken into 
account.  If all other cell reproduction in this environment is blocked, or products of the founding 
cell can be distinguished from all other cells, then results reflect the reproductive output of a 
single starting cell, and no others.  Measured stem cell capacities are then unambiguously 
attributed to that cell in that environment.  Technologies that track a single cell‟s reproductive 
output over time, combined with techniques that measure character values of single cells, can 
                                               
14
 “Gold standards” from Fundamentals of Stem Cell Biology (Cowan and Melton 2009) and the 
International Stem Cell Initiative‟s characterization of hESC lines (Adewumi et al 2007). 
15
 For recent examples, see special issues of Nature Reviews Genetics (April 2011) and Nature 
Cell Biology (May 2011). 
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yield data of this sort.  In this way, technical innovations guided by the single-cell standard can 
bolster evidence for stem cell models – but only relative to the environment in which stem cell 
capacities are realized.  More general results are obtained from replicate experiments using a 
range of environments.  If the same environment tends to elicit self-renewal of the same duration 
and/or differentiation into the same cell types, while different environments reliably yield 
different results, this indicates that the cell population from which replicates are drawn is 
homogeneous with respect to stem cell capacities.  Of course, populations homogeneous with 
respect to one set of character values need not be homogeneous with respect to others.  But 
sorting cells into populations homogeneous for many measurable traits is the best we can do, 
since stem cells cannot be identified in advance.  
So the „stem cell uncertainty principle‟ does not block progress in stem cell research.  
But, since the possibility of heterogeneity in stem cell capacities cannot be completely ruled out, 
hypotheses about stem cells can never be fully and decisively established.  Stem cell experiments 
can provide good evidence for hypotheses at the single-cell level, but only relative to the set of 
characters used to specify a homogeneous sub-population.  As new cell traits are discovered and 
made accessible to measurement, the assumption of homogeneity must be continually reassessed 
and revised.  All substantive models of stem cells are therefore necessarily provisional, and 
become obsolete when new characters and environments are introduced.  This evidential 
constraint necessitates a mode of collaboration in stem cell research that gives the lie to the idea 
that the field is essentially a competition of models and methods in a „race to the cure.‟ Improved 
single-cell methods applied to all available stem cell types gives rise to a whole constellation, or 
network, of improved models.  In this way, guided by experiment, the entire field moves forward 
together.  
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6. Conclusions  
The basic stem cell concept is relational and relative.  So stem cells are not defined absolutely, 
but relative to an organismal source, cell lineage, environments, traits and a temporal duration of 
interest.  Experimental methods for identifying stem cells specify these parameters.  In any actual 
case, therefore, stem cells must be understood in terms of experimental methods used to identify 
them.  The stem cell uncertainty principle imposes evidential constraints on these methods, 
however.  Several consequences follow.  First, all stem cell claims are provisional, dependent on 
an assumption of cell homogeneity that must be continually reassessed as research moves 
forward.  Second, stem cell pluralism is not a symptom of incomplete understanding, but follows 
from the general stem cell concept.  Claims about stem cells based on different elaborations of 
the basic model do not conflict.  The diversity of stem cells should not be a source of contention, 
but a positive resource for inquiry.  Finally, technical innovations that increase experimenters‟ 
ability to measure and track single cells can bring about a situation in which experiments can 
provide strong evidence for hypotheses about stem cells. „Single-cell‟ technologies are thus an 
important form of progress in stem cell biology, with evidential significance.  
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Figure 1 Simple stem cell model: (a) single cell, (b) cell population.  
A. 
 
 
 
 
B.   
Figure
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Figure 2 The stem cell concept: (a) self-renewal, (b) differentiation, (c) both.  Arrows represent 
cell reproductive processes, variables represent key parameters (see text).    
A.  
 
 
B.  
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Figure 2, cont.  
C.  
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Table 1 Stem cells, classified in terms of the general model and its key parameters.  (For 
simplicity, time intervals are left approximate and only characters are indicated, not specific 
values.  The latter are diverse; ‘various’ indicates that no standard is widely-accepted for a stem 
cell type.) 
 
Stem 
cell 
 
Characters Time 
interval/ 
duration 
 
Potency 
 
Source 
 
ESC 
shape, size, cell 
surface markers, 
gene expression 
 
indefinite 
(>50 
cycles) 
 
pluripotent 
 
early embryo 
inner cell mass 
 
HSC 
 
various 
various 
(wks-
decades) 
 
multipotent 
bone marrow, 
cord blood, 
peripheral blood 
 
NSC 
morphology, cell 
surface markers, 
nerve function 
 
months-
years 
 
oligopotent 
 
brain (adult and 
embryonic) 
iPSC shape, size, cell 
surface markers, 
gene expression 
months-
years 
pluripotent differentiated 
cells (various 
tissues) 
epiSC shape, size, cell 
surface markers, 
gene expression 
months-
years 
pluripotent early embryo 
inner cell mass 
GSC shape, size, cell 
surface markers, 
gene expression 
months-
years 
pluripotent genital ridge 
(embryo) 
CSC various ? ? cancer (leukemia) 
EC shape, size, cell 
surface markers 
weeks-
months 
pluripotent cancer 
(teratocarcinoma) 
epiderm morphology, cell 
surface markers 
years unipotent skin 
hair morphology, cell 
surface markers 
years unipotent follicle 
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Figure 3 Basic design of stem cell experiments: (a) experimental procedure, (b) results. 
A. 
 
 
B. 
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given available evidence. In this paper I argue that avoiding this collapse requires the 
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invariance as an example of such a virtue. An additional benefit of augmenting IBE with 
Woodward‟s model of causal explanation is also suggested. 
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1. Inference to the Best Explanation and the Threat of Vacuity 
To illustrate the advantage of „inference to the best explanation‟ (henceforth, IBE) over 
enumerative induction, Harman (1965, 90-1) invites us to consider inferences from 
samples to populations and the question of “when a person is and when he is not 
warranted in making the inference from “All observed A‟s are B‟s” to “All A‟s are B‟s””. 
Harman continues: 
 The answer is that one is warranted in making this inference whenever the 
 hypothesis that all A‟s are B‟s is (in the light of all the evidence) a better, simpler, 
 more plausible (and so forth) hypothesis than is the hypothesis, say, that someone 
 is biasing the observed sample in order to make us think that all A‟s are B‟s.  
Clearly we can posit various reasons for why all the observed A‟s were also B‟s. It might 
be that “All A‟s are B‟s”; someone could have purposefully manipulated the sample to 
deceive us; perhaps our method for selecting subjects ensures, or makes it likely that, we 
will observe only those A‟s that are also B‟s, and so on. Furthermore, and equally 
patently, the actual reason for the observed regularity will be different in different cases. 
We observe only male drones, because all drones are male. Water that‟s pumped through 
an effective filter will contain no contaminants above a certain size; the absence of 
contaminants from the original water supply, however, often will not be the reason that 
the filtered water is pure. Harman supposes that such reasons can function as 
explanations. Let‟s concede that for now. Faced with competing explanations for an 
observed regularity Harman urges us to infer to the truth (or approximate truth) of 
whichever explanation is best. 
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Harman‟s proposal is thoroughly sensible – we should infer that hypothesis which is 
“better” and “more plausible”.1 However, without some guidance concerning how we 
identify the best, from competing explanations, and Harman has named a problem but not 
solved it. Insofar as IBE is regarded as a substantive theory of confirmation, its advocates 
can‟t rest content with an interpretation that advises only to infer that conclusion which is 
most plausible. Seemingly though Harman‟s phrase is sufficiently seductive, and has 
become sufficiently well-entrenched, that it is now hard to appreciate how vacuous the 
advice really is. Had Harman suggested we infer „that hypothesis which seems most 
plausible in light of all available evidence‟, the attenuated condition of the suggestion 
would perhaps be more immediately apparent. If inferring to the best explanation is 
different, for Harman, it‟s hard to see how. On inspection, inference to the best 
explanation can appear quite insipid.  
Lipton (2004), cognizant of the problem, offers a general means of responding. 
Unfortunately his development of that response opens him to critical objections, or so I‟ll 
argue in Section 2. The problems with Lipton‟s response trace to a failure to identify 
explanatory virtues, as distinct from virtues of the hypotheses that feature in the 
explanation. This diagnosis leaves room for a successful defense of IBE that utilizes 
Lipton‟s general strategy, but insists on peculiarly explanatory virtues, burdening 
advocates for IBE with the task of identifying such. Turning to the work of Woodward 
                                                          
1
 Harman does, in addition, suggest that better explanations are simpler, less ad hoc, and 
explain more. However, these concepts are insufficiently well-defined to provide helpful 
guidance in the face of competing explanations. 
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(for example, Woodward (2003)), I‟ll argue in Section 3 that distinctive explanatory 
virtues are apparent within the sciences and, furthermore, that it is not implausible to 
suggest that these reliably guide theory choice. Part of Woodward‟s project involves 
discriminating descriptions from explanations. An implication of this distinction is that 
Harman‟s example, above, might fall outside the scope of IBE, a possibility I discuss and 
welcome in Section 4. The purpose of the paper is not a complete defense of explanatory 
reasoning, but an attempt to motivate two important pieces of the groundwork: first, to 
urge that IBE requires the identification of explanatory virtues, and can‟t rely on the 
theoretical virtues of those hypotheses that are centrally involved in an explanation; 
second, to suggest that IBE has a limited scope, for purposes of understanding ampliative 
reasoning, which we might move some ways towards delineating by distinguishing 
descriptions from explanations. 
2. Loveliness, Likeliness, Matching, Guiding 
Concerned that IBE avoid appearing trite, Lipton responds in part by distinguishing two 
senses of „best explanation‟. The likeliest explanation, for Lipton, is that which is most 
likely to be correct. Informed that two theories each explain some phenomenon, we 
establish the likeliest explanation by evaluating which theory is best supported by 
available evidence. To infer to the likeliest explanation we needn‟t attend to anything 
about the explanations themselves; it is the well confirmedness of the respective theories 
that matters. The loveliest explanation, in contrast, can‟t be determined by attending to 
the merits of the underlying theory. Lipton suggests that the loveliest explanation 
“provides the most understanding”. White (2005), endorsing Lipton‟s distinction, 
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suggests that explanations are often valued for “the degree of satisfaction” they deliver; 
explanations might disappoint because they are implausible, but also and alternatively 
because they can be “deeply unsatisfying”. Having made this conceptual distinction, 
Lipton and White each suggest that IBE is a potentially important tool for investigating 
inductive reasoning, because explanatory loveliness might prove a reliable guide to 
explanatory likeliness. If this connection between loveliness and likeliness is real, we 
could justifiably appeal to the loveliness of an explanation for purposes of defending 
conclusions about which theory or hypothesis is most plausible, at least in some 
circumstances.  
One concern with the proposal, as described, is that the concepts of understanding and 
satisfaction threaten to introduce a worryingly subjective dimension. What helps one 
person understand some phenomenon might differ from what helps another; explanations 
satisfy some folks, but not others. Judgments about differences in explanatory quality that 
ride on these kinds of consideration are unreliable markers of underlying plausibility. 
Lipton at least is careful to distance himself from overly psychological interpretations of 
the relevant concepts, but we can avoid such connotations altogether since the basic 
distinction suffices. Explanations can be evaluated in terms of the plausibility of the 
theory that motivates them, or in terms of features that are peculiar to explanations and 
independent of associated theories. In what follows I‟ll use the phrase „explanatory 
virtue‟ to denote the latter. IBE avoids the charge of triviality by distinguishing 
explanatory virtues from the overall merits of a theory, and defining the rule as an 
inference based on the former; the plausibility of the rule, at least if it‟s understood 
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normatively, hinges on whether explanatory virtues reliably guide us towards a proper 
evaluation of available theories. 
In furtherance of his claim that explanatory virtues need not be subjective, Lipton 
suggests simplicity, provision of mechanisms, scope, precision, among others, as 
appropriate measures of explanatory loveliness. None are unproblematic concepts, as 
Lipton concedes. Nevertheless, attaching loveliness here helps remove any lingering 
specter of subjectivity. Barnes (1995) protests, however, that these are not reliable guides 
to underlying plausibility. Suppose we have two competing explanations, but only one 
provides a mechanism. Whether we prefer the mechanistic explanation depends on the 
independent plausibility of the mechanism, suggests Barnes, rather than any intrinsic 
value in describing mechanisms. Lipton offers no obvious means of evaluating 
mechanistic hypotheses, but providing them can‟t be a reliable means of improving an 
explanation, or choosing between competing explanations, because even contrived and 
outrageous suggestions about the underlying mechanism describe a mechanism. Barnes 
raises similar complaints against the other putative explanatory virtues that Lipton 
describes. 
Against the first edition of Lipton‟s book Barnes objections seem pertinent. Lipton (1991) 
asserts that “mechanism and precision are explanatory virtues” (118), “unification makes 
for lovely explanations” (119) and suggests that elegance and simplicity are also qualities 
of explanatory loveliness (68). He further argues that by attending to these qualities we 
are typically, reliably directed to the most plausible hypothesis. Lipton is unfortunately 
silent, however, on the issue of how we should balance the pursuit of these various 
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virtues, which might pull in opposing directions. If each virtue is evaluated in isolation, 
then Barnes objections are critical: discriminating purely on the basis of the presence or 
absence of a mechanism, for example, will often warrant an implausible inference. If, on 
the other hand, Lipton intends us to weigh all explanatory virtues and reach an 
appropriate balance between them, then his failure to describe how this should be 
conducted leaves the account disconcertingly obscure. Lipton‟s earlier defense is either 
reasonably transparent, but implausible, or quite opaque. However, Lipton‟s defense 
shifts between the two editions of his book. In the more recent he argues explicitly for a 
correspondence between theoretical and explanatory virtues, then argues independently, 
and on empirical grounds, that we in fact use the latter to evaluate the former. What is 
discussed as “matching” and “guiding” in the later edition are not distinguished in the 
earlier. Lipton hereby implies that the likeliest and loveliest explanations will each 
provide the best balance of various virtues, although again Lipton provides no guidance 
on how we are to recognize the best trade-off. Given Lipton‟s new strategy it becomes 
hard to accuse him of proposing an unreliable rule of inference, since it‟s a rule that by 
definition should guide us towards that conclusion which best instantiates all those 
theoretical virtues that are typically assumed important. The problems with Lipton‟s new 
strategy lie elsewhere. 
One prominent theme in Lipton‟s book is that IBE describes our inferential practices 
better than alternative accounts. Lipton claims such advantages over Bayesianism, 
hypothetico-deductivism and Mill‟s methods of causal reasoning. Deficiencies with each, 
in terms of how well they describe our inferential practices, suggest either their 
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replacement with IBE or, in the case of Bayesianism, augmentation with explanatory 
considerations. These comparative claims have been challenged. Rappaport (1996) 
defends Mill‟s methods against Lipton‟s concerns. Bird (2007) argues that Lipton‟s 
objections are largely ineffective against hypothetico-deductivism. Douven (2005) argues 
that Lipton says too little about how and why Bayesians should build explanatory 
considerations into their framework. Furthermore, even if we concede that IBE better 
describes our inferential tendencies, we don‟t thereby achieve any normative justification 
for explanatory reasoning. What Lipton does say about the normativity of the rule is 
uninspiring.  
According to Lipton‟s matching claim, explanatory reasoning is justified since 
explanatory considerations direct us towards that hypothesis which is most precise, has 
greatest scope, and so on, which Lipton suggests render that hypothesis most probable. 
However, Lipton offers little by way of analysis for these theoretical virtues. 
Consequently, because they‟re notoriously vague, and because it‟s hard to justify why 
they matter for purposes of confirmation, and because we don‟t know how to balance 
these often competing qualities against one another, Lipton leaves many hostages to 
fortune. The justification for explanatory reasoning is entirely derivative, and it is 
derivative on something that‟s worryingly vague. There is no answer as to why we should 
value a rule that directs us towards the simplest hypothesis, other things being equal. 
However, we might reasonably expect that if a theory of confirmation is going to place a 
premium on considerations of simplicity, then it should justify that decision. Leaving so 
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many concepts unanalyzed might leave us again wondering whether there‟s any real 
substance to IBE.  
The failure to more carefully define these concepts becomes problematic again when we 
turn to Lipton‟s guiding principle. It is suggested both that, as an empirical matter, we 
tend to be impressed by explanatory considerations and, when confronted with competing 
explanations, it is the simpler, more precise, and so on, that is inferred. However, there is 
no obvious reason to suppose that the sense of simplicity that I employ when making a 
judgment about competing explanations will be the same sense that might prove a 
justified means of adjudicating between competing hypotheses.2 A normative justification 
for Lipton‟s account requires either that we offer distinct analyses of explanatory and 
theoretical simplicity, then argue that explanatory simplicity is a reliable guide to 
theoretical simplicity, or we stipulate that simplicity has the same sense in each context. 
The former strategy is far from straightforward. The latter makes it much more difficult to 
argue that we in fact prefer simpler explanations, in the relevant sense and other things 
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 For example, in curve-fitting problems it has been argued that introducing additional 
adjustable parameters is appropriate only if will improve the predictive accuracy of the 
curve. If we define simplicity in terms of the number of adjustable parameters, then we 
justify a role for simplicity within certain well-defined contexts (see Forster and Sober 
(1994)). However, the balance between fit and number of parameters emerges from a 
non-obvious mathematical theorem. It seems unlikely that any „intuitive‟ sense of 
simplicity that we might employ in evaluating explanations should guide us towards 
hypotheses that are more simple in this respect. 
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being equal. Maintaining both the guiding principle and a normatively justified 
interpretation of IBE becomes less plausible. 
Hopes of preserving the normative dimension of IBE are further degraded when Lipton 
appeals to data from cognitive psychology. For example, Lipton describes the results of 
work conducted by Kahneman and Tversky, which demonstrated our propensity for 
committing the conjunction fallacy. (Asked to identify which event was most probable, 
given some scenario, many subjects committed the error of supposing a conjunction of 
two events can be more probable than one of the conjuncts.) Lipton offers this as 
evidence both that we are not good at Bayesian updating and that explanatory 
considerations play an important role in how we reason. An obvious concern is that 
Lipton‟s interpretation of the result provides an immediate example of explanatory 
reasoning that is unreliable. Lipton responds that in circumstances more complicated than 
those described by Kahneman and Tversky explanatory reasoning might be more reliable, 
but offers no evidence to support the conjecture.  
In summary, Lipton argues that explanatory loveliness is both a reliable guide to 
explanatory likeliness, because considerations like simplicity and scope are features of 
more probable hypotheses and more virtuous explanations, and an important aspect of our 
inferential practices. However, the connections between these theoretical virtues and the 
plausibility of a given hypothesis are sufficiently vague that it is hard to admit them into a 
theory of confirmation as brute facts. The argument also requires us to concede that our 
natural proclivities, when evaluating explanations, will draw on similar considerations to 
those that will ultimately be deemed important for evaluating hypotheses, and that we 
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apply them in similar ways. Finally, in light of our demonstrated cognitive failures where 
we are perhaps unduly influenced by explanatory considerations, we must hope for 
evidence that such failures are heavily restricted to certain kinds of case. Absent such 
evidence and, although we might have reason to suppose we in fact employ explanatory 
reasoning, we‟d lack any reason to suppose that we should. The normative dimension of 
IBE, as developed by Lipton, is both vague and tenuous. Admittedly Lipton at times 
seems content with defending a purely descriptive interpretation of IBE, in which we 
declare only that explanatory considerations in fact feature prominently in our reasoning. 
Typically IBE is understood as a normative thesis; a purely descriptive thesis certainly 
falls short of my ambitions for the rule. 
Where did Lipton go wrong? I suggest it‟s in arguing that explanatory and theoretical 
virtues align. By adopting that position it becomes hard for explanatory considerations to 
illuminate, account for, or justify judgments about which of competing hypotheses is 
most plausible. The promise of IBE, as initially presented by Lipton, was with the idea 
that we could read off qualities of an explanation and thereby learn something important 
about the merits of the underlying theory. Given the matching claim, any normative 
justification for IBE becomes fully dependent on concepts that are not only problematic 
and vague, but also appear independent of explanatory considerations. Consequently, 
Lipton is forced to adopt an essentially descriptive interpretation of the rule. A model of 
IBE would be more useful and more interesting if we could identify peculiarly 
explanatory virtues, that cannot be identified with qualities of the underlying hypotheses, 
and that help us understand why certain inferences are sensible. Developed in this way 
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and IBE could live up to its reputation as a theory of how we should reason. Utilizing 
Woodward‟s model of causal explanation I‟ll now sketch a way of relating explanatory 
considerations to underlying plausibility that seems promising. 
3. Invariance, Mechanisms and Consilience  
Woodward‟s model is centrally concerned with change relating regularities, regularities 
that describe how changes in the value of one variable affect the value of another. 
Interventions on variables pick out causal and explanatory relations, for Woodward, if 
they are a reliable means of manipulating other variables within the regularity. Many 
regularities will satisfy this standard under some conditions but not others. For example, 
the ideal gas law properly captures our ability to increase the temperature of a gas by 
increasing the pressure, in certain circumstances. The law is thus a change-relating 
regularity that describes a causal relation, exploitable for purposes of explaining. The law 
doesn‟t hold universally, however. When temperatures become sufficiently low, or 
pressures sufficiently high, the law no longer accurately describes the relation between 
these variables. In such conditions we might appeal to the van der waals equation, which 
holds in circumstances where the ideal gas law breaks down. For Woodward, the latter is 
more invariant. Regularities are invariant if they continue to hold despite interventions on 
the variables that feature in that regularity. We explain an outcome by appealing to a 
system of regularities that is invariant under at least some interventions, and which can be 
combined with a range of possible initial and boundary conditions to describe how events 
would have differed had those conditions been otherwise. Only regularities that are 
invariant under some interventions are explanatory. Regularities that are more invariant 
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support a broader range of explanations, since they allow us to say more about how things 
would have been different if initial or background conditions were different.  
Although Woodward isn‟t concerned with the relationship between invariance and 
confirmation, and even expresses some skepticism about inference to the best explanation 
(see note 5), I suspect there are important connections. My proposal is that it is reasonable 
to infer more invariant explanations, over less invariant explanations, because 
considerations of invariance tell us something important about the regularities that ground 
the explanations. My suggestion is that pursuing greater invariance will tend to produce 
the kinds of achievements that scientists consider epistemically significant, including our 
admiration for verified novel predictions, predictive success more generally, and high 
precision testing, our suspicion of ad hoc hypotheses, desire for both `deeper' 
explanations and explanations of `free parameters', as well as our pursuit of theories that 
have greater consilience. Despite their reputations, these concepts are poorly understood. 
The concept of invariance, insofar as it can illuminate these more familiar concepts, 
advances our understanding of confirmation.  
Before offering some details, a few preliminaries are in order. First, invariance is distinct 
from predictive success, consilience, scope, and so on. The proposal thus shares with 
Lipton‟s defense a distinction between two types of explanatory achievement. We can 
evaluate an explanation in terms of its invariance, where more invariant explanations are 
better. Explanatory hypotheses and regularities can also be better insofar as they are less 
ad hoc, more precise, verified by novel predictions, and so on. If invoking the concept of 
invariance offers more plausible analyses for the confirmatory significance of such 
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considerations, then it has importance for our understanding of confirmation as well as 
explanation. What distinguishes my proposal from Lipton‟s more recent defense is that 
invariance is a peculiarly explanatory virtue, rather than a feature of the underlying theory 
or hypothesis. This creates room for a normative defense of explanatory reasoning. It is 
also important to distinguish a more modest from a more ambitious version of the thesis 
I‟m proposing. The more modest rests content with providing a better account for extant 
confirmatory considerations. The more ambitious version assumes, or argues, that those 
concepts are in turn indicative of more general forms of scientific achievement. If 
pursuing invariance helps us achieve deeper explanations, for example, and deeper 
explanations indicate a more truthlike theory, then we connect a distinctively explanatory 
virtue to perhaps the ultimate scientific achievement. Admittedly concepts like 
consilience and ad hoc-ness are only poorly understood, thus difficult concepts to offer in 
defense of realist commitments. However, insofar as IBE might help provide more 
convincing analyses for various intuitions surrounding questions of confirmation, once 
augmented with Woodward‟s concept of invariance, it can simultaneously help justify its 
own normative credentials. It‟s beyond the scope of this paper to start properly exploring 
the connections between invariance and all the concepts I‟ve alluded to. Hopefully a 
couple of examples will provide adequate motivation for the thesis. 
First, let‟s return to Lipton‟s desire for mechanistic explanations and Barnes‟ concern that 
merely adding a mechanism can‟t itself reliably improve an explanation. The concept of 
invariance enables us to distinguish mechanisms that improve our explanations from 
those that don‟t. Drawing on Woodward‟s example, the amount of pressure applied to the 
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gas pedal explains the speed of my car, at least under some conditions. This change-
relating regularity can be exploited for purposes of manipulating the speed of the car, and 
therefore for purposes of explaining the speed, even for those of us who are ignorant 
about how changing the pressure applied to the pedal brings about the change in speed. 
Providing a mechanism that relates these variables will not always produce a better 
explanation: fanciful mechanisms that have no grounding in experience describe 
mechanisms. Mechanisms which are more invariant than the crude regularity we begin 
with increase our ability to manipulate and control the speed of the car under a wider 
range of conditions. We improve our understanding of the counterfactual dependencies 
that describe the system. Providing a mechanism that relates distinct variables will 
improve an explanation only if it is more invariant than the regularity alone.  
Providing mechanisms for causal regularities is an important scientific pursuit. 
Thoroughly speculative mechanisms, however, are not valued, requiring us to find means 
of distinguishing speculative from plausible mechanisms. The concept of invariance 
achieves that. Furthermore, it‟s at least plausible to suppose that this improved ability to 
manipulate a system reflects a better understanding for how a given system behaves.3 
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 Several authors have suggested that IBE has importance for purposes of fixing prior 
probabilities, likelihoods, or both, within Bayes‟ equation (for example, Lipton (2004), 
Okasha (2000), Weisberg (2009)). The rule is thus given a probabilistic interpretation. 
Elsewhere I‟ve argued that advocates for this approach are vulnerable to a critical 
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As a second illustration, again inspired by Woodward (2003, 261-2), consider the puzzle 
of distinguishing consilience from conjunction. Conjoining two theories produces a new, 
more general theory. However, explaining events by appealing to a conjunction is no 
improvement over an explanation that appeals to the relevant conjunct. Conjoining 
Hooke‟s law with the ideal gas law doesn‟t improve our explanations for the temperature 
of a given gas, even though the conjunction is more general. Theories are, however, 
lauded for their consilience. Newton‟s theory of universal gravitation offered 
explanations for falling bodies, planetary motions and tidal effects via a unified system. 
Consilience involves more than just conjunction, but identifying the excess has proved 
problematic. Again the concept of invariance is edifying. Conjunctions provide no 
additional information about the effects of intervening on variables, beyond what‟s 
provided by one of the conjuncts in isolation. Frequently cited cases of consilience, in 
contrast, do provide additional information. Galileo offered explanations for bodies 
falling near the Earth‟s surface.  Newton also offered explanations for bodies falling near 
the surface of Earth (or any other massive object), but his were invariant under changes to 
the mass and radius of the body on which the objects are dropped. Newton‟s explanations 
are invariant in ways that Galileo‟s are not. The concept of invariance accounts for the 
differing attitudes towards conjunction and consilience.  
The concept of invariance promises valuable analyses of various confirmatory concepts. 
A convincing defense of this claim requires both a more careful explication of the two 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dilemma and that IBE should instead be understood as a guide to better representations of 
target systems (see author). 
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concepts already presented, and their relation to invariance, and extended discussions of 
the other concepts I‟ve alluded to. A satisfactory treatment lies beyond the scope of this 
paper, but hopefully I‟ve done enough to at least induce some goodwill for the idea. 
Rather than develop this aspect of the project further, in the following section I‟ll explore 
an independent reason to regard Woodward‟s theory as a helpful crutch for IBE. 
4. Descriptions, Explanations and IBE’s Scope  
For Woodward, explaining involves communicating relations of counterfactual 
dependence. Regularities that don‟t capture such relations can‟t be utilized for purposes 
of explaining, although they might provide useful and accurate descriptions of target 
populations. For example, “All swans are white” cannot explain why a particular swan is 
white, since it doesn‟t provide the kind of dependency to which Woodward attaches 
significance. The explanatory impotence of certain regularities has an important 
consequence for Harman‟s puzzle, described above. Concerned to identify those 
circumstances when it is appropriate to infer „All A‟s are B‟s‟ given that „All observed 
A‟s are B‟s‟, Harman suggests the inference is justified if the former provides the best 
explanation for the latter. If the regularity is not change relating however, then it doesn‟t 
explain at all, at least according to Woodward.  
IBE is understood differently by different authors. One disagreement concerns the rule‟s 
scope. Harman (1965) and Psillos (2002) suggest the rule is more general than inductive 
reasoning; Lipton (2004) describes IBE instead as one important type of non-deductive 
reasoning. I favour Lipton‟s more modest attitude; some of the considerations that 
persuade me will be presented below. Adopting Lipton‟s position burdens one with 
San Diego, CA -155-
providing criteria for when IBE can, and cannot, be employed, and an intriguing platform 
for that project is precisely the distinction between descriptions and explanations that 
Woodward‟s model of explanations articulates. Sometimes our concerns are principally 
with describing a process, or kind; sometimes our concerns lie with explaining why 
certain events occurred, or why things are configured in a particular way. Restricting 
explanatory inferences to those circumstances when we are actually engaged in 
explaining seems sensible. It also helps insulate the rule against important objections. 
Consider Hitchcock‟s (2007) objection, in which we imagine two coins, one fair and one 
biased (3:1) in favour of heads. A coin is selected at random and flipped four times, 
where each flip lands heads. We assume a prior probability of 1/2 that we selected a 
particular coin, conditionalize on the new evidence, and thereby determine the posterior 
probabilities. We know how probable it is that we selected either coin, but Hitchcock 
sensibly asks what reason IBE can offer for preferring one hypothesis over the other. 
Relative to the evidence, neither hypothesis is simpler, more unifying nor, more 
generally, more lovely. Thus while the Bayesian can give clear directives concerning 
which hypothesis is more probable, and by how much, advocates of IBE seemingly have 
little to offer. Hitchcock‟s concern is well-directed, but might serve to motivate the 
delineation described above. Whether the selected coin is fair, or not, is a question about 
whether we have properly described the propensity of the coin. Such descriptions will 
align more or less probably with the outcome of subsequent sequences of flips, which are 
thereby entirely relevant for purposes of evaluating the plausibility of the competing 
descriptions. By restricting IBE to the evaluation of change relating regularities, however, 
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the example falls outside the domain of IBE. Hitchcock is thus quite correct, I‟d submit: 
IBE has nothing to offer in terms of illuminating such cases. The lesson is not that IBE is 
flawed, but that it has a restricted range of application.4 
5. Conclusions 
Inference to the best explanation faces various objections and would benefit from 
additional work along several dimensions. Most urgent, to my mind, is that the rule 
distinguish itself from a recommendation simply that we infer that conclusion which is 
most plausible given available evidence. A second significant challenge emerges from 
some very sensible criticisms: explanatory considerations are not always relevant to 
inductive reasoning, so the rule must have a more limited scope than some have 
suggested. The challenge is to identify those circumstances when IBE helpfully and 
properly models good inferential habits. In Woodward‟s account of causal explanation 
I‟ve suggested that we may have the resources both to develop a potentially instructive 
and plausible version of IBE, and simultaneously start to better understand its boundaries.  
  
                                                          
4
 Woodward (2003, 5) also expresses doubts about IBE, arguing that the distinction 
between explanation and description is essential to a proper understanding of scientific 
methodology, but that descriptions are evidently not confirmed by appeals to explanatory 
qualities. Clearly, however, once we rescind hopes of developing IBE into a universal 
model of confirmation, Woodward‟s concern disappears.  
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1. Introduction 
The question of explanatory relevance has been for long a challenge for theorists of 
explanation. It is well-known for example that Hempel’s DN model, Salmon’s SR model or 
Salmon’s causal models fail to characterize philosophically what type of information is 
relevant to the explanation of some fact F and should therefore figure in its explanation. 
In the last two decades, James Woodward has developed a manipulationist model of 
explanation, which seems to fare better than its predecessors about explanatory relevance, if 
not to solve the issue, and that accounts for many of the usual tricky cases. In this model, 
explanatory information is information that is relevant to manipulation or control and that 
affords to change the value of some target explanandum variable by intervening on some 
other. Accordingly, the depth of an explanation is evaluated through the size of the domain of 
invariance of the generalization involved. 
In this paper, I argue that Woodward’s treatment of relevance in terms of invariant causal 
relations is still subtly but unavoidably wanting because it forces one to include within the 
explanation of a fact F much information that may be relevant to account for other facts of a 
same physical type but may be irrelevant to F. I further suggest to evaluate the depth of an 
explanation through the size of the domain of circumstances it describes as leaving the 
explanandum phenomenon unchanged. 
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In section 2, I briefly present Woodward’s account of explanation and his notion of 
explanatory depth. I develop at length in section 3 a test case example dealing with the 
explanation of the law of Areas and describe two ways to explain this physical regularity. I 
show in section 4 that, whereas the first explanation includes clearly irrelevant facts, 
according to Woodward’s account, it cannot be said to be less explanatory than the second. I 
further analyze why satisfying the manipulability requirement may imply to include irrelevant 
facts in explanations in order to make them deeper (in Woodward’s sense). I further describe 
in section 5 a new criterion for judging explanatory depth and argue that this criterion and 
Woodward’s criterion are incompatible. I finally emphasize in section 6 that manipulability is 
still a virtue, even if not an essential virtue of explanations and that, depending on the 
circumstances, one may be interested in developing explanations that are less explanatory 
(because they contain irrelevant facts) but that afford to control physical systems.  
 
2. Woodward’s manipulationist account of explanation 
It may seem weird to challenge Woodward (and Hitchcock) on the question of explanatory 
relevance for they have themselves showed much acumen in diagnosing where existing 
accounts fail and offered new answers to the problem. Indeed, in his 1995 article, Hitchcock 
elegantly shows that the problem of explanatory relevance is still a worry for Salmon’s causal 
model because identifying all the intermingled spatio-temporal causal processes running in 
some physical circumstances falls short of indicating why exactly some phenomenon takes 
place in these circumstances. As Woodward further notes, even if the right causal processes 
are identified, “features of a process P in virtue of which it qualifies as a causal process 
(ability to transmit mark M) may not be the features of P that are causally or explanatorily 
relevant to the outcome E that we want to explain” (Woodward, 2003, 353). 
In this context, it comes as no surprise that Woodward tries to answer the above worries by 
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means of his causal model. Doing justice to all aspects of Woodward’s rich treatment of 
explanatory relevance and explanation would take much longer than can be done within this 
short paper. The next paragraphs are therefore merely devoted to reminding the reader some 
important aspects of Woodward’s account so that what it amounts to when it comes to the 
analysis of the coming example appears clearly. 
For Woodward, “explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactual 
dependence” (2003, 191). Explanatory generalization used in an explanation must indicate 
that the explanandum was to be expected and how it would change, were some changes made 
in the circumstances that obtained; said differently, good explanations “are such that they can 
be used to answer a range of counterfactual questions about the conditions under which their 
explananda would have been different” (ibidem). 
In this perspective, “explanatory relevant information is information that is potentially 
relevant to manipulation and control” (2003, 10). In other words, something is relevant 
information if it essentially figures in an explanation describing how the explanandum was to 
happen and how it would change, were the properties described in the explanans modified. 
This requirement also discards irrelevant circumstances through the identification of 
irrelevant variables: “an explanans variable S is explanatorily irrelevant to the value of an 
explanandum variable M if M would have this value for any value of S produced by an 
intervention” (2003, 200). 
Woodward further defines the notion of invariance of a generalization. A generalization can 
be stable under many changes of conditions not mentioned in it. For example, Coulomb’s law 
holds under changes in the weather. By contrast, a generalization that “continues to hold or is 
stable in this way under some class of interventions that change the conditions described in its 
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antecedent and that tells us how the conditions described in its consequent would change in 
response to these interventions is invariant under such interventions” (1997, S.31)
1
.  
It is then clear that invariance is a gradual notion because a generalization can hold under 
more or less interventions. Accordingly, depending on the degree of invariance of the 
generalization they rely upon, explanations provide patterns for answering more or less what-
if explanatory requests about these counterfactual circumstances and therefore for controlling 
the corresponding systems. 
Woodward further claims that the concept of invariance provides a means for evaluating the 
goodness of explanations – what he calls “explanatory depth”: “We can thus make 
comparative judgments about the size of domains of invariance and this is all that is required 
to motivate comparative judgments of explanatory depth of the sort we have been making” 
(1997, S.39). To put things briefly, the more invariant, the more explanatory, or to use 
Woodward’s own words: “generalizations that are invariant under a larger and more 
important set of changes often can be used to provide better explanations and are valued in 
science for just this reason” (2003, 257). 
At this step, my claim can be precisely formulated: even if they are valued in science, more 
invariant explanations are not always more explanatory because the request for invariance 
may run contrary to the fundamental request for relevance that explanations should primarily 
satisfy. 
 
3. The law of Areas and its explanations 
                                                        
1 More precisely, invariance is defined by means of the notion of “testing intervention”. See 
(2003, 250) for more details. 
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The test case I now want to investigate is the explanation of the law of Areas (also called 
"Kepler's second law"), which states that, “for planets in our solar system, a line joining a 
planet and the sun sweeps out equal areas during equal intervals of time". I shall describe two 
explanations of it and compare them with respects to invariance and relevance. 
 As we shall see, the first explanation (hereafter explanation 1) relies upon the general 
angular momentum theorem. Let us go deeper into it. Let us assume a Galilean reference 
frame, a fixed axis M’ with position given by vector r’ and a moving material point with 
position given by vector r, having mass m and momentum p (bold characters denote vectors). 
The angular momentum of M about M’ is defined by: Lr’ = (r’-r) × p = m (r’-r) × v, where 
the symbol “×” stands for the usual external product. Let F denotes the sum of forces applied 
to M. The momentum of F about axis M’ or torque is defined as µF/M’ = (r’-r) × F. Then, 
deriving the angular momentum yields  
 
dLr'
dt
=
d((r − r') × p)
dt
= (r − r ') ×
dp
dt
+
d(r − r')
dt
× p  
Because the momentum p is collinear to the speed of M, the second term in the right-hand 
part of the equation is null. So far no physics has been used. Newton’s second law says that 
dp/dt = d(mv) / dt= ma = F. So finally, one gets  
(1) 
dL
r'
dt
= (r − r') × F = µ
F /M'  
For a collection of particles, one can also define the total torque µ=Σ µi, which is the sum of 
the torques on each particle, as well as the total angular momentum L, which is the sum of 
momentum of each particle and one gets  
(1.5) µ=Σ µi = dL/dt. 
The total torque is the sum of the momentum of all forces, internal and external. But, because 
of Newton’s law of action and reaction, the torques on two reacting objects compensate and 
therefore, the internal torques balance out pair by pair. In conclusion, “the rate of change of 
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the total angular momentum about any axis is equal to the external torque about that axis”. 
This is the general angular momentum theorem, which is true for any collection of objects, 
whether they form a rigid body or not. 
If one wants to explain the law of Areas, one should finally note that, in the case of the 
Earth/Sun two-body system, if vE denotes the speed of the Earth, rE its position, FG the 
gravitational force, LE the Earth momentum about the Sun, α the angle between rE and vE, 
and AE (t) the swept area in function of time, in virtue of the definition of the outer product, 
(2) 
L
E
m
E
=
r
E
× v
E
m
E
= r
E
. v
E
sin(α) = 2.
dA
E
(t)
dt
. 
Because this relation holds for each mass point, the relation µ=Σ µi = dL/dt can now be seen 
as describing the variation of the variation of the sum of the areas swept by each point of a 
system about an axis, be it a rigid body or a set of independent mass points. 
In the case of the Earth-Sun system, it should further be noted that the momentum of the 
gravitational force FG about the Sun is zero (because the force and the vector r are collinear). 
Therefore, because of (1.5), the angular momentum of the Earth about the Sun is constant and 
because of (2), A(t) grows linearly with time, which demonstrates that the law of Areas 
obtains. 
This explanation perfectly fits Woodward’s account of explanation and one can repeat what 
he says about his paradigmatic case of the theoretical explanation in terms of Coulomb's law 
of the electrostatic relation E=λ/(2πε0r) (203,196-204). The explanation does exhibit the 
features emphasized by DN theorists: it is a deductively valid argument in terms of Newton’s 
second law and the description of the system (positions, speeds and masses of the points, 
forces). But in addition, it does exhibit a systematic pattern of counterfactual dependence, 
which can be summarized by combining (1.5) and (2) into the general relation (3) µ=Σ µi = 
dL/dt=2 Σ mi d/dt (dAi(t)/dt), which the law of Areas is a special case when the right variables 
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are assigned the right values (two bodies, one central gravitational force, etc.). The derivation 
describes how the explanandum law of Areas would change according to (3) and how it 
systematically depends on Newton’s second law, the forces and the particular conditions cited 
in the explanans. More specifically, the explanation makes clear how the total swept area 
would vary were the mass, speed, position of the Earth different, were additional forces at 
play but also were additional bodies included in the system. In short, (3) and the explanation 
including it also indicate how to answer a range of what-if questions about counterfactual 
circumstances in which the explanandum would have changed. Regarding the range of these 
questions and the invariance of the explanation, it is difficult to do better, because Newton’s 
law and (3) cover all situations in classical physics and therefore all classical changes that can 
be brought about to the two-body system case. 
   Let us now turn to the second explanation (hereafter explanation 2). In order to give the 
reader a clearer feeling of why it is better, I shall give two versions of it, one of which more 
pictorial. Let us start with the vectorial derivation. Because of relation (2), the law of Areas 
obtains if the intensity L
E
 of the angular momentum LE of the Earth about the Sun is 
constant. In virtue of relation (1), this happens when (r’-r) × dp/dt = 0, which is the case if 
dp/dt and (r’-r) are collinear. This is so because the only force at play is radial and the 
variation of momentum of a particle is along the direction of the force exerted upon it, that is 
dp/dt = α F, where α is real, not necessarily constant and not specified. Newton provides a 
more geometrical way to see the explanation: 
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Figure 1: Geometrical demonstration of the Law of Areas by Newton (1726/1972) 
 
The Earth’s trajectory goes through A, B, C, etc. and the law of Areas obtains if the area of 
SAB, SBC, etc. are numerically equal. The explanation of each trajectory step is decomposed 
in two parts. On the one hand, if no force was at play, in virtue of the inertia principle, the 
Earth would go straight from B to c in one time interval with AB=Bc. This implies that the 
area of SAB and SBc are numerically equal. On the other hand, if the Earth was motionless in 
B, because of the central gravitational force, it would go somewhere on (SB), say in V. By 
combining the two moves, the Earth finally goes to C, with BV=cC. Because (Cc) and (SB) 
are parallel, the area of SAC and SBc are also numerically equal. By combining the two 
equalities, one gets that that the area of SAB and SAC are numerically equal. The law of 
Areas finally obtains by taking smaller and smaller time intervals. The important point is that 
the numerical equality between the area of SBc and SBC obtains whatever the position of V 
on (SB): in other words, it obtains provided that the change of momentum due to a force is 
along the force direction, that is, provided dp/dt = α F. 
How good is this second explanation? First, it also exhibits the features emphasized by DN 
theorists: it is a deductively valid argument in which some nomological component is 
essentially needed (as well as the description of some particular circumstances). It shows in 
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addition that the whole content of Newton’s second law is not required within the 
explanation. More precisely, the quantitative part of Newton’s second law, which relates the 
values of forces and acceleration, can be removed for the premises without altering the 
validity of the argument. Better, from a physical point of view, this removal brings some 
important piece of explanatory information because it indicates more specifically what in the 
physics is essential for the law of Areas to obtain. The quantitative aspect of the momentum 
variation is shown to be explanatorily irrelevant, which indicates that the law of Areas does 
obtain for all worlds with a dynamical law such that the variation of momentum is along the 
force direction – and this is a piece of explanatory information that explanation 1 does not 
provide because it includes the described irrelevant information. 
Accordingly, explanation 2 is also instrumental to answer what-if questions about what 
would happen should the intensity of the force be different, time be discrete or the 
gravitational constant change with time. So, the corresponding explanatory generalization is 
also invariant under a large range of interventions.  
 
4. Comparison between the two explanations regarding depth and diagnosis about the 
inadequacy of Woodward’s account 
Let us now see how the two explanations comparatively fare according to Woodward’s 
criterion of explanatory depth. As just mentioned, both explanations are invariant under a 
large range of interventions. As we saw, Woodward suggests assessing explanatory depth by 
comparing domains of invariance. In the present case, none of the two explanations can then 
be said to be deeper than the other because none of the two sets is a subset of the other. 
Indeed, explanation 1 directly yields answers to what-if questions about how the total swept 
area quantitatively changes when, say, non radial forces are at play or more bodies involved, 
which explanation 2 does not (because it omits the quantitative part of Newton’s second law). 
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Conversely, explanation 2 explicitly indicates that the law of Areas would still obtain in 
circumstances in which Newton’s second law would be violated, which explanation 1 does 
not, because it designs as explanatory relevant the whole law with its quantitative aspect. 
Overall, from Woodward’s perspective, we have a situation with two good explanations 
which explanatory depth cannot be compared because their domains of invariance only partly 
overlap. And this is a case that is accommodated by Woodward when he notes that the 
comparison of the domains of invariance of explanations “obviously yields only a partial 
ordering” because “for many pairs of generalizations, neither will have a range of invariance 
that is a proper subset of the other” (2003, 262-64). 
My point is that this woodwardian conclusion is not satisfactory: if one focuses upon the 
relevance of the explanatory material regarding the explanandum, explanation 2 is better than 
explanatory 1. It is indeed commonly agreed that an explanation of A should merely include 
explanatory information that is relevant to the occurrence of A (at least if one’s epistemic goal 
is to provide an explanation of A that is as explanatory as possible (see section 6 for more 
comments about this restriction). As mentioned earlier, explanation 2 omits explanatory 
material that is irrelevant to the occurrence of the law of Areas, which explanation 1 does not. 
It is then no surprise that explanation 1 provides an answer to many what-if questions which 
answer depends on this irrelevant material and cannot therefore be given by explanation 1. 
However, while these additional answerable questions contribute to extend the invariance of 
explanation 1, the ability to answer them should not be seen as a sign of the greater goodness 
of explanation 1 (quite the contrary!) because, as the Newtonian investigation described 
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above shows, answering them requires some causal information that is here explanatorily 
irrelevant
2
. 
Let us now try to see more clearly why Woodward’s account leads to include irrelevant 
features in explanations to make them deeper. The reason seems to be that he requires that an 
explanation should account for many counterfactual cases that belong to a same physical type, 
defined in terms of the explanandum variable appearing in the explanatory generalization, and 
which the explanandum fact is an instantiation of. But this compels him to include in the 
explanatory material not only the facts that are explanatorily relevant to the target 
explanandum but also the facts that are explanatory relevant to all the values the explanandum 
variable may take. But as the example shows, the explanatorily relevant facts for the latter and 
the former need not coincide. The moral to draw is that facts belonging to an identical type do 
not always have the same explanations nor explanations of the same type. 
Here, it is important to note that the explanandum type that requires to draw this moral (the 
variation of the swept area) is not the product of some gerrymandering artificially associating 
pears and apples. So the moral should be rephrased more precisely and strongly like this: facts 
belonging to an identical bona fide physical type (corresponding to the explanandum variable 
of a genuine physical generality) do not always have the same set of explanatory relevant 
facts nor explanations of the same type.  
This conclusion has a counterpart in terms of whether domains of invariance are appropriate 
to assess the depth of an explanation and which what-if erotetic requests are appropriate for 
this task (to use a notion Woodward often relies upon). Requiring that an explanation of a 
                                                        
2 Of course, these irrelevant features belong to a fundamental causal law, which is true in all 
models described by classical physics. But this does not imply that they should pop up in all 
our explanations of physical phenomena. 
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target explanandum fact F should allow one to answer what-if questions about counterfactual 
circumstances corresponding to the invariance domain of some general and functionally 
described regularity, which the explanandum case is an instance of, may imply to include in 
the explanatory material physical information that is relevant for these circumstances but not 
for F. Accordingly, even if these explanatory requests are by themselves scientifically 
legitimate, it may be illegitimate to judge the goodness or depth of an explanation of F by the 
ability it provides to answer these requests because the physical information necessary for this 
task may be explanatory irrelevant regarding F - and this information should therefore not be 
included in a good explanation E of F, which removes the possibility of answering these 
requests on the basis of E. In short, being a what-if question about some circumstances in the 
domain of invariance of the explanatory generalization that one uses in the explanation E is 
not a sufficient condition for being an appropriate question for testing the depth of E because 
this criterion is incompatible with a satisfactory treatment of the problem of relevance for 
explanations. 
The conclusion regarding the evaluation of explanatory depth in terms of domain of 
invariance comes naturally. It is not legitimate to evaluate the depth of an explanation by 
assessing the domain of invariance of the generalization used in it. Performing well on the 
invariance criterion leads to promote explanations of individual facts that are special cases of 
general explanatory patterns built on generalizations that are invariant on large domains… but 
it potentially also leads to violate the requirement of relevance for the explanations of these 
individual facts. 
 
5. Another criterion for explanatory depth 
Still, as can be inferred from the discussion of the example, it seems that a good explanation 
(which satisfies the criterion of explanatory relevance) does provide answers to many 
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appropriate what-if questions. Explanation 2 shows that the law of Areas would still obtain in 
many circumstances in which the quantitative part of Newton’s second law or the intensity of 
the gravitational law would be different. It thereby enables one to answer in the affirmative 
the corresponding “would-the-explanandum-still-be-the-case” (in short “would-still” 
questions). For a derivative explanation, this set of circumstances in which the explanandum 
is shown by an explanatory argument to be left unchanged corresponds to the set of situations 
in which the premises of the explanatory argument are true. Further, the more irrelevant 
information is removed from the premises, the weaker these explanatory premises and the 
wider the class of situations to which they apply. Let us call this class of situations the domain 
of strict invariance of the explanation (by contrasts with Woodward’s notion of domain of 
(large) invariance of the generalization employed in the explanation, hereafter “large 
invariance”). Then, the above discussion leads to the following suggestion:  
(S) The wider the domain of strict invariance of an explanation, the deeper the 
explanation. 
 It would take much more that can be said here to develop this suggestion into a fully-
fledged proposal about the nature of explanation. In particular, a critical comparison with 
notions discussed by Reichenbach or Salmon in different contexts such as the notions of 
broadest homogeneous reference class, maximal class of maximal specificity or 
exhaustiveness (Salmon, 1989, 69, 104, 193) would be helpful. Nevertheless, the following 
remarks are in order. First, (S) indicates how an explanation can be turned into a better one by 
expurgating its premises from irrelevant information; but it does not however indicates in 
general what type of information can be present in the premises for something to count as a 
potential explanation. Therefore, it should not be seen as something standing on its own 
(otherwise, the best explanation would be the self-explanation of one fact by itself). Second, 
the domain that is here described should be distinguished from the scope of the laws or the 
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domain of invariance of the generalization present in the premises, which characterize 
statements: strict invariance characterizes the explanation itself.  Alternatively it can be seen 
as the domain of the explanatory generalization saying that when the premises hold (in this or 
different worlds), so does the explanandum. Third, just as for Woodward’s account, this 
criterion is likely to describe only a partial order over explanations. Finally, it should be noted 
that the criteria of having a large domain of large invariance and of having a large domain of 
strict invariance go into two opposite directions. Indeed, explanations with large domains of 
general invariance require generalization with much physical information packed in it; 
whereas explanations with large domains of strict invariance require premises with as little 
physical information as possible in their premises. So it does not seem possible to try to 
conciliate both criteria about the nature of explanatory depth. 
 
6. Concluding remarks: generality and manipulability versus specificity and relevance 
or the contextual choice of epistemic virtues in scientific practice 
I have criticized in this article the use of the size of the domains of invariance of the 
generalizations used in explanation to describe the depth of these explanations. I have argued 
that this characterization of the goodness of explanations fares badly by the requirement of 
relevance, which explanatory explanations should primarily satisfy. To describe the goodness 
of explanations I have proposed a different criterion based on the notion of strict invariance 
and the ability to answer “would-still” questions offered by explanations. And I have 
emphasized that satisfying one criterion may run contra the satisfaction of the other.  
One final word of caution is needed here. The above analysis dealt with the explanatory 
character of explanations of specific individual facts, which relevance is a clear component 
of. Now, like all other things, explanations may also have unspecific additional virtues, which 
may be philosophically unessential to them but practically crucial to their use. In the present 
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case, having a wide large invariance is no doubt such an unessential virtue. Indeed, an 
explanation with wide large invariance, even if it is of average quality regarding explanatory 
relevance, does provide a functional pattern for a family of similar explanations: it offers the 
opportunity to explain many similar phenomena with the same pattern of reasoning, which 
yields some significant economy of scientific and cognitive means. As any versatile tool, 
because it is general, such an explanation may prove useful, even if it is not optimal for 
specific explanatory tasks. Finding such explanations is therefore a scientifically legitimate 
(and difficult) task. 
So should scientists favor in practice specific relevant explanations with wide domains of 
strict invariance over general explanations with wide domains of large invariance? I think 
there is no general answer to this question. Pace the philosophical interest for essential 
epistemic virtues, contextual interests are to prevail depending on what scientific needs are. 
Suppose that you are interested in controlling optical rays within optical fibers or the 
trajectory of a car in various circumstances; then there is little doubt that you will be 
interested in finding explanations with wide domains of large invariance so that you can 
determine how the rays or the cars will behave in a wide range of circumstances with one 
single functional relation and control them by adopting the external forcing. For some of these 
covered circumstances, it is likely that this single functional relation will contain unnecessary 
(irrelevant) information and for some specific cases you may even be using a sledgehammer 
to crack a nut; but why should you care? For control purposes, it may be more convenient to 
use one single relation covering all cases than a cumbersome wealth of them, each 
specifically targeted at some subset of circumstances. 
 Suppose now that you are interested is observing a green flash effect (some optical 
phenomena occurring after sunset or before sunrise, when a green spot is visible above the 
sun). Then, what you want to learn about the circumstances in which you stand a good choice 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -176-
  17 
to observe a green flash effect and you want to know a set of circumstances that is as large as 
possible. Therefore, knowing which circumstances will not alter the phenomenon (because 
they are irrelevant to the mechanism involved) is crucial. In this case, you will be interested in 
discarding from the explanation any irrelevant information that restricts your knowledge of 
this set, even if it comes at the price of leaving out of the explanans physical information that 
may be useful to answer questions about what would happen in close circumstances (in which 
no green flash effect is observed). So you may end up with an explanation that is not useful 
for manipulationist purposes because it is specifically targeted at the green flash effect; 
perhaps this explanation will not even have a functional form (like above the explanation 2 of 
the law of Areas); but, because its explanans only describes the physical facts that are crucial 
for the green flash effect to happen and discards the other, it will be more explanatory and 
therefore more informative about the whole range of circumstances in which the observation 
can be made.  
In conclusion, Woodward’s criterion for explanatory depth seems more appropriate to 
characterize explanations that are useful for control than the ones that are deeply explanatory. 
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Abstract 
Evolution is often characterized as a tinkerer that creates efficient but messy solutions to problems. 
We analyze the nature of the problems that arise when we try to explain and understand cognitive 
phenomena created by this haphazard design process. We present a theory of explanation and 
understanding and apply it to a case problem – solutions generated by genetic algorithms. By 
analyzing the nature of solutions that genetic algorithms present to computational problems, we 
show that the reason for why evolutionary designs are often hard to understand is that they exhibit 
non-modular functionality, and that breaches of modularity wreak havoc on our strategies of causal 
and constitutive explanation. 
 
1 Introduction 
The once dominant classical paradigm of cognitive science has been under attack for several 
decades. Connectionism, cognitive neuroscience, dynamical systems theory, and new robotics have 
all questioned whether the classical AI approach to cognition can credibly describe biologically 
evolved cognitive systems such as human minds. Whereas classical AI tends to approach 
computational problems with functional decompositions inspired directly by the programmer’s 
intuitions about possible efficient subroutines, the alternative research programs often emphasize 
that biological evolution is more likely to produce far more complex and messy designs.  
 
In our paper we analyze the nature of the problem that these messy solutions raise to the 
understanding of cognitive phenomena. In general, the problem of understanding non-intuitive 
designs produced by natural selection is well-known in philosophy of psychology (e.g., Clark 1997, 
Ch. 5), philosophy of  biology (Wimsatt  2007), and now even in popular  psychology (Marcus 2008), 
but the problem has proven to be difficult  to articulate without a clear idea of what exactly it  is that 
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evolutionary tinkering is supposed to hinder. The main challenge for understanding is often framed 
and explained by pointing to the path-dependent nature and the resulting unfamiliarity of the 
evolved design (Jacob 1977). We argue that  this is not  the whole story. We hope that  providing an 
explicit theory of explanation and understanding will move us beyond intuitions towards a more 
systematic analysis and, ultimately, concrete solutions. We also combine our theory of explanatory 
understanding with a computational application of evolutionary design: problem-solutions 
generated by genetic algorithms. By analyzing the nature of solutions that genetic algorithms offer 
to computational problems, we suggest that an important reason for why evolutionary designs are 
often hard to understand is that they can exhibit non-modular functionality, and that breaches of 
modularity wreak havoc on our strategies of causal and constitutive explanation.  
 
2 Explanation and understanding 
The ultimate goal of cognitive neuroscience is to provide mechanistic understanding of system-level 
properties of  the cognitive system in  terms of  the properties of  its parts and  their  organization.  
Probably the most developed account of general strategies for reaching such mechanistic 
understanding is William Bechtel’s and Robert Richardson’s (2010) study of the heuristics of 
decomposition and localization (DL). The DL procedure goes roughly as follows. First, the different  
phenomena that the system of interest exhibits are differentiated. Then the phenomenon of interest 
is functionally decomposed, i.e., analyzed into a set of possible component operations that would be 
sufficient to produce the phenomenon. One can think of this step as a formulation of a preliminary 
set of simple functions that taken together would constitute the more complex input-output relation 
(the system-level phenomenon). The system is also structurally decomposed into a set of component 
parts. The final step is to try to localize the component operations by mapping the operations onto 
appropriate structural component parts. The idea is thus to first come up with a set of more basic 
properties or behaviors which could, taken together, possibly result in the explanandum behavior, 
and then try to find out whether the system is in fact made of such entities that can perform the 
required tasks. If this cannot be done, the fault may lie with the functional and structural 
decompositions or with the very identification of the phenomenon, and these may then have to be 
rethought. The identification and decomposition procedures will in the beginning be guided by 
earlier theories and common sense, but empirical evidence can always suggest that a thorough 
reworking of the basic ontology and the form of the possible explananda may be in order. 
According to Bechtel and Richardson, decomposability is a regulative ideal in such model 
construction because complex systems are psychologically unmanageable for humans. 
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Decomposition allows the explanatory task to be divided into parts that are manageable for 
cognitively limited beings, thereby rendering the system intelligible (Bechtel and Richardson 2010). 
The  idea  comes originally  from  Herbert  Simon  (1962),  who  claimed  that  the  property  of  near-
decomposability is a necessary condition of understandability to any finite cognitive agent. Near-
decomposability means that the system can be decomposed into parts in such a way that the 
intrinsic causal properties of the parts are more important for the behavior of the system than the 
relational causal properties of the components that are constituted also by their environment and 
interaction. Near-decomposable systems are thus hierarchical in the sense that the complex whole 
can be conceived of as made from a limited set of simpler parts and interactions. Hierarchical 
systems are manageable for cognitively limited beings because their ‘complete description’ includes 
irrelevant elements describing similar recurring parts and non-important interactions. The removal 
of such descriptions does not hamper our understanding of the system and thus eases cognitive 
load.  
Although there are a number of arguments that conclusively show that such informational economy  
by itself is not constitutive of understanding2, we agree with Simon in that a property closely related 
to near-decomposability, namely modularity, is a necessary condition for understanding. As a 
conceptual starting point for our argument, we follow Petri Ylikoski and Jaakko Kuorikoski in 
conceiving understanding not as a special mental state or act, but as a regulative label attributed 
according to manifest abilities in action and correctness of reasoning. Understanding is a public, 
behavioral concept. Cognitive processes (comprehension) taking place in the privacy of individual 
minds are a causal prerequisite for possible fulfillment of these criteria, but the processes 
themselves are not the facts in virtue of which somebody understands or not. They are not the 
criteria of understanding in the sense that we would have to know them in order to say whether 
somebody really understands something. (Ylikoski 2009; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010)  
We take the primary criterion of understanding to be inferential performance: whether someone 
understands a concept is evaluated according to whether he or she can make the right inferential 
connections to other concepts. Likewise, whether someone understands a phenomenon is assessed 
based on whether he or she can make correct inferences related to it. This view can be further 
                                                             
2
 First, nobody has actually succeeded in giving a positive argument for equating understanding with increased 
informational economy (Barnes 1992). Second, successful classification schemes compress information by 
facilitating inferences to properties probably possessed by individuals on the basis of belonging to a certain 
known class. However, classification schemes by themselves are usually taken to be merely descriptive and not 
explanatory. The same general point can be drawn from standard statistical procedures, which by themselves 
only summarize the data, but do not explain it. (Woodward 2003, 362-364.) 
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developed by linking it to James Woodward’s account of scientific explanation in the following way: 
Woodward’s theory of explanation tells us more specifically what kinds of inferences are constitutive 
of specifically explanatory understanding. According to Woodward (2003), explanation consists in 
exhibiting functional dependency relations between variables. Knowledge of explanatory 
relationships facilitates understanding by implying answers to what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions concerning the consequences of counterfactual or hypothetical changes in the values of 
the explanans variable. Whether someone understands a phenomenon is evaluated according to 
whether he or she can make inferences not only about its actual state, but also about possible states 
of the phenomenon or system in question. In the case of causal explanations, these explanatory 
dependencies concern the effects of interventions and knowledge of causal dependencies thus 
enables the possessor of this knowledge to act and possibly manipulate the object of explanation. 
These answers are the basis of the inferential performance constitutive of understanding.  
The limits of inferential performance depend causally on contingencies related to the reasoning 
processes of the agents whose understanding is being evaluated. Thus the limits of understanding 
are dependent on the cognitive make-up of agents and can certainly be investigated psychologically. 
For  example,  if  the space limit  of  our  working memory  is indeed  roughly  seven  items,  then  this 
constitutes an upper boundary for the complexity of our inferences and, consequently, for our 
understanding.  
In order for answers to what-if questions to be well defined, the dependencies grounding the 
answers have to possess some form and degree of independence such that a local change in an 
aspect of the phenomenon under study cannot ramify uncontrollably or intractably. If local 
modifications in a part of a system disrupt other parts (dependencies) in a way that is not explicitly 
specified (endogenized) in the (internal or external) representation of the system according to which 
the what-if inferences are made, the consequences of these changes are impossible to predict and 
counterfactual assertions impossible to evaluate. Things participating in the dependency relations 
also have to be somewhat localized (physically and/or conceptually) in order for the contemplated 
changes  to  be  well  defined  in  the  first  place.  (Woodward  2003,  333.)  Therefore  a  necessary  
condition for a representation to provide understanding of a phenomenon is that the modularity in 
the representation matches the modularity in the phenomenon. 
Let us first discuss the case of causal understanding. If an intervention on a causal system actually 
changes the system in a way that  is not  represented in the model  of  the system, the model  as it  
stands does not give correct answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions concerning the 
state of the system after the intervention. If we intervened on a causal input corresponding to 
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variable Xi in a model and the intervention, no matter how surgical, also changed the dependencies 
within the system or values of other variables themselves affecting variables causally downstream of 
Xi, the model would give incorrect predictions about the consequences of the intervention. Hence, 
the model would not provide correct causal understanding of the workings of the system and the 
causal role of the variable in it. If the system cannot be correctly modeled on any level of description 
or decomposition so that it is modular in such a way – if the system itself is not causally modular – 
no what-if-things-had-been-different questions concerning interventions in the system can be 
answered and there is no causal understanding of the system to be had. If the system is in fact such 
that every local change brings about intractable changes elsewhere in the system to such an extent 
that there can be no representation that would enable a cognitively finite being to track these 
changes and make correct inferences about their consequences, then the system is beyond the 
limits of understanding.  
The problem of understanding causally non-modular systems has received some attention in the 
philosophy of science literature (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 2010, Ch. 9). However, according to 
the schema of Bechtel and Richardson, before we can even start thinking about acquiring causal-
mechanical understanding of the system realizing the complex behavior to be understood, we need 
to formulate hypotheses about the possible functional decompositions of the behavior (see also 
Cummins 1983). For example, what kind of simpler subtasks could possibly produce complex 
cognitive capacities such as language production and comprehension, long-term memory, and three-
dimensional vision? Importantly, these hypotheses are separate, though not independent, from 
hypotheses concerning the implementation of the capacity. Although the understanding offered by 
the functional decomposition is not strictly speaking causal – component operations do not cause 
the whole behavior because they are constitutive parts of it3 – the modularity constraint on 
understandability still applies in the following way. We can only understand the complex behavior by 
having knowledge of the component operations if we can make reliable what-if inferences 
concerning the possible consequences of changes in the component operations for the properties of 
the more complex explanandum capacity. We provisionally understand working memory if we can 
infer from possible changes in its hypothesized component operations (such as differences in the 
postulated phonological loop or episodic buffer) to changes in the properties of the capacity. These 
inferences are only possible if the functional decomposition itself is suitably modular, i.e., the 
consequences of “ local“ changes in component operations do not ramify in an intractable way 
                                                             
3
 Although we fully agree with Piccinini and Craver (2011) in that insofar as functional decompositions are 
explanatory, they are to be thought of as mechanism sketches and that the functional hypotheses are not 
independent of the question of mechanistic implementation.  
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making the behavior of the whole completely holistic. We now argue that genetic algorithms 
demonstrate that design by selection can lead to such non-modular complex behavior. 
 
3 Genetic algorithms 
Since the 1960s, there have been attempts to apply insights from evolutionary thinking to computer 
programming. Here we discuss one genre of evolutionary programming: genetic algorithms (cf. 
Holland 1975; Goldberg 1989; Mitchell 1996). In a nutshell, the idea of the genetic-algorithms 
approach is to “breed” randomly generated solutions to computational problems. This is done by 
mimicking the evolutionary mechanisms of inheritance, mutation, selection and crossover in a 
computer simulation. Although genetic algorithms (henceforth GAs) are not the only strand of 
evolutionary programming, they serve our purpose well because their basic principles are easy to 
understand and they are the most well-known kind of evolutionary programming outside computer 
science (Clark 1997, 2001; Mitchell 2009).  
 
From the point of view of AI, genetic algorithms are a form of non-exhaustive but massively parallel 
search in the search space of a problem. They can be used for a number of different purposes: for 
evolving behavioral strategies for simulated agents, for finding weights for a connectionist network, 
or  for  evolving  cellular  automata  to  perform  computations.  We  illustrate  the  nature  of  GAs by  
presenting a simple example from Melanie Mitchell (2009, Ch. 9). Mitchell’s original simulation 
showed how GAs can be used to evolve a controlling program for a simulated robot picking up soda 
cans in a 10x10 grid. Robby the robot  can only see squares that  are adjacent  to its location (center, 
North, South, East, West), and each turn it  can either move one step to a particular direction, move 
at random, try to pick up a can, or do nothing. Each simulation run lasts for a predetermined amount 
of time steps (originally 200), and Robby's task is to pick up as many randomly situated soda cans as 
possible.  
 
 Genome G: 
254355153256235251056355461151336154151034156110550150052030256256132252350325112
052333054055231255051336154150665264150266506012264453605631520256431054354632404
350334153250253251352352045150130156213436252353223135051260513356201524514343432 
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Figure 1. (taken from Mitchell 2009, 137). Each “locus”  in the genome G corresponds to one of the 
possible immediate environmental states of Robby and each digit (the allele) to a move in that 
situation (e.g. ‘0’ å ‘move north’, ‘5’ å ‘pick up’).  
 
Initially a random population of software individuals is generated, each with a “genome” consisting 
of 243 random numbers. Each locus in the genome guides Robby’s behavior in a particular situation 
(Fig 1). The fitness score of each candidate program in the population is calculated by running 
several simulation trials: crudely, the more cans the robot is able to pick up by average, the higher its 
fitness. Programs with the highest fitness scores are then used to form the next generation of 
programs:  they are paired randomly,  and the genomes of  the two parents are crossed over  at  a 
randomly chosen point to create the genomes of new individuals. Finally, for each descendant, there 
is a small probability (.05) that a mutation occurs in its chromosome. As a result, the new generation 
is based on the most successful variants among the previous generation and the process loops back 
to the fitness-calculation phase. Thus the GA continues searching for efficient solutions to the 
problem by investigating the surrounding areas in the search space.  
 
After a few hundred generations, the evolved strategies start to achieve impressing results in the 
simulated task. As we replicated Mitchell’s simulation, we observed that after the 800th generation, 
the best strategies among evolved Robbys started to have higher fitness scores than a simple 
“rational” solution programmed by a human designer (ultimately 480 vs. 420 points). However, 
although solutions found with GAs are efficient, their behavior is often hard to understand. The 
ingenious heuristics that the programs employ cannot be deciphered by simply looking at individual 
genes or sets of genes. Instead, looking holistically at the broad phenotypic behavior of the robot is 
necessary. A nice illustration of this impenetrability of such evolved solutions is the fact that in some 
cases when a highly evolved Robby is in the same square with a can, it  decides not to pick it  up, but 
rather chooses to move away from the square. While this behavior seems prima facie irrational, 
looking at  the total behavioral profile of the robot  uncovers a cunning strategy: Robby uses cans as 
markers to remember that there are cans on its side and explores the adjacent squares for extra 
cans  before  picking  up  the  marker  can.  Thus  by  not  treating  cans  only  as  targets  but  also  as  
navigational tools, Robby uses its environment to extend its severely limited visual capacities and to 
compensate for its total lack of memory. 
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Moreover, by examining the behavior of a 1500th generation Robby that has the highest fitness score 
in  its population,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  marker  strategy  manifests in  slightly  different  ways in  
different environmental situations. It is therefore not a discrete adaptation, but rather a collection of 
independently evolved sub-strategies. Furthermore, the marker strategy appears to tightly 
intertwine with other environment-employing “hacks” that the sophisticated Robby uses: when 
there is already a lot of empty space on the grid, Robby employs a “vacuum-cleaner” movement 
strategy.  It  follows the  walls of  the  board,  departing  toward  the  center  when  it  detects a  can,  
employs the marker  strategy if  possible, and immediately after  cleaning up its local  environment, 
returns directly to the south wall to continue its round around the board. 
 
Such kluges are common to designs created by GAs. Like biological evolution, GAs can come up with 
solutions that a human designer would not usually think of. These solutions often offload parts of 
problem solving to the environment, and thus rely on a tight coupling between the system and its 
environment. And as pointed out by Clark (1997, 2001), recurrent circuitry and complex feedback 
loops between different levels of processing often feature in systems designed by GAs. Such designs 
are often difficult to understand. We claim that such difficulties in understanding are often created 
by the lack of modularity in the functional decomposition of the behavior. This point can be 
illustrated by looking again at the genome of our most successful Robby (genome G in Fig 1). Robby 
is leaving cans as markers only in specific situations and only the totality of this selective marking 
strategy, together with navigational strategies utilizing cans and walls, constitutes the effectiveness 
of the search procedure. Looking at isolated genes in Robby’s genome only reveals trivially modular 
elements corresponding to elementary subtasks in Robby’s behavior: one gene corresponds to an 
elementary move in a specific environmental situation. But we cannot make inferences from local 
hypothetical changes in these elemental behaviors to consequent effects on fitness. The connection 
between any single elementary behavioral rule and the strategy is simply too complex and context 
dependent. A change in a single rule (in situation B and a can present, whether to pick or not to pick 
the can up) has consequences for the effectiveness of the other elementary behavioral rules 
constituting the navigational strategy. Explanatorily relevant inferences would require an extra 
“level” of modular sub-operations between the individual movements and the strategy as a whole. 
The marker and vacuum-cleaner strategies mentioned above are examples of such middle-level sub-
operations, but they are by themselves insufficient to yield understanding of the whole behavior of 
our most successful Robby, since the effectiveness of leaving a can is a result of the evolved match 
between the specific situations in which Robby leaves a can and the rest of the navigation behavior. 
And genetic algorithms do not, in general, produce such easily discernible designs. Rather, only by 
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simultaneously looking at constellations of different genes, and eventually the whole genome, the 
interesting heuristics in the system’s behavior can be revealed - if at all.  
 
To recapitulate, our example exhibits several distinct (yet related) challenges to understanding: 
1. The discernible middle-level strategies (marker, vacuum cleaner) do not have a dedicated 
structural basis. Instead, the nature of the design process leaves all atomic structural 
elements (the 243 DNA elements) open for  exploitation by all  capacities serving the main 
goal. In consequence, the system is not structurally or behaviorally nearly-decomposable, 
but instead has ”a flat hierarchy.” Strategies are implemented in highly distributed 
structures, and as pointed out in section 2, this raises a challenge for human cognitive 
capacities. 
2. Challenge 1 above means that the interactions between subtasks tend to be strong: a 
change in one subtask constituting a part of the marker-behavior affects also the functioning 
of the vacuum-cleaner navigation. In general the middle-level strategies can only be 
discerned and defined in a very abstract way and the interaction-effect in their contribution 
to the overall fitness is so large as to make any inferences about the consequence of partial 
changes in one strategy next to impossible. 
3. The way in which operations contribute to the fitness of the individual is highly context-
dependent and depends on the properties of the environment as well as the DNA of the 
agent. For instance, merely detecting the existence of the marker strategy requires that 
there are suitable clusters of  cans in the environment. Moreover, even small modifications 
to  the  environment  can  lead  to  drastic  changes  in  the  performance  of  a  strategy.  For  
instance, adding only a few randomly placed extra walls on the grid radically collapses the 
average score of the successful Robby described above. 
 
Extrapolating from this very simple case, GAs may yield functional decompositions of the problem 
that do not follow a tidy hierarchical decomposition into modular subtasks, whose individual 
contributions would be easy to understand (i.e., we could infer how a change in a sub-routine would 
affect the behavior of the mother-task). Instead, feedback, many tasks using same subtasks as 
resources, and environment couplings lead to holistic design where almost “everything is relevant 
for everything.”  The evolved functional architecture is flat in that there are few discernible levels of 
order between the elementary operations and the complex whole. The counter-intuitiveness of such 
flat architectures is apparent in the deep mistrust faced by connectionist suggestions for non-
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hierarchical design of cognitive capacities (see e.g., Rumelhart and McClelland 1986 vs. Pinker and 
Prince 1988). 
 
Furthermore, GAs underscore the path dependence of evolutionary problem solving. For sufficiently 
complex computational problems there are often several local maxima in the fitness landscape of 
the problem, and the population can converge to different maxima in different runs of the 
simulation. The functional decomposition that a human designer comes up with is just one possible 
solution among several others. Perhaps our biological evolution actually ended up with a radically 
different one. 
 
4 Lessons for the study of mind 
 
Genetic algorithms seem to demonstrate that evolution can in principle lead to non-modular 
functionality. This imposes a limit on our ability to understand such behavior: if we cannot trace the 
consequences of changes in the sub-operations, we cannot answer what-if questions concerning the 
complex behavior. Such behavior also constitutes a thorny problem for mechanistic understanding 
of the implementation of the said behavioral capacities, since the DL heuristic cannot even get off 
the ground. We can now ask two questions: should we expect to find such non-modular functionality 
in nature, especially in human cognition, and if so, what attitude should we adopt with respect to 
this problem. Should the aim of causal-mechanistic understanding of the brain be given up and 
replaced with a program of instrumentally interpreted dynamical models and modeling the 
dynamics of the mind with a few macro-variables? 
 
There are important disanalogies between GAs and biological evolution. (1) in GAs, there usually is 
no genotype–phenotype distinction. In biological evolution, however, genes do not directly cause 
properties of the phenotype, but rather participate in guiding ontogenesis. There have been 
suggestions that ontogenesis itself favors modular design. GAs may also seem a problematic 
platform for exploring the possibilities of DL heuristics, since the lowest level of functional 
organization and the level of implementation are the same (i.e., the genome). However, we see no 
reasons why this would affect our argument. Moreover, the argument developed here is about 
selection in general, and failures of functional modularity may in principle also arise in the course of 
development  –  at  least  if  the  idea  of  neuronal  group  selection  or  “neural  Darwinism”  is taken  
seriously. 
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(2) Most  studies on genetic algorithms are carried out  by using a single fixed goal  or  a fixed task 
type. In the Robby example, although the distribution of the cans was generated at random, the task 
itself remained essentially the same from generation to generation. However, Nadav Kashtan and 
Uri Alon (2005, see also Kashtan et al.  2007) have demonstrated that when the goals themselves are 
composed of modularly varying sub-goals, evolution produces modular functionality. It is easy to see 
why this is the case. If the tasks to which the system has to adapt to remains the same, the selection 
environment is stable and the peaks in the fitness landscape are immovable, then selection favors 
strategies which offload problem solving to that particular environment as much as possible. But if 
the task itself is composed of changing subtasks, it makes sense to design the adaptive response in 
such a way that a particular sub-operation can locally adapt to a local change in a subtask without 
altering the totality of the otherwise well functioning behavior. 
It seems likely that cognition has evolved in such a modularly changing selection environment, but 
the extent to which we should expect to find modular functionality in human cognition is hard to 
estimate and is most probably a purely empirical matter. Moreover, as a response to Simon’s (1962) 
Tempus and Hora argument, it has been argued that componential specialization in complex systems 
is a  force  that  works against  the  development  of  strictly  modular  structures (e.g.,  Levins 1973,  
Wimsatt 2007, 186–192). Nonetheless, these arguments as such give us no reason to believe that 
the produced functional decomposition should respect any intuitive constraints, such as those 
derived from introspection on our thought processes or the way in which we would program a 
strategy to tackle similar cognitive challenges. 
Genetic algorithms demonstrate that evolution can create designs which are in principle beyond the 
understanding of unaided cognitive beings such as us. Yet there is nothing mysterious in such 
designs. Simon pondered whether the relative abundance of hierarchical nearly decomposable 
complexity was due to our selective attention to precisely such systems, but we believe this to be a 
somewhat hasty conjecture. We have no trouble finding and delineating systems, such as Robby or 
possibly ourselves, with behaviors which are functionally non-decomposable and constituted by a 
flat architecture. However, there certainly might be a psychological bias that makes us see 
hierarchical design also where there is none. One way of coping with this impasse is to realize that 
there are no fundamental reasons to limit the relevant understanding epistemic agent  to  be  an  
unaided human. Although only a human agent can experience a sense of understanding, this feeling 
should not be confused with understanding itself. Therefore brute computational approaches can 
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produce understanding as long as the understanding subject, the cognitive unit whose inferential 
abilities are to be evaluated, is conceived as the human-computer pair. 
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Abstract
There are two senses of ‘what scientists know’: An individual sense
in which scientists report their own opinions, and a collective sense in
which one reports the state of the discipline. The latter is what is of in-
terest for the purpose of policy and planning. Yet an expert, although
she can report the former directly (her opinion on some question),
can only report her considered opinion of the latter (the community
opinion on the question). Formal judgement aggregation functions
offer more rigorous frameworks for assessing the community opinion.
They take the individual judgements of experts as inputs and yield a
collective judgement as an output. This paper argues that scientific
opinion is not effectively captured by a function of this kind. In order
to yield consistent results, the function must take into account the
inferential relationships between different judgements. Yet the infer-
ential relationships are themselves matters to be judged by experts
involving risks which must be weighed, and the significance of the risk
depends on value judgements.
In one sense, ‘what scientists know’ just means the claims which are the
determination of our best science. Yet science is a collective enterprise; there
∗Thanks to John Milanese, Heather Douglas, and Jon Mandle for comments on various
parts of this project.
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are many scientists who have individual and disparate beliefs. So ‘what scien-
tists know’, in another sense, means the omnibus comprised of the epistemic
state of scientist #1, the epistemic state of scientist #2, and so on for the
rest of the community. The phrase is ambiguous between a collective and an
individual meaning.
If we consult a scientific expert, either because we want to plan policy
or just because we are curious, we are typically interested in the collective
sense. We want to know what our best present science has to say about
the matter. And the expert we consult can differentiate the two senses, too.
She can relate what she as a particular scientists knows (what she herself
thinks, where here sympathies lie in controversies, and so on), but she can
also take a step back from those commitments to give her sense of what the
community consensus or dominant opinion is on the same matters. If it is
simply curiosity that has led us to consult an expert, this may be enough.
When policy hangs on the judgement, however, we want more than just one
expert’s report on the state of the entire field.
This distinction between their personal commitments and the state of the
field in their discipline is one that any scholar can make. If you think (as
tradition has it) that only individuals can have beliefs in a strict sense, then
take the expression ‘opinion of the scientific community’ as a fac¸on de par-
ler. If you think (as Lynn Hankinson Nelson does [10]) that the community
rather than the individual knows in a strict sense, then suitably reinterpret
‘what an individual knows’ in terms of belief. The distinction I have in mind
is neutral with respect to the metaphysics of social epistemology. The ques-
tion is simply how we could use consultation with individuals to generate a
composite, collective judgement.
Formal judgement aggregation offers rigorous frameworks which seem to
provide what we want. In the abstract, it defines a function that takes
individual scientists’ judgements as inputs and yields collective judgement
as an output. This assumes that the collective judgement of the scientific
community depends on the separate individual judgments of the scientists
— i.e., that what scientists know in the collective sense is a function of what
scientists know in the individual sense.
Taking a recent proposal by Hartmann et al. [6][7] as an exemplar, I argue
that judgement aggregation does a poor job of representing what scientists
know in the collective sense. I survey several difficulties. The deepest stems
from the fact that judgements of fact necessarily involve (perhaps implicit)
value judgements. Where values and risks might be contentious, this entails
2
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that individual judgements cannot merely be inputs to a function. Judgement
aggregation is not enough.
1 The majority and premise-majority rules
As a judgement aggregation procedure, one might na¨ıvely survey scientists
about factual matters and take any answer given by the majority of scientists
to reflect the state of science. Of course, scientists would agree about a great
many things that are simply not within their purview. Physicists would say
that Sacramento is the capital of California, but that does not make it part
of physics. So the survey should be confined to matters that are properly
scientific. The survey must also include only legitimate scientists and exclude
ignorant rabble. These restrictions are somewhat slippery, but let’s accept
them.
The na¨ıve procedure is a simple function from individual judgements to
an aggregate judgement: Return the judgement endorsed by a majority of
the judges. Call this the majority rule.
The majority rule has the nice features that it treats every judge equally
and that it does not bias the conclusion toward one judgement or another.
Yet it suffers from what’s called the discursive dilemma: It can lead to incon-
sistent collective judgements, even if all the judges considered individually
have consistent beliefs. In the following schematic example, there are three
judges: Alice, Bob, and Charles. Each has the consistent beliefs on the mat-
ters P , Q, and (P&Q) indicated in the table below. The majority rule yields
the inconsistent combination of affirming P and Q but denying (P&Q).
P Q (P&Q)
Alice T F F
Bob F T F
Charles T T T
majority T T F
The nice features of majority rule seem like desiderata for a judgement
aggregation rule, but avoiding the discursive dilemma is another such desider-
atum. A good deal of ink has been spilled specifying precisely the desiderata
and proving that they are together inconsistent. However, even where it can
be proven that a set of desiderata cannot be satisfied in all cases, they may
3
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still be jointly satisfied in some instances. The majority rule can lead to con-
tradiction, it does not do so in every case. As a practical matter, we might
begin by trying out a simple rule (like majority) and add sophistication only
if the actual community has judgements like those in schematic example.1
Even so, more sophisticated rules would be needed for corner cases.
Stephan Hartmann, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Jan Sprenger [6][7] develop
a judgement aggregation rule specifically to escape the discursive dilemma.
Their procedure involves polling judges only regarding matters of indepen-
dent evidence. For matters which are consequences of the evidence, the
procedure derives consequences from the aggregated judgements. In the sim-
ple case given in the table above, for example, the procedure would affirm P
and Q (because each is affirmed by a majority) and also P&Q (because it
is a consequence of P and Q). Call this the premise-majority rule. When it
can be applied, premise-majority generates a consistent set of judgements.
There are several difficulties with premise-majority, as a way of aggregat-
ing expert scientific opinion.2
First, premise-majority inevitably produces some determinate answer. As
Brams et al. [3] show, it is possible for a combination of separate elections
to result in an overall outcome that would not be affirmed by any of the
voters. Moreover, a judge’s inconsistency will necessarily be between some
belief about evidence and some belief about the consequences of the evidence
— since the evidence claims are stipulated to be independent — but premise-
majority does not query their beliefs about consequences at all. So it will
generate a consistent set of judgements even if many or all judges are in-
consistent. As such, premise-majority will generate determinate results even
when the community is confused or fractured into competing camps. But,
in considering scientific opinion, we certainly only want to say that there is
something ‘scientists know’ when there is a coherent scientific community.
Second, applying the rule requires a division between the judgements that
are evidence and the ones that are conclusions. As Fabrizio Cariana notes,
premise-majority “requires us to isolate, for each issue, a distinguished set
1The strategy of adding complications only as necessary can be applied generally to
decision problems. For example, intransitive preferences wreck dominance reasoning. Yet
one might presumptively employ dominance reasoning until one actually faces a case where
there are intransitive preferences.
2Since Hartmann et al. are thinking about the general problem of judgement aggrega-
tion, rather than the problem of expert elicitation, these are objections to the application
of the rule rather than to the rule as such.
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of logically independent premises” [4, p. 28]. He constructs a case involving
three separate, contentious claims and an agreed upon constraint, such that
any two of the three claims logically determines the third. It would be arbi-
trary to treat two of the claims as evidence (and so suitable for polling) and
the third as a consequence (and so fixed by inference). The premise-majority
rule simply is not applicable in cases where the line between premises and
conclusions is so fluid. This difficulty leads Cariani to conclude only that
premise-majority will sometimes be inapplicable; so he suggests, “Different
specific aggregation problems may call for different aggregation rules” [4,
p. 29]. Yet the problem is especially acute for scientific judgement, because
inference can be parsed at different levels. Individual measurements like ‘35◦
at 1:07 AM’ are not the sort of thing that would appear in a scientific pub-
lication; individual data points are unrepeatable and not something about
which you would query the whole community. Yet they do, of course, play
a roˆle in inference. At the same time, scientists may take things like the
constancy of the speed of light to be evidence for a theory; the evidence here
is itself an inference from experiments and observations. There are different
labels for these different levels. Trevor Pinch [12] calls them observations
of differing externality. James Bogen and James Woodward [2] distinguish
data from phenomena. Since we might treat the same claims as premises or
conclusions, in different contexts, it is unclear what we would poll scientists
about if we applied premise-majority.
Third, premise-majority is constructed for cases where the conclusion is
a deductive consequence of the premises. In science, this is almost never the
case.3 Scientific inference is ampliative, and there is uncertainty not only
about which evidence statements to accept but also about which inferences
ought to be made on their basis. One might avoid this difficulty by including
inferential relations among the evidential judgements. To take a schematic
case, judges could be asked about R and (R → S); if the majority affirms
both, then premise-majority yields an affirmative judgement for S.
One might worry that this suggestion treats ampliative, scientific infer-
ence too much like deductive consequence. The worry is that actual scientists
might accept a premise of the form ‘If R, then typically S’ but nothing so
strong as R → S. It is possible for inferences based on weaker conditionals
3I say ‘almost’ because sufficiently strong background commitments can transform an
ampliative inference into a deduction from phenomena. Of course, we accept equivalent
inductive risk when we adopt the background commitments; cf. [9].
5
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about what is merely typical to lead from consistent premises to inconsistent
conclusions. To answer the worry, one might appeal to what John Norton
[11] calls a material theory of induction. The central idea is that most of
inductive risk in ampliative inferences is shouldered by conditional premises;
Norton calls the premises material postulates. So — in answer to the worry
— one might think that asking about material postulates would allow us to
use the premise-majority rule to aggregate scientific judgements about many
even though not absolutely all matters.
A deeper problem with the suggestion is that it presumes that scientists
can say, independently of everything else, whether the inference from R to S
is appropriate. That is, it assumes that material postulates can be evaluated
on a ballot separately from everything else. In the remainder of the paper, I
argue that this idealizes science too much. Whether a scientific inference is
appropriate must be informed by more than just the particular evidence —
the appropriate scientific conclusion depends (at least in some cases) on the
risks and values involved.
In the next section, I spell out more clearly the way in which inference
can be entangled with values and risk. In the subsequent section, I return to
it as a problem for premise-majority. As we’ll see, it becomes a problem for
more than just Hartmann et al.’s specific proposal. It is a problem for any
formal judgement aggregation rule whatsoever.
2 The James-Rudner-Douglas thesis
Here is a quick argument for the entanglement of judgement and values:
There is a tension between different epistemic duties. The appropriate bal-
ance between these duties is a matter of value commitments rather than a
matter of transcendent rationality. So making a judgement of fact necessarily
depends on value commitments.
The argument goes back at least to William James, who puts the point
this way: “We must know the truth; and we must avoid error — these are
our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not
two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws”
[8, p. 99]. Although James has in mind personal matters of conscience (such
as religious belief), Richard Rudner makes a similar argument for scientific
judgement. Rudner argues that
the scientist must make the decision that the evidence is suf-
6
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ficiently strong. . . to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis.
Obviously our decision regarding the evidence and respecting how
strong is “strong enough”, is going to be a function of the im-
portance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in
accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. [13, p. 2]
There is not only a tension between finding truth and avoiding error, but
also between risking one kind of error and risking another. Any particular
test involves a trade-off between making the standards too permissive (and
so mistakenly giving a positive answer) or making them too strict (and so
mistakenly giving a negative answer). The former mistake is a false positive
or type I error; the latter a false negative or type II error. There is an
inevitable tradeoff between the risk of each mistake, and so there is a point
at which the only way to reduce the risk of both is to collect more evidence
and perform more tests. Yet the decision to do so is itself a practical as
well as an epistemic decision. In any case, it leaves the realm of judgement
aggregation — having more evidence would mean having different science,
rather than discerning the best answer our present science has to a question.
As such, values come into play. Heather Douglas puts the point this way,
“Within the parameters of available resources and methods, some choices
must be made, and that choice should weigh the costs of false positives versus
false negatives. Weighing these costs legitimately involves social, ethical, and
cognitive values” [5, p. 104].
Plotting a curve through these 19th, 20th, and 21st-century formulations,
call this the James-Rudner-Douglas or JRD thesis : Anytime a scientist an-
nounces a judgement of fact, they are making a tradeoff between the risk of
different kinds of error. This balancing act depends on the costs of each kind
of error, so scientific judgement involves assessments of the value of different
outcomes.
The standard objection to the thesis is that responsible scientists should
not be making categorical judgements. They should never simply announce
‘P ’ (the objection says) but instead should say things like ‘The available
evidence justifies x% confidence in P .’ This response fails to undercut the
thesis, because procedures for assigning confidence levels also involve a bal-
ance between different kinds of risk. This is clearest if the confidence is given
as an interval, like x±e%. Error can be avoided, at the cost of precision, by
making e very large. Yet a tremendous interval, although safe, is tantamount
to no answer at all.
7
San Diego, CA -199-
Eric Winsberg and Justin Biddle [1] give a substantially more subtle reply
to the standard objection. Regarding the specific case of climate modeling,
Winsberg and Biddle show that scientists’ estimates both of particular quan-
tities and of confidence intervals depend on the histories of their models. For
example, the results are different if scientists model ocean dynamics and
then add a module for ice formation rather than vice-versa. The history of a
model reflects decisions about what was considered to be important enough
to model first, and so it depends on prior value judgements.
But why should the JRD thesis have consequences for expert elicitation?
After all, James does not apply it to empirical scientific matters. He is
concerned with religious and personal matters, and he concludes merely that
we should “respect one another’s mental freedom” [8, p. 109]. He does not
apply it at all scientific matters where there is a community of legitimate
experts.
Rudner, who does apply the thesis to empirical judgements, nevertheless
hopes that the requisite values might themselves be objective. What we need,
he concludes, is “a science of ethics” [13, p. 6]. Rudner calls this a “task of
stupendous magnitude” [13, p. 6], but he is too optimistic. Searching for an
objective ethics in order to resolve the weight of values and risks is a fool’s
errand. A regress would ensue: The judgements of ethical science would
need to be informed by the ethically correct values so as to properly balance
inductive risks, but assurance that we have the correct values would only be
available as the product of ethical science. One might invoke pragmatism
and reflective equilibrium, but such invocations would not give Rudner final
or utterly objective values. If responsible judgement aggregation were to wait
on an utterly objective, scientific ethics, then it would wait forever.
Douglas accepts that the thesis matters for expert elicitation. So she
considers the concrete question of how to determine the importance of the
relevant dangers. She argues for an analytic-deliberative process which would
include both scientists and stakeholders [5, ch. 8]. Such a process is required
when the scientific question has a bearing on public policy, and there are
further conditions which must obtain in order for such processes to be suc-
cessful. For one, “policymakers [must be] fully committed to taking seriously
the public input and advice they receive and to be guided by the results of
such deliberation” [5, p. 166]. For another, the public must be “engaged
and manageable in size, so that stakeholders can be identified and involved”
[5, p. 166]. Where there are too many stakeholders and scientists for di-
rect interaction, there can still be vigorous public examination of the values
8
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involved. Rather than pretending that there is any all-purpose procedure,
Douglas calls for “experiment with social mechanisms to achieve a robust
dialog and potential consensus about values” [5, p. 169]. Where consensus
is impossible, we can still try to elucidate and narrow the range of options.
Douglas’ approach is both a matter of policy (trying to increase trust in
science, rather than alienating policymakers and stakeholders) and a matter
of normative politics (claiming that stakeholders’ values are ones that sci-
entists should take into consideration). In cases where these concerns are
salient, saying what scientists know will depend on more than just the prior
isolated judgements of scientists — but moreover on facts about the actual
communities of scientists, policymakers, and stakeholders.
Arguably, Douglas’ concerns will not be salient in all cases. Some science
is far removed from questions of policy. So the significance of the JRD thesis
may depend on the question being asked.
3 Our fallible selves
I argued above that the premise-majority rule was inapplicable in many sci-
entific contexts because it only worked for cases of deductive consequence.
Formally, this worry could be resolved by asking scientists about which in-
ferences would be justified; we poll them about claims like (E → H) at the
same time as we poll them about E. The JRD thesis undercuts this formal
trick. Where the judgement has consequences, the inference itself is an ac-
tion under uncertainty. So the appropriate inference depends on the values
at stake. Schematically, whether one should assent to (E → H) depends on
the risks involved in inferring H from E. Concretely, questions of science
that matter for policy are not entirely separable from questions of the policy
implications.
If we merely poll scientists, then we will be accepting whatever judge-
ments accord with their unstated values. We instead want the procedure
to reflect the right values, which in a democratic society means including
communities effected by the science. Importantly, this does not mean that
stakeholders get to decide matters of fact themselves; they merely help de-
termine how the risks involved in reaching a judgement should be weighed.
Nor does it mean that politicized scientific questions should be answered by
political means; climate scientists can confidently identify general trends and
connections, even allowing for disagreement about the values involved. What
9
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it does mean is that scientists cannot provide an account that is value-neutral
in all its precise details.4
This is fatal to premise-majority as a method of determining what sci-
entists know collectively. Moreover, it is fatal to any judgement aggregation
rule that treats judges merely as separate inputs to an algorithm. The prob-
lem extends to practical policies of expert elicitation, insofar as they are
procedures for enacting judgement aggregation rules. Where there are im-
portant values at stake that scientists are not taking into account or where
the value commitments of scientists are different than those of stakehold-
ers, the present judgements of individual scientists can not just be taken as
givens.
An analytic-deliberative process is required, but the appropriate mecha-
nisms are not ones which we can derive a priori. As Douglas argues, we need
to experiment with different possibilities [5, p. 169, cited above]. There is not
likely to be one universally applicable process. It will depend on facts about
the communities involved. Moreover, the inference from social experiments in
deliberation will itself be an inductive inference about a question that effects
policy. So the inference depends importantly on value judgements about the
inductive risks involved, and that means an analytic-deliberative process will
be required. It would be a mistake to hope, in parallel with Rudner’s appeal
to a science of ethics, for an objective set of procedural norms. How best
to resolve meta-level judgement about experiments in social arrangements is
as much a contingent matter as how to socially arrange object-level expert
consultation. We start with the best processes we can muster up now, and
we try to improve them going forward. Minimally, however, we can say that
future improvements should not elide the roˆle of values, as formal judgment
aggregation functions do, but explicitly accommodate it.
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Abstract: Debates between contingentists and inevitabilists contest whether the results of 
successful science are contingent or inevitable. This paper addresses lingering ambiguity in the 
way contingency is defined in these debates. I argue that contingency in science can be 
understood as a collection of distinct concepts, distinguished by how they hold science 
contingent, by what elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are 
contingent upon. I present a preliminary taxonomy designed to characterize the full range 
positions available and illustrate that these constitute a diverse array, rather than a spectrum. 
 
1. Introduction 
Ian Hacking, in The Social Construction of What?, asks his readers to assign themselves a 
number from one to five to describe how central contingency is to their personal conceptions of 
science. If you rate yourself at one, then you are a strong inevitabilitst, whereas if you choose 
five, you are highly contingentist and probably have strong constructionist sympathies (Hacking 
1999, 99). In response, Léna Soler questions whether this is the correct approach, and asks: 
“should we introduce degrees of contingentism depending on the kind of contingent factors that 
are supposed to play a role?” (Soler 2008a, 223). 
Herein, I answer Soler’s question in the emphatic affirmative, and therefore the question 
posed in the title with a resounding “no.” Contingency in science can be understood as a 
collection of distinct concepts, distinguished by how they hold science contingent, by what 
elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are contingent upon. What 
separates one contingentist from another is not that one tags herself a two and the other fancies 
himself a five according with how strongly each believes science might have developed
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differently. Their disagreement arises from the fact that they understand contingency-producing 
factors to act differently on different aspects of the scientific process. Contingency is a “what” 
question, not a “how much” question. 
Before beginning this discussion I review the contingentist/inevitabilist (C/I) debate in 
Section 2 by reconstructing positions the debate’s central figures stake out. Ian Hacking, who 
coined the terms “contingentism” and “inevitabilism,” figures centrally. I also discuss several 
scholars who were retrospectively cast as interlocutors in the debate, such as Andrew Pickering, 
Sheldon Glashow, and James Cushing, and those who responded to Hacking directly, namely 
Léna Soler and Howard Sankey. After demonstrating how their conceptions of contingency have 
defined the debate, I argue that the conversation wants for a clear understanding of contingency 
and suggest how this ambiguity might be clarified by more rigorous classification of the concepts 
it groups together. 
Section 3 presents a detailed discussion of the nature of contingency in science, in which 
I outline a fresh taxonomy of the concept. The taxonomy builds on John Beatty’s distinction 
between unpredictability contingency and causal dependence contingency (Beatty 2006). This 
distinction clarifies the debate substantially, but I argue that a second step is required. Further 
decomposing unpredictability contingency and sub-classifying causal dependence contingency—
based on the things within science considered to be contingent and the factors they are presumed 
to be contingent upon—allows more precise characterization of the views under discussion. A 
detailed picture of ways different authors use contingency serves as a basis from which to 
examine how a nuanced account of the concept can clarify some persistent ambiguities in the C/I 
debate. 
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2. Contingency and Inevitability 
Ian Hacking coined “contingentism” and “inevitabilism” in the same book in which he 
hinted that contingency might be understood as a spectrum. Contingency appears as a feature of 
his effort to understand the philosophical stakes of social constructionism. Hacking casts 
contingency as a sticking points between constructionists and their opponents. He identifies the 
constructionist program as seeking to undermine claims about the inevitability of ideas. When 
generalized, according to Hacking, the constructionist argument takes the form “X need not have 
existed, or need not be at all as it is, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not 
inevitable.” It often proceeds to two other more advanced stages, which contend a) that X is bad 
in its current form, and therefore b) should be eliminated or radically altered (Hacking 1999, 6). 
The constructionist program meets irreconcilable opposition from inevitabilists when it claims 
that the results of scientific investigation are contingent, and therefore unconstrained by the 
structure and properties of the natural world. 
Andrew Pickering, author of 1995’s Constructing Quarks, is Hacking’s paradigm 
contingentist. Pickering advanced the view that high energy physics’ Standard Model resulted 
from an exegesis of data, which could have produced any one of numerous, ontologically 
incompatible interpretations. He concludes that physics might have escaped the twentieth century 
quark free, and that if it had, it would not be any less successful (Pickering 1984). Hacking 
interprets this argument in light of later work, The Mangle of Practice (Pickering 1995), wherein 
Pickering argued that scientific consensus arises from negotiation between theory applied to the 
world, theory applied to instruments, and the construction of the instruments themselves to 
develop a robust fit with observed data. The results of science are contingent from this 
perspective because the negotiation could be carried out in any number of ways, each resulting in 
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the same degree of self-described success. Pickering’s punch line is that twentieth-century 
physics could have been just as successful if, for example, cyclotrons had not supplanted 
traditional cloud-chamber technology and the resulting theory of the micro-world had not been 
dominated by quarks, which he contends are the peculiar progeny of the particle accelerator. 
Hacking elaborates the inevitabilist stance in “How Inevitable Are the Results of 
Successful Science?,” writing: “We ask: If the results R of a scientific investigation are correct, 
would any investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if successful, at least implicitly 
contain or imply the same results? If so, there is a significant sense in which the results are 
inevitable” (Hacking 2000, 61). Pickering would deny that equal success implies equivalence of 
any sort. By contrast, Hacking casts Sheldon Glashow as arch inevitabilist. Glashow holds that 
any investigation into the natural world starting from reasonable initial assumptions would 
produce not only the same answers, but also a similar set of questions to ask. Glashow imagines 
intelligent aliens as hypothetical scientists whose physical laws should be isomorphic with ours. 
In doing so, Hacking charges, Glashow tacitly makes crucial assumptions about the “reasonable” 
initial conditions necessary for alien science to produce the same results. How do we know, for 
example, that aliens would identify proton structure as an interesting question? Hacking segues 
from Glashow into the difficulties with strong inevitability claims: how stringently can you set 
the initial conditions before the argument dissolves into tautology? If the inevitabilist asserts that 
a successful alternate scientific enterprise will produce the same results by stipulating that 
success requires asking the same questions, using the same instruments to observe the same 
entities, and starting from the same assumptions, then we are left with the trivial observation that 
effectively identical scientific investigations produce effectively identical results (2000, 66). 
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Pickering and Glashow represent extremes; Hacking seeks a middle way. His 
compromise locates contingency at the level of the questions scientists ask. It is contingent, he 
argues, which questions are “live.” Live questions are those that make sense within the 
contemporary theoretical framework. Once science satisfactorily answers a live question we can 
take that result to be inevitable in some meaningful sense, but we have no guarantee that it would 
have been asked in the first place.
1
 Contingency, for Hacking, enters into science by allowing 
historical and socio-cultural factors to define what questions scientists find interesting and what 
questions they are allowed to ask. These questions are not necessarily answerable, and they 
might not make sense in any theory-independent sense, but once nature proves forthcoming with 
an answer, that answer has the tinge of inevitability. Science could have developed differently, 
but only because it could have addressed a different set of questions. Possible alternate results 
are never logically incompatible with current successful science (2000, 71). 
When distinguishing contingency from inevitability, Hacking observes the debate’s 
independence from the realism/anti-realism issue: “the contingency thesis itself is perfectly 
consistent with […] scientific realism, and indeed anti-realists […] might dislike the contingency 
thesis wholeheartedly,” (Hacking 1999, 80). Howard Sankey (2008) maintains the same 
separation between the debates. He defends weak fallibilism, consistent with an inevitabilist 
viewpoint, holding that individual results of science are contingent—individual instances of 
scientific investigation are fallible—but we can be confident that statistically inevitabilist 
tendencies will wash out local contingencies. 
Sankey defends his fallabilist stance’s compatibility with a contingency thesis, which he 
says is an epistemic claim about scientific practice and the way investigators engage with the 
                                                
1
 Hacking does not offer an account of just how scientists can determine when a live question has been adequately 
answered, an issue that is not unproblematic (see Galison 1987). 
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world: “Scientist might collect different evidence from the evidence they in fact do collect. They 
might have developed different instruments and techniques from the ones which have been 
developed and put to use” (Sankey 2008, 259). A geological example, the discovery of 
continental drift, illustrates his point: “The epistemic situation is […] dependent on contingent 
factors such as the availability of evidence and relevant knowledge, the development of 
instrumentation and the provision of research funding” (2008, 262). Sankey’s contingency 
differs from both Pickering’s and Hacking’s. Pickering would not contest that the factors Sankey 
identifies are contingent, but he would compile a list of additional contingencies much longer 
than Sankey would admit. Hacking argues for contingency of form rather than content of 
science: difference without incompatibility. Sankey points to the empirical content of science as 
contingent. These perspectives are not incompatible, but they have different emphases—Sankey 
focuses on evidence, Hacking on inquiry. 
Sankey subtly contrasts James Cushing, who argues that contingency has an 
“ineliminable role in the construction and selection of a successful scientific theory from among 
its observationally equivalent and unrefuted competitors” (Cushing 1994, xi). Cushing uses 
“theory” equivocally, as his prime example is the choice between Bohr’s and Bohm’s 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, which can be construed as competing window dressings 
of the theory of quantum mechanics rather than as theories themselves. Quibbling aside, Cushing 
argues that choices between observationally equivalent theories are contingent. He does not 
claim that such choices are irrational, but that they are guided by philosophical and other external 
criteria. In the case of Bohm versus Bohr, the interpretive question hinges on whether one 
abandons strict determinacy or strict locality in the quantum realm. Evidence suggests that either 
particles in quantum states, obeying the probabilities assigned by their wave functions, assume 
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classically observable values for their key properties—charge, spin etc.—during an observation 
event, or some “hidden variables” determine these properties, but instantaneous signaling across 
finite distances is permitted. The first violates an ingrained philosophical preference for 
deterministic processes in physics, while the second flaunts a tradition of skepticism about 
instantaneous action at a distance. Cushing’s view, exemplified by the claim that the Bohmian 
view’s defeat at the hands of Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation was contingent, involves no 
change in the empirical content of the theories in question. Nor does Cushingtonian contingency 
act on the data collection process—the crux of Sankey’s argument. 
Most who deploy contingency do so in pursuit of goals other than defining it. Sankey 
wants to show the independence of the C/I debate from discussions of realism. Léna Soler 
identifies this argument as a premature, writing: “the ‘contingentism versus inevitabilism’ 
contrast does not exist as an autonomous, well identified issue of significance,” (Soler 2008b, 
232). On the basis of this ambiguity she sets out to clarify the issue, employing a thought 
experiment involving two, isolated communities of physicists, starting with the same initial 
conditions, asking their own questions, unguided by the work of the other scientists:  
Human beings might have succeeded in developing a physics as successful and 
progressive as ours, and yet asked completely different physical questions from the ones 
that have actually been asked, with the result that the accepted answers—in other words 
the content of the accepted physical theories and experimentally established physical 
facts—would be at the same time robust and different from ours. (2008b, 232) 
 
Any non-trivial contingency, Soler contends, requires that two isolated scientific communities 
starting from the same point produce “irreducibly different” results, while still satisfying a 
reasonable set of criteria for success (2008b, 232). 
Soler’s contingency involves deep and irreconcilable oppositions between competing 
physical theories. Given the constancy of the initial conditions in Soler’s thought experiment, it 
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tests only whether science is contingent irrespective of the initial conditions, and does not 
consider to what extent science might be contingent upon antecedent conditions.
2
 Soler’s thought 
experiment does not assess the relative contributions of contingency to the collection of internal 
and external factors that influence the trajectory of science. 
Each scholar mentioned here questions how science might be contingent. In doing so, 
each employs a different understanding of what contingency means and at what point the claim 
becomes meaningful. They cast contingency in a qualitatively different ways rather than with 
differing intensities, representing diversity of kind, not of degree: 
Hacking: It is contingent what questions scientists decide are interesting. 
Pickering: It is contingent what ontological entities scientists claim to find in the natural 
world. 
Glashow: The theoretical structure of science is not contingent. 
Sankey: It is contingent what instruments and techniques are available to scientists. 
Cushing: It is contingent how scientists arbitrate between empirically equivalent 
theories. 
Soler: Science is contingent only if it has available at least two equally successful, but 
irreducibly different paths from any given starting point. 
A smooth scale of contingentism cannot capture their differences, even superficially. The next 
section systematizes the diversity of views sheltered within the contingency concept. 
 
3. Taxonomizing Contingency 
3.1. A Preliminary Distinction 
                                                
2
 Here I implicitly distinguish “contingent per se” from “contingent upon,” borrowing from Beatty (2006). See 
Section 3 below for a more thoroughgoing discussion. 
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Contingency is a wildly diverse concept. How can we refine our understanding of 
contingency so it can be applied with less ambiguity? John Beatty offers a crucial distinction 
between “contingent per se” and “contingent upon” (Beatty 2006). “Per se” contingency 
describes stochasticity in the historical process; it implies that the process of history itself is 
unpredictable. “Upon” contingency requires no unpredictability, but rather describes a historical 
process that is far from robust with respect initial conditions, indicating that outcomes have a 
measure of causal dependence on the relevant antecedent factors. Any change in initial 
conditions could lead to a different outcome, even if the outcome of the process is, in principle, 
predictable from any given set of initial conditions.  
In drawing this distinction, Beatty invokes Stephen J. Gould’s thought experiment: restart 
the story of evolution from the Cambrian explosion, and ask if “replaying the tape” in this way 
directs the history of life down a different path (Gould 1989). Gould argues that evolution is 
highly contingent, and the rerun would differ dramatically from the initial broadcast. As Beatty 
observes, Gould alternates between the unpredictability and causal dependence senses of 
contingency. Beatty argues that these two conceptions are compatible, but have different 
consequences for our understanding of the historical process. 
How should recognizing the distinction between these two varieties of contingency 
inform the C/I debate? Take Pickering: his 1984 claim that physics might have proceeded in a 
direction that did not include quarks is an unpredictability claim about scientific knowledge. He 
holds there that scientific knowledge is contingent per se. His view as reinterpreted by Hacking 
is an “upon” contingency claim. If the response to new data is a negotiation between existing 
theories, auxiliary theories about instruments, and the instruments themselves, then the 
consequent theory is contingent upon each of those three factors. In the second version of the 
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argument, Pickering’s stance gets its bite from the factors it identifies as causally relevant rather 
than from the unpredictability of the scientific process. 
Hacking, Soler, and Sankey, all observe that even the strongest inevitabilist admits that a 
benign form of historical contingency shapes the course of science. The Bragg family might have 
gone into sheep shearing rather than physics, and the resulting disturbance in the development of 
x-ray crystallography would likely have substantially altered the story of the discovery of DNA’s 
structure. The Cold War might have dragged on a few years longer, the United States Congress 
might have been friendlier towards basic research expenditures, the Superconducting Super 
Collider might have been built, and high energy physicists might no longer be looking for the 
Higgs boson. In Beatty’s language, inevitabilists are happy with the claim that scientific 
knowledge is contingent upon some historical factors, while denying the stronger claim that it is 
contingent per se. 
Beatty’s distinction substantially clarifies disagreements between inevitabilists and 
contingentists. They do not disagree about the extent to which scientific knowledge is contingent; 
they disagree about what kind of contingency influences the scientific process. Contingentists, as 
described by Hacking, admit both unpredictability and causal dependence contingency, while 
inevitabilists see no trouble from some types of causal dependence contingency, but draw the 
line at its more consequential sibling. This distinction does not exhaust the possible positions in 
the contingency debate. It demonstrates that Hacking’s method of rating contingency on a 
spectrum inadequately describes the commitments involved, but it only begins to capture the full 
range contingency claims available. Those who allow causal dependence contingency might 
have reasonable disagreements about what aspects of science are subject to contingency claims 
and what science can be reasonably said to be contingent upon. 
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3.2. Towards a Taxonomy of Contingency 
Each of Beatty’s categories might be decomposed further. First, consider unpredictability 
contingency. Beatty defines it as the belief that “the occurrence of a particular prior state is 
insufficient to bring about a particular outcome,” (Beatty 2006, 339). It appears that the 
unpredictability contingentist makes a strong metaphysical claim about the historical process: it 
is indeterministic. Indeed, Gould does appear to be making such indeterminacy claims. Should 
we replay the exact same tape of life from the exact same initial conditions and get a different 
result, then the process by which life develops exhibits intrinsic stochasticity. 
Indeterminacy is not, however, the only way to understand per se contingency. Beatty 
observes that contingency is the lynchpin of Gould’s argument that selection should not be the 
only causal agent evolutionary biologists invoke to explain the features and behaviors of present-
day organisms (see Gould and Lewontin 1979). This suggests that unpredictability, as applied to 
contingency, can be understood as a methodological argument. This weaker understanding 
would suggest that outcomes are contingent (per se) with respect to some specified set of causal 
factors. It does not rule out the ability of other causal factors to provide an exhaustive, 
deterministic explanation. In fact, it often suggests such factors. Such is Gould’s case against 
what he calls pan-selectionism—the assumption that selection can be invoked to explain any 
feature of an organism. The weaker version of unpredictability contingency he employs suggests 
that the features of organisms are contingent (unpredictable) with respect to selection effects. 
Such a view is consistent with deterministic evolution; it merely implies that factors other than 
selection are partly responsible. 
The strong version of unpredictability contingency, which we might call indeterminist 
contingency, implies randomness in the historical process. The weaker version, incompleteness 
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contingency, claims that some set of causal factors is inadequate offer a complete explanation of 
the historical process, and that outcomes are unpredictable with respect to that set of factors. 
These two forms do different types of philosophical work. Indeterminist contingency says 
something about how the world is. Incompleteness contingency brands a set of explanatory tools 
inadequate, and so depends on the state of scientific practice and must refer to established 
explanatory orthodoxy. 
Causal-dependence contingency is a more complicated case than unpredictability because 
the objects of “upon” might be expounded ad nauseam. The first step towards a classification 
requires identifying suitably distinct parts of science that might be held contingent. Science, like 
contingency, is heterogeneous and the claim that science is contingent can mean different things 
depending on what parts of science that claim specifies. Science makes ontological claims, 
formulates methodological procedures, develops models, adopts interpretations, and builds 
communities. Causal dependence contingency can be initially differentiated based on which of 
these many aspects of science are claimed contingent. I propose five categories: 
(1) Trivial contingency – Science is part of a historical process, and so is contingent in 
the same way human history is contingent. This weak claim covers individual 
scientists and the details of their everyday existences. 
All non-Laplacian parties are happy to admit this form of contingency. A claim that 
science is contingent in the trivial sense, however, offers the hard-boiled contingentist little 
succor. Trivial contingency is agnostic about the aspects of science that are typically of interest 
to philosophers, and so has little bearing on the debate. This type of contingency is frequently 
invoked to argue that contingency need not be repugnant to the sophisticated inevitabilist. 
Sankey, for instance, argues that continental drift did not gain traction within the geology 
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community until the 1950s and 1960s, when the U.S. Department of Naval Research began 
funding ocean floor research to bolster its submarine program (Sankey 2008, 262). Naturally, if 
the research had not been funded, and had not been conducted, the trajectory taken by the science 
would have been different, but this does not bear on the claim that successful science should pass 
through stages resembling ours. Trivial contingency alters the route science takes, but remains 
silent about its destination. 
(2) Sociocultural contingency – The social structures that constitute scientific activity 
and science’s interaction with culture are contingent. 
At first glance this slightly stronger form of contingency might seem similarly innocuous. 
Like trivial contingency, it is agnostic about the content of science, acting instead on institutions, 
disciplines, communities, political relationships, and laboratory cultures. It is more complicated 
than trivial contingency, however, because it is the point where some strong contingentists dig in 
their heels. Forms of contingency that cut closer to the bone (see below) often rest on social 
determinism. A contingentist claiming that theoretical entities are contingent upon (causally 
determined by) social structures might want to deny that those social structures are themselves 
contingent. Similarly, inevitabilists might flinch when sociocultural contingency is used in 
conjunction with a stronger form, as in, for example, the controversial Forman thesis, which 
asserts that quantum indeterminacy was contingent upon the distinctive social conditions of the 
Weimar Republic (Forman 1971). 
(3) Methodological contingency – The way in which we do science might have been 
different. This moderately weak variety holds experimental and theoretical 
techniques, laboratory practice, instruments, apparatus, and heuristic devices 
contingent. 
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Contingency claims frequently target the way science functions. Sankey approximates 
this version of contingency when he describes evidence collection and instrumentation as sources 
of contingency and claims that the development of plate tectonics could only come about when 
specific instrumentation came into common use (Sankey 2008). Many historical studies have 
examined how tool selection influences the way theories develop. The literature on model 
organisms is an obvious example. Robert Kohler’s Lords of the Fly contends that the choice of 
drosophila melanogaster as the model organism for experimental genetics shaped the field’s 
development (Kohler 1994). Experimental apparatus influences the collection, packaging, and 
inflection of data, while the available mathematics, heuristics, and analogies guide how that data 
is analyzed. This type of contingency is not trivial, but it does not directly imply 
incompatibilities between existing science and science that might have proceeded with different 
experimental or analytical tools. As with sociocultural contingency it can be combined with more 
potent forms. 
(4) Interpretive contingency – The way in which we expound data in order to fill 
theoretical gaps is contingent. 
Understanding theoretical implications requires interpreting data. Data, even if they 
motivate a particular theory, often do not compel one interpretation of that theory. Take 
Cushing’s claim about the contingency of the Copenhagen interpretation: Quantum mechanics 
allows multiple logically consistent interpretations of what happens when quantum systems are 
observed. Building a satisfying ontological explanation requires physicists to interpret 
measurements that, by the very nature of the theory, do not provide the whole story. Given this 
necessary appeal to factors other than data, the interpretation we choose is contingent upon the 
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context in which the theory emerges, and an alternate interpretation might well have emerged 
given different conditions (Cushing 1994). 
(5) Theoretical contingency – This is the strongest form of contingency. In the 
constructionist mold, it holds that scientific theories themselves and the claims they 
make about the world, are contingent. 
This form postulates deep incompatibility between two possible scientific trajectories. 
While theoretical contingency can be parsed in “upon” syntax, it approximates a per se claim. 
The main difference between theoretical contingency and the in-principle unpredictability of 
scientific results is the frequent postulation by its advocates of a causal arrow from specific 
historical or cultural factors to theories. Forman’s argument that cultural instability in the 
Weimar Republic compelled physicists to accept indeterminacy, for instance, makes quantum 
mechanics’ ontological claims contingent upon the Weimar cultural environment (Forman 1971). 
This is not the same as describing science as unpredictable, but the factors on which it is 
contingent make the claim equivalent with the incompleteness contingency claim that science is 
unpredictable from internal factors alone. The per se claim and the theoretical contingency claim 
often go hand in hand, as the argument often holds that theoretical contingency works because 
theory is either almost infinitely malleable (indeterminist), and/or subject to pressures that are 
currently underappreciated (incompleteness). 
It might appear that this constitutes a spectrum given a description beginning with 
“trivial” and graduating into increasingly more serious claims, but the relationships between the 
elements are not so straightforward. Trivial contingency does not require a commitment to any of 
the other four, and theoretical contingency often implies several of the others a fortiori, but 
middle-of-the-road contingency claims cannot be so easily ranked. It would be consistent to hold 
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -218-
  16 
an inevitabilist stance about methodology, arguing that mature science motivates an optimal 
form of investigation and modeling, while maintaining interpretive contingency. It would be 
equally consistent to be inevitabilist about interpretation while contingentist about methodology. 
These examples elucidate why contingency is a “what sort” question as opposed to a “how 
much” question. If I claim that one part of the scientific process is contingent while holding that 
another is not, that does not make me more or less contingent than I would be if I held the 
inverse view. 
The categories above provide only half the picture. To complete the taxonomy a second 
layer is required. Distinctions based on what parts of science are contingent are critical, but we 
can also, invoking Beatty, draw further distinctions based on what they consider those factors to 
be contingent upon. Thus, while two people might agree that the methodological components of 
science are contingent, they might also disagree substantively about the factors upon which 
methodology is contingent. The factors upon which science, in all its aspects, might be 
contingent map onto the aspects that can themselves be held contingent: everyday events, 
sociocultural contexts, methods, interpretations, theories. 
 
4. Summary 
I have argued that the debate between contingentists and inevitabilists can be recast as an 
array of positions that directly oppose one another only over a small range of their total 
implications. Within the framework provided by Beatty, I have decomposed contingency into 
seven types, two under unpredictability and five under causal dependence. Each of these latter 
five might be further decomposed based on the “upon” relation of the contingency in question. 
These views of contingency can be held alone or in conjunction with others, and each 
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combination constitutes a distinct position, which carries different assumptions about how 
science engages with the natural world. 
Statements that science is contingent or inevitable are cumbersome when not identifying 
the area of science on which that property acts and specifying how that property operates within 
it. Science might be interpretively contingent without being methodologically contingent. It 
might be both without being theoretically contingent. Many processes play a role in the 
production of scientific knowledge. Contingency may enter through many doors; it will adopt a 
different character, with different consequences, when entering through each. The framework I 
have outlined demonstrates how science can be considered contingent and inevitable in 
qualitatively different ways and exposes assumptions about the causal structure of the scientific 
process that would otherwise remain implicit. 
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Reconsidering the Argument from Underconsideration1 
Moti Mizrahi 
St. John’s University 
Abstract 
According to the argument from underconsideration, since theory evaluation is comparative, and 
since scientists do not have good reasons to believe that they are epistemically privileged, it is 
unlikely that our best theories are true. In this paper, I examine two formulations of this 
argument, one based on van Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on what Lipton 
called the “no-privilege” premise. I consider several moves that scientific realists might make in 
response to these arguments. I then offer a revised argument that is a middle ground between 
realism and anti-realism, or so I argue. 
Keywords 
anti-realism, argument from underconsideration, bad lot, epistemic privilege, scientific realism 
1. Introduction 
The argument from underconsideration is advanced by anti-realists as an argument against 
scientific realism. According to this argument, it is unlikely that our best scientific theories are 
true, since theory evaluation is comparative, and since scientists have no good reasons to believe 
they are selecting from a set of theories that contains a true theory. As Lipton (1993, 89) points 
out, this argument has two premises. The first is the ranking premise, which states that theory 
testing yields comparative warrant. As Lipton (1993, 89) puts it: “testing enables scientists to say 
which of the competing theories they have generated is likeliest to be correct, but does not itself 
reveal how likely the likeliest theory is.” 
The second is the no-privilege premise, which states that “scientists have no reason to 
suppose that the process by which they generate theories for testing makes it likely that a true 
theory will be among those generated” (Lipton 1993, 89). From these two premises, anti-realists 
conclude that, “while the best of the generated theories may be true, scientists can never have 
good reason to believe this” (Lipton 1993, 89). In other words, although they might have good 
reasons to believe that they have selected the theory that is likeliest to be true from a set of 
competing theories, scientists have no good reason to believe that any of the competing theories 
is likely true. The argument from underconsideration is thus aimed against the epistemic thesis of 
scientific realisms, which is the claim that “Mature and predictively successful scientific theories 
are well-confirmed and approximately true of the world. So, the entities posited by them, or, at 
any rate, entities very similar to those posited, inhabit the world” (Psillos 1999, xix). 
In what follows, I examine two formulations of this argument, one based on van 
Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on the “no-privilege” premise. I consider several 
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moves that scientific realists might make in response to these arguments. I then offer a revised 
argument that is a middle ground between realism and anti-realism, or so I argue. 
2. The Bad Lot Premise 
According to van Fraassen (1989, 149), scientists may be choosing the best theory of a bad lot. 
Following Wray’s (2010) recent discussion of the argument, van Fraassen’s “bad lot” version of 
the argument can be stated as follows: 
(F1) In evaluating theories scientists merely rank the competitors comparatively. [The 
Ranking Premise] 
(F2) There is no reason to suppose that a true theory will be among the theories 
evaluated. [The Bad Lot Premise] 
(F3) Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the theory that is judged to be 
superior is likely true. 
Accordingly, anti-realists claim that there is no reason to suppose that the set of theories to be 
evaluated contains a true theory. In reply, realists might wonder: why do we need to suppose that? 
Isn’t that what theory testing is all about? Realists might argue that we don’t need a reason to 
think that the set of competing theories contains a true theory before we begin testing. For 
realists, the testing itself will separate the good theories, if there are any, from the bad ones. If all 
the theories in the set fail their tests, then it is a bad lot. But if at least one theory passes its tests, 
then it is not a bad lot after all. 
To see why (F2) might seem odd to scientific realists, consider the following analogous 
argument: 
(T1) In evaluating contestants on talent shows, judges merely rank the contestants 
comparatively.2 
(T2) There is no reason to suppose that a talented person will be among the contestants 
evaluated. 
(T3) Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the person that is judged to be the 
winner is likely talented. 
Premise (T2) seems rather odd. We do not need to suppose that a talented person is among the 
contestants. That is what the competition is all about. The competition is supposed to separate 
the talented from the untalented and weed out the untalented. Like in the case of theory testing, 
the criterion of selection has to do with success. That is to say, the judges assume that 
performing excellently on a consistent basis, under the strict conditions of a competition, is a 
reliable indicator of talent. Again, like in the case of theory testing, if all the contestants fail to 
perform excellently on a consistent basis throughout the competition, then the lot of contestants 
is probably a bad one. In any case, it is the competition that will separate the talented from the 
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untalented. Similarly, realists would argue, it is experimental and observational testing that will 
separate the (approximately) true theories from the false ones. 
3. The No-Privilege Premise 
More recently, Wray (2010) has proposed a revised version of van Fraassen’s “bad lot” argument, 
which was labeled the argument from underconsideration by Lipton (1993). According to Wray 
(2010, 3), anti-realists argue as follows: 
(W1) In evaluating theories scientists merely rank the competitors comparatively. [The 
Ranking Premise] 
(W2) Scientists are not epistemically privileged, that is, they are not especially prone to 
develop theories that are true with respect to what they say about unobservable 
entities and processes. [The No-Privilege Premise] 
(W3) Hence, we have little reason to believe that the theory that is judged to be superior 
is likely true. 
In response, realists might complain that the no-privilege premise, i.e., (W2), which talks about 
“epistemic privilege” and scientists being “especially prone,” makes it sound as if scientists have 
a special gift of some sort. But, realists would argue, that is a rather strange way of talking about 
science. Coming up with good explanations for natural phenomena is a complex human endeavor 
that involves many factors, having to do with talent, skills, diligence, training, and so on. In 
addition to the human aspect of theory generation, there is also a methodological aspect 
involving observation instruments, experimentation techniques, patterns of inference, etc. The 
no-privilege premise—(W2)—seems to assume that these aspects of theory generation do not 
change and that scientists never get better at what they do. 
To see why (W2) might seem odd to scientific realists, consider the following analogous 
argument: 
(B1) In evaluating desserts, chefs merely rank the competitors comparatively. 
(B2) Chefs are not “culinarily privileged,” i.e., they are not especially prone to make 
desserts that are delicious. 
(B3) Therefore, we have little reason to believe that the dessert that is judged to be 
superior is likely delicious. 
Premise (B2) seems rather odd. To say that chefs are “culinarily privileged” seems like a strange 
way of talking about the culinary arts. Chefs get better at making desserts through training and 
practice. Similarly, realists might argue, scientists get better at developing theories through 
training and practice. For realists, there is nothing mysterious about “epistemic privilege” going 
on here. So realists would find (W2) odd for the same reasons that (B2) seems odd. 
In reply, anti-realists could appeal to the pessimistic induction. Wray (2010, 6) writes that 
the “no-privilege thesis […] asks us to acknowledge the similarities between contemporary 
scientists and their predecessors.” He quotes Mary Hesse who argues that the support for the no-
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privilege premise comes from an “induction from the history of science.” Wray also points out in 
a footnote that “this is a pessimistic induction of the sort that Laudan (1984) develops.” For 
realists, however, the problem with the pessimistic induction is that it overemphasizes the 
similarities and underemphasizes the dissimilarities between contemporary theories and their 
predecessors. Similarly, realists might argue, the problem with Wray’s formulation of the 
argument from underconsideration is that it overemphasizes the similarities and underemphasizes 
the dissimilarities between contemporary scientists and their predecessors. As Bird (2007, 80) 
puts it: 
The falsity of earlier theories is the very reason for developing the new ones—with a 
view to avoiding that falsity. It would be folly to argue that because no man has run 100 
m in under 9.5 seconds no man ever will. On the contrary, improvements in times spur on 
other competitors, encourage improvements in training techniques and so forth, that make 
a sub 9.5 second 100 m quite a high probability in the near future. The analogy is 
imperfect, but sufficiently close to cast doubt on Laudan’s pessimistic inference. Later 
scientific theories are not invented independently of the successes and failures of their 
predecessors. New theories avoid the pitfalls of their falsified predecessors and seek to 
incorporate their successes. 
Likewise, Lipton (2000, 197) argues that we cannot infer “future theories are likely to be false” 
from “past theories turned out to be false” by induction because of the “Darwinian” evolution of 
theories. A similar point, realists might argue, applies to scientists as well. Contemporary 
scientists learn from their predecessors and they seek to avoid their predecessors’ mistakes. 
Furthermore, contemporary scientists have access to instruments and technologies that were not 
available to their predecessors. For realists, these aspects of scientific change make a difference 
insofar as the ability of scientists to select theories that are (approximately) true is concerned. 
4. Truth vs. Approximate Truth 
To this anti-realists might object that the analogous arguments sketched above fail to show that 
(W2) and (T2) should be rejected, for deliciousness and being talented, which are supposed to be 
traits analogous to truth, are not analogues to truth at all. Deliciousness and being talented are 
relative qualities. For example, in the case of deliciousness, whatever cakes we have in a 
particular lot, we can always imagine being led to consider one of the cakes as delicious, 
especially if we never tasted a better cake before. But truth is not a relative quality, the objection 
continues. Propositions are categorically true or false. 
In reply, realists might concede that propositions are categorically true or false. However, 
they might insist that, strictly speaking, only singular propositions can be true or false (Kvanvig 
2003, 191), and since theories (whatever they are) are not singular propositions, they cannot be 
said to be true or false. Accordingly, a theory, expressed as a set of propositions, can have true 
and/or false propositions as its parts. However, realists might protest, it seems that anti-realists 
assume that even one false proposition taints a whole theory. For instance, Kitcher points out that 
the pessimistic induction assumes this kind of implicit holism about theories. As Kitcher (2002, 
388) writes: 
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We are invited to think of whole theories as the proper objects of knowledge, and thus, 
because the theory, taken as a whole, turns out to be false, we have the basis for a 
“pessimistic induction.” It doesn’t follow from the fact that a past theory isn’t completely 
true that every part of that theory is false (emphasis added). 
Since only singular propositions can be true or false, and since theories are not singular 
propositions, it follows that, strictly speaking, whole theories cannot be true or false (Cf. Kitcher 
1993, 118). 
By way of illustration, consider the following example, which is adapted from Leplin 
(1997, 133). Suppose that there is a power outage in my house. Upon looking outside my 
window, I see a utility truck parked nearby and some workers digging in the yard. Since I made a 
call to the phone company earlier about a problem with my phone line, I infer that telephone 
repairmen, who have responded to my earlier call, inadvertently cut the power line to my house. 
Unbeknownst to me, however, it is not telephone repairmen who have cut the power line but 
cable repairmen whom I had not expected. Now, if we take this “theory,” i.e., that there is a 
power outage in my house because telephone repairmen have inadvertently cut the power line to 
my house, as a monolithic whole, then it is strictly false. However, this theory involves several 
claims, some are true and some are false. On the one hand, it is not the case that telephone 
repairmen working in the backyard have inadvertently cut the power line. On the other hand, it is 
true that repairmen working in the backyard have inadvertently cut the power line. I may not 
know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about this state of affairs. But I do 
know some parts about it, and those parts are themselves true. 
Consider another example from the history of science. In his An Inquiry into the Causes 
and Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae (1798), Edward Jenner argues that cowpox originated as 
grease, a disease common in horses. He claims that it was transmitted to cows when horse 
handlers helped with milking on occasion. In addition, Jenner (1800, 7) claims not only that 
cowpox protected against smallpox but also that “what renders the Cow Pox virus so extremely 
singular, is, that the person who has been thus affected is for ever after secure from the infection 
of the Small Pox.” 
Now, if we take the entire Inquiry as Jenner’s “theory,” then it is strictly false as a whole. 
He was wrong about grease being the origin of cowpox. He mistakenly took horsepox for grease, 
and there was no intermediate passage through cows either. Even though he got some things 
wrong, he was right about others. His hypothesis, properly construed, is correct. While it is not 
the case that vaccination provides lifelong protection, as Jenner thought, it is the case that 
repeated vaccination, properly done, contributes to the control of smallpox. Indeed, Jenner paved 
the way for this knowledge, and the know-how for selection of correct material for vaccination, 
with his distinction between true and spurious cowpox. Nowadays, pseudocowpox (milker’s 
nodes) is recognized as a type of spurious cowpox (Baxby 1999). According to the World Health 
Organization, “Publication of the Inquiry and the subsequent promulgation by Jenner of the idea 
of vaccination with a virus other than variola virus constituted a watershed in the control of 
smallpox, for which he more than anyone else deserves the credit” (Fenner, et al. 1988, 264). 
Another example is Paul Ehrlich’s side-chain theory of antibody formation. Ehrlich 
proposed that harmful compounds can mimic nutrients for which cells express specific receptors. 
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However, he considered these receptors to be on all cell types. He also did not realize that there 
are specialized producer cells, such as B lymphocytes. He thought of the entire spectrum of 
receptors as a single cell because he considered their main task as the uptake of different 
nutrients. These are parts of Ehrlich’s side-chain theory that turned out to be incorrect. It does 
not follow, however, that the entire theory is wrong. Despite these errors, the theory is based on a 
correct principle, which is that “specific receptors on cells interact with foreign material in a 
highly specific way, and this triggers their increased production and release from the cell surface 
so that they can inactivate foreign material as antibodies” (Kaufmann 2008, 707). 
If this is correct, then it seems that we should abandon talk of whole theories as being 
true or false. Instead, we should talk about theoretical claims as being true or false. Indeed, Wray 
seems to acknowledge this point. Wray (2008, 323) writes: 
For the sake of clarity, let me call H1 the Tychonic hypothesis, rather than the Tychonic 
theory. After all, the Tychonic theory includes an array of other claims (emphasis added). 
And, more recently, Wray (2010, 6) writes: 
But our theories, consisting of many theoretical claims, that is, a conjunction of 
numerous theoretical claims, are most likely false (original emphasis). 
If this is correct, then we can distinguish between truth and approximate truth. Articulating a 
precise notion of approximate truth is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, on most 
accounts of approximate truth, this notion is cashed out in terms of a theory being close to the 
truth. Hence, to say that T is approximately true is to say that T is close to the truth.3 How do we 
know that T is close to the truth? Well, realists would argue, we test it. But anti-realists would 
insist that theory evaluation is comparative. So when we test theories, we compare them. From a 
set of competing theories, if one theory T passes the tests, then that is a reason to believe that T is 
closer to that truth than its competitors. If this is correct, then approximate truth, which is a 
property of theories, is not like truth, which is a property of propositions, insofar as the former is 
relative, whereas the latter is categorical. 
To sum up, then, truth is a property of propositions, since only propositions can be 
categorically true, whereas approximate truth is a relation between theories, since a theory can be 
closer to the truth only relative to its competitors. Some might object, however, that theories, 
expressed as sets of propositions, are simply conjunctions, and conjunctions are categorically 
truth or false. In reply, I would argue that the truth/approximate truth distinction is analogous to 
the logical distinction between truth and validity. In logic courses, we teach our students that 
deductive arguments can be valid or invalid, but not true or false. Even though, in principle, a 
deductive argument can be expressed as a conditional (i.e., if the premises are true, then the 
conclusion must be true), which is categorically true or false. In logic, we reserve the terms ‘true’ 
and ‘false’ to premises and conclusions, and the terms ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ to arguments to 
capture the difference between truth as a property of propositions and validity as a relation 
between propositions (more specifically, a relation between premises and a conclusion). 
Similarly, I submit, we should reserve the term ‘true’ to theoretical claims, which are singular 
                                                          
3
 See, e.g., Leplin (1981), Boyd (1990), Weston (1992), Smith (1998), and Chakravartty (2010). 
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propositions that can be categorically true or false, and the term ‘approximately true’ to theories, 
which is a relation between theories, even though, in principle, theories can be expressed as 
conjunctions. 
5. A Middle-Ground Argument 
In Section 3, I have said that realists might find the no-privilege premise—(W2)—in Wray’s 
version of the argument from underconsideration rather odd, since it seems to assume that 
scientists never get better at theory generation. However, anti-realists might object to that and 
argue that scientists do get better at theory generation, but they never become good enough such 
that it is reasonable to believe that their theories are likely true. It seems to me that anti-realists 
would be correct in arguing that there may not be good reasons to believe that scientists become 
good enough such that it is reasonable to believe that their theories are likely true. For one thing, 
the logical space of possible theories is so vast that it seems rather unlikely that scientists would 
stumble on those competing theories that are closest to the truth. However, I think that anti-
realists are wrong in concluding from this that there are no good reasons to believe that certain 
theories are closer to the truth than others. In this section, then, I will try to carve out a middle 
ground between realism and anti-realism. 
If the aforementioned considerations are correct, then I think it is safe to say that the 
following claims are true: 
(1) Theoretical claims, expressed as singular propositions, can be categorically true or 
false. 
(2) Theories, expressed as sets of propositions, have theoretical claims as their parts. 
(3) Scientific theories can be said to be approximately true (i.e., T1 is closer to the truth 
than T2). 
(4) Theory evaluation is comparative (i.e., to say that T is approximately true is to say 
that T is closer to the truth than its competitors). 
If these claims are indeed true, as I have argued above, then I think that the following argument 
can be made, which is a middle ground between scientific realism and anti-realism: 
(R1) In evaluating theories, scientists rank the competitors comparatively. [The 
Ranking Premise]. 
(R2) If scientists rank competing theories comparatively, then they can only make 
comparative judgments about competing theories, not absolute judgments (i.e., T1 
is likely true). 
(R3) Hence, scientists can only make comparative judgments about competing theories, 
not absolute judgments (i.e., T1 is likely true). 
(R4) If ‘approximate truth’ (closeness to the truth) is a relation between theories, then 
to make comparative judgments about competing theories is to say that a theory is 
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closer to the truth than its competitors (i.e., T1 is closer to the truth than T2, T3,…, 
Tn). 
(R5) ‘Approximate truth’ (closeness to the truth) is a relation between theories, not a 
property of theoretical claims. 
(R6) Hence, to make comparative judgments about competing theories is to say that a 
theory is closer to the truth than its competitors (i.e., T1 is closer to the truth than 
T2, T3,…, Tn). 
(R7) If the logical space of possible theories is vast, then there are no good reasons to 
believe that scientists have stumbled upon competing theories that are closest to 
the truth. 
(R8) The logical space of possible theories is vast. 
(R9) Therefore, there are no good reasons to believe that scientists have stumbled upon 
competing theories that are closest to the truth. 
The upshot of this argument is that theory evaluation can give us reasons to believe that a theory 
is approximately true (i.e., that T1 is closer to the truth than T2, T3,…, Tn) but it cannot give us 
reasons to believe that a theory is closest to the truth (i.e., that T1 is likely true). For example, if 
scientists evaluate T2 and T3 by observational and experimental testing, they could reasonably 
make the comparative judgment that T3 is closer to the truth than T2 (Figure 1). However, a 
theory can be closer to the truth relative to its competitors but still be quite far off from the truth. 
Theory evaluation cannot tell us which theory is closest to the truth, unless we have reasons to 
believe that the theories we are testing are those that are closest to the truth (i.e., T7 and T8 in 
Figure 1). But, since we do not have reasons to believe that, as anti-realists argue, we cannot 
reasonably claim that the theories we have tested are closest to the truth (i.e., likely true), 
although we can reasonably claim that one of them is closer to the truth than its competitors. In 
other words, theory evaluation can tell us which theory among competing theories is closer to the 
truth (e.g., that T3 is closer to the truth than T2). However, theory evaluation cannot tell us which 
theory among competing theories is closest to the truth (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. T3 is closer to the truth than T2 but still quite far off from the truth. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I examined two formulations of the argument from underconsideration, one based 
on van Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on what Lipton called the “no-privilege” 
premise. I considered several moves that scientific realists might make in response to these 
arguments. I offered a revised argument that I take to be a middle ground between realism and 
anti-realism, since it adopts the realist thesis that theory evaluation can tell us which theory 
among competing theories is closer to the truth, and the anti-realist thesis that the lot of 
competing theories could consist of theories that are far off from the truth, and so theory 
evaluation cannot tell us which theory is closest to the truth. 
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The thermodynamics of computation assumes that computational processes at the 
molecular level can be brought arbitrarily close to thermodynamical reversibility; 
and that thermodynamic entropy creation is unavoidable only in data erasure or 
the merging of computational paths, in accord with Landauer’s principle. The no 
go result shows that fluctuations preclude completion of thermodynamically 
reversible processes. Completion can be achieved only by irreversible processes 
that create thermodynamic entropy in excess of the Landauer limit. 
1. Introduction 
 Electronic computers degrade work to heat and the need for its removal sets a practical 
limit to their performance. The study of the thermodynamics of computation, surveyed in 
Bennett (1982), seeks the limits in principle to reduction of this dissipation. Since dissipation 
reduces with size, the most thermodynamically efficient computers are sought among those that 
use individual molecules, charges or magnetic dipoles as memory storage devices. 
 These molecular-scale processes are treated like macroscopic ones in one aspect: they can 
be brought arbitrarily close to the most efficient, non-dissipative processes, those that are 
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thermodynamically reversible. Their defining characteristic is that they are at equilibrium at 
every stage. They are brought slowly from start to finish by the successive nudges of miniscule 
disequilibria. It is assumed that the dissipative effects of these nudges can be made arbitrarily 
small by indefinitely extending the time allowed for the process to reach completion.  
 Some form of dissipation, however, is judged unavoidable. The controlling idea of the 
thermodynamics of computation is that the creation of thermodynamic entropy and the 
associated need to pass heat to the environment arise only with logically irreversible operations. 
These include the erasure of data and the merging of computational paths. The amount of 
thermodynamic entropy created is quantified by Landauer’s principle. It asserts that at least k ln 
2 of thermodynamic entropy is created when one bit of data is erased. The result is an elegant 
account of the bounds to the thermodynamic efficiency of computation. They are independent of 
the physical implementation, but are set by the logical operations comprising the computation.  
 Alas, this image of a well-developed science is an illusion. The thermodynamics of 
computation is an underdeveloped muddle of vague plausibility arguments and misapplications 
of statistical physics. Earman and Norton (1998, 1999) track the science’s history through the 
Maxwell demon problem and find it rife with circular reasoning and question begging.  Norton 
(2005, 2011) urges that the arguments used to support Landauer’s principle are fallacious and 
have never successfully advanced beyond flawed plausibility arguments. Erasure may reduce the 
range of possible values for data in a memory. But this reduction is not a compression of the 
accessible phase space of thermodynamic components that can be associated with a change of 
thermodynamic entropy. The volume of accessible phase space remains unchanged in erasure. 
Prior to erasure we may also be unsure as to the data stored and assign probabilities to the 
possibilities. That sort of probability, however, is not associated with a thermodynamic entropy. 
 Finally, Norton (2011) describes a “no go” result—that thermodynamically reversible 
processes at molecular scales are precluded from proceeding to completion by fluctuations. 
Individual computational steps can only be completed if they are sufficiently far from 
equilibrium to overcome fluctuations. As a result they create quantities of thermodynamic 
entropy in excess of those tracked by Landauer’s principle. It follows that the lower limit to 
thermodynamic entropy creation is not set by the logical specification of the computation, but by 
the details of the particular physical implementation and the number of discrete steps it employs, 
whatever their function. 
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 This paper will develop the no go result. It is motivated and then stated in the next 
section. In Section 3, it is illustrated; and in Section 4 a possible loophole is described and 
closed. 
2. The No Go Result 
2.1 A Preliminary Form 
 In a thermodynamically reversible process,1 all component systems are in perfect 
equilibrium with one another at all stages. As result, they are impossible processes.2 Nothing 
changes. Heat will not spontaneously pass from one body to another if they are at the same 
temperature. In ordinary thermodynamics, this awkwardness is overcome by introducing a slight 
disequilibrium. We minutely raise the temperature of the first body and let that minute 
temperature gradient drive the heat transfer, slowly. Because heat is now passing spontaneously 
from hot to cold, this is a dissipative process. The thermodynamic entropy created measures the 
amount of dissipation. For theoretical analyses, this entropy creation can be neglected since it 
can be made as small as we like by making the driving temperature difference appropriately 
small. The process will still go forward, but more slowly. 
 Matters are different when we allow for the molecular constitution of matter. For now the 
equilibrium of a thermodynamically reversible process is dynamic. If two bodies at the same 
temperature are in thermal contact, energy will spontaneously pass to and fro between them as 
energy fluctuations due to random, molecular-scale events. If we are to assure that heat passes 
                                                
1 Typical erasure processes begin with a thermodynamically irreversible process in which the 
memory device is thermalized. For example, the wall dividing a two-chamber memory cell is 
raised so the molecule can access both chambers. The resulting uncontrolled, thermodynamically 
irreversible expansion creates the k ln 2 of thermodynamic entropy tracked by Landauer’s 
principle. As Norton (2005, Section 3.2) argues, a mistaken tradition misidentifies this 
thermalization as thermodynamically reversible since the replacing of the partition supposedly 
returns the original state of “random data.” 
2 For an analysis of thermodynamically reversible processes, see Norton (forthcoming, §3). 
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from the one to the other, we must arrange for a disequilibrium that is sufficiently great to 
overcome the fluctuations. 
 Boltzmann’s Principle, “S = k ln W,” that is, “entropy = k ln probability,” measures the 
dissipation needed. An isolated system is to pass from state 1 with total thermodynamic entropy 
S1 to state 2 with total entropy S2. The inverted principle tells us that, if the system can 
spontaneously move between the two states, then the probabilities P1 and P2 of the two states are 
related by 
P2/P1 = exp ((S2- S1)/k)                                                                (1) 
In macroscopic terms, negligible thermodynamic entropy creation is sufficient to drive processes 
to completion. If S2- S1 = 10k, a macroscopically negligible amount, we find P2/P1 = 22,026, so 
that the final state 2 is strongly favored. 
 At the molecular level, these amounts of thermodynamic entropy are large. They exceed 
the entropy change of k ln2 = 0.69k tracked by Landauer’s principle. They must exceed it, for 
creation of merely k ln 2 of entropy is insufficient to assure completion of a process. Then P2/P1 
= exp (k ln 2/2) = 2. The process is only twice as likely to be in its final state 2 as in its initial 
state 1. This is a fatal result for the thermodynamics of computation. If we have any computing 
process with multiple steps operating at molecular scales, we must create thermodynamic 
entropy in each step if the process is to go forward, quite aside from any issues of logical 
irreversibility. 
2.2 The Main Result 
 Boltzmann’s Principle in the form (1) applies to isolated systems. In the thermodynamics 
of computation, the computing systems are treated as open systems, in equilibrium with a heat 
bath at the ambient temperature T. The main result arises when we adapt these considerations to 
such systems. 
 A computer is a system consisting of many interacting components, including memory 
cells, systems that read and write to the memory cells and other control components to 
implement the computer’s program. At any moment, the combined system is in thermal 
equilibrium with the environment at temperature T. Hence, the system is canonically distributed 
over its phase space, according to the probability density 
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p(x, π) = exp(-E(x, π)/kT)/ Z 
where Z is the normalizing partition function and x and π  are multi-component generalized 
configuration and momentum coordinates. 
 Each computational step is carried out by a thermodynamically reversible process, whose 
stages are parameterized by λ. Fluctuations will carry the system spontaneously from one stage 
to another. As a result, the system is probabilistically distributed over the different stages. The 
probabilities are computed by Einstein’s methods, as adapted by Tolman  (1938, pp. 637-38), 
and conform to the probability density 
p(λ) = constant. Z(λ)                                                       (2) 
where Z(λ) is given by 
Z(λ) =  ∫
λ
 exp(-E(x, π)/kT) dxdπ  
This last integral extends over the volume of phase space accessible to the system when the 
process is at stage λ. 
 In the Einstein-Tolman analysis, each of these stages is given a thermodynamic 
description as if it were an equilibrium state, even though it may have arisen through a 
fluctuation. The canonically distributed system at stage λ is assigned a canonical free energy 
F(λ) = -kT ln Z(λ)                                                         (3) 
treating Z(λ) as a partitition function, where the free energy is defined as 
F(λ) = E(λ) – TS(λ) 
Here E(λ) and S(λ) are the mean energy and the thermodynamic entropy assigned to the system 
in stage λ. It now follows from (2) and (3) that  
p(λ) = constant. exp(-F(λ)/kT) 
and that the probability densities for the system fluctuating between stages λ1 and λ2 satisfy 
p(λ2)/ p(λ1) = exp(-(F(λ2) - F(λ1))/kT)                                       (4) 
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 The process is thermodynamically reversible. Hence it is in equilibrium at every stage. 
Equilibrium requires the vanishing of the generalized thermodynamic force X(λ) acting on the 
system:3 
X(λ) = - ∂/∂λ|T F(λ) = 0 
Integrating over λ, we find that the free energy F(λ) is constant over the stages of the process: 
F(λ) = constant              F(λ1) = F(λ2)                                             (5) 
 From (4), we have that 
p(λ) = constant              p(λ1) = p(λ2)                                               (6) 
 This last result (6) is the no go result. It precludes thermodynamically reversible 
processes proceeding as we expect. 
 Our default expectation is that these processes are in a quiescent equilibrium at every 
stage λ, perhaps with a slight disturbance due to fluctuations. We expect to bring the process 
from its initial to its final stage by minute disequilibrium nudges that advance the process 
arbitrarily slowly in the tiniest of steps. What (6) tells us is that fluctuations obliterate the 
quiescent equilibrium. If the system is in one stage λ at some moment, it is equally likely to be 
found at the next moment at any other stage. If we set up the process in its initial stage, it is as 
likely to leap by a fluctuation to the final stage as it is to stay where it is. If the process has 
arrived at the final stage, it is as likely to be flung by a fluctuation back to its initial stage, as it is 
to stay where it is. In a slogan, fluctuations obliterate thermodynamically reversible processes. 
 Fluctuations are temperature sensitive. Hence we might expect the confounding effects of 
fluctuations to be calmed and controlled by cooling the processes, perhaps even close to absolute 
                                                
3 At equilibrium, the total entropy Stot of the system Ssys and the environment Senv is stationary. 
Writing d = ∂/∂λ|T, that amounts to 0 = dStot = dSsys + dSenv. By supposition, the computer 
system exchanges no work with the environment, but only heat in a thermodynamically 
reversible process. Hence dSenv = dEenv/T = - dEsys/T, where the last equality follows from 
conservation of energy: dEenv+ dEsys = 0. Combining, we have 0 = dSsys- dEsys/T. Hence the 
condition for equilibrium is 0 = d(Esys – TSsys) = -Xsys. 
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zero. A review of the calculation above shows that the no go result (6) obtains no matter what the 
temperature, even if it close to absolute zero.4 
2.2 What It Takes to Beat Fluctuations 
 If fluctuations obliterate thermodynamically reversible processes, how is it possible for 
these processes to figure in thermodynamic analysis at all? The answer is that the disequilibrium 
required to overcome fluctuations is negligible macroscopically. While the no go result applies to 
macroscopic systems, it is overcome by disequilibria too small to trouble us. However, at the 
molecular scale explored by the thermodynamics of computation, the situation is reversed. 
There, the disequilibria needed to overcome fluctuations dominate. Most importantly, it requires 
thermodynamic entropy creation in amounts that well exceed those tracked by Landauer’s 
principle.  
 A few computations illustrate this answer. Relation (4) tells us that we can 
probabilistically favor the end stage λ2 over the initial stage λ1 if the end stage free energy F(λ2) 
is smaller than the initial stage free energy F(λ1). A decrease of 3kT is sufficient for a modest 
favoring in the ratio of 20:1, for then 
p(λ2)/p(λ1) = exp(-(-3kT)/kT) = exp(3) = 20 
The dissipation associated with the reduction in free energy F(λ2) - F(λ1) = -3kT is a minimum 
increase in the thermodynamic entropy of5 
                                                
4 Temperature does affect the free energy needed to override the fluctuations. We see below that 
a probabilistic favoring of 20:1 is achieved by a free energy reduction of 3kT. This reduction 
diminishes as T decreases. However the thermodynamic entropy created remains at least 3k, 
independent of the temperature. 
5 To see this, use F=E-TS to rewrite F(λ2) - F(λ1) = -3kT as 
S(λ2) - S(λ1) - (E(λ2) - E(λ1))/T = 3k  
We have ΔSsys = S(λ2) - S(λ1). By conservation of energy, -(E(λ2) - E(λ1)) is the energy gained 
by the environment. By supposition, this energy is passed by heat transfer only. In the least 
dissipative case of a thermodynamically reversible heat transfer that corresponds to the minimum 
increase of entropy ΔSenv = -(E(λ2) - E(λ1))/T. 
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ΔStot = ΔSsys + ΔSenv = 3k 
where the change Δ is applied to the entropy of the universe as a whole Stot, which is the sum of 
the system entropy Ssys and the environment entropy Senv. Even though this modest probabilistic 
favoring by no means assures completion of the process, the entropy creation of at least 3k is 
many times greater than the k ln 2 = 0.69k of entropy tracked by Landauer’s principle in a single 
bit erasure. 
 Since the ratio of probability densities grows exponentially with free energy differences 
in (4), further creation of thermodynamic entropy can bring probability density ratios that 
strongly favor completion of the process. For example, if we increase the free energy difference 
to 25kT, then the end stage is strongly favored, for 
p(λ2)/p(λ1) = exp(-(-25kT)/kT) = exp(25) = 7.2 x 10
10. 
In macroscopic terms, however, 25kT of free energy is negligible. This quantity, 25kT, is the 
mean thermal energy of ten diatomic molecules, such as ten oxygen molecules. Hence, there is 
no obstacle to introducing a slight disequilibrium in a macroscopic system in order to nudge a 
thermodynamically reversible process to completion. 
3. Illustrations of the No Go Result for a One‐Molecule Gas 
 This no go result applies to all thermodynamically reversible processes in systems in 
thermal equilibrium with their environment. However its derivation and its statement as (6) is 
remote from its implementation in specific systems. It is helpful to illustrate how fluctuations 
obliterate a  simple process described in the thermodynamics of computation, the 
thermodynamically reversible, isothermal expansion and compression of a one-molecule gas. 
The analysis of the last section provides the precise computation. Here I give simpler estimates 
of the disturbing effects of fluctuations. 
3.1 Reversible, Isothermal Expansion and Compression 
 A monatomic one-molecule gas is confined to a vertically oriented cylinder and the gas 
pressure is contained by the weight of the piston. The process intended is a thermodynamically 
reversible, isothermal expansion or compression of the gas. Our expectation is that this process 
will proceed indefinitely slowly, with the weight of the piston maintained just minutely away 
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from the equilibrium weight so that the expansion or compression is only just favored. As the 
piston is raised in an expansion, it draws work energy from the one-molecule gas; and this 
energy is restored to the one-molecule gas as heat from the environment. The gas exerts a 
pressure P=kT/V, for V the volume of the gas. Thus the work extracted in a doubling of the 
volume and thus also the heat passed to the gas is given by kT /V 'dV '
V
2V
∫  = kT ln 2. The 
thermodynamic entropy change in the gas is the familiar k ln 2. 
 That is our expectation. It is confounded by fluctuations. Consider the piston first. It is a 
thermal system that is Boltzmann distributed over its height h ≥ 0 above the piston floor 
according to 
p(h)  =  (Mg/kT) exp ( -Mgh/kT) 
where M is the piston mass. The mean of this distribution is kT/Mg and its standard deviation is 
also kT/Mg. 
 This latter number measures the extent of thermal fluctuations in the height of the piston. 
For a macroscopic piston, M will be very much larger than kT/g and the extent of fluctuations in 
height will be negligible. However in this case of a one-molecule gas, the piston must be very 
light if it is to be suspended at equilibrium by the pressure of the one-molecule gas. Hence its M 
is small and the fluctuations in height will be great. They can be estimated quantitatively as 
follows. The weight of the piston is Mg. The mean force exerted by the gas pressure is (kT/V).A 
= kT/h, where A is the area of the piston and h its height above the base of the cylinder, so that V 
= Ah. Setting these two forces equal as the condition for equilibrium, we recover the equilibrium 
height as6 
heq = kT/Mg 
Remarkably, this quantity heq is just the same as the mean height and standard deviation of the 
above distribution, both of which are also given by kT/Mg.  
                                                
6 Hence the mean energy of height is Mgheq = kT. While this energy is associated with a single 
degree of freedom of the moving piston, it differs from the familiar equipartition mean energy 
per degree of freedom (1/2)kT, because the relevant term of the piston’s Hamiltonian, Mgh, is 
linear in h and not quadratic, as the equipartition theorem assumes. 
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 This extraordinary result can be expressed more picturesquely as follows. If we set up the 
piston so that its weight perfectly balances the mean pressure force of the one-molecule gas, it 
will not remain at the equilibrium height, but will fluctuate immediately through the entire 
volume of the gas. It will perhaps be suddenly flung skyward by a collision with molecule; and it 
may then fall precipitously between collisions. The intended process of a gentle, indefinitely 
slow expansion or contraction is lost completely behind the wild gyrations of the piston over the 
full volume of the one-molecule gas. 
 Similar results hold for heat transfer between the one-molecule gas and its environment. 
Since it is monatomic, the Boltzmann distribution of the gas energy E is 
p(E) = 2(E/π)1/2 (kT) -3/2 exp(-E/kT) 
The mean of this distribution is the familiar equipartition energy (3/2) kT and the standard 
deviation is (3/2)1/2 kT = 1.225 kT.7 Hence, simply by virtue of its contact with the environment 
at temperature T, the one-molecule gas energy will be swinging wildly through a range 
comparable in size to the total mean energy of the gas. 
 We had expected that we would track a quantity of heat kT ln 2 = 0.69 kT while the 
piston slowly and gently moves to halve or double the volume of the gas. What we find is that 
the piston is wildly and randomly flung to and fro through the entire volume of the gas, while the 
gas energy fluctuates similarly wildly over a range greater than the 0.69 kT of heat transfer we 
track. We had expected a process that proceeds calmly at arbitrarily slow speed from start to 
finish. Instead we find a chaos of wild gyrations with no discernible start or finish. 
 This is a rough analysis. To maintain the equilibrium of a thermodynamically reversible 
process would require that the weight Mg be adjusted as the volume V changes since the gas 
pressure will vary inversely with volume. Norton (2011, Section 7.5) replaces the uniform force 
field of gravity with another force field that varies with height in precisely the way needed to 
maintain mean quantities at equilibrium. 
                                                
7 This and the earlier energy standard deviation can be computed most rapidly from Einstein’s 
energy fluctuation theorem, which identifies the variance of the energy with kT2 d<E>/dT, where 
<E> is the mean energy. For the piston, <E>=kT, so the variance is (kT)2 = (Mgheq)
2. For the 
monatomic gas, <E>=(3/2)kT, so the variance is  (3/2)(kT)2. The standard deviation is the square 
root of the variance. 
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3.2 Generality 
 A one-molecule gas confined in a cylinder by a piston is fanciful and cannot be realized 
practically. It is, however, one of the most discussed examples in the thermodynamics of 
computation because it is easy to visualize. Its statistical and thermodynamic properties mimic 
those of more realistic systems with few degrees of freedom. We may model a memory device as 
a two-chambered cell with a single molecule trapped in one part. A more realistic 
implementation of the memory device is a single electric charge trapped by a potential well in a 
solid state medium; or a magnetic dipole aligned into a specific orientation by a magnetic field. 
 The thermodynamic operations carried out on the one-molecule gas have analogs in the 
more realistic implementations. Mechanical variables such as volume and pressure are replaced 
by electric and magnetic correlates. The general results remain the same. If we halve the range of 
possible states of a memory device, we reduce its thermodynamic entropy by k ln 2, just as we 
do when we halve the volume of a one-molecule gas. The large fluctuations exhibited by the 
one-molecule gas derive from its small number of degrees of freedom. Correspondingly, the 
more realistic implementations will exhibit similarly large fluctuations. 
 The two processes investigated were heating/cooling and expansion/contraction of the 
gas. These are instances of the two processes that appear in all thermodynamically reversible 
processes: heat transfer and exchange of generalized work energy. As a result, the analysis here 
has a quite broad scope. Consider thermodynamically reversible measurement, in which one 
device reads the state of another. For example, a magnetic dipole reads the state of a second 
dipole when the two slowly approach and align in a process that maintains equilibrium 
throughout. This detection or measurement process is a reversible compression of the phase 
space of the reader dipole and is thermodynamically analogous to compression of a one-
molecule gas. As a result, this measurement process will be fatally disrupted by fluctuations. 
While a standard claim of the thermodynamics literature is that these measurements can be 
performed without dissipation, the no go result shows that dissipation is required if the 
fluctuations are to be overcome and the process driven to a correct reading. 
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4. A Loophole? 
 Each computation consists of many steps. Dissipation, significant at the molecular level, 
is required by the no go result to bring each of these steps to completion. Bennett (1973, 1982) 
proposes an ingenious loophole for computations with very many steps. The very many 
thermodynamically reversible steps are chained together to form one large thermodynamically 
reversible process. The computer’s state wanders back and forth through the various stages in a 
generalization of Brownian motion. The no go result affirms that the state will be uniformly 
distributed over all the stages of the computation. Bennett now makes the step to the final state 
highly dissipative, so that it can be favored with arbitrarily high probability. Hence the 
computation will eventually terminate in this final state with high probability. The 
thermodynamic entropy created in this final, irreversible step may be large. However, if there are 
very many steps combined into the overall computation, the entropy created per step can be quite 
small.  
 Whether this loophole can succeed depends on whether the many steps of a computation 
can be chained together in such a way that achieving the final state also assures that all the 
computer’s components are in the intended final states. The danger point is when the computer 
completes one step and initiates the next. The initiation of the second step must arise only when 
the first step is completed and the state of the computer conforms to what the logical 
specification of the program requires for that first step. We need to be assured that the disrupting 
effects of fluctuations will not trigger the second step before these conditions are met. 
 In an attempt to assure this, Bennett (1982) describes a Brownian clockwork computer, a 
mechanical implementation of a Turing machine. Its parts are mechanically interlocked so that 
when the tape manipulator head reaches its final state, each of the cells of the tape are in the final 
states intended by the logical specification of the computation.  
 Bennett’s description of the device is detailed with vivid line drawings. However it is 
incomplete in the one aspect that matters most. The statistical mechanical properties of the 
individual components are poorly represented. Here is the easiest way to see that they are 
omitted: the machine is sufficiently powerful that we could set it up with a large tape carrying 
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“random” data of 0s and 1s and then run an erasure program that resets all the cells to zero.8 On 
Bennett’s view, there must be an associated creation of thermodynamic entropy of at least k ln 2 
per bit erased and the passing of kT ln 2 of heat per bit erased to the environment. Yet their 
creation is nowhere apparent in the operation of the machine.9 
 The narrative that describes the machine’s operation depends on our imagining processes 
that are unproblematic if implemented by macroscopic bodies. For example, the branching of the 
program’s execution arises when the path of the manipulator is obstructed by a knob whose 
position encodes the data recorded in the tape cell. Our macroscopic intuitions preclude the 
manipulator ever proceeding with a misread of the data. These same processes may fail if we 
attempt to implement them in a thermodynamically reversible manner at the molecular level. For 
that means that all interactions must be at equilibrium. The components at issue, such as a single 
molecule or a molecular-scale dipole, exert very weak forces on average and these forces are 
confounded by fluctuations comparable in size to the average. Another component interacting 
with them can only apply correspondingly weak forces, else the requirement of equilibrium of 
thermodynamic reversibility would be violated. Once again our intended average behavior would 
be immersed in wild fluctuations. The resulting interaction would be very different from a 
macroscopically pictured manipulator thumping into macroscopic knob and being definitively 
obstructed by it. 
 The following indicates how adding these thermal complications would compromise the 
operation of the clockwork computer. The obstruction of the manipulator head by the data knob 
is equivalent to the reading by a detector of the state of a data cell. The manipulator in effect 
reads the state of the data cell and records the reading by implementing one of several possible 
computational paths. Bennett (1982, pp. 307-308; 1987, p.14) has described two schemes in 
which a reader detects the position of a single component memory device in a reversible 
thermodynamic process. The molecular implementation is quite fragile in comparison with its 
robust macroscopic counterpart and fails precisely because the analysis of both schemes neglects 
                                                
8 The program reads a cell and rewrites its contents to 0, if the cell has a 1. If the cell has a 0, it 
moves one cell to the right and repeats. 
9 Or one could assume that the physical description is complete so that the machine can erase the 
tape without thermodynamic entropy creation. That contradicts Landauer’s principle. 
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how fluctuations confound the intended behavior of thermodynamically reversible processes at 
the molecular scale. Norton (2011, §7.3) describes how both detection schemes fail. For the case 
of binary data, they are as likely as not to terminate with the detector reading the right as the 
wrong result. 
 We have every reason to expect that these problems would appear were the clockwork, 
Brownian computer somehow implemented with molecular scale storage devices and operated 
by thermodynamically reversible processes. We have no assurance that any step would proceed 
according to its logical specification. If the reading of data in a cell is implemented as Bennett 
describes, they would likely as not return the wrong result. When the manipulator is eventually 
trapped probabilistically in its final state, we should expect the tape to be left in a state of chaos 
that does not reflect the results intended by the logical specification of the program. 
 In short, the loophole fails. It is a conjecture, motivated by macroscopic intuitions that do 
not apply at molecular scales. 
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It's Okay to Call Genetic Drift a Force
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Abstract
One hotly debated philosophical question in the analysis of evolutionary
theory concerns whether or not evolution and the various factors which
constitute it (selection, drift, mutation, and so on) may profitably be consid-
ered to be forces in the traditional, Newtonian sense. Several compelling
arguments assert that the force picture is incoherent, due to the peculiar
nature of genetic drift. I consider two of those arguments here  that drift
lacks a predictable direction, and that drift is constitutive of evolutionary
systems  and show that they both fail to demonstrate that a view of genetic
drift as a force is untenable.
1. Introduction
The evolution of populations in nature is described in many ways, using a whole
host of smaller factors with extensive theories of their own: natural selection,
genetic drift, mutation, migration, linkage disequilibrium, meiotic drive, extinc-
tion, increase in complexity, and so on. The natural philosophical question, then,
is this: what is the relationship between these component theories and the
overall trajectory of evolution in the broad sense?
Work on this question has recently focused on the causal picture implied
by this relationship. Is evolution (as a whole) a causal process? Do some of the
smaller-scale theories describe causal processes? Which ones? And how do those
smaller-scale causal processes combine to produce the resultant trajectory of
populations through time? Two positions on these questions have crystallized.
One, the statisticalist interpretation of evolutionary theory (e.g., Walsh et al.,
2002; Matthen and Ariew, 2002), claims that both evolution as a whole and these
smaller-scale theories do not describe causal processes. Rather, the causal pro-
cesses at work exist at the level of individual organisms and their biochemistry:
individual instances of survivals, deaths, predations, mutations, and so forth. All
these theories, then, constitute quite useful, but not causal, ways in which we
may statistically combine events to enable us to grasp interesting trends within
populations of causally interacting individuals.
The other view, the causalist interpretation (e.g., Millstein, 2002, 2006;
Shapiro and Sober, 2007), considers all of these processes to be genuinely causal.
1
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Evolution causes changes in populations, as do selection, mutation, migration,
genetic drift, and so forth. How exactly we specify these causal processes varies 
for example, as different varieties of sampling (Hodge, 1987), as population-
level causes (Millstein, 2006), or as supervening on lower-level causes (Shapiro
and Sober, 2007)  but they are causal nonetheless.
This heated debate has produced much work on an allied problem which
will be the topic of my discussion here. It is a common pedagogical trope in the
teaching of biology to describe all of these smaller-scale theories as referring to
forces, each of which propels a population in a different direction through some
space (of morphologies, phenotypes, genotypes, etc.) with a different strength,
adding together in some sense to produce the population's overall evolutionary
trajectory over time. Crow and Kimura introduce a discussion of equilibrium
under selection pressure by noting that ordinarily one regards selection as
the strongest force influencing gene frequencies (1970, p. 262). Hartl and Clark
discuss the possibility of balancing mutation and drift, writing that there are
many forces in population genetics that act in opposition to one another, and it
is this tension that makes for interesting behavior at the population level. [ . . . ]
Merely because these two forces are in opposition, it does not guarantee that
there will be a stable balance between them (1997, p. 294). Strickberger argues
that since mutational equilibrium is not reached in many natural populations,
other forcesmust be responsible for the establishment of gene frequencies (1968,
p. 719). This pedagogical pattern is even common at the high school level: in a
chapter titled The Forces of Evolutionary Change, Lewis summarizes natural
selection, nonrandom mating, mutation, migration, and genetic drift in a force-
like diagram (1997, p. 412).
I have quoted from several textbooks to demonstrate the pervasiveness of
this `force' metaphor at all levels of biological pedagogy. But what of it? Why is
this particular biological turn of phrase of philosophical interest? In his original
introduction of what would become the causalist interpretation, Sober (1984)
described, influentially, evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. Sober'smetaphor
is intended to carry some genuine explanatory weight. Allowing, of course, that
the analogy here is not entirely precise, he claims that just as component, causal
forces are summed together to determine the net force acting on a body in
Newtonian dynamics, a force-like understanding is the right way to picture not
just themetaphorical structure of evolution, but its causal structure as well. Sober
writes that in addition to work on the history of life,
evolutionary biology has also developed a theory of forces. This de-
scribes the possible causes of evolution. The various models provided
by the theory of forces describe how a population will evolve if it be-
gins in a certain initial state and is subject to certain causal influences
along the way. (Sober, 1984, p. 27)
This viewmakes evolution, in the apt terminology deployed by Maudlin, a quasi-
Newtonian theory (2004, p. 431). There are, on the one hand, inertial laws
that describe how some entities behave when nothing acts on them, and then
2
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there are laws of deviation that specify in what conditions, and in what ways, the
behavior will deviate from the inertial behavior (Maudlin, 2004, p. 431). This is,
Maudlin notes, a very natural way for us to understand the behavior of systems:
whether or not the laws of a given system are amenable to such analysis, we like
to produce quasi-Newtonian theories.
But to deploy force language in this more substantive way brings Sober in
for another line of argument in addition to the critiques aimed at the causal view
in general.1 For we now must ask about the soundness of this appropriation of
Newtonian force. Should selection and drift be treated in this way, or not? One
recurring difficulty with adopting the force metaphor is the issue of genetic drift.
A common refrain in this debate claims that considering drift to be similar to a
Newtonian force is highly problematic.
In what follows, I will argue in favor of the force metaphor, by taking on
two arguments against the tenability of considering drift as a force. The first is
the (by now, well-trodden) claim that genetic drift, though its magnitude may
be determined by the effective population size, lacks a direction specifiable or
predictable in advance. Since all Newtonian forces, it is said,must have specifiable
magnitudes and directions, drift cannot be considered a force, and the metaphor
thus falls apart. The second argument claims that it is a category mistake to
consider drift a force which impinges upon populations. It is, rather, the default
state in which populations find themselves. All evolving populations necessarily
drift, and thus to describe drift as an external force is misleading. Both of these
critiques, I will show, miss the mark.
2. The Direction of Drift
It is by now an old chestnut in this debate that genetic drift lacks a specifiable or
predictable direction. Matthen and Ariew (2002, p. 61) note in a dismissive aside
that in any case, drift is not the sort of thing that can play the role of a force  it
does not have predictable and constant direction. Brandon (2006) adopts the
same argument, and it is one of the central motivations behind his development
of the zero-force evolutionary law (Brandon, 2006, 2010; McShea and Brandon,
2010).
The basic outline is straightforward. Genetic drift, often called random
drift, is a stochastic process. Consider a population which is uniformly heterozy-
gous for some allele Aa  all members of the population possess one copy of
the dominant allele (A) and one copy of the recessive allele (a). Assuming no
selection, mutation, or other evolutionary forces act on the population, genetic
drift will eventually drive this population toward homozygosity, uniformity at
either AA or aa, with one of the two alleles removed from the population. This
1. Early in the debate between causalists and statisticalists, this point was often missed  Matthen
and Ariew (2002), for example, take it to be a point against the causal interpretation itself that
genetic drift cannot be described as a force. This entails, at best, that the forcemetaphor should
be discarded, not that the causal interpretation is untenable, a point stressed by Stephens
(2004) and Millstein (2006).
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is because the homozygous states AA and aa are what we might call absorbing
barriers  once a population has lost all of its A or a alleles (and again, given
that there is no mutation), it is stuck at the uniform homozygous state. The
random walk of genetic drift will, given enough time, eventually arrive and
remain at one or the other of these permanent states.
Here, then, is the rub  the populationwill arrive at one of these states, but it
is impossible in advance to predictwhich onewill be its eventual fate. In this sense,
at least, the population-level outcome of genetic drift is random.2 It is obvious,
the argument concludes, that drift cannot act as a Newtonian force, because
Newtonian forces have directions that may be specified and predicted. Consider
natural selection. The direction in which selection will drive a population is
obvious, and is indeed specifiable in advance: selection will move populations in
the direction of increased fitness. Wemay even visualize the adaptive landscape
in the absence of any actual populations, specifying the direction of the selective
force prior to any actual population's experiencing it.3 Such analysis is clearly
impossible for drift, and drift cannot therefore be described as a force.
Two responses on behalf of the force metaphor have been offered. In our
initial discussion of drift above, drift was described fairly clearly in directional
terms: it drives populations toward homozygosity (Stephens, 2004, pp. 563564).
Insofar as this is a direction,wemay avoid the objection. There are several reasons
that we might be worried about this response, however. First, Filler has argued
persuasively that if we are too liberal with our force metaphor, we run the risk of
sapping the notion of `force' of all its explanatory power. Consider, for example,
Molière's classic satire of opium's dormitive virtue. We could construct a
fatigue-space in which sleep sits at the end of one axis, and then describe a
dormitive force which drives persons up the sleep axis. Ascribe this dormitive
force to opium, and we have come close to completing Molière's folly, providing
a nearly empty explanation for opium's causing sleep (Filler, 2009, pp. 779780).
If heterozygosity-space resembles fatigue-space in Filler's sense too closely,
then the toward homozygosity response to this objection fails.
Another worry about toward homozygosity as a direction for drift is that
it may mischaracterize what it is that drift is intended to describe. As mentioned
above, drift has a direction toward homozygosity insofar as (in the absence of
mutation and migration) homozygosity constitutes a set of absorbing barriers
for the state of a population. What drift is genuinely about, however, is not
the existence of these barriers  which are set by the mutation and migration
constraints  but rather the population's behavior between these barriers. This
toward homozygosity direction of genetic drift, therefore, is not a feature of
drift itself, but defined by other parts of evolutionary theory; thinking that
2. The sense of stochastic and random at work here is, therefore, a subjective one. Whether
or not there exists a stronger type of stochasticity underlying genetic drift, and what exactly
this sense might amount to, seems to hinge in large part on the result of the debate over drift's
causal potency (see Rosenberg, 2001).
3. Though see Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006) for some of the difficulties with the adaptive landscape
metaphor.
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toward homozygosity is a feature of drift thus may be mistaken.
We have several independent reasons, then, for suspecting that the de-
fense of the force view by appeal to drift's direction toward homozygosity is
problematic. If this is true, we must look for another way to resolve the trouble
with drift's direction, and the second available response turns to the definition of
`force' itself. Perhaps the trouble with the objection lies in its rigorous adherence
to the claim that forces must have directions predictable in advance.4 Could we
discard this requirement without discarding the extra explanatory power that
the notion of a `force' provides us?
One attempt to do so is offered by Filler (2009, pp. 780782). He argues that
we may harvest two specific criteria for forces from the literature on Newtonian
systems: namely, that forces be both precisely numerically specifiable in mag-
nitude and able to unify our explanations of a large array of phenomena. Such
criteria, it is presumed (though not argued), would forestall the dormitive force
while permitting genetic drift. Even if they do not, however, Filler notes that
we could still posit a continuum of forces with maximally precise and unifying
forces on one end and mathematically vague and weakly unifying forces on the
other (Filler, 2009, p. 781).
What of this attempt to salvage the force view? In general, I am broadly
sympathetic with the response of carefully weakening the criteria for `force'-
hood. I would like, however, to support the same conclusion by a slightly different
line of argument. While the literature that Filler cites to establish mathemati-
cal specifiability and unifying power as desiderata for forces is valuable, I am
concerned about it for two reasons. First, given that these criteria are offered
by Filler without providing an analysis of genetic drift or any other forces, they
seem dangerously close to being ad-hoc additions to our force concept. Is there a
principled argument for why these criteria should replace that of directionality,
in general? Second, Filler does not offer a direct argument that genetic drift
passes these criteria, so we can't yet be sure that the argument he provides gives
us the result that we're looking for. I believe both of these deficits can be reme-
died by comparing genetic drift to a different force that is standardly invoked in
Newtonian dynamics: Brownian motion.
2.1. Brownian Motion
My claim, then, is this: whatever our general analysis of a force winds up being,
it happens to be the case that we already countenance examples of forces that do,
indeed, have stochastically specified directions, namely, the force of Brownian
motion. This argument is admittedly less ambitious than that of Filler  we do
not, for example, wind up with enough theoretical resources to fully specify
the continuum from paradigm cases of forces to fringe cases. But we do have
precisely what we need to countenance genetic drift as a force, for genetic drift,
4. The claim that forces must have specifiable directions appears, at least, in Matthen and Ariew
(2002); Stephens (2004); Brandon (2005); and Brandon (2006).
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Figure 1: A simulation of a particle released at (0, 0) undergoing Brownian
movement. Inspired by Perrin's drawing of the Brownian motion of colloidal
particles in water, viewed under the microscope (fig. 6 of Perrin, 1909, p. 81).
it turns out, can be formulated precisely analogously to the force of Brownian
motion.
Brownian motion is a common occurrence. The behavior of dust particles
as they float through a sunny window or a glass of water is governed in large
part by the manner in which they collide with the molecules of the fluid in which
they are suspended (see Figure 1). Since the motion of the fluid molecules is itself
modeled stochastically (with the tools of statistical mechanics), it is unsurprising
that Brownian motion in turn is a stochastic force.
What does the formal representation of a stochastic classical force look
like? The now-standard derivation of the mathematics of Brownian motion was
provided by Langevin in 1908 (translated in Lemons and Gythiel, 1997):
m
d2x
dt2
= −6piµa
dx
dt
+ X. (1)
This is a stochastic differential equation, with x representing the location of
the particle within the fluid,m its mass, a damping coefficient −6piµa (which
describes the manner in which the viscosity of the fluid through which the
particle moves slows its travel), and a random noise term X, which describes
the actual effect of the collisions with fluid molecules.
A few observations about this equation are in order. First, it is written as
an equation for a force:m · d2x/dt2 is just mass times acceleration, so we could
equivalently have written F = −6piµa · dx/dt + X. Nor need one quibble that
the differential equation specifying this force references the particle's velocity,
dx/dt. Equations for many other forces do so as well, including friction in air or
6
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water (drag). Secondly, the source of the randomness here is obvious, coming
entirely from the noise term X. About it, Langevin says that we know that
it is indifferently positive and negative and that its magnitude is such that it
maintains the agitation of the particle, which the viscous resistance would stop
without it (Lemons and Gythiel, 1997, p. 1081).
Finally, the force described by this equation bears all of the same prob-
lematic characteristics as genetic drift. Most importantly, its direction can by
no means be predicted in advance: nothing about the direction of the force de-
scribed by equation (1) is determinate in this sense. It depends entirely on the
noise term which, as Langevin notes, indifferently (that is to say, randomly)
changes sign and magnitude as the system evolves. The same is, of course, true
of genetic drift, under which an allele frequency is equally likely to increase
or decrease at each point in time. The example of Brownian motion, therefore,
offers us a case in which the notion of `force' is weakened in precisely the way
required to countenance genetic drift  by admitting forces that vary in direction
stochastically over time.
The opponents of the force view still have one obvious way to respond to
this argument. They might reject outright the extension of force talk to both
Brownian motion and genetic drift. While this is a perfectly coherent choice, I am
not certain what the motivation for it would be. Of course, when we introduce a
stochastic force, we introduce an element of unpredictability into our system,
rendering null one of the primary benefits of a classical, force-based picture: the
ability to use information about component force values to make determinate
advance predictions about the behavior of systems. But we already lack the ability
to make such detailed predictions of individual biological systems  why would
we think that a force-based view of evolutionary theory would somehow make
them possible? The question, rather, is simply whether it is possible to maintain
a net-force picture of evolutionary theory which includes the randomness
of genetic drift, and the example of Brownian motion shows this to be clearly
achievable, should we be inclined to do so.
Further, just because the values are not predictable in advance does not
mean that these stochastic forces somehow cannot be taken into account in the
development of models. The Wright-Fisher model of genetic drift has spawned
much research in population genetics as a computational/mathematical model
of the action of genetic drift, and, similarly, Brownian motion can be taken into
account in models of fluid dynamics when it is taken to be an important factor
(see, e.g., Huilgol and Phan-Thien, 1997).
Finally, it seems that many authors in the debates over the causal structure
of evolution either explicitly tolerate or make room for forces of different sorts
such as these. McShea and Brandon, for example, when discussing how we might
arrive at the correct distribution of evolutionary causes into forces, note their
skepticism that there are objective matters of fact that settle what counts as
forces in a particular science, and so what counts as the zero-force condition
(2010, p. 102). That is, while facts can settle what causal influences are at work in
a given system, they cannot, according to McShea and Brandon, settle how we
7
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partition these causal processes into forces. Even the statisticalist analysis of
Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew describes as a paradigm case of Newtonian, dynamical
explanation the case of a feather, affected not only by the force of gravity but
also by attractive forces from other bodies, electromagnetic forces, forces imparted
by random movements of the air molecules, etc. (2002, p. 454, emph. added). I claim
that without further argument, there is little reason to dogmatically adhere to
the requirement that forces have directions specifiable in advance.
3. Drift as Constitutive of Evolutionary Systems
Another line of attack on the force view, marshaled by Brandon, doesn't turn
on the appropriateness of stochastic-direction forces. Rather, it claims that it
is a category mistake (or something close to it) to consider drift as an external
force that acts on biological systems. Drift, on the contrary, is part and parcel
of a constitutive process of any evolutionary system, and is therefore necessarily
found in any set of circumstances in which evolution is possible. Force talk, on
the other hand, should be reserved for forces which appear in special circum-
stances. In the biological case, mutation, selection, and migration (among others)
are special forces, but drift, as a constitutive component of evolution, is not
 it is part of the zero-force state of evolutionary systems (Brandon, 2006, p.
325).
To help elucidate this argument further, return to Maudlin's discussion
of quasi-Newtonian systems as mentioned in the introduction (2004, p. 431).
Maudlin points out a very valuable psychological or motivational distinction
between our inertial or zero-force laws and our deviation or force laws. Namely,
the zero-force conditions are supposed to be what influences a body when, in
some particularly relevant sense, nothing is happening to it. The appropriate sense
of nothing happening is obviously domain-relative, and Brandon's claim seems
to be precisely that placing drift on the side of the force laws is a poor definition
of nothing happening. When nothing is happening to a biological system, he
argues, it drifts.
Again, let's turn to an analogy with classical mechanics. Classical mechanics
has its own set of highly pervasive forces, and for each of these we have made the
implicit decision to consider that force not as part of the inertial conditions, but as
a deviation from those conditions. Take gravitation, for example. We might reply
to Brandon's objection that gravitation is as universal in Newtonian systems as
genetic drift is in evolutionary systems. Applying the logic of Brandon's objection
here, then, Newton's first law is incorrectly formulated. Gravitation should be
considered part of the default or zero-force state of Newtonian mechanics.
While this isn't an outright reductio, it strikes me that any discussion of forces
which fails to handle the paradigm case of Newtonian gravitation is seriously
flawed.
I suspect, however, that the supporter of this objection would reply that
there is an important and salient difference between genetic drift and gravitation.
8
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While there may be no Newtonian system which in fact exhibits no gravitational
effects, it is possible to describe in Newtonian terms a system that would not
be subject to gravitation  either by dialing the gravitational constant G back
to zero, or by imagining the behavior of an isolated test mass at infinity, in-
finitely distant from all other mass in the universe. Gravitation therefore is not
necessary for the description of a Newtonian system in the way that drift is for an
evolutionary system.
It is not obvious to me, however, that there is any conceptual difficulty in
abstracting genetic drift away from an evolutionary system. Imagine an infinite
population with individuals initially equally distributed among four possible
genotypes, A, B, C, andD. Parents produce offspring identical to themselves,
modulo a small mutation rate. There exists a selective force, which causes types
C andD to have a 10% chance of dying before reaching reproductive age. Finally,
the reproductive output of each type in the next generation is set in advance:
say that all types produce exactly one offspring if they survive to reproductive
age, and then die. Here we have an example of a thought experiment on which
selection exerts an influence (types C and D will clearly eventually die out),
mutation has an influence (due to the non-zero mutation rate), but genetic drift
has none. The population is infinite, so we have no bottleneck effects or effects
of finite population size. Further, each individual has a guaranteed reproductive
outcome from birth, based upon its type  and to the extent that these outcomes
are probabilistic, this is the influence of selection or mutation, not drift. Indeed,
we can predict that in the infinite limit, the population will consist of roughly
halfA organisms and half B.5
Is there anything more outlandish about this drift-free toy model than an
example consisting of a universe containing only one isolated and non-extended
point mass, free of gravitation, or a test mass at infinite distance from all other
masses? Clearly there are no infinite populations in the real world, but here
it seems we have a perfectly tenable thought-experiment on which we may
separate the effect of drift from all the other evolutionary forces, and then
reduce that effect to zero. There is nothing any more constitutive about drift
for evolutionary systems than there is about gravitation for Newtonian systems.
4. Conclusion
I have here considered two arguments against the conceptual tenability of con-
sidering genetic drift as a force like those of Newtonian dynamics. The first
asserted that genetic drift lacks a predictable direction. This argument fails by
virtue of an analogy with Brownian motion: if Brownian motion is a satisfactory
force (and, I have argued, it is), then so is genetic drift. The second argument
against drift-as-force proposed that drift is a constitutive feature of evolutionary
systems. This argument fails because accepting its premises results in a misun-
5. With a small, but predictable, fraction of newly-arisenmutants. I am indebted to Grant Ramsey's
thoughts on drift for helping me devise this example.
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derstanding of the relationship between Newtonian gravitation and inertia.
I have, of course, done nothing here to resolve the overall debate between
the causal and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. But the utility of
the forcemetaphor in the description of evolutionary systemsmakes it something
worth defending  and it continues to survive the host of objections raised against
it.
10
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[Abstract: We show that the common claim that internal validity should be understood as 
prior to external validity has, at least, three epistemologically problematic aspects: 
experimental artefacts, the implications of causal relations, and how the mechanism is 
measured. Each aspect demonstrates how important external validity is for the internal 
validity of the experimental result.] 
 
1) Internal and external validity: perceived tension and claimed priority 
Donald T. Campbell introduced the concepts internal and external validity in the 1950s. 
Originally designed for research related to personality and personality change, the use of 
this conceptual pair was soon extended to educational and social research. Since then it has 
spread to many more disciplines. 
Without a doubt the concepts captures two features of research scientists are aware of in 
their daily practice. Researchers aim to make correct inferences both about that which is 
actually studied (internal validity), for instance in an experiment, and about what the 
results ‘generalize to’ (external validity). Whether or not the language of internal and 
external validity is used in their disciplines, the tension between these two kinds of 
inference is often experienced.  
In addition, it is often claimed that one of the two is prior to the other. And the sense in 
which internal validity is often claimed to be prior to external validity is both temporal and 
epistemic, at least. For instance, Francisco Guala claims that:  
“Problems of internal validity are chronologically and epistemically antecedent to 
problems of external validity: it does not make much sense to ask whether a result is valid 
outside the experimental circumstances unless we are confident that it does therein” 
(Guala, 2003, 1198). 
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The claim about temporal priority is that we first make inferences about the local 
environment under study before making inferences about the surrounding world. The claim 
about epistemic priority is that we come to know the local environment before we come to 
know the surrounding world. 
In the following we problematize the relation between external and internal validity. Our 
claim is that the two types of validity are deeply intertwined. However, we are not going to 
attempt to argue for the full claim. We argue only in favour of the part of the claim that is 
in conflict with the idea behind the internal/external distinction. The argument is directed 
at showing that internal validity understood as prior to external validity has, at least, three 
epistemologically problematic aspects: experimental artefacts, the implications of causal 
relations, and how the mechanism is measured. We exemplify the problems associated 
with experimental artefacts and mechanism measurement by cases from experimental 
psychology. Each aspect demonstrates how important external validity is for the internal 
validity of the experimental result.  
We end the paper by presenting a different kind of test. Lee Cronbach claims that internal 
validity, as interpreted by the later Campbell, is a rather meaningless feature of scientific 
results. If we are right, a Cronbachian attack on internal validity in general must also be 
mistaken. Since on our understanding internal and external validity are intertwined a 
successful attack on internal validity would threaten to have adverse effects on external 
validity. To be consistent with our standpoint the particular conception Cronbach attacks 
should pinpoint other features than the concept of internal validity has traditionally been 
assumed to capture. 
 
2) What is internal and external validity? 
It is impossible to evaluate whether the perceived tension and the claimed priority of 
internal validity are justified unless we know more precisely what it is that we make 
internally valid inferences about and what this validity is supposed to consist in. Below we 
present three formulations of internal and external validity:  
Campbell’s early conception: “First, and as a basic minimum, is what can be called 
internal validity: did in fact the experimental stimulus make some significant difference in 
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this specific instance? The second criterion is that of external validity, representativeness, 
or generalizability: to what populations, settings, and variables can this effect be 
generalized?” (Campbell 1957, 297).  
Guala’s recent conception: “Internal validity is achieved when the structure and behavior 
of a laboratory system (its main causal factors, the ways they interact, and the phenomena 
they bring about) have been properly understood by the experimenter. For example: the 
result of an experiment E is internally valid if the experimenter attributes the production of 
an effect B to a factor (or set of factors) A, and A really is the (or a) cause of B in E. 
Furthermore, it is externally valid if A causes B not only in E, but also in a set of other 
circumstances of interest, F, G, H, etc.” (Guala 2003, 1198).  
Campbell’s later conception: “In the new contrast, external […] validity involve[s] theory. 
Local molar causal validity [, i.e. internal validity,] does not. While this contrast is 
weakened in the principle of proximal similarity [i.e. external validity], I still want to retain 
it. The principle of proximal similarity is normally (and it should be) implemented on the 
basis of expert intuition. […] Our intuitive expectations about what dimensions are 
relevant are theory-like, even if they are not formally theoretical. Moreover, clinical 
experience, prior experimental results, and formal theory are very appropriate guides for 
efforts to make the exploration of the bounds of generalizability more systematic.” 
(Campbell 1986, 76) 
Campbell’s early conception and Guala’s conception show similarity in how they 
understand external validity. It is about how to generalize what has been found internally. 
Campbell’s later conception differs from both in that the connection between local causal 
claims and general claims is weakened. The word “local” emphasizes that the claimed 
validity is limited to “the context of particular treatments, outcomes, times, settings, and 
persons studied” (Shadish et al. 2002, 54). Local causal claims are “molar” as well. 
Campbell exemplifies it in the following way: “For the applied scientist, local molar causal 
validity is a first crucial issue and the starting point for the other validity questions. For 
example, did this complex treatment package make a real difference in this unique 
application at this particular place and time?” (Campbell 1986, 69). There is no guarantee 
that molar claims refer directly to a potential cause. A true molar claim entails merely that 
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something in the complex it captures is a cause. The difference between Campbell’s later 
conception and Guala’s conception is considerable in that respect. Guala’s internal validity 
requires that we understand the causal mechanism that operates in the local case. The later 
Campbell explicitly opposes such a view as generally true of internal validity. Applied 
scientists also need internal validity, but they can normally not analyse causation with such 
precision; “to stay with our problems, we must use techniques that, while improving the 
validity of our research, nonetheless provide less clarity of causal inference than would a 
retreat to narrowly specified variables under laboratory control” (Campbell 1986, 70-71). 
The difference between Campbell’s earlier and later understanding of internal validity 
seems to be one of emphasis primarily. However, the difference between their views of 
external validity is more significant. External validity is not in general established through 
representative sampling, and it is not a matter of simple inductive generalisation. First, a 
cause has to be extracted from the molar situation and then the causal relation is exported 
to proximally similar cases. 
For each of these conceptions there are epistemologically problematic aspects of internal 
validity. We will focus on three: experimental artefacts, the implications of causal 
relations, and the measurement of mechanism. 
 
3) Epistemology—the problem of experimental artefacts  
Can there be such a thing as an internally valid inference? That clearly depends on whether 
the methods we use guarantee that we see clearly, i.e. that what we see in the local 
environment is not in fact an artefact of something else. But some well-known “internally 
valid” results have in fact been generated by, for instance, the method of randomization or 
measurement used.  
 
3a) Overconfidence—experimental artefacts 
Overconfidence is a psychological phenomenon that refers to an overrating of the 
correctness of one’s judgements. Typically, participants are asked knowledge questions 
such as “Which city has more inhabitants? Hyderabad or Islamabad?” and are asked to rate 
how confident they are that their answer on this particular question is correct on a scale 
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from 50% to 100%. Overconfidence occurs when the mean subjective probability assigned 
to how correct responses are is higher than the proportion of correct answers. In contrast a 
participant is calibrated if:  “…over the long run, for all propositions assigned a given 
probability, the proportion that is true equals the probability assigned” (Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff and Philips, 1982). 
The overconfidence effect can, however, be made to disappear under certain experimental 
conditions. Some authors (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting, 1991; Juslin, 1994) 
have claimed that the overconfidence effect is simply an effect of unrepresentative 
sampling. The basic idea behind the critique is that participants need a certain amount of 
information in order to make a correct estimate of their performance on a task. When this 
is not available, they will instead draw on their more general knowledge of the area. If I 
have no clear intuition on whether Islamabad or Hyderabad is the biggest city in the 
question above, I might use the knowledge I have of my general competency in geography 
or what I know about the capitals of Asian countries to produce a confidence judgement. 
That means that if the knowledge questions are sampled in a skewed way so that they 
contain more difficult questions than are normally encountered, participants will exhibit 
overconfidence (i.e. miscalibration). If the knowledge questions posed are instead 
randomly sampled from representative environments, the overconfidence effect disappears 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin, 1994).  
The early experiments investigating overconfidence were clearly internally valid in the 
sense that results were robust: The experimental stimuli produced judgments that had the 
properties of overconfidence. However, they appear to be experimental artefacts, and slight 
variations in the experimental set up will change the results. There are, however, even 
more serious allegations against overconfidence – allegations that are especially interesting 
in this context. In a second set of critique against overconfidence authors such as Ido Erev 
(Erev, Wallsten and Budescu, 1994) and Peter Juslin (Juslin, Winman and Olson, 2000) 
claim that overconfidence (and the related hard-easy effect which we will not discuss here) 
is a product of regression towards the mean. Overconfidence occurs because a participant 
responding to a difficult task (as the one described above) is more likely to overestimate 
correctness than underestimating it. In the extreme, a participant that responds at a chance 
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level cannot be underconfident given the scale 50% to 100% certain that the response is 
correct. This explains also why the representatively sampled knowledge questions (of 
intermediate difficulty) made the overconfidence effect disappear. The artefact is not 
produced by the knowledge questions as such, but depend rather on features inherent in the 
experimental situation: it is difficult to conceptualize a scale measuring certainty that 
would not have endpoints such as these.  
 
4) Epistemology—the problem of causation 
Whether there can be an internally valid inference also depends on the nature of what is 
inferred to. Normally, as we have seen in 2) the inference is causal. Now, there are many 
concepts of causation. Some of these are clearly of a kind that does not support inferences 
that are primarily internally. For instance, someone operating with a notion of causation 
similar to one of those that Kant, Hume, or Mill relied on will judge internally valid 
inferences to causal matters impossible. For each of those causal concepts the implications 
of causation, regardless of whether it has to do with the notion of sufficiency or necessity, 
go beyond the local environment. If there is a causal relation in the local environment it 
follows that this holds also outside this environment. And, trivially, it holds that if it does 
not hold outside the environment it cannot hold inside either. Hence such concepts of 
causation warrant neither the alleged temporal nor epistemological priority of internal 
validity. 
It is in fact a long distance between traditional causal concepts and causation that is 
suitable for being primarily internally validly inferred to. However, more than one 
advocate of randomised controlled trials adopts a view on which an intervention study 
underwrites a positive causal inference. Consider the following quote from David 
Papineau: 
“You take a sample of people with the disease. You divide them into two groups at 
random. You give one group the treatment, withhold it from the other [...] and judge on 
this basis whether the probability of recovery in the former group is higher. If it is, then T 
[treatment] must now cause R [recovery], for the randomization will have eliminated the 
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danger of any confounding factors which might be responsible for a spurious correlation.” 
(Papineau 1994, 439) 
This is excessively optimistic for reasons having to do with the possible artefacts of 
randomization (cf. Shadish et al., 2002, Ch. 2) and the more general points that we have 
already pressed, but that is, not the present point. Let us assume that randomization is 
successful in the desired respect. Papineau’s modified position seems to rely on a concept 
of causation given which in the relevant cases causation is entailed by (i.e. is 
unproblematically inferable from) the fact that the relative frequency of R in the 
intervention group is higher than it is in the control. Thus, for instance, the concept of 
cause employed is not that causes are sufficient in the circumstances, nor that they are 
necessary. This is plainly not so since neither kind of causation is entailed by the 
experimental fact (cf. Persson 2009).  
 
5) Epistemology—the measurement of mechanism 
How mechanisms are measured has a strong impact on the results obtained. As we saw in 
the case of overconfidence the choice of measurements can have unintended side effects, 
but the relation between how stimuli are presented and the effects that are measured is 
more complex than so. An interesting example comes from psychophysics and concerns 
range effects, i.e., effects due to the fact that participants receive more than one 
experimental condition.  
 
5a) Range effects– the measurement of mechanism 
Poulton (1975) presents a number of different range effects demonstrating how the order in 
which stimuli is presented in itself affect the result, or the type of mechanism that is being 
observed (an “unbiased” perceptual judgment, or judgments mediated by range effects – in 
themselves mechanisms).  We will use the simplest example, where the range in which a 
stimulus is presented influences how far apart different stimuli are judged to be. In the case 
of Figure 1 the slope of perceived distances between stimuli is radically different when the 
end points are L1 and L2, rather than S1 and S2 when ∅ represents the physical magnitude 
and ψ the subjective (perceived) magnitude. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 POULTON; SEE LAST PAGE] 
Figure 1. Adapted from Poulton, 1968.  
 
Since participants’ pre-conceptions of what the range of stimuli is will affect their 
responses, the “external validity” of the stimuli (in this context how well the range it 
introduces, or the range the experimenter assumes, matches participants’ pre-conceived 
range of stimuli) determines whether the results obtained in the laboratory correctly 
capture the features of the mechanism operating there. Hence, in cases like these, external 
validity is a requirement for internal validity. Note that this potentially false estimate of the 
function has prefect internal validity. Given the range, the stimuli really do cause the 
response, and we have a fair grasp of what the mechanisms are.  
Poulton himself, however, treats the results differently than we do: “All experimental data 
are not equally valuable. A theoretical model is unlikely to be better than the data which 
has shaped it. If data are of restricted validity as a result of unrepresentative sampling or 
the independent variables or of uncontrolled transfer effects, a model based upon the data 
is not likely to have great generality. This is the case however much data the model can fit, 
provided all the data has been generated using the same inadequate techniques of sampling 
or experimentation” (Poulton 1968, 1). We do not disagree with Poulton, but in contrast to 
him we emphasize that the core issue here is how internal validity is to be guaranteed 
unless range effects are properly understood. And this will happen only when extra-
experimental factors (such as participants’ pre conception of the range that is to be 
introduced) are properly understood. Thus we would like to maintain that the case of the 
perceptual mechanisms at the mercy of range effects internal and external validity cannot 
be treated as separate entities.  
 
6. The difficulty of adapting systems 
A straightforward extension of the above observations about the co-dependence of external 
and internal validity is to be found in Egon Brunswik’s work on representativeness. What 
he adds to the discussion is a focus on the difficulties in observing an organism that adapts 
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to the circumstances in which it exists: “The concept inherent in functionalism that 
psychology is the science dealing with the adjustment of organisms to the environment in 
which they actually live suggest the need of testing any obtained stimulus-response 
relationship in such a way that the habitat of the individual, group, or species is represented 
with all of its variables, and that the specific values of these variables are kept in 
accordance with the frequencies in which they actually happen to be distributed.” 
(Brunswik, 1944, 69).   
Note, however, that here the focus is exclusively on the adaptive character of human 
cognition (in Brunswik’s case the perceptual system). If the aim of an experiment in 
psychology is to understand the functioning of different psychological mechanisms (in the 
form of stimulus-response relations), then the quality of this finding is just as dependent on 
whether the psychological mechanism has been properly activated as it is on whether the 
results can be replicated. This is not only a question about how the result will generalize to 
other settings (external validity) – it is a question about whether a proper result has at all 
been generated (internal validity). Thus, for psychological mechanisms that can be 
assumed to have an adaptive character, external validity (or certain aspects of it) appears to 
be prior to internal validity: It is more important that an experiment measures what it aims 
to measure than that the result internally valid.  
 
6a Is the study object human cognition or the environment? 
Egon Brunswik is one of the psychologists that have most clearly advanced the idea that 
external validity has to be taken into account if we are to understand the human mind at all. 
In his own words:  “psychology has forgotten that it is a science of organism-environment 
relationships, and has become a science of the organism” (Brunswik, 1957, 6). His remedy 
to this difficulty was the notion of representative design (Brunswik, 1955), and, in 
particular, his use of representative sampling while studying perceptual constants 
(Brunswik 1944). 
In his 1944 study, Brunswik wanted to understand whether the retinal size of an object 
could be used to predict its actual size. In order to establish the relationship between retinal 
size and object size, participants were followed for several weeks and stopped at random 
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intervals. For whatever object they were looking at, at that point, retinal size, object size, 
and distance were measured. Since the objects taken into account were the objects actually 
attended to by participants in their daily environments, Brunswik could estimate the real-
life predictive power of retinal size for object size. His conclusion was that the retinal size 
had some predictive power regardless of the distance to the object.  
Note that Brunswik’s method as described here is only a method for understanding the 
environment. In order to explain how participants judge the size of objects, it has to be 
combined with a demonstration that retinal size is used to predict object size. However, the 
controlled experiment that can be used to test this hypothesis will not help us understand 
how predictive retinal size is of object size. This requires a method such as Brunswik’s. 
Note also that the method of representative sampling is only possible in so far as the 
researcher already has a clear understanding of the cognitive process under investigation. 
Unless we have some idea of which aspects of the environment are accessed by the 
cognitive mechanism, methodological shortcuts such as representative sampling are not 
possible. Simply stated, we have to know what to measure in order to measure it, also 
when the measurement is done through random sampling. Campbell, of course, notes this 
problematic issue in the context of random sampling of participants (note the difference in 
emphasis). He points out that: “… the validity of generalizations to other persons, settings, 
and future (or past) times would be a function of the validity of the theory involved, plus 
the accuracy of the theory-relevant knowledge of the persons, settings, and future periods 
to which one wanted to generalize […]. This perspective has already moved us far from 
the widespread concept that one can solve generalizability problems by representative 
sampling from a universe specified in advance” (Campbell 1986, 71).  
Also other methodologically inclined psychologists have reflected upon the co dependency 
of the environment and the agent. Often this is conceptualized as the difficulty of 
understanding whether what is being observed is a feature of the participant’s internal 
processing or a feature of the task environment. Thus Ward Edwards (1971) observes that:  
“My own guess is that most successful models now available [in psychology] are 
successful exactly because of their success in describing tasks, not people …modelling 
tasks is different from modelling people, [we need] to hunt for tools for modelling tasks, 
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and to provide linkages between models of tasks and models of people”. And this difficulty 
has it roots in precisely the difficulty of making controlled experiments that observe 
features of a cognitive system designed for adapting to the circumstances. Or in 
Campbell’s own words: “Both criteria [external and internal validity] are obviously 
important although it turns out that they are to some extent incompatible, in that the 
controls required for internal validity often tend to jeopardize representativeness” 
(Campbell 1957, 297).  
 
7) Cronbach’s challenge 
Let us now set the objections against the possibility of internally valid inferences aside. Let 
us grant that the problems of randomization, measurement and causation can be dissolved 
by appropriate adaptive measures. Even so the question whether internal validity should be 
given priority remains: 
“I consider it pointless to speak of causes when all that can be validly meant by reference 
to a cause in a particular instance is that, on one trial of a partially specified manipulation t 
under conditions A, B, and C, along with other conditions not named, phenomenon P was 
observed. To introduce the word cause seems pointless. Campbell’s writings make internal 
validity a property of trivial, past-tense, and local statements.” (Cronbach 1982, 137) 
Cronbach’s point translates nicely to what we have argued here. To the extent that there is 
a variety of causation that can be fully examined in such a way that it underwrites a 
positive causal inference—for instance, by a randomized controlled trial—then that variety 
of causation is not very scientifically valuable. What should we do with these past tense, 
local statements concerning highly artificial experimental contexts? They seem trivial as 
scientific results. The only way this kind of trivial causal statements could prove useful is 
if they connect with more substantial ones. In other words, internal validity of this kind 
could have a value in relation to external validity as providing one of the instances 
externally valid claims have to be true about. Now, internal validity is not prior to external 
validity in any interesting sense. If anything, it seems secondary. It should be noted that 
Campbell (1986, 70) acknowledges this: “The theories and hunches used by those who put 
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the therapeutic package together must, of course, be regarded as corroborated, however 
tentatively, if there is an effect of local, molar validity in the expected direction”. 
However, this relationship between internal and external validity is important. Cronbach’s 
challenge might be reconstructed as a counter argument to our claim that internal and 
external validity are intertwined. It might be constructed as the view that internal validity is 
redundant. As we have seen our response is: 1) to the extent that the causation internal 
validity concerns is substantial, external validity is needed as part of the evidence; 2) to the 
extent that the causation is of a trivial form, this kind of causation might still be important 
as one of the instances that is needed to prove external validity. (There is, of course, a third 
possibility as well, that all genuine causation is local.) 
 
8) Priorities reconsidered 
However critical we have been of attempts to prioritize internal validity, there is a last 
argument that can be made in its favour, and it is elegantly (and fittingly) made by 
Campbell in the following passage: “If one is in a situation where either internal validity or 
representativeness must be sacrificed, which should it be? The answer is clear. Internal 
validity is the prior and indispensable consideration. The optimal design is, of course, one 
having both internal and external validity. Insofar as such settings are available, they 
should be exploited, without embarrassment from the apparent opportunistic warping of 
the content of studies by the availability of laboratory techniques. In this sense, a science is 
as opportunistic as a bacteria culture and grows only where growth is possible. One basic 
necessity for such growth is the machinery for selecting among alternative hypotheses, no 
matter how limited those hypotheses may have to be.” (Campbell 1957, 310). Although we 
do not believe that internal and external validity can be treated separately – or even chosen 
between in the way suggested by Campbell – we fully agree that scientific research will 
have to take whatever routes are available.  
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Defusing Ideological Defenses in Biology
Angela Potochnik
Abstract
Ideological language is widespread in biology. Game theory has been defended
as a worldview; sexual selection theory has been criticized for what it posits as
basic to biological nature; and evolutionary developmental biology is advocated
as an alternative, not addition, to traditional evolutionary biology. Views like
these encourage the impression of ideological rift in the field. I advocate an
alternative interpretation, whereby many disagreements between camps of biologists
reflect unproblematic methodological differences. This interpretation provides a more
accurate and more optimistic account of the state of play in the field of biology. It also
helps account for the tendency to embrace ideological positions.
1 Ideology and Dissension in Theoretical Biology
Defenders and critics of one or another approach in theoretical biology sometimes employ
sweeping, ideologically loaded claims in support of their positions. By this I mean that
differences in viewpoint or methodology are construed as resulting from incompatible research
programs, each committed to a different view of biological reality. I witnessed one possible
result of such a construal a few years ago, when two biologists with different research
programs, addressing different types of phenomena, each volunteered an opinion of the other’s
work. In the view of Biologist A, Biologist B was “no longer doing biology.” Biologist
1
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B independently offered the opinion that Biologist A was “not a colleague” of his/hers.
Though this was an extreme version of divisiveness, I have witnessed similar exchanges
play out in other groups of biologists, both in print and over dinner.1 Yet these same
biologists collaborate in a variety of ways. For instance, Biologists A and B have coauthored
publications and shared students. To my mind, this suggests that the presentation of such
differences as commitments to fundamentally opposed views of biological reality is ripe for
reconsideration. Let us begin by considering three examples of disagreements that have been
construed as ideological.
The Optimization Research Program Gould and Lewontin (1979) ushered in an era
of polarization in evolutionary biology between “adaptationists” and their critics. In their
highly influential paper, Gould and Lewontin explicitly cast as ideology the approach of
proposing an adaptive explanation for traits considered individually. They coined an “-
ism” for this approach, and they employed religious metaphors to characterize the view.
Thus adaptationism “is based on faith in the power of natural selection” and employs the
“catechism” that genetic drift is only important in unusual, unimportant circumstances.
The adaptationist refuses to credit other causes like drift with any real influence while
“[congratulating her/himself] for being such an undogmatic and ecumenical chap.” This
construal saddles a type of methodology in evolutionary biology with ideological baggage
and then criticizes it as false dogma.
Optimization models utilize the procedure that Gould and Lewontin draw into question
and are thus one of the primary targets of their criticisms. Many biologists do not
accept Gould and Lewontin’s ideological gloss of optimization modeling, instead subscribing
to Maynard Smith’s (1982) interpretation of their point as simply the methodological
corrective that optimization models should reflect constraints arising from evolutionary
1I do not suggest that such scenarios are more common in biology than other disciplines; the situation in
theoretical biology is simply my focus in this paper.
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influences besides natural selection. However, a number of defenses of the optimization
approach, and evolutionary game theory in particular, have embraced the construal of their
position as ideological. Grafen (1984) coined the term “phenotypic gambit” to describe
commitment to the optimization approach, which he acknowledges is a “leap of faith.”
Mitchell and Valone (1990) endorse what they call the “Optimization Research Program,”
citing Lakatos’s view of research programs, the core hypotheses of which adherents should
protect from disconfirmation at all costs. Brown (2001) accepts this construal and defends
the Optimization Research Program as his “worldview”, with game theory at its center. A
prominent style of defending optimization modeling thus qualifies as ideological in the sense
identified above.
Criticisms of Sexual Selection Theory Sexual selection theory is a well-developed set
of hypotheses for the role of selection in the evolution of a variety of sexual and reproductive
traits. Different versions of the theory vary in important regards, but I will attempt to give
a basic summary that applies to most versions. In many animal species, males (and perhaps
sometimes females) are expected to differ in their mating success, which creates selection
pressure for traits desirable to members of the opposite sex and/or traits useful in competing
with others of the same sex. Thus the peacock’s long, colorful train is explained as the result
of peahens preferentially mating with comely trained peacocks, not any survival advantage
conferred by the trains. Similarly, the evolution of combat among male bighorn sheep is
explained as the result of ewes preferentially mating with the victors. Traits classically
explained as the result of sexual selection range from physical traits, such as ornamentation,
to behavioral traits like combat displays or parental care. The basic tenets of sexual selection
theory are widely accepted in biology, though as I mentioned there are disagreements about
some features, and the hypotheses have been updated and fine-tuned to accommodate ever-
expanding information about animals’ bodies and behavior (e.g., Clutton-Brock, 2009).
3
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Yet past decades have also seen a number of criticisms of sexual selection theory. Here I
will focus on recent criticisms put forth by Roughgarden (2009); see also (Roughgarden, 2004)
and (Roughgarden et al., 2006). Roughgarden analyzes and thoroughly rebuts a wide range of
hypotheses about the evolution of sex, gender, and reproductive behavior that she attributes
to sexual selection theory. Toward the end of the book, Roughgarden argues that she has
shown that all those hypotheses are false, that there is no reason to amend the hypotheses,
but that sexual selection theory is “a philosophy of biological nature” (p. 246) with an
“incorrect foundation.” In Roughgarden’s view, the hypotheses all “derive from a common
view of natural behavior predicated on selfishness, deception, and genetic weeding” (p. 247).
Roughgarden suggest that, instead, kindness and cooperation are “basic to biological nature”
(p. 1). She thus proposes an alternative “social selection theory,” based on the contrary
assumptions of “teamwork, honesty, and genetic equality” (p. 247). Roughgarden, then,
construes her disagreement with sexual selection theorists as fundamental and expansive,
based on beliefs about what is biologically basic. She represents the options as complete
commitment to or else complete rejection of all the hypotheses she identifies with sexual
selection theory.
Evolutionary Developmental Biology Evolutionary developmental biology, frequently
referred to as “evo-devo,” is the subfield of biology devoted to studying the evolution of
developmental processes. Advocates of evo-devo do not view it simply as an extension of
evolutionary biology, but as a needed corrective or even replacement. Mu¨ller (2007) contrasts
evo-devo with the reigning Modern Synthesis, a synthesis of a number of subfields of biology
in the early twentieth century, made possible by the development of population genetics as
a way to reconcile discrete Mendelian genetics and gradual evolution by natural selection.
According to Mu¨ller,
Whereas in the Modern Synthesis framework the burden of explanation rests on
4
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the action of selection, with genetic variation representing the necessary boundary
condition, the evo-devo framework assigns much of the explanatory weight to
the generative properties of development, with natural selection providing the
boundary condition. When natural selection is a general boundary condition, the
specificity of the phenotypic outcome is determined by development. Thus, evo-
devo. . . posits that the causal basis for phenotypic form resides not in population
dynamics or, for that matter, in molecular evolution, but instead in the inherent
properties of evolving developmental systems (p. 947).
This construes evo-devo not as a supplement to other approaches to evolutionary biology, but
as a replacement. The “explanatory weight” goes to development instead of natural selection,
for the causal basis for phenotypic form is evolving developmental systems, not population
dynamics. Carroll et al. (2004) similarly claim that “regulatory evolution is the creative
force underlying morphological diversity across the evolutionary spectrum” (p. 213, emphasis
added). According to Callebaut et al. (2007), evo-devo takes epigenetic considerations as
“primordial for the organismic perspective” (p. 41) and thus as providing a “truer picture
of life on this earth” (p. 62). As in the two previous examples, advocates of evo-devo
present their approach as a view about what is fundamental—in this case, to the evolution
of morphology—and the view is a total commitment, in the sense of positing developmental
processes as the sole causal basis and hence the explanation of these phenomena, to the
exclusion of selection.
In each of these debates, the options are presented as sweeping commitments to bipolar
positions. Either you subscribe to the Optimization Research Program as your worldview,
or you reject it. Either you jettison all of sexual selection theory, or else you commit
to the sexual selectionist view of the basics of biological nature. Either you endorse the
evolution of developmental systems as the sole causal basis of the evolution of form, or
5
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you unquestioningly uphold the tradition of the Modern Synthesis. These positions are
presented as ideological in the sense of involving adherence to a systematic set of ideas, a
comprehensive way of looking at things. The set of ideas in question is viewed as fundamental
to the domain under investigation, and adherence to one side or the other is taken to be a
total commitment. This ideological tenor thus suggests that there is a rift in theory, that
there is dispute regarding the basic understanding of these types of phenomena. Here I
develop an alternative interpretation, according to which these disagreements and ones like
them are more fruitfully seen as rooted in methodological, not ideological, differences (§2).
This methodological interpretation provides a more accurate account of how the field of
biology functions and a more optimistic take on the state of play in the field. It also suggests
a rationale for why some theoretical biologists embrace polarized, ideological positions (§3).
Before proceeding, a couple of clarifications are in order. First, by claiming that these
positions are presented as ideological, I do not mean to suggest that they are necessarily
influenced by broader social ideology. Other research demonstrates that this frequently is
the case; Richardson (1984), for instance, develops this point for two of my examples here—
game theory and sexual selection theory. Yet the focus of this paper is not the influence of
broader social values on theoretical biology, but the construal of debates as ideological in the
sense identified above. Second, though I will argue that many debates in biology presented
as ideological are more fruitfully understood as methodological debates, this may not hold
true for all such debates. Certainly there is room for disagreements in theoretical biology
that really do involve commitments to fundamentally opposed positions. One goal of the
present analysis is thus to provide resources for distinguishing methodological differences
from truly opposed “worldviews.”
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2 Distinguishing Idealizations from Ideology
There is room for an alternative interpretation of debates in theoretical biology like those
surveyed above, despite their ideological tenor. The starting point is philosophical treatments
of the role of modeling in science. The scientific practices that have been termed “model-
based science” account for the persistence of multiple modeling approaches (e.g. Levins, 1966;
Godfrey-Smith, 2006; Weisberg, 2006). On this view, idealized models represent targeted
features of a system at the expense of misrepresenting other features. Different modeling
approaches thus can seem to be incompatible, for they employ different parameters and
opposed assumptions, when instead the exact opposite is true. The limitations of idealized
models make the use of multiple approaches essential. Taking to heart the idea that models
provide a limited representation of only targeted features of a phenomenon makes clear that
no single modeling approach offers an exhaustive, fully accurate account of any phenomenon.
This view of model-based science enables an interpretation of seemingly ideological
debates in biology as instead methodological at root. Despite the rhetoric sometimes
employed, the question to ask about apparently competing modeling approaches is often
not which grounds a more successful worldview, but which method better serves one’s
present research aims. Several aspects of this shift are important. On the methodological
interpretation, proposed modeling approaches should be evaluated not according to universal
ontological considerations—what the world is posited to be like overall—but considerations
of method, especially representational capacity. The evaluation is thus not an absolute
judgment, but is contingent on the aims of representation for the research program at hand.
This means that different methods may very well be called for in different circumstances,
and so a variety of approaches may be warranted. The key features of this interpretation
of a debate are thus (1) the resolution depends on evaluation of methodology; (2) choice of
approach is contingent on research aims; and (3) multiple approaches can coexist without
7
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ideological differences methodological differences
basis of evaluation what the world is like method, representational aims
scope of position complete “worldview” contingent on research program
commitment to approach absolute; either/or multiple approaches can coexist
Table 1: The distinguishing features of ideological and methodological disagreements
difficulty.
These distinguishing characteristics of ideological and methodological disagreements are
represented in Table 1. Some disagreements in biology are patently methodological, but
many disagreements admit of both construals, including ones traditionally interpreted as
ideological. This is so for the three debates I considered above, as I will demonstrate below.
There are also some debates for which an ideological construal will remain appropriate. To
take an extreme example, embracing basic evolutionary theory commits one to a systematic
set of ideas about a type of process and the results it can have. This set of ideas is
fundamentally opposed to intelligent design.2 There is not room for both, for arguments
for intelligent design presume the impossibility of evolution. Intelligent design thus cannot
be defended on the basis of representational aims.
Let us reexamine the three debates from above, to the end of showing that in each
case a methodological interpretation is not only possible but preferable. Although several
defenses of the optimization approach have construed the approach as a commitment to a
worldview, or a matter of faith, another construal is available. Maynard Smith (1982), for
one, attempts to refocus the debate on methodology. This is as strong of a defense as is
needed to justify the modeling approaches of optimization and evolutionary game theory,
and it is a more defensible position than an ideological defense. Biologists know too much
2This example was suggested by a referee for this journal.
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about nonselective influences on evolution to subscribe to the notion that selection is the
only evolutionary influence. To say that selection is often the only important influence, as
some have done, is just to declare a preference for tracking that causal process over others.
It is more straightforward and more promising to instead defend optimization as simply one
modeling approach among many in biology, each with a specific representational focus and
delimited range of application.
Mitchell and Valone (1990) represent the debate over the use of game theory as a
choice between embracing either the assumptions of evolutionary game theory or those of
quantitative genetics, but this is wrong. Certain assumptions of each of these modeling
approaches are undeniably idealized, and there are just as obvious limitations to each
approach’s range of applicability to evolutionary phenomena (Potochnik, 2010). These
considerations indicate that game theory and quantitative genetics are each motivated by
specific, and limited, representational goals. Each facilitates the faithful representation
of some features of some types of evolutionary scenarios. It follows that neither set of
assumptions is sufficient for all projects in population biology, which is why both approaches
persist. The methodological defense thus better accounts for game theory’s role in population
biology than does the ideological defense.
The ideological tenor of Roughgarden’s (2009) criticisms of sexual selection theory plays
an important role for her argument. Advocating the rejection of sexual selection theory in its
entirety draws attention to assumptions shared by many of the theory’s specific hypotheses,
such as competition for mating opportunities and the default traits of each sex, and the
regards in which those assumptions may be problematic. Yet a methodological version
of Roughgarden’s criticisms could still accomplish this. This alternative, methodological
approach would be to point out the range of phenomena treated by sexual selection models
and assumptions/idealizations the models share. This would set up the desired contrast
with Roughgarden’s social selection theory, which groups a different range of phenomena
9
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and employs different assumptions. For instance, whereas sexual selection theory addresses
scenarios where same-sex animals compete for mating opportunities, social selection theory
addresses scenarios where outcomes/selection effects are mediated by social interactions.
These groupings of evolutionary phenomena overlap partially, but not entirely. Further,
whereas sexual selection theory assumes that direct competition is the norm, social selection
theory assumes that a mutually beneficial outcome is within evolutionary reach. It is
possible—even likely—that each assumption is right some of the time.
An advantage of this methodological version of Roughgarden’s criticisms is that it would
provide a less polarizing introduction to the many distinct positive views she advocates,
including the alternative modeling techniques she suggests (Potochnik, 2012). Roughgarden
lumps her suggestions for modeling approaches together with her complete rejection of sexual
selection theory and controversial alternative hypotheses. Faced only with the choice of
wholesale rejection or acceptance of those views, many reject them (e.g. Kavenagh, 2006).
Yet this need not be so. Roughgarden’s suggestions for modeling behavioral evolution, which
emphasize malleable selection effects due to influences like negotiation and punishment, are
distinct from her specific hypotheses for the evolution of traits related to sex, gender, and
reproduction. A methodological approach at once facilitates Roughgarden’s criticisms of
background assumptions shared by many sexual selection hypotheses and also renders her
various ideas separable, and thus potentially palatable to a broader group of biologists.
Evolutionary developmental biology is a valuable field of research, shedding light on an
important type of evolution previously neglected by mainstream evolutionary biology. Its
focus is how systems of development have evolved, sometimes giving rise to novel features
of organisms. To neglect the influence of development on evolved traits and how processes
of development have themselves evolved is to ignore an essential element of evolution. This
methodological point is sound, and worthy of attention from biologists outside of evo-devo.
Yet the idea voiced by advocates of evo-devo that developmental systems are the sole causal
10
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basis for phenotypic form, and that natural selection is merely a “boundary condition”
(Mu¨ller, 2007), is going too far in the opposite direction. Evolution is an incredibly complex,
prolonged process, with a variety of important causal influences that combine and interact in
myriad ways. Different modeling approaches will capture different elements of that process
and employ simplifying assumptions and idealizations to exclude other elements. They
will also apply more aptly to different ranges of evolutionary phenomena. Evo-devo draws
attention to one set of causal influences, viz., developmental processes, that are especially
important for certain types of evolution, viz., morphological evolution. This provides an
important part of the evolutionary story, but it does not replace the stories that instead
feature natural selection (or drift, etc.) Shifting from an ideological to a methodological
defense thus would be a valuable change for advocates of an evo-devo approach as well. As
with the earlier two examples, evo-devo can be motivated more effectively when practitioners
of other methods are not asked to declare a new worldview.
These examples of disagreements about biology thus can be profitably interpreted as
rooted in methodological differences, despite the tendency of many biologists to construe
the differences as ideological in nature. The same is true for other debates in biology
that are similarly structured, such as the longstanding disagreements surrounding group
selection. Recall that I do not expect all apparently ideological debates to be resolved on
methodological grounds. Instead, each debate must be examined to see whether it can be
construed to possess the features of a methodological disagreement, as summarized in Table
1. On the methodological interpretation, competing approaches should not be evaluated
according to which is true, or the basis of a successful worldview, and a complete commitment
to an approach is unwarranted. The evaluation is instead based on which types of systems
and which features of those systems are central to one’s present research program, and which
approach best meets those representational aims.
It is important to note that, even when a methodological interpretation is appropriate,
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there still may be disagreements about matters of fact. For instance, two biologists may
well disagree on whether natural selection is a significant causal factor in the evolution of a
particular trait. But such disagreements need not amount to universal commitments, and
they are not the only reason for variation among biologists’ methods. The methodological
interpretation of disagreements in theoretical biology keeps models’ aims and limitations
at center stage, which results in the evaluation of an approach contingent on the aims of
research and the likelihood of the coexistence of multiple approaches in a stable area of
research.
3 Normal Science with a Twist
Features of this methodological interpretation of debates can actually help account for why
some biologists on each side of these issues embrace polarized, ideological positions. In
the section above, I suggested that research programs within biology differ in ways that
warrant employing certain modeling approaches to the exclusion of others. For central as
well as accidental reasons, participants in different research programs focus on different
phenomena; are acquainted with different bodies of past research; and even may have
familiarity with different varieties of organisms. This means that advocates and critics
of a modeling approach address that approach from different locations, for they often differ
in both interests and expertise. Such differences can easily lead to disagreements about the
commonness of types of phenomena and the significance of causal patterns. Those engaged
in optimization research are well familiar with the successes of optimal foraging theory, and
they dismiss the overdominance of malaria-resistance as an uncommon if not unique genetic
situation. Roughgarden’s hypotheses lead her to focus on animal species with extensive social
interactions, such as shared care of young or collective hunting. And evo-devo theorists are
well familiar with the evolution of limbs.
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Another ingredient of ideological stances in theoretical biology is an implicit commitment
to the existence of simple causal processes with broad domains of application. A tacit belief
in such “magic bullet” causes enables differences in focus and expertise among researchers
to be interpreted as commitments to different types of causes. If it is agreed that most
phenomena are influenced by a vast array of causal factors, then researchers’ differences are
naturally understood to arise from a difference in focus, not a difference in worldview. In
this case, the claim that certain features of the evolutionary process are more important is
reduced to the claim that some are worthier of investigation than others. Put this way, it
is not an empirical claim, but merely a statement of research interests (see Godfrey-Smith
(2001) on this point regarding adaptationism in particular).
This account of how ideological positions in theoretical biology arise in a sense explains
away such ideological tendencies. Yet I should emphasize that the posited account attributes
more significance to ideological positions than, say, the idea that these stances are simply
adopted as a way to increase recognition or funding. In my view, standoffs between opposed
ideological positions indicate something important about the field of biology. That there are
such entrenched proponents and opponents of different methods indicates that a variety of
modeling approaches have some purchase on the evolutionary process and other biological
phenomena. In my view, this reflects the complex causal processes at work in biology, and
the endless variety in how causal factors combine and interact. There are evolved traits like
foraging behavior that optimization analysis readily predicts; those like sickled red blood
cells with which it can get nowhere; and a whole range of intermediate traits for which it is
partially successful insofar as it represents the causal contribution of natural selection, which
may be just one causal influence among many. The causal influences on social behavior in
animals are likely as diverse as the behaviors themselves, so there is room for sexual selection
theory’s success with some behaviors and failure with others. Development and evolution are
both without question causal influences on organisms’ traits; how these influences interact
13
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is just as certain to be highly variable.
Recasting ideological differences as methodological differences also grounds a more
optimistic interpretation of the current state of play in theoretical biology. The diversity
of approaches does not stem from a clash of worldviews, and so biology is not in a state of
crisis from which one research program will emerge triumphant. Instead, strong ideological
differences persist within a functional field of research. This will continue to be the case so
long as different methodologies are useful in different research programs.
So, then, why does the main point of this paper matter? If ideological differences
are consistent with a fully functional field of science, why concern oneself with the
reinterpretation I suggest? In my view, were more biologists and philosophers of biology
to embrace this interpretation of commitment to favored modeling approaches, real,
advantageous consequences would result. Most basically, less attention would be devoted to
unnecessary arguments that are, as it turns out, about preferred phenomena and modeling
approaches of choice. A prime example is the decades of continuing debate in philosophy
of biology over adaptationism, when optimization approaches can instead be motivated on
much more modest grounds (Potochnik, 2009).
Adopting the methodological interpretation would also promote cooperation among those
who continue to have substantive disagreements about biology. Instead of becoming mired
in ideological impasse, focusing on modeling approaches allows communication and progress
in spite of different views about how the models apply to the real world. Godfrey-Smith
claims that,
When much day-to-day discussion is about model systems, disagreement about
the nature of a target system is less able to impede communication. The model
acts as a buffer, enabling communication and cooperative work across scientists
who have different commitments about the target system (2006, p. 739).
On this view, even continuing disagreements about evolutionary phenomena need not hinder
14
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -288-
cooperative work on features of models. If all parties can, at least temporarily, set aside
differences in commitment to broad claims of causal importance, they can further joint
understanding of models’ inner workings and conditions of their application. Indeed, I have
observed this first-hand at meetings of a working group on evolutionary game theory (at the
National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis).
Finally, the refocus facilitated by a shift to the methodological interpretation of disputes
in biology creates more room for activities of significance for theoretical biology and the
philosophical analysis of biology. Recognition of the viability of a range of modeling
approaches and the related idea of complex and variable causal processes should lead to
a diminished focus on isolated, illustrative applications of a type of model. This should be
replaced by an increased focus on determining the range of and conditions for a modeling
approach’s applicability and the limitations of its assumptions, as well as increased attention
to the interplay among multiple causal influences. For philosophers of biology, the lesson is to
expect a continual plurality of methods in biology—methods that can appear contradictory—
and to take with a grain of salt any claim that one or another approach is the key to
understanding biology.
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Was Leibniz the First Spacetime Structuralist?
Abstract
I argue that the standard interpretation of Leibniz as a relationist about space is mistaken, and 
defend a reading according to which his correspondence with Samuel Clarke actually 
suggests that Leibniz holds a view closely resembling modern spacetime structuralism. I 
distinguish my proposal from Belot's recent reading of Leibniz as a modal relationist, arguing 
for the superiority of my reading based on the Clarke correspondence and on Leibniz's 
conception of God's relation to the created world. I note a tension between my proposal and 
Leibniz's ontology, and suggest that a solution is forthcoming and worth pursuing. 
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1. Introduction.  The canonical reading of Leibniz's view of space and time holds that he 
was a thoroughgoing relationist: roughly, he believed that there is nothing to space over and 
above the various relations of coexistence between bodies, and he believed that there is 
nothing to time over and above the relations of succession between events. This reading dates 
back to Russell and is perhaps recapitulated most fully in Earman's World Enough and 
Spacetime (1989); recently, Gordon Belot has suggested a more nuanced variant of it. 
Importantly, the received view relies very heavily on a correspondence between Leibniz and 
Samuel Clarke, in which Leibniz seems to argue transparently and at great length for the 
relationist conception of space that has long been attributed to him. I believe that this reading 
reveals a misunderstanding of what Leibniz says about space in the Correspondence. My 
goal in this paper, accordingly, will be to reconstruct in a somewhat schematic way what 
Leibniz's remarks therein actually tell us about his theory of space. 
In a nutshell, I believe that his actual view looks suspiciously like a modern view 
known as spacetime structuralism, and my investigation will revolve around the claim that a 
plausible reconstruction of his view of space indicates that he was, for all intents and 
purposes, a proto- spacetime structuralist. In other words, Leibniz held a view of space very 
similar to that held by the modern spacetime structuralist, though he formulated it in different 
terms and based it upon his own particular metaphysics. I will proceed in the following 
manner, then: I'll first situate the canonical reading of Leibniz in light of a quick 
reconstruction of the main tenets of Newtonian substantivalism. Next, I'll introduce and 
explain spacetime structuralism, providing background for my discussion of Leibniz's views. 
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After this, I'll launch the promised investigation of Leibniz's view of space as he presents it 
against Clarke. In the course of the investigation, I'll distinguish my reading of Leibniz from 
Belot's and motivate a rejection of Belot's reading in favor of mine. At the very least, I hope 
to show how the machinery of spacetime structuralism enhances our understanding of 
Leibniz's view. But what I really want to establish is that Leibniz was, in a sense, the first 
spacetime structuralist: the lineage of this hotly debated view goes back much further than 
one would have thought. 
2. Newtonian Substantivalism and Spacetime Structuralism.  Let's now examine 
Newton's view of space. In the first Scholium of the Principia, Newton provides perhaps his 
most concise statement of what has come to be known as “substantivalism”, saying that 
“absolute space, of its own nature and without reference to anything external, always remains 
homogeneous and immovable”, and that “place is that part of space that a body occupies” 
(2004, 64-65). Space, in other words, exists over and above bodies; it's a preexisting 
“container” that would still be there even if there were no bodies. It is, in Earman's words, “a 
substratum of points underlying physical events” (1989, 10). Space and its parts “maintain 
their own identities independently of physical bodies”, to quote a recent paper by John 
Roberts (2003, 555). The essence of the Newtonian view is that the parts of space – i.e. 
points – possess intrinsic identity. Now, the standard reading of Leibniz on space commits 
him to the outright denial of Newton's claim: space does not exist prior to, or over and above, 
physical bodies in any sense; the parts of space not only lack intrinsic identity but aren't even 
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properly thought of as locations within a substantival container. This is the essence of what 
has come to be known as “relationism”. Earman puts the claim this way: “spatiotemporal 
relations among bodies... are direct; that is, they are not parasitic on relations among a 
substratum of space points that underlie bodies” (1989, 12). On the standard reading, 
Leibniz's positive claim about space emerges from the negative claim in that space is simply 
the order of bodies, and nothing more, and would not exist without bodies.
Now, as I've said, I'm proposing that Leibniz's actual conception of space becomes 
clear when viewed through the lens of spacetime structuralism, and that there's a good deal of 
evidence that he was actually a proto- spacetime structuralist himself. As background for this 
interpretation, we need to recall the views of the spacetime structuralist. Broadly speaking, 
spacetime structuralism is an instance of a more general view in the philosophy of science 
called ontic structural realism, which is roughly the idea that, in Esfeld's and Lam's words, 
“there are objects, but instead of being characterized by intrinsic properties, all there is to 
[them] are the relations in which they stand” (2008, 31). The view amounts to the claim that 
the relational complexes described by fundamental physics fully individuate the relata that 
they contain; these relata include things like electrons and spacetime points. Wuthrich 
summarizes the view (without advocating it) in a recent paper: “The objects... do not have 
any intrinsic properties but only relational ones. So what is really there... is a network of 
relations among objects that do not possess any intrinsic properties but are purely defined by 
their 'place' in [a relational structure]” (2009, 1042). One can also distinguish, as Wuthrich 
does, two broad variants of the view: one according to which objects and relations are 
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ontologically on a par with each other, and another according to which what's fundamentally 
real is just the set of relations, and objects are only thought of as somehow emerging from 
those relations. This distinction will become important in my discussion of Leibniz's view.
 The spacetime structuralist applies some version of ontic structural realism to the case 
of general relativity. The individuals in the domain of general relativity – the individuals 
participating in the theory's relational complexes – are the points of the spacetime manifold, 
which is the basic object on which fields are defined. For the spacetime structuralist, then, 
these points have no intrinsic properties or intrinsic identity, in accordance with ontic 
structural realism. Now, for the moderate spacetime structuralist, who adopts the view that 
neither objects nor relations are ontologically prior, there are fundamentally real spacetime 
points, but they are only individuated relationally, by the metric field and other key structural 
features of general relativity. In short, “there undoubtedly are space-time points that fulfill 
the function of objects[,] [b]ut instead of these objects having intrinsic properties, all there is 
to them is the relations in which they stand” (Esfeld and Lam 2008, 34). For a more radical 
structuralist, who applies the “relations only” version of ontic structural realism to the case of 
general relativity, there won't be anything like fundamentally real spacetime points; 
spacetime points will be purely emergent features of GR's relational complexes, which carry 
all the fundamental reality we can ascribe to the spacetime manifold. Crucially, both kinds of 
spacetime structuralist will emphatically deny that spacetime is purely relational, lacking 
anything over and above or prior to the relations between bodies. The nature of space lies 
between the substantival and relational extremes: it's structural, in the sense either that points 
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are real, existent individuals lacking identity independently of the relational complexes into 
which they enter, or the sense that points are not fundamentally real but emerge from 
something else that is, namely the relational complexes described by general relativity. 
3. Leibniz's Anticipation of Spacetime Structuralism. With the structuralist view on the 
table, I can now launch my investigation of Leibniz, with two initial points of caution: first, 
showing that Leibniz was the progenitor of spacetime structuralism will necessarily involve a 
fair bit of interpretation and extrapolation, due to the obvious chasm between the physics of 
his day and the modern understanding of space and time as a unified whole described by 
general relativity. What I'm trying to show is that Leibniz holds a view that in the vocabulary 
of his day looks very similar to what today's spacetime structuralists say in their vocabulary. 
Second, the question of the relationship between Leibniz's ontology and his theory of 
phenomenal space is one of the most vexed in all of Leibniz scholarship. For the purposes of 
this paper, I will bracket this issue, though I think its resolution is ultimately relevant to the 
accuracy of the reading I advocate here. The goal of this paper is to motivate a new reading 
of Leibniz's theory of space taken on its own terms; I think that a serious investigation of the 
Correspondence, with these caveats in mind, will strongly suggest that my reading is correct.
 Let's first look at a passage from Leibniz's third letter to Clarke, where he formulates 
perhaps his most famous definition of space:
As for my own opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space to be something 
purely relative... I hold it to be an order of coexistences... For space denotes, in 
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terms of possibility, an order of things that exist at the same time, considered as 
existing together, without entering into their particular manners of existing. And when 
many things are seen together, one consciously perceives this order of things among 
themselves. (2000, 14)
This passage is undoubtedly one of the sources of the canonical reading – Leibniz directly 
states that space is “purely relative”. We ought to construe this remark, though, in light of 
what he says next: space is an order of things that exist at the same time, an order that has 
nothing to do with the “particular manners of existing” of its constituents. This feature of the 
definition is crucial; it already indicates that Leibniz thinks there's more to space than 
“direct” relations between bodies. It indicates, in other words, that relations between bodies 
are not direct, and are parasitic on something more fundamental. So even in his supposedly 
canonically relationist definition of space, we see hints of a more complex view. I also want 
to draw attention to the modal language he uses here: the spatial order has something to do 
with possibility, though the connection is unclear. I will make it more explicit soon, as it's one 
point on which I read Leibniz differently from the way Belot does.
Leibniz's first definition looks extremely suggestive. And what it suggests, other 
passages in the correspondence clarify. In his fourth letter, in response to Clarke's pleas to 
refine his view of space, he elaborates the view in an almost explicitly structuralist manner. I 
reproduce the passage in full here:
The author contends that space does not depend on the situation of bodies. I answer: it 
is true, it does not depend on such or such a situation of bodies, but it is that order 
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which renders bodies capable of being situated, and by which they have a 
situation among themselves when they exist together, as time is that order with respect 
to their successive position. But if there were no creatures, space and time 
would be only in the ideas of God. (2000, 27, emphasis mine)
Earlier, Clarke had challenged the idea that space depends on the particular arrangement of 
bodies; here Leibniz restates his view in light of the challenge, revealing that space in fact 
does not depend on the arrangement of bodies. He almost explicitly says that there's an 
underlying order, and that this underlying order itself is space. Space is the order that 
“renders bodies capable of being situated”: Leibniz seems to think that there's some kind of 
ontologically prior relational complex, and that by virtue of taking certain places in this 
structure, bodies get their particular “situations”. At this point we should note that the English 
word “situation” is a literal rendering of the Latin word “situs”, and the concept of situs plays 
a crucial role in Leibniz's conception of space. In the Metaphysical Foundations of  
Mathematics, Leibniz defines situs as “mode of coexistence” and defines motion as “change 
of situs (1969, 667-668). Situs, in other words, is a relational property that bodies acquire by 
virtue of their particular place in the spatial order. Each body has a unique situs at any given 
time, given its place in the spatial order at that time; but the order that confers situs on bodies 
does not depend on the arrangement of bodies. Instead, the order underlies and makes 
possible the arrangement of bodies by specifying a unique but purely relational property at 
each place in the structure.  
But what are we to make of the remark that “if there were no creatures, space and 
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time would be only in the ideas of God?” One might take this remark to imply that space 
actually does depend on the arrangement of bodies after all, or that Leibniz is just being 
inconsistent. To see that neither is the case, first recall the modal language that Leibniz uses 
in his first definition of space. The modal element of Leibniz's view, to my mind, connects at 
a fundamental level with his conception of God. To motivate the connection, consider these 
remarks from the Monadology: 
Now, since there is an infinity of possible universes in God's ideas, and since only one 
of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God's choice, a reason which 
determines him toward one thing rather than another... And this is the cause of the 
existence of the best, which wisdom makes known to God, which his goodness 
makes him choose, and which his power makes him produce. (1989, 220)
On Leibniz's view of God, the latter conceives of all the possible universes and actualizes the 
best one. That the one he actualizes is the best one constitutes a “sufficient reason” for the 
choice to actualize it, in accordance with Leibniz's familiar dictum that there must be a 
sufficient reason for every event. With this view on the table, the remark about space in the 
mind of God makes much more sense, revealing a deep connection between space and God's 
creation of the world. It looks something like this: all of the possible universes exist in God's 
mind; the set of all possible universes includes the set of all possible spatial orders; when 
God actualizes the best possible universe, he also actualizes the best possible spatial order. 
Now, if there “were no creatures”, God wouldn't yet have actualized anything; Leibniz thinks 
the actual world is the best possible world, and the actual world includes various and sundry 
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creatures. So space, considered in an abstract sense, independently of the actual spatial order, 
is an infinite set of possible structures in the mind of God. 
Thus, one potentially confusing aspect of Leibniz's view turns out to be consistent 
with what I see as his proto-structuralism. It's not that if there were no creatures, there would 
be no space because space is nothing over and above relations between bodies; it's rather that 
if there were no creatures, there would be no world in the first place: by hypothesis, our 
world is the best possible world, and it certainly contains many creatures. And if there's no 
world, there's certainly no space. It seems, then, that we've cleared an important hurdle to 
reconstructing Leibniz's view in the way that I think it ought to be reconstructed. 
We encounter another potential obstacle in a passage from his fifth letter, a passage in 
which he seems to propound a view at odds with what we've seen so far. Here are the 
relevant remarks:
I do not say that space is an order or situation which makes things capable of being 
situated; that would be nonsense... I do not say, therefore, that space is an order or 
situation, but an order of situations, or (an order) according to which situations are 
disposed, and that abstract space is that order of situations when they are conceived as 
being possible. (2000, 61)
Leibniz here responds to Clarke's objection to the second definition of space, which I've just 
discussed at length. The first thing to notice is that Leibniz seems to deny directly the view of 
space advanced in that second definition, even seemingly declaring the earlier view to be 
nonsense! If this were the case, then interpretive integrity would demand that I relax my 
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structuralist reading. But we need to look at the way Clarke phrases his objection; in doing 
so, we see that he misreads Leibniz's second definition, and that Leibniz's response in this 
new passage is aimed at the misreading. 
In his fourth reply, Clarke had objected thus: “I do not understand the meaning of 
these words: 'an order (or situation) which makes bodies capable of being situated'. It seems 
to me to amount to this: that situation is the cause of situation” (2000, 34). Notice that he 
does not object to the coherence of saying that an underlying order (structure) confers situs 
on the bodies that participate in it. He only objects to the coherence of claiming that an 
underlying situation confers situs on individual bodies: he thinks that it's incoherent to say 
that situs confers situs. Now, this claim would clearly be incoherent, but Leibniz never makes 
it. To see this, look back to the second definition cited above: Clarke simply inserts the 
parenthesis in his objection, and the parenthesis is what generates the objection in the first 
place. What this passage actually does, to my mind, is to reinforce the structuralist reading 
that I'm advocating. Leibniz agrees that situs can't confer situs, on pain of incoherence. But 
he never denies the claim that he had actually made in the second definition: the claim that 
an underlying spatial order is responsible for conferring situs on individual bodies. And in 
this new passage, he still holds that space is an underlying order: it's the order “according to 
which situations are disposed”. This remark, along with the second definition, indicates that 
Leibniz thinks of the spatial order as ontologically prior to the notion of situs: recall his 
assertion that space does not depend on the particular relations among bodies. 
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4. Spacetime Structuralism or Modal Relationism? At this point, it's hard to escape 
reading Leibniz as committed to space being prior to relations among bodies, in the sense 
that there's a deeper relational complex underwriting the latter. We've seen that situs is 
conferred upon bodies by an order that's prior to them and does not depend on them; bodies 
only acquire their modes of coexistence with each other by occupying places in this order. 
But we now might want to ask what this order really amounts to; I think I've established that 
it has something to do with prior spatial relations, but recently Gordon Belot has suggested 
that it involves a different kind of prior thing, though something that still makes Leibniz 
ultimately a relationist. A brief investigation and criticism of Belot's reading will help clarify 
my own position. 
Belot argues that Leibniz holds a view close to Belot's own “modal relationism”, in 
the sense that Leibniz “employ[s] a notion of geometric possibility in giving content to 
claims about the structure of space” (2011, 173). For Belot, there are two kinds of 
relationists. “Conservative” relationists “identify the geometry of space with material 
geometry” and “give truth conditions for claims about spatial structure that differ from those 
of substantivalists only in quantifying over material points rather than points of space” (2011, 
3). In other words, there's nothing to space prior to the relations between chunks of matter; 
the geometry of existent matter is the geometry of space. Relations between bodies, 
consequently, are direct. “Modal” relationists, by contrast, deny the identification of spatial 
points with material points, instead employing a kind of geometric modality, such that claims 
about the ultimate structure of space are about what geometric relations could possibly be 
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instantiated by any set of material points. For these relationists, in other words, the relations 
between material bodies are no longer direct, but what they're parasitic on is a kind of modal 
structure, rather than a set of real parts or points of physical space. The truth conditions for 
claims about the structure of space, then, come from the facts about geometric possibility. 
For example, to say that space is finite is to say that “there is some number N such that it is 
impossible for material points to be located more than N units away from one another”; to 
say that space is infinite is to say that there is no such number (2011, 4). And the truth of the 
claim that space is finite (or infinite) depends on whether there is (or is not) such a number. 
Belot thinks that Leibniz holds something like the latter view, and the argument for 
this interpretation revolves around two claims: first, that Leibniz is clearly not a conservative 
relationist, since a careful reading of his remarks about space indicates that he thinks the 
structure of space is prior to the structure described by the actual relations between material 
bodies. It should be clear that I fully agree with Belot about this. Secondly, though, Belot 
makes the positive claim that the relevant texts (including some of the same passages in the 
Correspondence on which I'm relying) support the reading that the underlying structure of 
Leibnizian space is modal: it's an  order of geometric possibility rather than any kind of prior 
physical order. One way to think about this is to consider the question whether Leibniz thinks 
“that space can profitably be thought of as composed of geometrically related parts”; Belot 
answers in the negative, claims that this makes Leibniz “some sort of relationist”, and then 
argues for a modal reading of Leibniz's relationism (2011, 173). By way of illustrating my 
reading: I agree that Leibniz denies the “geometrically related parts” view, but I do not agree 
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that this denial makes Leibniz any kind of relationist; I think his view of space involves 
grounding the relations between material bodies on something more than a set of modal 
constraints on geometric relations. 
The following argument will illustrate the difference between my reading and Belot's, 
and will also illustrate the superiority of my reading. In addition to thinking that Leibniz is a 
modal relationist, Belot thinks that Leibniz is committed to the structure of space being 
necessary, or the same in all possible worlds. In any possible world, for Leibniz, space is 
three-dimensional and Euclidean. Now, if the structure of space is the same in all possible 
worlds and is to be understood as nothing more than a network of possible geometric 
relations, then in Leibnizian terms, space must be uncreated. In other words, it must exist 
only in God's mind. But we've canvassed some good reasons to deny that space only exists in 
God's mind: this is what I take the remarks about possibility in the Correspondence to be 
getting at. In the actual world, there is a spatial order; this order is one of the things God 
actualized when he created the actual world. So Leibniz seems to think that in the actual 
world, space does not only exist in God's mind. But equally, we have good reason to deny, 
with Belot, that space is just a consequence of relations between bodies. So it looks like 
Leibniz is neither a conservative relationist nor a modal relationist. 
For Leibniz, there's a sense in which modal relationism, when combined with the 
view that the structure of space is necessary, has to collapse into conservative relationism, 
since there will be nothing in the created world prior to the relations between bodies on the 
former combination of views. But again, Leibniz is not a conservative relationist – he thinks 
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that in the created world, the structure of space is prior to the the structure of material 
relations. Space is part of the created world after all – it doesn't only exist in God's mind – 
and space is prior to the relations between bodies. At the same time, space doesn't consist of 
points that have intrinsic identity; instead, space is an order that confers a specific property – 
namely, situs – upon bodies in the order, by virtue of where they are in the order at a 
particular time. This view bears a striking resemblance to spacetime structuralism.
I can now finally address the question of what the created spatial order really amounts 
to: is it, as the moderate structuralist thinks, a collection of fundamental relations between 
equally fundamental points, but such that the points have no individuality or properties 
except those which the relations confer upon them? Or is it, as the more radical structuralist 
thinks, ultimately just a collection of relations? Leibniz's emphatic denial, in the 
Correspondence and elsewhere, that space has anything like actual parts leads me to 
conclude that he conceives of the underlying spatial order as something like the more radical 
alternative. It's the relations that are fundamental; out of them emerges the notion of situs, 
and out of this notion in turn emerges the notion of relations between material bodies. Space 
only has points, or parts, in a derivative sense: fundamentally, space is an order that allows us 
to talk about the locations of bodies, their relative positions, and the like. Another revealing 
set of remarks from the Correspondence bolsters the suggestion that Leibniz thought of 
ontologically basic relations as perfectly coherent and as fundamental in his theory of space: 
As for the objection that space and time are quantities, or rather things endowed with 
quantity, and that situation and order are not so, I answer that order also has its 
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quantity: there is in it that which goes before and that which follows; there is 
distance or interval. Relative things have their quantity as well as absolute ones... And 
therefore though time and space consist in relations, still they have their quantity. 
(2000, 50) 
This passage, in conjunction with the other passages I've examined, suggests that Leibniz 
thinks of the spatial order as ultimately a set of distance relations that are prior to and make 
possible the distance relations between material bodies. Crucially, this is very similar to the 
situation in modern spacetime structuralism: structuralists commonly take the metric field to 
be the fundamental determinant of the structure of spacetime, though other fields play 
important roles; and the metric field is precisely that field which encodes spatiotemporal 
distance relations within the spacetime manifold. 
5. Does Leibniz's Ontology Allow for a Created Spatial Order? I will conclude by noting 
my awareness of an issue that my reading raises in connection with Leibniz's metaphysics. I 
said earlier that I would bracket the problem of the relationship between Leibniz's theory of 
space, taken on its own terms, and his deeper metaphysical commitments, but I cannot 
entirely avoid it, because a tension may arise between the two in asserting that Leibniz thinks 
spatial relations are part of the created world. It is widely accepted that Leibniz thinks 
relations have only a mental, or ideal, kind of reality. Though the precise meaning of this 
thesis is disputed, it does imply that the spatial order, on my reading, must be ideal and 
created. The only way this is possible, in Leibnizian terms, is if the spatial order ultimately 
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depends on the perceptions of individual substances, or monads. One might think that this 
commits Leibniz to an ultimate denial of the reality of the spatial order, making the 
structuralist reading pointless, unless we can show that dependence on the perceptions of 
monads does not imply unreality for Leibniz. I believe such a solution is forthcoming in 
terms of the mutual coordination of the perceptions of every monad in a world. The spatial 
order's dependence on monadic perceptions doesn't make it “unreal” in any robust sense, for 
every monad's series of perceptions is coordinated with that of every other monad so as to 
make all the monads perceive the same publicly accessible universe – which includes the 
spatial order – from its point of view. In this sense, the spatial order is just as objectively real 
as the monads themselves, and makes possible the arrangement of bodies that each monad 
perceives within that order. This reading is especially plausible when we consider that the 
basic individuating features of Leibniz's monads are just their perceptions; any order that 
depends on their perceptions will only be “ideal” in a very restricted sense. It would take 
another paper, one devoted to Leibniz's ontology of substance, to work out these issues fully; 
but I believe the potential conflict can be resolved, and that the evidence I've examined in the 
body of this paper strongly suggests that it's worth resolving.
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Why do biologists use so many diagrams? 
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Abstract 
 
Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective 
medium for communicating research findings, but they are even more 
impressive as tools for scientific reasoning. Focusing on circadian rhythm 
research in biology to explore these roles, we examine diagrammatic formats 
that have been devised (a) to identify and illuminate circadian phenomena 
and (b) to develop and modify mechanistic explanations of these phenomena.  
 
1. Prevalence and importance of diagrams in biology 
 
If you walk into a talk and do not know beforehand whether it is a philosophy or biology 
talk, a glance at the speaker’s slides will provide the answer. Philosophers favor text, 
whereas biologists shoehorn multiple images and diagrams into most of their slides. 
Likewise, if you attend a philosophy reading group or a biology journal club you can readily 
identify a major difference. Instead of verbally laying out the argument of the paper under 
study, the presenter in a journal club conveys hypotheses, methods, and results largely by 
working through diagrams from the paper. This reflects a more fundamental contrast 
between philosophers and biologists: their affinity for text versus diagrams is not just a 
matter of how they communicate once their work is done, but shapes every stage of inquiry. 
Whereas philosophers construct, evaluate, and revise arguments, and in doing so construct 
and revise sentences that convey the arguments, biologists seek to characterize 
phenomena in nature and to discover the mechanisms responsible for them. Diagrams are 
essential tools for biologists as they put forward, evaluate, and revise their accounts of 
phenomena and mechanisms.  
 
Diagrams play these roles in science more generally, but we have chosen to focus on 
biology – in particular, on the research topic of circadian rhythms – to begin to get traction 
on this understudied aspect of the scientific process. Circadian rhythms are oscillations in 
organisms with an approximately 24‐hour cycle (circa = about + dies = day). They are 
endogenously generated but entrained to the day‐night cycle in specific locales at different 
times of the year. They have been identified in numerous organisms—not only animals but 
also plants, fungi, and even cyanobacteria—and characterize a vast array of physiological 
processes (e.g., basic metabolism and body temperature) and behaviors (e.g., locomotion, 
sleep, and responding to stimuli).  
 
2. Diagrams and mechanistic explanation 
 
Diagrams play a central role in biology because they are highly suited to two key tasks: (1) 
displaying phenomena at various levels of detail, and (2) constructing mechanistic 
explanations for those phenomena., Philosophers of biology have increased their attention 
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to those tasks over the last two decades, construing mechanisms as systems that produce a 
phenomenon of interest by means of the organized and coordinated operations performed 
by their parts (Bechtel and Richardson 1993/2010; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). To advance a mechanistic explanation, biologists 
must characterize the phenomenon of interest (e.g., circadian oscillations in activity),  
identify the mechanism they take to be responsible (e.g., a molecular “clock”), decompose it 
into its parts and operations, and recompose it (conceptually, physically, or 
mathematically) to show that the coordinated performance of these operations does 
indeed generate the phenomenon. Early in the discovery process scientists may identify 
only a few parts and operations, and hypothesize a relatively simple mechanism that can be 
recomposed by mentally imagining a short sequence or cycle of operations (e.g., a single 
gene expression feedback loop was initially posited for the molecular clock). At least in 
biology, further research generally uncovers additional parts and operations with complex 
organization and dynamics (e.g., multiple interacting feedback mechanisms constituting the 
overall molecular clock mechanism).   
 
While a simple mechanistic account might be presented linguistically in the form of a 
narrative about how each part in succession performs its operation, diagrams generally 
provide particularly useful representational formats for conceptualizing and reasoning 
about mechanisms.1 By displaying just a few common graphical elements in two 
dimensions, a diagram can visually depict a phenomenon or the organized parts and 
operations of an explanatory mechanism (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Perini 2005). 
Available elements include labels, line drawings, iconic symbols, noniconic symbols 
( shapes, colors), and – the device most often used for operations – various styles of arrows. 
The spatial arrangement of these elements can convey spatial, temporal, or functional 
relations that help characterize a phenomenon or mechanism. Deploying our spatial 
cognition on diagrams has certain advantages over language‐based reasoning in 
constructing mechanistic explanations. Notably, scientists can mentally animate (Hegarty 
2004) a static diagram to simulate the succession of operations by which a simple 
sequential mechanism produces a phenomenon. Simultaneous operations are more 
challenging.2   
 
The primary role of diagrams for scientists is not to provide a visual format for 
communicating the phenomena discovered or the mechanistic accounts that explain them.  
Rather, diagrams of mechanisms are comparable to the plans a designer develops before 
                                                        
1 Defining and classifying diagrams is beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, we focus 
on clear exemplars and set aside such formats as micrographs and animations. 
2 As researchers recognize the complicated interaction of components in a mechanism and 
the complex dynamics emerging from multiple simultaneous operations, they often turn to 
computational modeling and the tools of dynamic systems analysis to understand how the 
mechanism will behave, giving rise to what Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2011) characterize 
as dynamic mechanistic explanations. Jones and Wolkenhauer (in press) provide a valuable 
account of how diagrams contribute to the construction of such computational models. It is 
also worth noting that linguistic reasoning has its own advantages. We would posit that the 
more complex the mechanism, the more beneficial is a coordinated deployment of 
linguistic, diagrammatic and computational resources.  
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building a new machine. These are used not just to tell those actually constructing the 
machine how to make it; they also figure in the design process. Before producing the final 
plans, the designer tries out different designs and evaluates whether they are likely to 
result in a working and efficient machine. Often the initial sketches of these plans reveal 
serious problems that must be overcome, resulting in revisions to the plans. The biologist is 
not creating the machine (except in fields such as synthetic biology), but is trying to reverse 
engineer it. Still, she needs to go through many of the same processes as a designer—
sketching an initial diagram, identifying ways in which it is inadequate, and modifying the 
diagram repeatedly until it is judged a satisfactory mechanistic account of the targeted 
phenomenon. Moreover, the biologist wants to end up not merely with some possible 
mechanism capable of producing the phenomenon, but rather with the one actually present 
in the biological system. In what follows, we will examine how diagrams are put to work in 
biology, focusing on two key tasks: delineating phenomena, and constructing mechanistic 
accounts to explain them.   
 
3. Diagrams to delineate the phenomenon 
 
An initial delineation of the phenomenon to be explained is a crucial step in mechanistic 
research. This remains true even if, in the course of discovering the mechanism, 
researchers revise their understanding of the phenomenon. Many philosophical accounts of 
mechanistic explanation have focused on linguistic descriptions of phenomena (e.g., “in 
fermentation, sugar is converted into alcohol and carbon dioxide by means of a series of 
intermediate reactions within yeast cells”). However, scientists focus much of their effort 
on obtaining much more specific, often quantitative, accounts of phenomena. Numerical 
data involved in characterizing a phenomenon may be presented in tables. As Bogen and 
Woodward (1988) made clear, however, explanations are directed not at the data but 
rather at the pattern extracted from the data—the phenomenon. Some data patterns can be 
captured in one or a few equations, such as the logarithmic function relating stimulus 
intensity (e.g., amplitude of a tone) to the sensation evoked (e.g., perceived loudness). By 
plotting these values on a graph, the phenomenon of a nonlinear relation between 
amplitude and loudness is immediately evident. The graph takes advantage of spatial 
cognition, whereas the logrithmic equation makes explicit a very precise claim that can and 
has been challenged (e.g., by those who argue for a power function). Scientists move deftly 
between linguistic descriptions, diagrams, and equations when all are available, using each 
to its best advantage.  
 
Diagrams are especially useful for thinking about dynamic phenomena – patterns of change 
over time. Circadian phenomena are dynamic, so diagrams conveying them generally 
incorporate time in some way (as the abscissa on a line graph, as the order of arrows in a 
sketch of a mechanism, as points along the trajectory in a state space, etc.). Moreover, 
research on circadian oscillations often targets the interaction between endogenous 
control (by an internal clock) and exogenous timing cues, commonly referred to as 
Zeitgebers. Hence, what was needed was a way of diagramming the activity of an organism, 
such as a mouse running on a wheel, that revealed at a glance its rhythmicity and the 
impact of Zeitgebers. 
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Circadian researchers settled on a distinctive format, the actogram. Figure 1 illustrates the 
diagrammatic devices that satisfy the desiderata Time of day is represented horizontally 
and successive days are represented vertically (one line of data per day).  Activity is 
tracked along each line—e.g., a single hash mark each time a mouse rotates a wheel. The 
bars at the top use white vs. black to represent the 24‐hour light‐dark conditions. Here the 
mouse was exposed to light from hours 4‐16 during the first phase of the study (specified 
elsewhere as Days 1‐7). During the other twelve hours of Days 1‐7, and all 24 hours 
beginning Day 8, the mouse was kept in darkness. On Day 18, four hours after onset of 
activity, the mouse’s rhythm was perturbed by a pulse of light. The large gray arrow directs 
the reader’s attention to the effects of this isolated Zeitgeber.   .    
 
Figure 1. A basic actogram in which the top bar indicates a normal light‐dark cycle 
for the first phase of the study (Days 1‐7)_and constant darkness thereafter. The 
gray arrow identifies the day a light pulse was administered. (From 
http://www.photosensorybiology.org/id16.html.) 
 
The actogram offers a relatively transparent representation of the animal’s behavior; that 
is, readers who have learned its conventions should be able to see through the diagram to 
the multiple behavioral phenomena that it visually depicts.3 Figure 1 offers this kind of 
access to at least four circadian phenomena. First, in rows 1‐7 it can be seen that the hash 
marks occur in consolidated bands bounded by the black segments of the upper bar. This 
indicates that when Zeitgebers are present (light alternating with dark), virtually all wheel‐
running occurs in the dark: the animal is nocturnal. Second, the fact that the hash marks 
continue to appear in consolidated bands after row 7 (when the animal is free‐running in 
the absence of Zeitgebers) indicates that the animal can endogenously maintain a robust 
division between periods of rest and of activity. Third, these later bands of hash marks 
‘drift’ leftward, indicating that the animal begins its activity a bit earlier each day. 
Maintenance of a free‐running period somewhat less than 24 hours is the core 
phenomenon of circadian rhythmicity. Fourth, the pulse of light flagged by the gray arrow 
brings an abrupt cessation of activity on Day 18 and inserts a phase delay (seen as a 
                                                        
3 See Cheng (2011) for a more extensive discussion of semantic transparency. Note also 
that some phenomena are less transparently conveyed by diagrams than others. 
Presumably, the spatial cognition deployed in less transparent cases is effortful to some 
degree and/or  coordinated with propositional cognition. 
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rightward “jump” in the bands of hash marks) into what was otherwise a continuing 
pattern of phase advance (left‐ward “drift”) under constant darkness. This reset 
phenomenon is one aspect of the more general phenomenon of entrainment.  
 
Thus, actograms make circadian rhythmicity in an animal’s activity visually accessible. But 
when chronobiologists attempt to understand the molecular mechanisms that produce 
such macroscopic rhythmicity, they are confronted with new phenomena that call for 
different diagrammatic formats. Notably, the concentration levels (relative abundance) of 
many types of molecules within cells oscillate. For example, Hardin, Hall, and Rosbash 
(1990) demonstrated the circadian oscillation of period (per) mRNA in Drosophila 
melanogaster (fruit flies).4 In Figure 2 (below) we reproduce a pair of diagrams from their 
paper that illustrate how the same data can be displayed in two formats that differ 
substantially in how they visually depict per mRNA oscillation. Flies had previously been 
kept for three days in a light‐dark cycle of 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Starting on the 
fourth day (hours 24‐48 in Figure 2), the flies were placed in constant darkness. Every four 
hours a batch of flies was sent for processing to determine per mRNA abundance via a 
molecular probe. The output of this procedure, the Northern blot, is shown at the top of 
Figure 2. Darker regions of the blot visually depict greater presence of per mRNA across the 
four days.  
 
 
Figure 2. Two diagrams from Hardin et al.’s (1990) original portrayal of circadian 
oscillation in per mRNA levels in Drosophila. On top is a series of Northern blots 
(from different flies every 4 hours). Below this is a line graph of the same data. The 
Zeitgeber schedule is shown at the bottom, with white hatched bars depicting the 
intervals in which lights would have been on if the initial light‐dark cycle had 
continued. 
 
                                                        
4 Much of the early research on molecular mechanisms is nonmammalian, including the 
discovery of per mRNA oscillations. A role for per is conserved in the mouse circadian 
mechanism. 
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Below the Northern blots, the same data are displayed in a line graph. Here numeric values 
for per MRNA are displayed in a format that makes their oscillation immediately apparent. 
Moreover, a quick check of the horizontal scale confirms that the period of oscillation is 
circadian: there are four peaks in four days. Closer examination reveals that the peak 
occurs slightly earlier on Day 4, indicating a slightly shorter period in the absence of a 
Zeitgeber. Actograms provide a better visual display of such variations in period, but are 
less suitable for conveying variations in amplitude.  
 
4. Diagrams to identify the parts, operations, and organization of a mechanism 
 
A major use of diagrams in mechanistic science is to present a proposed mechanism by 
spatially displaying, at some chosen level of detail, its parts and operations and the way 
they are envisaged as working together to produce a phenomenon. Such diagrams typically 
utilize a two‐dimensional space in which elements representing different parts and 
operations of the mechanism can be laid out so as to depict key aspects of their spatial,  
temporal, and functional organization. As noted in Section 2, a variety of labels, line 
drawings and symbols can be used to distinguish different kinds of parts. Parts perform 
operations that affect other parts and lead to or interact with other operations. One or 
more styles of arrows, often labeled, are typically chosen for displaying these operations.  
 
As static structures, diagrams do not directly show how the mechanism produces the 
phenomenon. Unless a computational model is available, researchers must animate the 
diagram by mentally simulating the different operations and their consequences 
(sometimes off‐loading this effort by developing animated diagrams). Such mental 
simulation lacks quantitative precision and can be highly fallible. A researcher may 
overestimate the capabilities of a component part or neglect important consequences of a 
particular operation, such as how it might alter another part. Moreover, diagrams 
themselves are generally subject to revision and quite often wrong. Since their 
representational content constrains what can be mentally simulated, key gaps in a diagram 
will yield inaccurate simulations. On the positive side, the diagram helps the researcher 
keep track of what must enter into each stage of simulation. In short, diagrams are an 
imperfect but necessary tool.  
 
A crucial step in discovering the molecular mechanism responsible for circadian rhythms 
was Konopka and Benzer’s (1971) discovery of per, the Drosophila gene whose mRNA 
levels became the focus of Hardin, Hall, and Rosbash’s (1990) research. In addition to 
showing circadian oscillations in per mRNA, Hardin et al ascertained that the PER protein 
also oscillated with a period of approximately 24 hours but peaked several hours later than 
per mRNA. Hardin et al. recognized these oscillations as a circadian phenomenon at the 
molecular level, but also had the idea that per mRNA and PER might be parts of the 
mechanism that explained behavioral circadian oscillations. Combining this with their 
knowledge that negative feedback is a mode of organization capable of producing 
oscillations, they proposed three variations of a molecular mechanism whose oscillatory 
dynamics could be responsible for, and thereby explain, behavioral oscillations.  In all three 
variations, PER served to inhibit per transcription or translation in a negative feedback 
loop. These are diagrammed, somewhat idiosyncratically, in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Hardin et al.’s (1990) representation of three versions of their proposed 
molecular mechanism for circadian oscillations in terms of a negative feedback loop. 
Question marks indicate points of uncertainty as to the origin and termination of the 
feedback operation. 
 
As we claimed above, diagrams are not solely vehicles for communicating a proposed 
mechanistic explanation; they also can serve as a representational tool employed in 
reasoning about the proposed mechanism. First, a diagram can be used to envisage how a 
particular mechanism functions to produce a phenomenon. In this case, the phenomenon 
involves regular oscillations. To understand how the mechanism produces such oscillations 
a viewer would begin at the upper left, where the known operations of transcription into 
mRNA and translation into a protein are portrayed. These result in the accumulation of PER 
molecules, represented in the diagram as a small line drawing of one molecule. Once PER 
accumulates, feedback must inhibit either transcription or translation, thereby stopping 
the accumulation of PER.  The existing PER will gradually degrade (an operation not 
explicitly represented, but which molecular biologists would readily infer). As it degrades, 
the concentration of PER will decline. This will release the transcription and translation 
processes from inhibition, and synthesis of PER will begin again. When repeated, this cycle 
of active and repressed per expression will result in the observed pattern of rhythmic 
oscillations in both per mRNA and PER. 
 
A second major way in which such a diagram can serve reasoning about a mechanism is by 
making it clear where there are uncertainties about its operations. Note how little of Figure 
3 is put forth as a depiction of previous discoveries concerning the mechanisms of per 
regulation. The bulk of the diagram serves as a simultaneous depiction of multiple possible 
mechanisms (sketched only in bare outline) that could explain oscillations of per mRNA 
and PER. The diagram is in large part an invitation to explanation, not a record of it. The 
possible mechanisms sketched here as (1) – (3) could each theoretically account for the 
observed oscillations. In (1), PER interacts with some biochemical substrate or process “X”, 
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which then somehow regulates either the per gene itself (transcriptional regulation), or the 
transcribed mRNA (post‐transcriptional regulation). In (2), X interacts with some further 
substrate or process “Y,” which then does the same. In (3), the behavior of the organism 
provides the necessary feedback. What is known is only that the mechanism(s) at work in 
Drosophila must eventuate in regulation of per mRNA abundance.  
 
Third, the constraints presented by what is presented in the diagram serve to guide 
hypothesizing about and investigating of further elements of the proposed mechanism. 
Indeed, both the unknowns represented by the question marks in Figure 3 and the 
operations specified became the focus of subsequent research. For example, researchers 
sought not merely to determine where PER fed back to inhibit formation of more PER, but 
how it did so. This and other inquiries quickly led to the discovery of many additional 
components of the mechanism: by the end of the 1990s at least seven different genes, as 
well as their transcripts and proteins, were viewed as part of the clock mechanism, both in 
Drosophila and in mammals. Many of these were also shown to oscillate, but at different 
phases than PER.  
 
As the list of clock parts expanded and as researchers proposed multiple feedback loops, it 
became ever more crucial to be able to represent how the operations performed by 
individual parts affected other parts, and researchers regularly produced diagrams to 
illustrate and guide their reasoning. On the left in Figure 4 is a fairly typical contemporary 
diagram of the mammalian circadian oscillator.  Key parts are indicated by upper‐case 
labels: italicized for genes vs. enclosed in colored ovals for proteins. When proteins serve 
as transcription factors, they are shown attached to the promoter regions (E‐box, D‐box, 
and RRE) of the respective genes.  
 
In using this diagram to reason about the mechanism, researchers follow the action of 
individual proteins and the ways in which they activate or repress the expression of 
specific genes. At the top right is a further‐specified version of the feedback loop first 
proposed by Hardin et al. in which PER inhibits its own transcription: it does so by 
dimerizing with CRY (Hardin et al.’s substrate “X”) and preventing the CLOCK/BMAL1 
complex (Hardin et al.’s substrate “Y”) from upregulating per transcription at the E‐box 
promoter site. There is also a second feedback loop responsible for the synthesis of CLOCK 
and BMAL1. A second promoter site on the per gene has been identified, and its activator 
(DBP) is part of a positive feedback loop. It should be obvious that as the understanding of 
the mechanism became more complicated, diagrams became ever more crucial both in 
representing the mechanism and in reasoning about it. We should note that research on 
this mechanism is far from complete. The inhibitory operations, in particular, are the focus 
of important ongoing research that is serving to identify yet additional parts and 
operations. Diagrams such as these serve not just to represent and facilitate reasoning 
about the mechanism but also serve as guides to where further investigation is required 
(even if these are not always explicitly signaled by question marks).  
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Figure 4. On the left is an example of a common way of representing the 
mechanism of the mammalian circadian clock, labeling genes in black italics 
and the proteins they express in colored ovals and using arrows to represent 
feedback loops (Zhang and Kay 2010). On the right an alternative 
representation (Ukai and Ueda 2010) which places the three promoter sites 
at the center. A grey line from the promoter to the gene indicates that the 
promoter site is found on the gene, whereas green arrows from the gene to a 
promoter box indicate that the protein synthesized from the gene is an 
activator at that promoter site and a while a squared‐off magenta line 
indicates that the protein in some way inhibits the expression of the gene. 
 
Once a basic diagram format is developed and researchers become familiar with its 
conventions, it is often retained by other researchers, who introduce relatively minor 
modifications to capture specific features of a given account. The choice of a diagrammatic 
format is not neutral, and researchers sometimes find it important to develop alternative 
formats that provide a different perspective on the mechanism. Ueda, for example, has 
introduced the alternative representation shown in the diagram on the right side of Figure 
4. It presents essentially the same information about parts and operations as the diagram 
on the left, but shifts attention away from the genes and proteins to the promoter regions – 
the three boxes placed in the center of the figure. The different genes that are regulated by 
these promoters are shown in colored ovals in the periphery of this diagram. The proteins 
they express are assumed but not depicted. The relation of the boxes to the genes is 
explained in the figure caption.  
 
Ueda adopted this format as part of his argument that the relations between the three 
promoter regions are fundamental to the functioning of the clock. Transcription factors 
bind to particular promoters at different times of day: the E/E’ box in morning, the D box in 
midday, and the RRE at nighttime. For Ueda, the individual genes and proteins involved are 
just the vehicles via which these promoters interact. He made this even more explicit in the 
three diagrams shown in Figure 5. Here he abstracts from the genes and proteins and 
focuses just on the promoters, using arrows to indicate when products from the sites serve 
to activate or repress activity at another promoter. He shows all these interactions in the 
diagram on the left, but further decomposes them into two kinds of circuits (motifs) in the 
other two diagrams. In the middle is a delayed negative feedback motif in which proteins 
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expressed in the morning regulate expression of other genes at midday, which then repress 
the morning element. On the right is a repressilator motif in which products from each 
element repress further operation of the preceding element. Each of these motifs has been 
the subject of experimental, computational, and synthetic biology investigations that show 
how they generate oscillations (Ukai‐Tadenuma et al. 2011).  
 
Importantly, in choosing to represent the mechanism as in Figure 5, different aspects of its 
organization and functioning become salient. By emphasizing the overall structure of the 
mechanism, the overlapping oscillations are made more salient at the expense of detail 
about the proteins involved in the regulatory processes. These different contents provide 
different constraints on the reasoning that can be performed by way of the diagram, and 
can lead to different insights about the mechanism itself, thus helping to provide a more 
complete explanation of the phenomenon. 
 
   
Figure 5. Hogenesch and Ueda’s (2011) diagrams that abstract from the genes and 
proteins of the circadian oscillator to identify the basic causal circuit (left), which he 
then decomposes into two motifs (center and right) that are viewed as explaining 
the oscillatory behavior of the mechanism.  
 
5. Conclusion: Diagrams and Mechanistic Explanation  
 
A major explanation for the prevalence of diagrams in biology is the role they play in 
mechanistic explanation. We have focused on their role in two pursuits—delineating a 
phenomenon of interest and constructing mechanistic accounts to explain the phenomenon. 
A number of diagrams may be generated in making progress from an initial account to the 
one proposed in public. Each specifies the parts, operations, and organization of the current 
conception of the mechanism. Diagrams also play other roles in mechanistic explanation. 
For example, even modestly complex mechanisms, such as those involving negative 
feedback loops, challenge the ability of theorists to figure out their behavior by mentally 
rehearsing their interactions. To visualize dynamic phenomena, scientists often resort to 
other types of diagrams, such as phase spaces in which oscillations appear as limit cycles. 
Such diagrams abstract from mechanistic details to portray how the overall state of the 
system changes over time.  
 
Having identified important roles diagrams play in biology, we conclude by noting three 
ways in which analysis of diagrams contributes to philosophy of science. We have begun to 
address the first:  from diagrams we can gain a (partial) understanding of how scientists 
reason about a phenomenon, specifically by simulating the understood elements of a 
mechanism encoded in a diagram to see if they are adequate to explain the phenomenon.  
Second, diagrams can serve as a vehicle for understanding scientific change when we 
analyze how the diagrams within a field evolve, find acceptance, and are eventually 
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discarded. Third, identifying the cognitive elements of diagram use, including their design 
and the learning processes required to interpret them, can provide insight into the 
cognitive processes involved in scientific reasoning more generally. By directing attention 
to the importance of diagrams in biology, we hope to have set the stage for more sustained 
philosophical inquiry.   
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Abstract. Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable 
alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Craver 
2011; Kaplan and Bechtel 2011). This claim is meant to hold both in principle and in 
practice. The basic claim is that any explanation of a particular feature of a biological 
system, including dynamical explanations, must ultimately be grounded in mechanistic 
explanation. There are several variations on this theme, some stronger and some weaker. 
In order to avoid equivocation and miscommunication, in section 1 we will argue that 
mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. In section 2 we 
will argue that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization 
and decomposition on any non-trivial construal of these concepts. Therefore, in section 3 
we conclude the mechanistic model of explanation either needs to stretch to now include 
explanations wherein localization or decomposition fail, or acknowledge that there are 
counter-examples to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences. We will also 
consider consequences and possible replies on the part of the mechanist in section 3.
1. Introduction. While there are many different accounts of mechanistic explanation, the 
basic idea is that a phenomenon has been explained when the responsible realizing or 
underlying mechanism has been identified. In particular, the relevant parts of the 
mechanism and the operations they perform must be identified, i.e., those 
parts/operations that maintain, produce, or underlie the phenomena in question (Bechtel 
2010; Craver 2007; Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Kaplan and Craver 2011; 
Kaplan and Bechtel 2011). Whatever the particular account of mechanistic explanation 
on offer, it is clear that mechanistic explanation is supposed to be fundamental in the 
biological sciences, period. What is less clear is exactly what this explanatory axiom 
entails. What follows is a list of claims pertaining to dynamical and mathematical 
explanations in the biological sciences that some mechanistic thinkers assert are entailed 
by the mechanistic model:
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1) Dynamical and mathematical explanations in systems neuroscience must be grounded 
in or reduced to mechanistic explanations (via localization and decomposition) to be 
explanatory.
2) Dynamical mechanisms are not an alternative to mechanistic explanation but a 
complement.
3) When dynamical and mathematical models do not describe mechanisms by 
appropriately mapping elements of the latter onto the former, then they provide no real 
explanation.
4) At this juncture, dynamical and mathematical models of explanation in biology not 
sufficiently grounded in mechanisms have nothing to offer but “predictivism” by way of 
explanatory force. That is, critics of mechanistic explanation do not have a viable 
alternative research strategy or alternative conception of explanation on offer (Kaplan 
and Bechtel 2011; Kaplan and Craver 2011).
The mechanists in question claim that certain defenders of dynamical and mathematical 
explanation in the biological sciences violate 1-3 and are therefore guilty of 4 (Kaplan 
and Craver 2011; Kaplan and Bechtel 2011). We first we need to get clear on exactly 
how the “dynamicist” is being portrayed. Kaplan and Craver go after the “strong 
dynamicist and functionalist”, which they characterize as follows, “In particular, we 
oppose strong dynamicist and functionalist views according to which mathematical and 
computational models can explain a phenomenon without embracing commitments about 
the causal mechanisms that produce, underlie, or maintain it” (2011, 603). The strong 
dynamicist and functionalist holds that “mechanistic explanation is no longer an 
appropriate goal for cognitive and systems neuroscience” (Ibid). And finally, “If these 
dynamicists are right, such models yield explanations in the total absence of 
commitments regarding the causal mechanisms that produce the cognitive or system 
behavior we seek to explain” (Ibid, 604). According to Kaplan and Craver then, the 
strong dynamicist abandons the mechanistic model of explanation and has nothing 
coherent or cogent to replace it with.
We also reject strong dynamicism and functionalism so characterized. We will show 
however that ‘either mechanistic explanation or dynamical predictivism’ is a false 
dilemma. What we will claim is that systems biology and systems neuroscience contain 
robust dynamical and mathematical explanations of some phenomena in which the 
essential explanatory work is not be being done by localization and decomposition. More 
positively, the explanatory work in these models is being done by their graphical/network 
properties, geometric properties, or dynamical properties.  We mean this claim to be true 
both in practice and in principle. Presumably then, what separates us from the mechanists 
is that they are committed to all such “higher level” explanations ultimately being 
discharged via localization and decomposition and we are not. However, we certainly do 
not think such explanations are incompatible or mutually exclusive, we have no problem 
calling them “complementary.” Nonetheless, we will argue that graphical and dynamical 
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properties for example are “non-decomposable” and non-localizable features of the 
causal and nomological structure of the “mechanisms” in question.  
We want to end this section with a sociological note of caution. A great deal of the 
discussion in the literature strongly suggests that what we have before us is a thinly 
veiled iteration of the ancient philosophical debate between competing ‘isms’ regarding 
the essence of mind and the essence of explanation. Take the following, “It has not 
escaped our attention that 3M [mechanistic model of explanation], should it be found 
acceptable, has dire implications for functionalist theories of cognition that are not, 
ultimately, beholden to details about implementing mechanisms. We count this as 
significant progress in thinking about the explanatory aspirations of cognitive science” 
(Ibid, 612). So in one corner we have the functionalist/dynamist with their usual 
disregard/distaste for implementing mechanisms and in the other corner the mechanist, 
who insists on filling in all the boxes and the equations with the really truly fundamental 
“causal structure.” We think that it’s time to transcend these beleaguered battle lines. 
That is, while we reject strong dynamicism and functionalism, and while we agree that 
dynamical and mechanistic explanations inevitably go hand-in-hand, we are open to the 
possibility that there are explanations in the biological sciences that are not best 
characterized in terms of localization and decomposition. To reject this possibility out of 
hand is as extreme as thinking that implementing mechanisms are irrelevant for 
explaining cognition and behavior. 
When Kaplan and Craver say, “The mechanistic tradition should not be discarded lightly. 
After all, one of the grand achievements in the history of science has been to recognize 
that the diverse phenomena of our world yield to mechanistic explanation” (2011, 613), 
we agree. In fact, we don’t think the mechanistic tradition should be discarded. What we 
do think is that the mechanistic tradition understood in terms of localization and 
decomposition is in principle not the only effective explanatory strategy in the life 
sciences.  
2. Counter-Examples to Localization and Decomposition in Systems Neuroscience
2.1 Defining Localization and Decomposition. Localization and decomposition are 
universally regarded as the sine qua non of mechanistic explanation. Identifying the parts 
of a mechanism and their operations necessitates decomposing the mechanism. One can 
use different methods to decompose a mechanism functionally, into component 
operations, or structurally, into component parts (Bechtel and Richardson 2010). The 
ultimate goal is to line up the parts with the operations they perform, this is known as 
localization (Ibid). Proponents of mechanistic explanation like to emphasize the way it 
differs from the DN-model of explanation, which is based on laws.  Mechanistic 
explanation is not about the derivation of phenomenon from initial conditions and 
dynamical laws, but rather explanation via localization and decomposition.
Mechanistic explanation is reductionist in the sense that explanation is in terms of the 
parts of the mechanism and the operations those parts perform. Parts and operations are at 
a lower level of organization than the mechanism as a whole. Bechtel says that the most 
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conservative mechanistic account is one in which a mechanism is characterized as 
generating a phenomenon via a start-to-finish sequence of qualitatively characterized 
operations performed by identifiable component parts (2011, 534). However, Bechtel, 
Craver and others have recently emphasized how liberal mechanistic accounts have 
become. For example, Bechtel has stressed that the reductionist methodology of 
localization and decomposition must be “complemented” by contextualizing 
parts/operations both within a mechanism at a given level and between the mechanism 
and its environment at a higher level. The context in question includes spatial, temporal, 
causal, hierarchical and organizational.
We applaud and affirm the liberalization of mechanistic explanation.  We assume, 
though, that these mechanists consider localization and decomposition as ultimately 
essential to mechanistic explanation. That said, we wonder what they would count as 
counter-examples in principle. Fortunately, Bechtel and Richardson (2010) give us some 
clues.  They emphasize that localization and decomposition are “heuristic” strategies that 
sometimes fail when a system fails to be decomposable or nearly decomposable (Ibid, 
13). According to them, there are two kinds of failures of decomposability or 
localizability: 1) when there are no component parts or operations that can be 
distinguished (such as a connectionist network), in which case one can only talk about 
organizational features—the best one can hope for here is functional decomposition, and 
2) when there are component parts and operations but their individual behaviors 
systematically and continuously affect one another in a non-linear fashion. In this case 
mechanisms are not sequential but have a cyclic organization rife with oscillations, 
feedback loops, or recurrent connections between components. In these instances there is 
a high-degree of interactivity among the components and the system is non-
decomposable and therefore localization will fail (Ibid, 24). In addition, if the non-
linearity affecting component operations also affects the behavior of the system as a 
whole, such that the component properties/states are dependent on a total state-
independent characterization of the system (i.e., one sufficient to determine the state and 
the dynamics of the system as a whole), then the behavior of the system can be called 
“emergent” (Ibid, 25). They emphasize that when the feedback is system wide such that 
almost all “The operations of component parts in the system will depend on the actual 
behavior and the capacities of other its components” (Ibid, 24), the following obtains. 
First, the behavior of the component parts considered within the system as a whole are 
not predicable in principle from their behavior in isolation. Second, the behavior of the 
system as a whole cannot be predicted even in principle from the separable Hamiltonians 
of the component parts (Ibid). 
We affirm all this and indeed others have stressed these points in illustrating the limits of 
localization and decomposition (Chemero and Silberstein 2008; Stepp, Chemero, and 
Turvey 2011). However, what puzzles us is that Bechtel and Richardson go on to say 
that, “When these conditions are met, the systemic behavior is reasonably counted as 
emergent, even though it is fully explicable mechanistically” (Ibid, 24). Here Bechtel and 
Richardson seem to be saying that even though such “emergent” behavior is not 
amenable to decomposition or localization, it is nonetheless mechanistically explicable. 
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But, in exactly what sense are such systems mechanistically explicable?  We shall return 
to this in section 3, after we consider explanations in systems neuroscience. 
2.2 Explanation in Systems Neuroscience. Systems neuroscience is a rapidly growing 
area devoted to figuring out how the brain engages in the coordination and integration of 
distributed processes at the various length and time scales necessary for cognition and 
action. The assumption is that most of this coordination represents patterns of 
spontaneous, self-organizing, macroscopic spatiotemporal patterns which resemble the 
on-the-fly functional networks recruited during activity. This coordination often occurs at 
extremely fast time scales with short durations and rapid changes. There is a wide 
repertoire of models used to account for these self-orgainzing macroscopic patterns, such 
as oscillations, synchronization, metastability, and nonlinear dynamical coupling. Many 
explanatory models such as synergetics and neural dynamics combine several of these 
features, e.g., phase-locking among oscillations of different frequencies (Sporns 2011).
Despite the differences among these models, there are some important generalizations to 
be had.   First, dynamic coordination is often highly distributed and non-local. Second, 
population coding, cooperative, or collective effects prevail. Third, time and timing is 
essential in a number of ways.  Fourth, these processes exhibit both robustness and 
plasticity.  Fifth, these processes are highly context and task sensitive. Regarding the 
third point, there is a growing consensus that such integrated processes are best viewed 
not as vectors of activity or neural signals, but as dynamically evolving graphs. The 
evidence suggests that standard neural codes such as rate codes and firing frequencies are 
insufficient to explain the rapid and rapidly transitioning coordination. Rather, the 
explanation must involve “temporal codes” or “temporal binding” such as spike timing-
dependent plasticity wherein neural populations are bound by the simultaneity of firing 
and precise timing is essential.  In these cases neurons are bound into a group or 
functional network as a function of synchronization in time. The key explanatory features 
of such models then involves various time-varying properties such as: the exact timing of 
a spike, the ordering or sequencing of processing events, the rich moment-to-moment 
context of real world activity and immediate stimulus environment, an individual’s 
history such as that related to network activation and learning, etc. All of the above can 
be modeled as attractor states that constrain and bias the recruitment of brain networks 
during active tasks and behavior (Von der Malsberg et. al, 2010). 
There is now a branch of systems neuroscience devoted to the application of network 
theory to the brain. The formal tools of network theory are graph theory and dynamical 
system theory, the latter to represent network dynamics—temporally evolving dynamical 
processes unfolding in various kinds of networks.  While these techniques can be applied 
at any scale of brain activity, here we will be concerned with large-scale brain networks. 
These relatively new to neuroscience explanatory tools (i.e., simulations) are enabled by 
large data sets and increased computational power. The brain is modeled as a complex 
system: networks of (often non-linear) interacting components such as neurons, neural 
assemblies and brain regions. In these models, rather than viewing the neurons, cell 
groups or brain regions as the basic unit of explanation, it is brain multiscale networks 
and their large-scale, distributed and non-local connections or interactions that are the 
basic unit of explanation (Sporns 2011). The study of this integrative brain function and 
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connectivity is primarily based in topological features (network architecture) of the 
network that are insensitive to, and multiply realizable with respect to, lower level 
neurochemical and wiring details. More specifically, a graph is a mathematical 
representation of some actual (in this case) biological many-bodied system. The nodes in 
these models represent neurons, cell populations, brain regions, etc., and the edges 
represent connections between the nodes. The edges can represent structural features such 
as synaptic pathways and other wiring diagram type features or they can represent more 
functional topological features such as graphical distance (as opposed to spatial distance). 
Here we focus on the latter wherein the interest is in mapping the interactions (edges) 
between the local neighborhood networks, i.e., global topological features—the 
architecture of the brain as a whole. While there are local networks within networks, it is 
the global connection between these that is of greatest concern in systems neuroscience. 
Graph theory is replete with a zoo of different kinds of network topologies, but one of 
perhaps greatest interest to systems neuroscience are small-world networks as various 
regions of the brain and the brain as a whole are known to instantiate such a network. The 
key topological properties of small-world networks are: 1) a much higher clustering 
coefficient relative to random networks with equal numbers of nodes and edges and 2) 
short (topological) path length. That is, small-world networks exhibit a high degree of 
topological modularity (not to be confused with anatomical or cognitive modularity) and 
non-local or long-range connectivity. Keep in mind that there are many different types of 
small-world networks with unique properties, some with more or less topological  
modularity, higher and lower degrees (as measured by the adjacency or connection 
matrix), etc. (Sporns 2011; Von der Malsberg et. al 2010). 
The explanatory point is that such graphical simulations allow us to derive, predict and 
discover a number of important things such as mappings between structural and 
functional features of the brain, cognitive capacities, organizational features such as 
degeneracy, robustness and plasticity, structural or wiring diagram features, various 
pathologies such as schizophrenia, autism and other “connectivity disorders” when small-
world networks are disrupted, and other essential kinds of brain coordination such as 
neural synchronization, etc. In each case, the evidence is that the mapping between 
structural and topological features is at least many-one. Very different neurochemical 
mechanisms and wiring diagrams can instantiate the same networks and thus perform the 
same cognitive functions. Indeed, it is primarily the topological features of various types 
of small-world networks that explain essential organizational features of brains, as 
opposed to lower level, local purely structural features. Structural and topological 
processes occur at radically different and hard (if not impossible) to relate time-scales. 
The behavior and distribution of various nodes such as local networks are determined by 
their non-local or global connections. As Sporns puts it, “Heterogeneous, multiscale 
patterns of structural connectivity [small-world networks] shape the functional 
interactions of neural units, the spreading of activation and the appearance of synchrony 
and coherence” (2011, 259).
Thanks to its generality and formal power, network neuroscience has also discovered 
various predictive power laws and scale-free invariances, i.e., symmetry principles at 
work in the brain. For example, the probability of finding a node with a degree twice as 
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large as an arbitrary number decreases by a constant factor over the entire distribution. 
The explanatory power of small-world networks derives from their organizational 
properties, and not from the independent properties of the entities that are in small-world 
networks.  
3. Consequences. Surprisingly, Bechtel and Richardson themselves use small-world 
networks as an example to illustrate that “mechanisms” of this sort require an addition to 
the mechanistic armament, namely, “dynamic mechanistic explanation” (Bechtel and 
Richardson, 2011, 16). Dynamical mechanistic explanation utilizes the tools of 
dynamical systems theory such as differential equations, network theory, etc., to engage 
in the computer simulation of complex mechanisms wherein the differential equations in 
question cannot be solved analytically. They claim of course that such “dynamical” 
explanations should nonetheless be squarely viewed as mechanistic explanation because:
Reliance on simulations that use equations to understand the behavior of 
mechanisms may appear to depart from the mechanistic perspective and embrace 
something very much like the DN account of explanation. A simulation involves 
deriving values for variables at subsequent times from the equations and values at 
an initial time. However, simulations are crucially different from DN 
explanations. First, the equations are advanced not as general laws but as 
descriptions of the operations of specific parts of a mechanism. Second, the 
purpose of a computational simulation (like mental simulation in the basic 
mechanistic account) is not to derive the phenomenon being explained but to 
determine whether the proposed mechanism would exhibit the phenomenon. 
Finally, an important part of evaluating the adequacy of a computational model is 
that the parts and operations it describes are those that can be discovered through 
traditional techniques for decomposing mechanisms (Bechtel, 2011, 553).  
There are several things that need to be said here. First, we agree that dynamical and 
network-type explanations are not D-N explanation and therefore cannot be guilty of 
“predictivism.” Secondly, we agree that such explanations are nonetheless about 
predicting whether certain causal structures will have certain cognitive, functional or 
other features. Certainly, the fact that these simulations or dynamical/graphical systems 
predict or allow us to derive certain features does not make them explanatory. What does 
make them explanatory? These simulations show why certain causal and nomological  
structures will exhibit said features in virtue of their dynamical and graphical properties. 
Bechtel and company will balk at the word ‘nomological’, because the equations are not 
“advanced as general laws.” When defending law-like explanations and the existence of 
laws in the special sciences, it is customary to point out that even the laws of physics do 
not always meet the ideals of the D-N model. That is, physical laws are often not 
spatiotemporally universal or free of exceptions, ceteris paribus clauses, idealizations and 
approximations. We are happpy however to forgo  the word law in favor of Bechtel’s 
phrase “organizational principles.” For example, in network-based explanations the 
organizing principles include the aforementioned “power laws”,  involving self-
similarity, scale-invariance and fractal patterning in space and time. Thirdly, while it may 
be true that one aspect of evaluating the adequacy of a computational model is that the 
parts and operations it describes are discovered through traditional techniques of 
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decomposition, it should be clear that the brain networks being described here are non-
decomposable and non-localizable. There is a degree of functional decomposition for 
these networks but not structural decomposition.  That is, localization is simply beside 
the point. 
There is no question that graphical and dynamical simulations do describe mechanisms, 
but they are not merely abstract descriptions of structural mechanisms. The key question 
here is what’s really doing the explanatory work and the answer in this case is not in the 
structural or lower level mechanistic details. The simulations are not merely idealizations 
and approximations of such lower level structural interactions. Kaplan and Craver would 
claim that these models are mechanistic because they meet the “3M” criterion.
In successful explanatory models in cognitive and systems neuroscience (a) the 
variables in the model correspond to components, activities, properties, and 
organizational features of the target mechanism that produces, maintains, or 
underlies the phenomenon, and (b) the (perhaps mathematical) dependencies 
posited among these variables in the model correspond to the (perhaps 
quantifiable) causal relations among the components of the target mechanism 
(2011, 611).
If what Kaplan and Craver mean to assert here is that any explanation proffered by a 
mathematical model of a mechanism is only truly explanatory if and only if said 
explanation can be reduced to or simply mapped onto the lower level structural features 
of the mechanism, then such mathematical models fail to be explanatory. Again, these 
graphical and dynamical models are non-decomposable and non-localizable. Otherwise, 
networks-based explanation easily meet the 3M criteria.
The key question is whether brains have the topological architectures they do in virtue of 
their structural mechanisms, or vice-versa? Or put another way, in virtue of what do 
graph theoretic models explain? As Bechtel himself admits, in such non-decomposable 
complex systems, the global topological features act as order-parameters (collective 
variables) that greatly constrain the behavior of the structural elements. As Sporns puts it, 
“a reentrant system operates less as a hierarchy and more as a heterarchy, where super-
and subordinate levels are indistinct, most interactions are circular, and control is 
decentralized” (2011, 193). The dynamical interactions here are recurrent, recursive and 
reentrant. So there is no sense in which the arrow of explanation or determination is in 
principle exclusively from the ‘lower level’ structural to the ‘higher’ level graphical-
dynamical. There is no structural, reductive or “downward-looking” explanation for the 
essential graphical properties of brain networks. Simply put, such global organizational 
principles or features of complex systems are not explicable in principle via localization 
and decomposition.
This is true for many reasons. The aforementioned many-one relationship between the 
structural and graphical features illustrates that specific structural features are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for determining global topological features. That is, topological 
features such as the properties of small-world networks exhibit a kind of “universality” 
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with respect to lower level structural details. This is why in complex systems research 
part of the goal is to discover power laws and other scale-invariant relations.  These laws 
allow us to predict and explain the behavior and future time evolution of the global state 
of the system regardless of its structural implementation. It turns out the reason power 
laws are predictive and unifying is that they show why the macroscopic dynamics and 
topological features obtain across diverse lower level structural details. And the why has 
nothing to do with similar structural details of the disparate systems.  
A very brief and informal characterization of universality might be helpful here. There 
are many cases of universality in physics at diverse scales, but the general idea is that a 
number of microphysically heterogeneous systems, sometimes even obeying different 
fundamental equations of motion, end up exhibiting the same phenomenological 
behavior. When this happens we say such systems share the same critical exponents and 
thus all belong to the same universality class.  The explanandum of universality is the 
uniformity and convergence of large-scale behavior across many very diverse instances. 
That is, universality is a feature of classes of systems, not a specific system. The 
Renormalization Group analysis (RG) explains why specific physical systems divide into 
distinct universality classes in terms of the geometry or topology of the state space of 
systems, i.e., the so-called fixed points of the renormalization flow. Hamiltonians 
describing heterogeneous physical systems fall into the basin of attraction of the same 
renormalization group fixed point. The space of Hamiltonians contains numerous fixed 
points, each of which is describing different universality classes with different critical 
exponents and scaling functions. The microphysically diverse systems in the same 
universality class will exhibit a continuous phase transition, near which, their analogous 
macroscopic quantities will obey power laws possessing exactly the same numerical 
values of the critical exponents. The quantitative behavior near phase transitions exhibits 
this universality wherein the values of the exponents are identical.
What is interesting here is that techniques such as RG methods from statistical mechanics 
are being successfully applied to complex biological systems that don’t have uniform 
parts. The occurrence of scale-invariance and hence self-similarity is the deeper reason 
why microphysically and mechanistically diverse systems can exhibit very similar or 
even identical macroscopic behavior. Thus, there is a direct route from power law 
behavior, scale-invariance and self-similarity to explaining why universality is true even 
in complex biological systems. Global topological features cannot be predicted from or 
derived ab initio from the structural features, because these are qualitatively different 
types of properties.  
We take no position over whether these are genuine laws: we agree with Woodward 
(2003) that there is no need to determine whether something is a genuine law or a mere 
invariance to determine whether it can be used in explanation. The manner of explanation 
involved here is distinctly nomological. The laws found in systems neuroscience have 
more in common with laws found in physics than most special science laws. This is not 
surprising since the formal methods involved are mostly imported from physics. In fact, 
when it comes to the traditional virtues one expects of laws (e.g., quantifiability, 
universality, predictive power, satisfaction of counterfactual conditionals, explanatory 
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power, simplicity, unification, etc.), the laws in systems neuroscience are no worse off 
than most laws in physics.
Explanations in systems neuroscience are highly pluralistic involving aspects of 
mechanistic, dynamical, various causal and statistical-causal explanations.   Many 
explanatory techniques are used in this endeavor including a host of causal and statistical 
modeling techniques and variety of formal/statistical measures of complexity. There are 
various hybrids of these explanatory patterns as well. Therefore systems neuroscience 
embraces explanatory and causal pluralism as a matter of pragmatic explanatory 
practice. However, the norms of such systems neuroscience explanations decidedly 
transcend those of localization. 
Following Woodward (2003), many mechanists such as Kaplan and Craver (2011) have 
adopted an interventionist account of mechanistic explanation in which a mechanistic 
explanation is only explanatory if it allows us to manipulate various “knobs and levers” 
of the mechanism thereby providing us with some control over the manifestation of the 
phenomenon. Said control should allow us to “predict” how the system will behave if 
certain parts are broken, knocked-out, altered, etc. Kaplan and Craver allege that one of 
the things that separates dynamical explanations from real (causal) explanations, is that 
the former do not allow for intervention, manipulation or control.  However, explanations 
in systems neuroscience are consistent with manipulationist or interventionist theories of 
explanation in general. Indeed, not just structural decompositions, but also dynamical and 
graphical explanations, can be and often are interventionist explanations. Mechanistic 
accounts of explanation that focus on localization and decomposition have no monopoly 
on interventionist explanation. There is nothing that says the knobs being tweaked must 
be structural components, they can also be global nomological features such as order-
parameters or laws.  
The kinds of complex biological systems under discussion here present a problem for any 
simplistic interventionist mechanistic model however. For example, often knock-out type 
experiments reveal that because of various types of plasticity, robustness/degeneracy and 
autonomy in complex biological systems, turning specific structural elements on or off, 
such as genes, has no discernable or predictable effect. In other words, we learn that such 
systems are non-decomposable and thus not amenable to localization. Needless to say, 
global organizational features such as plasticity, robustness, degeneracy and autonomy 
are not explicable via localization either. Therefore, very often the type of efficacious and 
informative manipulations one performs on such systems involves not structural 
components but global features such as order-parameters.  
4. Conclusion. We have been arguing that the kinds of explanation common in systems 
neuroscience do not involve decomposition and localization.  This would seem to make 
them non-mechanistic. It makes no difference us whether the mechanists want to stretch 
mechanistic explanation to include explanations wherein localization or decomposition 
fail, or whether they want to acknowledge that there are counter-examples to mechanistic 
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explanation in systems neuroscience. We do think however that these are the only options 
remaining to the mechanist. 
We have seen that: 1) there are mathematical explanations in systems neuroscience that 
are not grounded in localization and decomposition in principle, 2) mathematical 
explanations in systems neuroscience are complementary to explanations via localization 
and decomposition but not reducible to them, 3) while one can sometimes map structural 
elements onto mathematical explanations in systems neuroscience, the mapping is at least 
many-one and does not allow for structural decomposition or localization and 4) systems 
neuroscience really does provide an explanatory alternative to localization and 
decomposition that greatly transcends mere “predictivism.”  
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♣❤②s✐❝s✱ ✇❡ ❛r❣✉❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ✇✐❞❡s♣r❡❛❞ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ❢r❡❡✲❢❛❧❧ ♠❛ss✐✈❡
❜♦❞✐❡s ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡ q✉❛❧✐✜❡s ❛s ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ❲❡ t❤❡♥ s❤♦✇
❤♦✇ t❤✐s ♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥❡❞ ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❡s ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞
✇✐t❤ str✐❝t ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ✐♥ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✳
✶ ■♥tr♦❞✉❝t✐♦♥
■♥ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ♦r✐❣✐♥❛❧ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✐♦♥ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ t❤❡♦r② ♦❢ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✱ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐✲
t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✇❛s ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❡❞ ❜② t✇♦ ❧❛✇s✿ ❚❤❡ ✜rst ✭♠♦r❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧✮ ❧❛✇ ❝♦♥s✐st❡❞ ♦❢
❤✐s ❝❡❧❡❜r❛t❡❞ ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s ❞❡s❝r✐❜✐♥❣ ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ❣❡♦♠❡tr② ♦❢ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ✐s ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡❞ ❜②
t❤❡ ✢♦✇ ♦❢ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣②✳ ❚❤❡ s❡❝♦♥❞ ❣♦✈❡r♥✐♥❣ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡✱ r❡❢❡rr❡❞ t♦ ❛s t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥✲
❝✐♣❧❡✱ t❤❡♥ ♣r♦✈✐❞❡s t❤❡ ✏❧❛✇ ♦❢ ♠♦t✐♦♥✑ ❢♦r ❤♦✇ ❛ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞② ✇✐❧❧ ✏s✉r❢ t❤❡ ❣❡♦♠❡tr✐❝
✜❡❧❞✑ ❛s ✐t ♠♦✈❡s t❤r♦✉❣❤ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡✳ ❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ t❤✐s ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ❛ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞② tr❛❝❡s
∗❚❤❛♥❦s t♦ ❏♦❤♥ ◆♦rt♦♥✱ ❘♦❜❡rt ❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥✱ ❛♥❞ ❇❛❧á③s ●②❡♥✐s ❢♦r ♠❛♥② ❤❡❧♣❢✉❧ ❝♦♥✈❡rs❛t✐♦♥s✳
✶
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♦✉t t❤❡ ✏str❛✐❣❤t❡st ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡✑ ♦r ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣❛t❤s ♦❢ t❤❡ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ❣❡♦♠❡tr②✳ ◆♦t ❧♦♥❣ ❛❢t❡r
t❤❡ t❤❡♦r②✬s ✐♥✐t✐❛❧ ✐♥tr♦❞✉❝t✐♦♥✱ ✐t ❜❡❝❛♠❡ ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t t❤❛t t❤❡ ✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t ♣♦st✉❧❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢
t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ t♦ ♣r♦✈✐❞❡ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r②✬s ❧❛✇ ♦❢ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ✇❛s r❡❞✉♥❞❛♥t✳ ■♥ ❝♦♥tr❛st t♦
❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❡❧❡❝tr♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❛♥❞ ◆❡✇t♦♥✐❛♥ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥✱ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t② s❡❡♠❡❞ s♣❡❝✐❛❧ ✐♥
t❤❛t ✐ts ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ♣r♦✈✐❞✐♥❣ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ❝♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ ❞❡r✐✈❡❞ ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❢r♦♠ t❤❡ ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✳
❚❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐s ♥♦t ❧♦❣✐❝❛❧❧② ✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t ♦❢ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞
❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✱ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧❧② ✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❡❞ ❛s ♣r♦✈✐❞✐♥❣ ❛ ♣r❡❝✐s❡ ♣r❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥
❢♦r t❤❡ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝❛❧ ❡✈♦❧✉t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t② ❞♦❡s ♥♦t ❢♦❧❧♦✇ ❢r♦♠
❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✳ ❚♦ t❤❡ ❝♦♥tr❛r②✱ ✐♥ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮ ✐t ✇❛s ❛r❣✉❡❞ t❤❛t ✉♥❞❡r t❤❡
❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧ ✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❛t✐♦♥✱ ♥♦t ♦♥❧② ❞♦❡s t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ❢❛✐❧ t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇ ❢r♦♠ t❤❡ ✜❡❧❞
❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✱ ❜✉t s✉❝❤ ❡①❛❝t❧② ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ❡✈♦❧✉t✐♦♥ ✇♦✉❧❞ ❣❡♥❡r✐❝❛❧❧② ✈✐♦❧❛t❡ t❤❡ ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s
❢♦r ♥♦♥✲✈❛♥✐s❤✐♥❣ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✳ ■♥ s❤♦rt✱ ✉♥❞❡r t❤❡ ❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧ ✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❛t✐♦♥ t❤❡ t✇♦
❧❛✇s ❛r❡ ♥♦t ❡✈❡♥ ❝♦♥s✐st❡♥t✳
❉❡s♣✐t❡ t❤✐s ❢❛✐❧✉r❡✱ t❤❡ ✇✐❞❡s♣r❡❛❞ ✏❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t❡❧② ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝✑ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❢r❡❡✲❢❛❧❧ ❜♦❞✐❡s
♠✉st ♥♦t ❜❡ ❞❡♥✐❡❞✳ ❚❤❡ ♥❡❛r❧②✲❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ❡✈♦❧✉t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐s ✇❡❧❧ ❝♦♥✜r♠❡❞
✇✐t❤✐♥ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ♠❛r❣✐♥s ♦❢ ❡rr♦r✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ s♦♠❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♠♦st ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ❝♦♥✜r♠❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢
❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✱ ✐♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss✐❝ r❡❝♦✈❡r② ♦❢ t❤❡ ♦t❤❡r✇✐s❡ ❛♥♦♠❛❧♦✉s ♣❡r✐❤❡❧✐♦♥ ♦❢
▼❡r❝✉r②✱ ❛❧s♦ ❛♣♣❡❛r t♦ ❝♦♥✜r♠ t❤❡ ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t❡❧② ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✳
❚❤✐s ❛❜✉♥❞❛♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t ❝♦♥✜r♠❛t✐♦♥ s✉❣❣❡sts t❤❛t t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ❝❧❛✐♠ t❤❛t ♠❛ss✐✈❡
❜♦❞✐❡s ♠✉st ❡①❛❝t❧② ❢♦❧❧♦✇ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝s ❢❛✐❧s t♦ ❝♦❤❡r❡ ✇✐t❤ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✱ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧✲
❧♦✇✐♥❣ ♠❛② ❝♦♥st✐t✉t❡ s♦♠❡ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ♦r ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t❡❧② ❝♦rr❡❝t ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ ♦❢
❤♦✇ ❣❡♥❡r✐❝ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❜❡❤❛✈❡✳
❲❡ ♠✉st ❤❡♥❝❡ r❡❝♦♥❝✐❧❡ ❛♥ ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t ❞✐❧❡♠♠❛✿ ❖♥ t❤❡ ♦♥❡ ❤❛♥❞ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣
❛♣♣❡❛rs ✐❧❧✉str❛t✐✈❡ ❛s ❛♥ ✐❞❡❛❧ ♦❢ t❤❡ tr✉❡ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✳ ❖♥ t❤❡ ♦t❤❡r ❤❛♥❞ t❤❡
❛r❣✉♠❡♥ts ❛❣❛✐♥st t❤❡ ❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧ ✈✐❡✇ ✐♥ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮ r❡✈❡❛❧ t❤❛t ♥♦♥✲✈❛♥✐s❤✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s
t❤❛t ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ❢♦❧❧♦✇ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝s ✇♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ ❤✐❣❤❧② ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ✇✐t❤ r❡s♣❡❝t t♦ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r②✱
s✉❣❣❡st✐♥❣ t❤❛t t❤❡② ❛r❡ ♥♦t s✉✐t❛❜❧❡ ❛s ✐❞❡❛❧ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ♠♦❞❡❧s✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❡✈❡♥ ✐❢ ✇❡
✇❡r❡ t♦ ❛❞♦♣t s✉❝❤ ♠♦❞❡❧s ❛s ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s✱ ✐♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❣❛✐♥ ❦♥♦✇❧❡❞❣❡ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ♣❛t❤s ♦❢
❛❝t✉❛❧ ❜♦❞✐❡s✱ ✐t ✐s ✉♥❝❧❡❛r ❤♦✇ t♦ ❞r❛✇ ❝♦♥❝❧✉s✐♦♥s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ♥♦♥✲♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❝❛s❡s ❜②
❝♦♥s✐❞❡r✐♥❣ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ♠♦❞❡❧s t❤❛t ❛r❡ ❣❡♥❡r✐❝❛❧❧② ✐♥❝♦♠♣❛t✐❜❧❡ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r②✳
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■♥ t❤✐s ♣❛♣❡r✱ ✇❡ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤ s✉❝❤ ❛ r❡❝♦♥❝✐❧✐❛t✐♦♥ ❜② ❛r❣✉✐♥❣ t❤❛t✱ ✐♥ ❧✐❣❤t ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢❛✐❧✉r❡ ♦❢
t❤❡ ❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧ ✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❛t✐♦♥✱ t❤❡ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ s❤♦✉❧❞ ✐♥st❡❛❞ ❜❡ ❛❞♦♣t❡❞ ❛s ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② t❤❡✲
s✐s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s t❤❛t ❡①❤✐❜✐t ♥❡❛r❧②✲❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝
♠♦t✐♦♥✳ ■♥ s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✷✱ ✇❡ ♣r♦♣♦s❡ ❛♥ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡✲
♥♦♠❡♥❛ t♦ ❞❡s✐❣♥❛t❡ ❛ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ♦❢ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❡①❤✐❜✐t❡❞ ❛❝r♦ss ❛ ✇✐❞❡ ❝❧❛ss
♦❢ ✭♦st❡♥s✐❜❧② ❞✐✈❡rs❡✮ s②st❡♠s ♦❢ ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r t❤❡♦r②✳ ❯s✐♥❣ t❤✐s ❛♥❛❧②s✐s✱ ✐♥ s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✸✱
✇❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥ ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ♥❡❛r❧② ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥✉♠❡r♦✉s ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ s②st❡♠s
❝♦✉♥ts ❛s s✉❝❤ ❛ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ✇✐t❤✐♥ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡❧② ❝❧♦s❡ ✭t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧✮ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞s ♦❢ ❛♥✲
❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧s t❤❛t ❡①❤✐❜✐t ♣❡r❢❡❝t ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥✳ ❋✐♥❛❧❧②✱ ✐♥ s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✹✱ ✇❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥ ✇❤②
s✉❝❤ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❡♠♣❧♦②❡❞ t♦ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ t❤✐s ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡✲
❛❧✐st✐❝ ♠♦❞❡❧s✱ ✇✐t❤♦✉t ❤❛✈✐♥❣ t♦ r❡✐❢② t❤❡ ♣r♦❜❧❡♠ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♦r t❛❦❡ t❤❡♠ ❛s r❡♣r❡s❡♥t❛t✐✈❡
♦❢ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s✳
✷ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐♥ P❤②s✐❝s
❚❤❡ ❛r❣✉♠❡♥ts ♦❢ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮ r❡✈❡❛❧ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ❝❛♥♥♦t ❜❡ ✉s❡❞ t♦
♣r❡s❝r✐❜❡ t❤❡ ♣r❡❝✐s❡ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✳ ◆❡✈❡rt❤❡❧❡ss✱ t❤❡
❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡✱ ❞❡♠♦t❡❞ ❢r♦♠ t❤❡ st❛t✉s ♦❢ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ ❧❛✇ t♦ ❛ t❤❡s✐s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❣❡♥✲
❡r❛❧ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s✱ ♠❛② st✐❧❧ ❜❡ ♦❢ ✈❛❧✉❡ t♦ ♦✉r ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞✐♥❣
❣❡♥❡r✐❝ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✳ ❚❤❡ ❝❤❛❧❧❡♥❣❡ ✐s t♦ ✜♥❞ ❛♥ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐✲
❛t❡ ✇❛② ♦❢ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③✐♥❣ s✉❝❤ ✏♥❡❛r❧② ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝✑ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t♦ ♣❡r❢❡❝t
❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ✐♥ ❧✐❣❤t ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t ❛tt❡♠♣ts t♦ ♠♦❞❡❧ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s
t❤❛t ❝♦✉❧❞ st❛❜❧② ❢♦❧❧♦✇ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝s ❡♥❞ ✉♣ ✈✐♦❧❛t✐♥❣ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✳ ■❢ s✉❝❤ ❛
r❡✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ✐s ✇❡❧❧✲❢♦✉♥❞❡❞✱ ✇❡ ♠✉st ❥✉st✐❢② ✐ts ❡♥❞♦rs❡♠❡♥t ✐♥ t❤❡
❢❛❝❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❦✐♥❞s ♦❢ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❡s ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥✳ ❚❤✐s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❞♦♥❡
❜② ✐♥t❡r♣r❡t✐♥❣ t❤❡ r♦❜✉st ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♣❛tt❡r♥s ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡ ❛s ❛
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✳ ■♥ t❤✐s s❡❝t✐♦♥✱ ✇❡ ❜❡❣✐♥ ✇✐t❤ ❛♥ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ t❤✐s ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✬s
✉s❡ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s✳
✸
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❋✐❣✉r❡ ✷✳✶✿ P❤❛s❡ ❞✐❛❣r❛♠ ♦❢ ❛ ❣❡♥❡r✐❝ ♠❛t❡r✐❛❧ ❛t ✜①❡❞ ❞❡♥s✐t②✳
✷✳✶ ❚❤❡ P❛r❛❞✐❣♠ ❈❛s❡✿ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐♥ P❤❛s❡ ❚r❛♥s✐t✐♦♥s
❚❤❡ ♥♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥ ✇❛s ✐♥✐t✐❛❧❧② ❝♦✐♥❡❞ t♦ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ ❛ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡
❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ t❤❡r♠❛❧ s②st❡♠s ✉♥❞❡r❣♦✐♥❣ ♣❤❛s❡ tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥s✱ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r❧②
t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ s②st❡♠s ✐♥ t❤❡ ✈✐❝✐♥✐t② ♦❢ ❛ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝ st❛t❡ ❝❛❧❧❡❞ t❤❡ ✏❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t✳✑
■♥ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s t❤❡ st❛t❡ ♦❢ ❛ s②st❡♠ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ t❤r❡❡ st❛t❡ ✈❛r✐❛❜❧❡s
♣r❡ss✉r❡✱ t❡♠♣❡r❛t✉r❡✱ ❛♥❞ ❞❡♥s✐t②✳ ❆❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ t❤❡ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝ st✉❞② ♦❢ ♣❤❛s❡
tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥s✱ ✇❤❡♥ t❤❡ st❛t❡ ♦❢ ❛ s②st❡♠ ✐s ❦❡♣t ❜❡❧♦✇ t❤❡ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ✏❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t✑ ✈❛❧✲
✉❡s (Pc, Tc, ρc) ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ s✉❜st❛♥❝❡✱ ♣❤❛s❡ tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥ ❜♦✉♥❞❛r✐❡s ❝♦rr❡s♣♦♥❞ t♦
❞✐s❝r❡t❡ ❝❤❛♥❣❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ s②st❡♠ ✭s✐❣♥✐✜❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✶ ❜② t❤❡ t❤✐❝❦ ❜❧❛❝❦ ❧✐♥❡s✮✳ ■❢✱ ❤♦✇✲
❡✈❡r✱ ❛ s②st❡♠ ✐s ❛❧❧♦✇❡❞ t♦ ❡①❝❡❡❞ ✐ts ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ✈❛❧✉❡s✱ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐st ♣❛t❤s ❛✈❛✐❧❛❜❧❡ t♦ t❤❡
s②st❡♠ ❛❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ✐t t♦ ❝❤❛♥❣❡ ❢r♦♠ ✈❛♣♦r t♦ ❧✐q✉✐❞ ✭♦r ❜❛❝❦✮ ✇✐t❤♦✉t ✉♥❞❡r❣♦✐♥❣ s✉❝❤ ❞✐s✲
❝r❡t❡ ❝❤❛♥❣❡s✳ ❚❤❡s❡ ♣❛t❤s ✐♥✈♦❧✈❡ ❛✈♦✐❞✐♥❣ t❤❡ ✈❛♣♦r✲❧✐q✉✐❞ ❜♦✉♥❞❛r② ❧✐♥❡ ❜② ♥❛✈✐❣❛t✐♥❣
❛r♦✉♥❞ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t ❛s ❞❡♣✐❝t❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❜r♦❛❞ ❛rr♦✇ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✶✳
❚❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts ❛ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡ ✉♥✐❢♦r♠✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t s②st❡♠s ♥❡❛r t❤❡ ❝r✐t✲
✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t✳ ❖♥❡ s✉❝❤ ✉♥✐❢♦r♠✐t② ✐s ❞❡♣✐❝t❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷✳ ■♥ t❤✐s ✜❣✉r❡ ✇❡ s❡❡ ❛ ♣❧♦t ♦❢ ❞❛t❛
r❡❝♦✈❡r❡❞ ❜② ●✉❣❣❡♥❤❡✐♠ ✭✶✾✹✺✮ ✐♥ ❛ t❡♠♣❡r❛t✉r❡✲❞❡♥s✐t② ❣r❛♣❤ ♦❢ t❤❡ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝
✹
San Diego, CA -339-
❋✐❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷✿ ❆❞❛♣t❡❞ ♣❧♦t ♦❢ ✭●✉❣❣❡♥❤❡✐♠✱ ✶✾✹✺✮ ❞❛t❛ r❡s❝❛❧❡❞ ❢♦r ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t②✳
st❛t❡s ❛t ✇❤✐❝❤ ✈❛r✐♦✉s ✢✉✐❞s tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥ ❢r♦♠ ❛ ❧✐q✉✐❞ ♦r ✈❛♣♦r st❛t❡ t♦ ❛ ✏t✇♦ ♣❤❛s❡✑
❧✐q✉✐❞✲✈❛♣♦r ❝♦❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ r❡❣✐♦♥✳ ❙②st❡♠s ✐♥ st❛t❡s ❧♦❝❛t❡❞ ✐♥ t❤✐s ❧❛tt❡r r❡❣✐♦♥ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ✐♥
❧✐q✉✐❞ ♦r ✈❛♣♦r ♣❤❛s❡s ❛♥❞ ✭❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s✮ ♠❛✐♥t❛✐♥s ❝♦♥st❛♥t t❡♠♣❡r❛✲
t✉r❡ ❛s t❤❡ ❞❡♥s✐t② ♦❢ t❤❡ s②st❡♠ ❝❤❛♥❣❡s✳ ❆♥ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ❢❡❛t✉r❡ ❡①❤✐❜✐t❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷ ✐s
t❤❛t ✭❛❢t❡r r❡s❝❛❧✐♥❣ ❢♦r t❤❡ ρc ❛♥❞ Tc ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♠♦❧❡❝✉❧❡s✮ t❤❡ tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥ ♣♦✐♥ts ♦❢
t❤❡ ❡❛❝❤ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❞✐st✐♥❝t s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s ♥❡❛r ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ❛♣♣❡❛rs t♦ ❜❡ ✇❡❧❧ ✜t ❜② ❛ s✐♥❣❧❡ ❝✉r✈❡
r❡❢❡rr❡❞ t♦ ❛s t❤❡ ❝♦❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ ❝✉r✈❡✳ ❚❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝♦❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ ❝✉r✈❡s ❜❡st ✜tt✐♥❣
❞✐✈❡rs❡ ♠♦❧❡❝✉❧❛r s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ❜② ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ✈❛❧✉❡ β r❡❢❡rr❡❞ t♦ ❛s
t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥✿
Ψ(T ) ∝
∣
∣
∣
∣
T − Tc
Tc
∣
∣
∣
∣
β
✭✶✮
✇❤❡r❡ t❤❡ ♣❛r❛♠❡t❡r Ψ(T )✱ ❝❛❧❧❡❞ t❤❡ ♦r❞❡r ♣❛r❛♠❡t❡r t❡❧❧s ✉s t❤❡ ✇✐❞t❤ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝♦❡①✐st❡♥❝❡
❝✉r✈❡ ❛t ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r t❡♠♣❡r❛t✉r❡ ✈❛❧✉❡ T ✳ ❆s ❞❡♣✐❝t❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷✱ ❛s T ❣❡ts ❝❧♦s❡r
❛♥❞ ❝❧♦s❡r t♦ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ t❡♠♣❡r❛t✉r❡ Tc ❢r♦♠ ❜❡❧♦✇✱ t❤✐s ✇✐❞t❤ ❞r♦♣s ❞♦✇♥ ❡✈❡♥t✉❛❧❧②
✺
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✈❛♥✐s❤✐♥❣ ❛t ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t②✳ ❲❡ ❝❛♥ t❤✐♥❦ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t β ❛s t❡❧❧✐♥❣ ✉s ❛❜♦✉t ❤♦✇
r❛♣✐❞❧② s✉❝❤ ❛ ✈❛♥✐s❤✐♥❣ ♦❝❝✉rs✳ ❆s ❝♦♥✜r♠❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❛❜♦✈❡ ❞❛t❛✱ t❤✐s ♥✉♠❜❡r t✉r♥s ♦✉t
t♦ ❜❡ s✐♠✐❧❛r ✭✐♥ t❤❡ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞ ♦❢ β ≃ .33✮ ❢♦r ✈❛st❧② ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t ✢✉✐❞ s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s✳✶
❲❤❛t ✐s ❢❛s❝✐♥❛t✐♥❣ ❛❜♦✉t ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s s✉❝❤ ❛s t❤✐s ✐s ♥♦t t❤❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧ ✭♦r ✏♥❡❛r❧②✑ ✉♥✐✲
✈❡rs❛❧✮ r❡❣✉❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s✳ ❚❤❛t ✉♥✐❢♦r♠ r❡❧✐❛❜❧❡ r❡❣✉❧❛r✐t✐❡s ✭✈✐③✳ ✏✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧
❧❛✇s✑✮ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❢♦✉♥❞ t♦ ❛♣♣❧② t♦ ♥✉♠❡r♦✉s ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ✭t❤♦✉❣❤ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡✮ ✐s ♥♦t❤✐♥❣
♥❡✇✳ ❚❤❡ ✐♥t❡r❡st✐♥❣ ♣❛rt ✐s t❤❛t s✉❝❤ ✉♥✐❢♦r♠ r❡❧✐❛❜❧❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❝❝✉rs ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t
❛t ❧❡❛st ❛t ♦♥❡ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❛r❡ s♦ ✐♥❝r❡❞✐❜❧② ❞✐ss✐♠✐❧❛r✳ ❋r♦♠ ❛ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢
❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ t❤♦✉❣❤t t♦ ❜❡ ♣❡r❤❛♣s ♠♦r❡ ✏❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧✑ t❤❛♥ t❤❡ ❣r♦ss st❛t❡ ✈❛r✐❛❜❧❡s ✭P ✱
T ✱ ❛♥❞ ρ✮ ✉s❡❞ t♦ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝ s②st❡♠s✱ t❤❡ ✈❛r✐♦✉s s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣
s✐♠✐❧❛r ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t ✈❛❧✉❡s ❤❛✈❡ q✉✐t❡ ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s✿ ❆t t❤❡ q✉❛♥t✉♠ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✲
✐❝❛❧ ❧❡✈❡❧✱ ❢♦r ✐♥st❛♥❝❡✱ t❤❡ st❛t❡ ✈❡❝t♦rs ♦r ❞❡♥s✐t② ♠❛tr✐❝❡s r❡♣r❡s❡♥t✐♥❣ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡
q✉❛♥t✉♠ ♠✐①t✉r❡s ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ ✐♥❝r❡❞✐❜❧② ❞✐st✐♥❝t ✭❡✳❣✳ ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ♦rt❤♦❣♦♥❛❧✮✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ✇❡
♥❡❡❞ ♥♦t ❣♦ ❞♦✇♥ t♦ ❛ q✉❛♥t✉♠ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ t♦ r❡❝♦❣♥✐③❡ t❤❡ ✈❛st ❞✐✈❡rs✐t②✳ ❋r♦♠ ❛
❝❤❡♠✐❝❛❧ ♣❡rs♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♠♦♥♦t♦♥✐❝ ♥❡♦♥ ✐s ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t ❢r♦♠ ❛ ❞✐❛t♦♠✐❝ ♦①②❣❡♥ ♠♦❧❡❝✉❧❡✱ ♦r ❛♥
❛s②♠♠❡tr✐❝❛❧ ❝❛r❜♦♥ ♠♦♥♦①✐❞❡ ♠♦❧❡❝✉❧❡✳ ❲❡ ♠✐❣❤t ❤❡♥❝❡ ❡①♣❡❝t s✉r♣r✐s❡ ❢r♦♠ ❛ ♣❤②s✐✲
❝✐st ♦r ❝❤❡♠✐st s✐♥❝❡ ❞❡s♣✐t❡ s✉❝❤ ✈❛st ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ ♦st❡♥s✐❜❧② ♣❡rt✐♥❡♥t ❞❡t❛✐❧s ❛t
t❤❡s❡ ❧❡✈❡❧s ♦❢ t❤❡♦r✐③✐♥❣✱ t❤❡ s✉❜st❛♥❝❡s st✐❧❧ s❤❛r❡ t❤✐s ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t②✳ ❚❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r✲
✐t② ❞❡s♣✐t❡ s✉❝❤ ✭s♣❡❝✐♦✉s❧② r❡❧❡✈❛♥t✮ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐s ✇❤❛t ❞✐st✐♥❣✉✐s❤❡s t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❛❝r♦ss
t❤❡r♠❛❧ s②st❡♠s ❛s ❛ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ■♥ t❤❡ ♥❡①t s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✇❡ ❜❡❣✐♥ ❛
♠♦r❡ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✬s ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ❛♣♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s✳
❚❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ✉s❛❣❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ t❡r♠ ♦r✐❣✐♥❛t❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ st✉❞② ♦❢ t❤❡r♠❛❧ s②st❡♠s✱ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❤❛s ♥♦✇ ❜❡❡♥ ✐❞❡♥t✐✜❡❞ ✐♥ ❛ ♠✉❧t✐t✉❞❡ ♦❢ ♦t❤❡r ❞♦♠❛✐♥s✳ ❖✈❡r t❤❡ ♣❛st ❞❡❝❛❞❡✱ ❘♦❜❡rt
❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥ ❤❛s ❛r❣✉❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ ♣❤✐❧♦s♦♣❤✐❝❛❧ ❧✐t❡r❛t✉r❡ t❤❛t ✏✇❤✐❧❡ ♠♦st ❞✐s❝✉ss✐♦♥s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✲
✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❛♥❞ ✐ts ❡①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥ t❛❦❡ ♣❧❛❝❡ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♦❢ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❛♥❞ st❛t✐st✐❝❛❧
♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s✱✳✳✳ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ✐s r❡❛❧❧② ✉❜✐q✉✐t♦✉s ✐♥ s❝✐❡♥❝❡✑ ✭❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥✱ ✷✵✵✷✮✳ ❆ ✭❢❛r
❢r♦♠ ❝♦♠♣r❡❤❡♥s✐✈❡✮ ❧✐st ♦❢ ✈✐♥❞✐❝❛t✐♥❣ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s ✐♥❝❧✉❞❡s t❤❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥
❝♦♥t❡①ts ✐♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ ♥♦♥✲t❤❡r♠❛❧ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ♣❛tt❡r♥s ❡①❤✐❜✐t❡❞ ✐♥ ❛✈❛❧❛♥❝❤❡ ❛♥❞ ❡❛rt❤q✉❛❦❡
✶❚❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ✈❛❧✉❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t ❡①✐sts ♥♦t ♦♥❧② ❢♦r t❤❡r♠❛❧ ✢✉✐❞ s②st❡♠s✱ ❜✉t ❛❧s♦
✐♥ ❞❡s❝r✐❜✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❢❡rr♦♠❛❣♥❡t✐❝ s②st❡♠s ✐♥ t❤❡ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞ ♦❢ ❛ t❤❡r♠❛❧ st❛t❡ t❤❛t ❝❛♥ ❜❡
❛♥❛❧♦❣♦✉s❧② ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ❛s t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ♣♦✐♥t✳
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♠♦❞❡❧✐♥❣ ✭❑❛❞❛♥♦✛ ❡t ❛❧✳✱ ✶✾✽✾❀ ▲✐s❡ ❛♥❞ P❛❝③✉s❦✐✱ ✷✵✵✶✮✱ ❡①t✐♥❝t✐♦♥ ♠♦❞❡❧✐♥❣ ✐♥ ♣♦♣✉❧❛✲
t✐♦♥ ❣❡♥❡t✐❝s ✭❙♦❧❡ ❛♥❞ ▼❛♥r✉❜✐❛✱ ✶✾✾✻✮✱ ❛♥❞ ❜❡❧✐❡❢ ♣r♦♣❛❣❛t✐♦♥ ♠♦❞❡❧✐♥❣ ✐♥ ♠✉❧t✐✲❛❣❡♥t
♥❡t✇♦r❦s ✭●❧✐♥t♦♥ ❡t ❛❧✳✱ ✷✵✶✵✮✳ ❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥ ❤❛s ❞✐s❝✉ss❡❞ ♠❛♥② ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ❞✐st✐♥❝t ❢r♦♠ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✱ ✐♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ ♣❛tt❡r♥s ✐♥ r❛✐♥❜♦✇ ❢♦r♠❛t✐♦♥✱
s❡♠✐✲❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t✐♦♥✱ ❛♥❞ ❞r♦♣ ❜r❡❛❦✐♥❣✭❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥✱ ✷✵✵✷✱ ✷✵✵✺✮✳ ◆✉♠❡r♦✉s ♥♦♥✲
❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❤❛✈❡ ❛❧s♦ ❜❡❡♥ ❞✐s❝♦✈❡r❡❞ ✐♥ ❝♦♥t❡①ts s✉❝❤ ❛s t❤❡ st✉❞②
♦❢ ❝❤❛♦t✐❝ s②st❡♠s ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣ ✏✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧ r❛t✐♦s✑ ✐♥ ♣❡r✐♦❞ ❞♦✉❜❧✐♥❣ ✭❋❡✐❣❡♥❜❛✉♠✱ ✶✾✼✽❀ ❍✉
❛♥❞ ▼❛♦✱ ✶✾✽✷✮✱ ♦r t❤❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t✐❡s ✐♥ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♦❢ ❝♦❧❞ ❞❛r❦ ♠❛tt❡r ❤❛❧♦s ❢♦✉♥❞
✐♥ ❛str♦♥♦♠✐❝❛❧ ♦❜s❡r✈❛t✐♦♥s ✭◆❛✈❛rr♦ ❡t ❛❧✳✱ ✷✵✵✹✮✱ t♦ ♥❛♠❡ ❛ ❝♦✉♣❧❡✳ ■♥ t❤❡ ♥❡①t s❡❝t✐♦♥
✇❡ ♦✛❡r ❛♥ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✬s ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ ❛♣♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s✳
✷✳✷ ❚❤❡ ❙❛♠❡ ❜✉t ❉✐✛❡r❡♥t✿ ❆♥❛❧②③✐♥❣ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❚❤❡ t❡r♠ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐s ✉s❡❞ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s t♦ ❞❡s❝r✐❜❡ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❜r♦❛❞ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t✐❡s ❛r❡
❡①❤✐❜✐t❡❞ ❜② ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ❞❡s♣✐t❡ ♣♦ss✐❜❧② s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣
t♦ ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t❧② ✏♠♦r❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧✑ r❡♣r❡s❡♥t❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s✳ ❑❛❞❛♥♦✛ ✭✷✵✵✵✱ ♣✷✷✺✮
❞❡s❝r✐❜❡s t❤❡ t❡r♠ ♠♦st ❣❡♥❡r❛❧❧② ❛s ❛♣♣❧②✐♥❣ t♦ t❤♦s❡ ♣❛tt❡r♥s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ✏❬♠❪❛♥② ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧❧②
❞✐✛❡r❡♥t s②st❡♠s s❤♦✇ t❤❡ s❛♠❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r✳✑ ❇❡rr② ✭✶✾✽✼✮ ❤❛s ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ✐t ❛s t❤❡ ✏✇❛②
✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ♣❤②s✐❝✐sts ❞❡♥♦t❡ ✐❞❡♥t✐❝❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ✐♥ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t s②st❡♠s✳✑ ❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥ ✭✷✵✵✷✱ ♣✹✮
❡①♣❧❛✐♥s t❤❛t t❤❡ ✏❡ss❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✑ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❢♦✉♥❞ ✇❤❡♥ ✏♠❛♥② s②st❡♠s ❡①❤✐❜✐t s✐♠✐❧❛r
♦r ✐❞❡♥t✐❝❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t t❤❡② ❛r❡✱ ❛t ❜❛s❡✱ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧❧② q✉✐t❡ ❞✐st✐♥❝t✳✑
❈❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❛t✐♦♥s s✉❝❤ ❛s t❤❡s❡ r❡✈❡❛❧ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝♦♥❝❡♣t ❤✐♥❣❡s ♦♥ t❤❡ s❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ t❤❡
t✇♦ s❡❡♠✐♥❣❧② ❝♦♠♣❡t✐♥❣ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❞✐s♣❧❛②✐♥❣ ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ❞❡s♣✐t❡ ♦t❤❡r
✭❡✈✐❞❡♥t❧② ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t✮ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❛t s♦♠❡ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥✳ ❚♦ ♠❛❦❡
t❤✐s ❝♦♥❝❡♣t✉❛❧ ❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥❝② ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t✱ ✇❡ ♣r♦♣♦s❡ t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✳
✭❯P✮✿ ❆ ❝❧❛ss XT ♦❢ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♦❢ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ✐♥ ❛ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ s❛✐❞
t♦ ❡①❤✐❜✐t ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥ ✇❤❡♥❡✈❡r t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss ❝❛♥ s✐♠✉❧t❛♥❡♦✉s❧②
♠❡❡t t❤❡ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ t✇♦ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s✿
✭❙✐♠✮ ❚❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts ❛ r♦❜✉st s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ s♦♠❡ ♦❜s❡r✈❛❜❧❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❛❝r♦ss
✼
Philosophy of Science Assoc. 23rd Biennial Mtg -342-
t❤❡ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ ❜② ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ XT ✳
✭❱❛r✮ ❚❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ ✐♥ XT ✐s st❛✲
❜❧❡ ✉♥❞❡r r♦❜✉st ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡✐r st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦
❝♦♥t❡①t T ✳
❚❤❡ ✜rst t❤✐♥❣ t♦ s♣❡❝✐❢② ✐s ✇❤❛t ❝♦✉♥ts ❛s ❛ ✏❝❧❛ss ♦❢ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♦❢ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ✐♥ ❛
t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t✳✑ ■♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❛✈♦✐❞ ❝♦♠♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥s ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ ♠✉❧t✐♣❧❡ ✭♣♦ss✐❜❧② ♥♦t
❡♥t✐r❡❧② ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t✮ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❛ ❢✉❧❧ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ t❤❡♦r②✱ ✭❯P✮ ✐s ❜❡st ❛♥❛❧②③❡❞ ✐♥ t❡r♠s
♦❢ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ r❡str✐❝t✐✈❡ ♥♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❛ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ✇❤✐❝❤ ✐❞❡♥t✐✜❡s ✇✐t❤✐♥ ❛ ❣✐✈❡♥
t❤❡♦r② ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ ✈❛r✐❡t② ♦❢ st✉❞✐❡❞ ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✳ ❊①❛♠♣❧❡s ♦❢ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t
t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①ts ✐♥ ❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s ✐♥❝❧✉❞❡ t❤❡ ❍❛♠✐❧t♦♥✐❛♥ ✈❡rs✉s t❤❡ ▲❛❣r❛♥❣✐❛♥
❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s✱ ♦r ✐♥ q✉❛♥t✉♠ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s ✇❡ ♠✐❣❤t ❞✐st✐♥❣✉✐s❤ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥ ✇❛✈❡ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s ❛♥❞
♦♣❡r❛t♦r ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s✳✷ ❆ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♠❛② ❛❧s♦ r❡str✐❝t t❤❡ ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r❡❞ ❜②
t❤❡ t♦t❛❧ t❤❡♦r②✳ ❋♦r ❡①❛♠♣❧❡✱ s♦✉r❝❡ ❢r❡❡ ❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❡❧❡❝tr♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ♠✐❣❤t ❜❡ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r❡❞ ❛
❞✐st✐♥❝t t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t ✇✐t❤✐♥ t❤❡ ❢✉❧❧ t❤❡♦r② ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❡❧❡❝tr♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ✇❤✐❝❤ ❛❧s♦
♠♦❞❡❧s t❤❡ ❡✛❡❝ts ♦❢ s♦✉r❝❡s✳ ■♥ s♦♠❡ ❝❛s❡s ✐t ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ❢♦r ❛ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t T t♦
s♣❡❝✐❢② ❛♥ ❡♥t✐r❡ t❤❡♦r② ✉♥✐q✉❡❧②✱ ✐♥ ♦t❤❡r ❝❛s❡s✱ ❛ s♣❡❝✐✜❝❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ ✭♣♦t❡♥t✐❛❧❧②
♥♦♥❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t✮ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ❛♥❞ s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ t②♣❡s ♠❛② ❜❡ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡✳
●✐✈❡♥ ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ♦❢ ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✱ t❤❡ ❡①♣❡rt ✇✐❧❧
t②♣✐❝❛❧❧② ❜❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢② ♣❡rt✐♥❡♥t st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ✏❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ✳✑ ❋♦r
❡①❛♠♣❧❡✱ ✐♥ ❝❧❛ss✐❝❛❧ ❡❧❡❝tr♦♠❛❣♥❡t✐s♠ t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ ♠❛② ❝♦♠❡ ✐♥ t❤❡
❢♦r♠ ♦❢ ✜❡❧❞s s♣❡❝✐❢②✐♥❣ t❤❡ ✢♦✇ ♦❢ t❤❡ s♦✉r❝❡ ❝❤❛r❣❡s ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ❡❧❡❝tr♦♠❛❣♥❡t✐❝ ✜❡❧❞ ✈❛❧✉❡s
t❤r♦✉❣❤♦✉t ❛ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡❀ ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t② t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝ ❛♥❞ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠ t❡♥s♦rs
♠✐❣❤t ♣❧❛② t❤✐s r♦❧❡❀ ✐♥ t❤❡r♠♦❞②♥❛♠✐❝s✱ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♠❛② ❜❡ ♣❛r❛♠❡tr✐③❡❞ ❜② P ✱
T ✱ ❛♥❞ ρ ✭♦r ♣❡r❤❛♣s V ❛♥❞ N✮✱ ✇❤❡r❡❛s ✐♥ q✉❛♥t✉♠ st❛t✐st✐❝❛❧ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s ♦♥❡ ♠❛② ✉s❡
❞❡♥s✐t② ♦♣❡r❛t♦rs✳
❙❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭❙✐♠✮ ✐s ♣r✐♠❛r✐❧② ❛♥ ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ q✉❡st✐♦♥✳ ■♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❝❧❛✐♠ t❤❛t s♦♠❡✲
t❤✐♥❣ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✲❧✐❦❡ ✐s ♦❝❝✉rr✐♥❣✱ t❤❡r❡ ♠✉st ❜❡ ❛♥ ❡✈✐❞❡♥t s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss ♦❢ s②s✲
t❡♠s ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣ t❤❡ ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ❚❤✐s ❡✈✐❞❡♥t s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ♥❡❡❞ ♥♦t ❜❡ ✭❞✐r❡❝t❧②✮ ✐♥ t❡r♠s
✷◆♦t❡✱ ✐♥ ❜♦t❤ ❞✐❝❤♦t♦♠✐❡s t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐st ♦❝❝❛s✐♦♥❛❧ ❝✐r❝✉♠st❛♥❝❡s ♦r ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s s✉❝❤ t❤❛t t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡
❢♦r♠✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ❝❛♥ ❝❡❛s❡ t♦ ❜❡ ❡q✉✐✈❛❧❡♥t✳
✽
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♦❢ ❛♥② ♦❢ t❤❡ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ✉s❡❞ t♦ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ ❡❧❡♠❡♥ts ♦❢ XT ✳ ❙♦ ❢♦r t❤❡ ♣❛r❛❞✐❣♠
❡①❛♠♣❧❡ ♦❢ t❤❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♦❢ ♣❤❛s❡ tr❛♥s✐t✐♦♥s✱ ✭❙✐♠✮ ✐s s❛t✐s✜❡❞ ♦♥❝❡ ♣❤②s✐❝✐sts r❡❝♦✈❡r
s✉✣❝✐❡♥t ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ ❞❛t❛ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❦✐♥❞ ❞❡♣✐❝t❡❞ ✐♥ ✜❣✉r❡ ✷✳✷✳ ❚❤❡ r♦❜✉st s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ♦❢ ✭❙✐♠✮
❝❛♥ ❜❡ q✉❛♥t✐✜❡❞ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥ts ♦❢ t❤❡s❡
✈❛r✐♦✉s s②st❡♠s ❡✈❡♥ t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❡①♣♦♥❡♥t ♣❛r❛♠❡t❡r β ♠❛② ♥♦t ♥❡❝❡ss❛r✐❧② ❜❡ ♣✉t
✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ t❤❡ st❛t❡ q✉❛♥t✐t✐❡s ♦❢ T ✭❡✳❣✳ ❝❤❡♠✐str② ♦r st❛t✐st✐❝❛❧ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s✮✳
❙❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭❱❛r✮ ❞❡♣❡♥❞s ♣r✐♠❛r✐❧② ♦♥ t❤❡ s✐③❡ ❛♥❞ ♠♦st ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t❧② t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs✐t②
♦❢ t❤❡ ♠♦❞❡❧s ✐♥ ❝❧❛ss XT ✳ ❚❤❡ ❧❛r❣❡r ❛♥❞ ♠♦r❡ ✈❛r✐❡❞ t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss XT ✇✐t❤
r❡s♣❡❝t t♦ t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♦❢ T ✱ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ ✏st❛❜❧❡ ✉♥❞❡r ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s✳✑ ■❢ XT
✐s s✉✐t❛❜❧② r✐❝❤ ✇✐t❤ ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs✱ t❤❡♥ ❛ ♠❡♠❜❡r x ∈ XT ♠❛② ❜❡ ✏♠❛♣♣❡❞✑ t♦ ❛ r✐❝❤
✈❛r✐❡t② ♦❢ ♦t❤❡r ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ XT ✇❤✐❧❡ st✐❧❧ ♠❛✐♥t❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡ ✈❡r② s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② s❤❛r❡❞ ❜② ❛❧❧
♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢XT t❤❛t ❛❧❧♦✇❡❞ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss t♦ s❛t✐s❢② ✭❙✐♠✮✳ ■♥ t❤❡ ♣❛r❛❞✐❣♠ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡ ♦❢ t❤❡r♠❛❧
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ✭❱❛r✮ ✐s s❛t✐s✜❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t ❛t t❤❡ ❝❤❡♠✐❝❛❧ ♦r t❤❡ st❛t✐st✐❝❛❧ ♠❡❝❤❛♥✐❝s
❧❡✈❡❧s ♦❢ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥✱ t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ✐♥ ♦✉r ❝❧❛ss s❤❛r✐♥❣ t❤✐s s✐♠✐❧❛r ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❛r❡ s♦
❞✐✈❡rs❡✳
❲❡ ♥♦t❡ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝❡♥tr❛❧ ❝♦♥❝❡♣ts ♦❢ r♦❜✉st ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ r♦❜✉st s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ♦♥ ✇❤✐❝❤
✭❱❛r✮ ❛♥❞ ✭❙✐♠✮ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧② ❞❡♣❡♥❞ ❛r❡ ♥♦t ❜✐♥❛r②✳ ❙♦♠❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ♠❛② ❜❡
✏♠♦r❡ r♦❜✉st✑ t❤❛♥ ♦t❤❡r ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s✱ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ ❜♦t❤ t❤❡ ✏❞❡❣r❡❡✑ ♦❢ s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ❞✐s♣❧❛②❡❞
❛♥❞ t❤❡ ✏❞❡❣r❡❡✑ ♦❢ ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s t❤❛t t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❝❛♥ ✇✐t❤st❛♥❞ ✇❤✐❧❡ st✐❧❧ ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣ s✉❝❤
s✐♠✐❧❛r ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r✳ ❚❤❡ ❣r❡❛t❡r t❤❡ r♦❜✉st♥❡ss ♦❢ t❤❡ ♣❡rt✐♥❡♥t s✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ✐♥ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❛❝r♦ss
t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss ♦❢ s②st❡♠s ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ ✭T ✲st❛t❡✮ ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss✱ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ r♦❜✉st t❤❡
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐s✳✸ ❚❤✐s ♥♦♥✲❜✐♥❛r② ❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥❝❡ ♠❡❛♥s ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♠❛② ❜❡ s✉❜❥❡❝t t♦ ✈❛❣✉❡✲
♥❡ss ❝❤❛❧❧❡♥❣❡s ✐♥ s♦♠❡ ❝❛s❡s✳ ❲❤✐❧❡ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s✱ s✉❝❤ ❛s t❤❡r♠❛❧ ❝r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r
❛♥❞✱ ❛s ✇❡ ❛r❣✉❡✱ t❤❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❢r❡❡✲❢❛❧❧ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❛r♦✉♥❞ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣❛t❤s
♠❛② ❜❡ ✐❞❡♥t✐✜❡❞ ❛s ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❛♥t ❝❛s❡s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ♣❡♥✉♠❜r❛❧ ❝❛s❡s ✇❤❡r❡ ✐t ✐s ✉♥❝❧❡❛r
✇❤❡t❤❡r ❛ ❝❛♥❞✐❞❛t❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧❛ss ✐s s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② s✐♠✐❧❛r ❛♥❞ r♦❜✉st ✉♥❞❡r ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s
♠❛② ❡①✐st✳
✸❖❢t❡♥ t❤✐s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ r✐❣♦r♦✉s❧② ❛ss❡ss❡❞ ❜② ❛♥ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡❧② ♥❛t✉r❛❧ ♥♦r♠✱ ♠❡tr✐❝✱ t♦♣♦❧♦❣②✱ ❡t❝✳ ❞❡✜♥❡❞
♦♥ t❤❡ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♦❢ T ✳ ❊✳❣✳ ✇❡ ♠✐❣❤t ✉s❡ s♦♠❡ ✐♥t❡❣r❛t✐♦♥ ♥♦r♠ t♦ q✉❛♥t✐❢② t❤❡ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥
t✇♦ ✭s❝❛❧❛r✮ ✜❡❧❞s ❢♦✉♥❞ ✐♥ XT ✳ ❚❤❡ ❝❤♦✐❝❡ ♦❢ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡ ♥♦r♠✱ t♦♣♦❧♦❣②✱ ❡t❝✳ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢②✐♥❣ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥
t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ XT ✐s ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t ♦♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥t❡①t T ✳
✾
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✸ ❚❤❡ ●❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❚❤❡s✐s
■♥ t❤✐s s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✇❡ r❡❝♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ ♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡ ✐♥ t❡r♠s
♦❢ t❤❡ ✭❯P✮ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s✳ ■♥ ✸✳✶ ✇❡ ❡①❛♠✐♥❡ ✇❤② s✉❝❤ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ q✉❛❧✐✜❡s ❛s ❛♥ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡ ♦❢ ❛
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ■♥ ✸✳✷ ✇❡ t❤❡♥ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢② ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t ♦♣❡r❛t✐♦♥ r❡s✉❧t ♦❢ ❊❤❧❡rs
❛♥❞ ●❡r♦❝❤ ♦✛❡rs ✇❤❛t ✇❡ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢② ❛s ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❡①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ t❤✐s ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣✳
✸✳✶ ❚❤❡ ❙✐♠✐❧❛r✐t② ❛♥❞ ❉✐✈❡rs✐t② ♦❢ ●❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❈♦♥s✐❞❡r ❛ s❡q✉❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss❡s (XǫGR)ǫ∈(0,s) ✐♥❞❡①❡❞ ❜② s♦♠❡ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② s♠❛❧❧ ❡rr♦r ♣❛r❛♠✲
❡t❡r ǫ ∈ (0, s)✳ ❋♦r ✜①❡❞ ǫ✱ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ❝♦♥s✐sts ♦❢ ✭❧♦❝❛❧✮ s♦❧✉t✐♦♥s t♦ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞
❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✿
Tab = Gab ✭✷✮
✇❤❡r❡ t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠ ✜❡❧❞ Tab ❞❡s❝r✐❜❡s t❤❡ ✢♦✇ ♦❢ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣② ❛♥❞Gab ❞❡s❝r✐❜❡s
t❤❡ ✏❊✐♥st❡✐♥ ❝✉r✈❛t✉r❡✑ ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝ ✜❡❧❞ gab✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❡❛❝❤ ♠❡♠❜❡r ♦❢
XǫGR ♠♦❞❡❧s s♦♠❡ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞② ✇❤♦s❡ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ♣❛t❤ ❝♦♠❡s ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❛ ✭t✐♠❡❧✐❦❡✮
❝✉r✈❡ γ t❤❛t ✐s ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ❜❡✐♥❣ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✭✇❤❡r❡ t❤❡s❡ t✇♦ s❡♥s❡s ♦❢ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ❛r❡
♣❛r❛♠❡tr✐③❡❞ ❜② r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ❢✉♥❝t✐♦♥s ♠♦♥♦t♦♥✐❝❛❧❧② ❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t ♦♥ t❤❡ s♠❛❧❧♥❡ss ♦❢ ǫ✮✳
❲✐t❤ t❤❡ ✭❯P✮ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ✐♥ ❤❛♥❞✱ ❢♦r ❛ ❣✐✈❡♥ ❞❡❣r❡❡ ♦❢ ✏ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss✑ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ♥♦✇ ❛s❦ ✐❢ s✉❝❤
❛ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR s❛t✐s✜❡s t❤❡ ✭❙✐♠✮ ❛♥❞ ✭❱❛r✮ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♦❢ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②
t❤❡♦r② ♣✉r❣❡❞ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝❛♥♦♥✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♠♠✐t♠❡♥t t♦ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❛r❣✉❡❞ ❛❣❛✐♥st ✐♥ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱
✷✵✶✷✮✳
❚❤❡ s❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭❙✐♠✮ ✐s ❛♥ ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ ♠❛tt❡r ❛♣♣❛r❡♥t❧② ✇❡❧❧ ❝♦♥✜r♠❡❞ ❜② ❝❡♥t✉r✐❡s
♦❢ ❛str♦♥♦♠✐❝❛❧ ❞❛t❛ r❡❝♦✈❡r❡❞ ❢r♦♠ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❛ r❡❧❛t✐✈❡❧② s♠❛❧❧ ❜♦❞② ✭❛ ♣❧❛♥❡t✱ ♠♦♦♥✱
s❛t❡❧❧✐t❡✱ ❝♦♠❡t✱ ♦r ❡✈❡♥ ❛ st❛r✮ tr❛✈❡❧s ✉♥❞❡r t❤❡ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛ ♠✉❝❤ str♦♥❣❡r ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧
s♦✉r❝❡✳ ❊①❛♠♣❧❡s ✐♥✈♦❧✈✐♥❣ ♥♦♥✲♥❡❣❧✐❣✐❜❧❡ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐st✐❝ ❡✛❡❝ts ✭❧✐❦❡ t❤❡ ▼❡r❝✉r② ❝♦♥✜r♠❛✲
t✐♦♥✮ ❛r❡ ♦❢ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥❝❡✱ ❜✉t ❡✈❡♥ t❡rr❡str✐❛❧ ❝❛s❡s ✐♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ ●❛❧✐❧❡♦ ❛♥❞ ❧❡❛♥✐♥❣
t♦✇❡rs ♦r ♦t❤❡r ✭♥❡❛r❧②✮ ❢r❡❡✲❢❛❧❧ ❡①❛♠♣❧❡s ✐♥ ❞❡t❡r♠✐♥❛t❡❧② ◆❡✇t♦♥✐❛♥ r❡❣✐♠❡s ❝❛♥ ❝♦✉♥t
❛s ❝♦♥✜r♠✐♥❣ ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s ❢♦r ❝❡rt❛✐♥ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ✈❛❧✉❡s✳ ❙✐♥❝❡ ♦❜s❡r✈❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ♣r❡❝✐s✐♦♥ ✐s ✐♥✲
✶✵
San Diego, CA -345-
❡✈✐t❛❜❧② ❜♦✉♥❞❡❞✱ ✐t ✐s ♦❢t❡♥ ❝❧❛✐♠❡❞ t❤❛t t❤❡ s❛t❡❧❧✐t❡✱ ♠♦♦♥✱ ♣❧❛♥❡t✱ ❡t❝✳ ✐♥❞❡❡❞ ✏❢♦❧❧♦✇s
❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝✱✑ ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ r❡s✉❧ts ♦❢ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮✳ ■♥ s✉❝❤ ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s✱ t❤❡ ❜♦❞② ✐s ❛❝t✉❛❧❧②
♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ t♦ ❝♦♠❡ ✏❝❧♦s❡ ❡♥♦✉❣❤✑ t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ t♦ ✇❛rr❛♥t s✉❝❤ ❡q✉✐✈♦❝❛t✐♦♥✳
❚❤❡s❡ ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s ❤❡♥❝❡ ❝♦♥✜r♠ ♠❡♠❜❡rs❤✐♣ ✐♥ ❛ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ❢♦r s♦♠❡ ǫ t❤r❡s❤♦❧❞ ❜❡❧♦✇ t❤❡
❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢ ❡①♣❡r✐♠❡♥t❛❧ ♣r❡❝✐s✐♦♥ ♦r ❛tt❡♥t✐♦♥✳
■♥ ♦r❞❡r t♦ ❛♣♣r❡❝✐❛t❡ t❤❡ s❛t✐s❢❛❝t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✭❱❛r✮✱ ✇❡ ♠✉st ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t t❤❡♦r❡t✲
✐❝❛❧ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♦❢ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t② t❤❡♦r②✳ ❙t❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠s ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣
t♦ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r② ❝♦♠❡ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠ ♦❢ t❤❡ t❡♥s♦r ✜❡❧❞s Tab ❛♥❞ gab✱ r❡❧❛t❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s
✭✷✮✳ ❆ss✉♠✐♥❣ ✇❡ ♦♥❧② ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r ✭❧♦❝❛❧✮ s♦❧✉t✐♦♥s t♦ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✱ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐st s✐①
✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t ✜❡❧❞ ❝♦♠♣♦♥❡♥ts ❞❡s❝r✐❜✐♥❣ gab ❛♥❞ s♦ t❤❡ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣② ✢♦✇ Tab✳ ■♥ ♦t❤❡r
✇♦r❞s✱ ❢r♦♠ ❛ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧s ♦❢ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t② t❤❡♦r② ♣❡rs♣❡❝t✐✈❡✱ t❤❡r❡ ❛r❡ s✐① ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ ❞❡❣r❡❡s
♦❢ ❢r❡❡❞♦♠ t♦ ❤♦✇ t❤❡s❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❛r❡ ❞❡s❝r✐❜❡❞ ❛t ❡❛❝❤ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ♣♦✐♥t✳
●✐✈❡♥ t❤❡ ✇❡❛❧t❤ ♦❢ ❡✈✐❞❡♥t ❝♦♥✜r♠✐♥❣ ✐♥st❛♥❝❡s ❢❛❧❧✐♥❣ ✉♥❞❡r ❛ ❝❧❛ssXǫGR ✇✐t❤ s✉✐t❛❜❧❡
ǫ✱ t❤❡r❡ ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ t❤❡s❡ ❞❡❣r❡❡s ✭❡✈❡♥ ❛❢t❡r r❡s❝❛❧✐♥❣✮ ♦♥❝❡
✇❡ ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r t❤❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ ❞❡♥s✐t②✱ s❤❛♣❡ ❛♥❞ ✢♦✇ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣②
♦❢ ❛ ♣❧❛♥❡t✱ ✈❡rs✉s ❛ s❛t❡❧❧✐t❡✱ ❛st❡r♦✐❞✱ ❛♥✈✐❧✱ ❡t❝✳ ■♥ t❤❡s❡ ✏❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥✑
t❡r♠s✱ t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs✐t② ♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐♥ ❛ ❣✐✈❡♥ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ q✉✐t❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t✳ ❉❡s♣✐t❡
t❤✐s ❞✐✈❡rs✐t②✱ s✉❝❤ ❜♦❞✐❡s st✐❧❧ s❛t✐s❢② t❤❡ ❞❡✜♥✐♥❣ r❡q✉✐r❡♠❡♥t ♦❢ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣
❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝✳ ■t ✐s ✇✐t❤ r❡s♣❡❝t t♦ t❤✐s ❞✐✈❡rs✐t② ✐♥ t❤❡s❡ ❞❡❣r❡❡s ♦❢ ❢r❡❡❞♦♠ ✭♦❢ t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲
♠♦♠❡♥t❛✴❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡s ♦❢ t❤❡ ✏♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s✑ ♦❢ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ✐♥
XǫGR✮ t❤❛t ❛ ✏r♦❜✉st st❛❜✐❧✐t② ✉♥❞❡r ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s✑ ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ ✐♥ ❛❝❝♦r❞❛♥❝❡ ✇✐t❤
✭❱❛r✮✳
❙♦✱ ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ♦✉r ✭❯P✮ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s✱ s✉❝❤ ♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡
❝♦♥st✐t✉t❡s ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ ♠❡❡t✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❝♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡
❛♥❛❧②s✐s ❞❡♣❡♥❞s ❡♥t✐r❡❧② ♦♥ t❤❡ tr✉t❤ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❛❜♦✈❡ ♠❛❞❡ ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ ❝❧❛✐♠s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡
❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✇❡❧❧ ♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ ❜② ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ XǫGR ❝❧❛ss❡s ❢♦r ❛ s✉✐t❛❜❧❡
r❛♥❣❡ ♦❢ ǫ ✈❛❧✉❡s✱ ❛♥❞ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐♥ ❡❛❝❤ ❝❧❛ss ❛r❡ s♦ ❢❛♥t❛st✐❝❛❧❧② ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ❢r♦♠ t❤❡
♣❡rs♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♦❢ t❤❡✐r Tab ✭gab✮ ✜❡❧❞s✳ ■♥ t❤❡ ♥❡①t s❡❝t✐♦♥ ✇❡ t✉r♥ t♦ t❤❡ ♠♦r❡ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧
q✉❡st✐♦♥ ♦❢ ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞✐♥❣ ❤♦✇ s✉❝❤ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ✐♥ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✱
❜② ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r✐♥❣ t❤❡ ♣r♦♣❡rt✐❡s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss❡s (XǫGR)ǫ∈(0,s) ✐♥ t❡r♠s ♦❢ ❛♥ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝
✶✶
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r❡s✉❧t ♦❢ ❊❤❧❡rs ❛♥❞ ●❡r♦❝❤ ✭✷✵✵✹✮✳
✸✳✷ ❊①♣❧❛✐♥✐♥❣ ●❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❲❡ ❤❛✈❡ ♥♦✇ ❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡❞ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② t❤❡s✐s ✐♥ t❤❡ ❝♦♥t❡①t ♦❢ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②
❛s ❛♥ ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧❧② ❝♦♥t✐♥❣❡♥t ❝❧❛✐♠ ❛❜♦✉t ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠ XǫGR ✇❤♦s❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♠♦❞❡❧ ❛
♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠ s✉❝❤ t❤❛t t❤❡ ♣❛t❤ ♦❢ s♦♠❡ ❜♦❞② ❝♦✉♥ts ❛s ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❜❡✐♥❣ ❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝ ✇✐t❤♦✉t
✈✐♦❧❛t✐♥❣ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✳ ❲❡ ❤❛✈❡ ❛❧s♦ ❣✐✈❡♥ ❛ ♣❧❛✉s✐❜✐❧✐t② ❛r❣✉♠❡♥t s✉❣❣❡st✲
✐♥❣ ✇❤② ♦❜s❡r✈❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❞❛t❛ ❛❧r❡❛❞② ♦❜t❛✐♥❡❞ ❜② ❡①♣❡r✐♠❡♥t❛❧✐sts ❝♦♥✜r♠s t❤✐s ❡♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧
❤②♣♦t❤❡s✐s✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❣✐✈❡♥ s✉❝❤ ❝♦♥✜r♠❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs✐t② ♦❢ t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t❛
♦❢ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✱ ♠❡♠❜❡rs❤✐♣ ✐♥ s♦♠❡ XǫGR ✇✐❧❧ ❜❡ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② st❛❜❧❡ ✉♥❞❡r s✐❣✲
♥✐✜❝❛♥t ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ st❛t❡ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ♦❢ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r② t♦ s❛t✐s❢② ✭❱❛r✮✳ ❆
r❡♠❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ q✉❡st✐♦♥ ♠✉st ♥♦✇ ❜❡ ❛♥s✇❡r❡❞✿ ❍♦✇ ❝❛♥ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❡①❤✐❜✐t✐♥❣
t❤✐s ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥ ❜❡❤❛✈❡ s♦ s✐♠✐❧❛r❧② ✇❤✐❧❡ ❜❡✐♥❣ s♦ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥t ❛t t❤❡ ❧❡✈❡❧ ♦❢
t❤❡♦r❡t✐❝❛❧ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ t♦ ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②❄
●❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥❡❞ ❜② ❛♣♣❡❛❧✐♥❣ t♦ ❛♥ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t ✏❧✐♠✐t ♣r♦♦❢✑
♦❢ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ❞✐s❝✉ss❡❞ ✐♥ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮✳ ■t ✇❛s ❛r❣✉❡❞ t❤❡r❡ t❤❛t ❊❤❧❡rs
❛♥❞ ●❡r♦❝❤ ✭✷✵✵✹✮ ❛r❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ❞❡❞✉❝❡ t❤❡ ✏❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥✑ ♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣
❜♦❞✐❡s ✇✐t❤ r❡❧❛t✐✈❡❧② s♠❛❧❧ ✈♦❧✉♠❡ ❛♥❞ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡✱ ❜② ❝♦♥s✐❞❡r✐♥❣ s❡q✉❡♥❝❡s
♦❢ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠ t❡♥s♦r ✜❡❧❞s ✇✐t❤ ♣♦s✐t✐✈❡ ♠❛ss ♦❢ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠ ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N✱ r❡❢❡rr❡❞ t♦
❛s ✏❊●✲♣❛rt✐❝❧❡s✳✑ ❚❤❡ s♣❛t✐❛❧ ❡①t❡♥t ❛♥❞ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ t❤❡s❡ ❊●✲♣❛rt✐❝❧❡s ❝❛♥
❜❡ ♠❛❞❡ ❛r❜✐tr❛r✐❧② s♠❛❧❧ ❜② ♣✐❝❦✐♥❣ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② ❧❛r❣❡ i ❛♥❞ j ✈❛❧✉❡s r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡❧②✳ ❚❤❡
t❤❡♦r❡♠ ♦❢ ✭❊❤❧❡rs ❛♥❞ ●❡r♦❝❤✱ ✷✵✵✹✮ ❡♥t❛✐❧s t❤❛t ✐❢ ❢♦r ❛ ❣✐✈❡♥ ❝✉r✈❡ γ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts s✉❝❤
❛♥ ❊●✲♣❛rt✐❝❧❡ s❡q✉❡♥❝❡✱ t❤❡♥ ❜② ♣✐❝❦✐♥❣ ❛ ❧❛r❣❡ ❡♥♦✉❣❤ j✱ γ ❝♦♠❡s ❛r❜✐tr❛r✐❧② ❝❧♦s❡ t♦
❜❡❝♦♠✐♥❣ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✐♥ ❛ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ❝♦♥t❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡ T
(i,j)
ab ✐♥st❛♥t✐❛t❡❞ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣②✳
❙♣❡❝✐✜❝❛❧❧②✱ ❧❡t ( g
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N ❜❡ t❤❡ s❡q✉❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ♠❡tr✐❝s t❤❛t ❝♦✉♣❧❡ t♦ t❤❡s❡ ( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N
❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣ t♦ ✭✷✮ ✐♥ ❛r❜✐tr❛r✐❧② s♠❛❧❧ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞s (Ki)i∈N ♦❢ γ✱ ❝♦♥t❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡ s✉♣♣♦rt ♦❢
t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ T
(i,j)
ab✳ ❚❤❡♥ ✐❢ ❢♦r ❡❛❝❤ i✱ ❛s j →∞ t❤❡ g
(i,j)
ab ❛♣♣r♦❛❝❤ ❛ ✏❧✐♠✐t ♠❡tr✐❝✑ gab
✐♥ t❤❡ C 1(Ki) t♦♣♦❧♦❣②✱ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❦❡❡♣s tr❛❝❦ ♦❢ ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝s ❛♥❞ t❤❡✐r ✉♥✐q✉❡
❝♦♥♥❡❝t✐♦♥s✱ t❤❡♥ t❤❡ ❝✉r✈❡ γ ❛♣♣r♦❛❝❤❡s ❣❡♦❞✐❝✐t② ❛s j →∞✳
✶✷
San Diego, CA -347-
❚♦ ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞ t❤❡ ✐♠♣❛❝t ♦❢ t❤❡ t❤❡♦r❡♠ ❢♦r ♦✉r ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧❛ss❡s (XǫGR)ǫ∈(0,s)✱ ✇❡
♥❡❡❞ t♦ ❛♣♣r❡❝✐❛t❡ t❤❡ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ ❜② ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤✳ ❚❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t
r❡s✉❧t ❡ss❡♥t✐❛❧❧② ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡s ❛ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ✏ǫ✲δ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣✑ ❜❡t✇❡❡♥✱ ✭❛✮ ❤♦✇ ✏♥❡❛r❧②✲❣❡♦❞❡t✐❝✑
✇❡ ✇❛♥t t❤❡ ❝✉r✈❡ γ t♦ ❜❡✱ ❛♥❞ ✭❜✮ ❤♦✇ ♠✉❝❤ ✇❡ ♥❡❡❞ t♦ ❜♦✉♥❞ t❤❡ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❡✛❡❝ts
♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞② ♦♥ t❤❡ ❜❛❝❦❣r♦✉♥❞ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡✳✹ ❚❤❛t ✐s t♦ s❛②✱ t❤❡ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ ❧✐♠✐t r❡s✉❧t
❝❛♥ ❜❡ t❤♦✉❣❤t ♦❢ ❛s t❡❧❧✐♥❣ ✉s t❤❛t ✏❢♦r ❡✈❡r② ❞❡❣r❡❡ ♦❢ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t♦ ❣❡♦❞✐❝✐t② ✇❡ ✇❛♥t
t❤❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✬ ♣❛t❤ t♦ ❜❡✱ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts ❛ δ✲❜♦✉♥❞ ♦♥ t❤❡ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❡✛❡❝t ♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞② t❤❛t
✇✐❧❧ ❦❡❡♣ t❤❡ ♣❛t❤ ❛t ❧❡❛st t❤❛t ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❣❡♦❞✐❝✐t②✳✑ ❚❤❡ ✐♠♣♦rt❛♥t t❤✐♥❣ t♦ ♦❜s❡r✈❡ ❛❜♦✉t
t❤✐s ǫ✲δ ✐♥t❡r♣❧❛② ✐s t❤❛t t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❞♦❡s r❡q✉✐r❡ ✐♠♣♦s✐♥❣ ❛ δ✲❜♦✉♥❞
♦♥ t❤❡ ♣❡rt✉r❜❛t✐✈❡ ❡✛❡❝ts ♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞②✱ ✐t ❞♦❡s ♥♦t ✐♠♣♦s❡ ❛♥② s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ❝♦♥str❛✐♥ts ♦♥ t❤❡
❞❡t❛✐❧s ♦❢ ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣② ♦❢ t❤❡ ❜♦❞② ✢♦✇s ✇✐t❤✐♥ t❤❡ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡ s♣❛t✐❛❧ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞
♦❢ t❤❡ ❝✉r✈❡✱ ♥♦r ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝ ✐t ❝♦✉♣❧❡s t♦ s♣❡❝✐✜❝❛❧❧② ❜❡❤❛✈❡s✳ ❙♦ t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝
✐s ✏❜♦✉♥❞❡❞✑ ✇✐t❤✐♥ ❛ ❝❡rt❛✐♥ δ✲♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞ ♦❢ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t ♠❡tr✐❝✱ t❤❡ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r ❞❡t❛✐❧s
♦❢ t❤❡ t❡♥s♦r ✈❛❧✉❡s✱ t❤❡ ❝♦rr❡s♣♦♥❞✐♥❣ ❝♦♥♥❡❝t✐♦♥✱ ❛♥❞ ❡s♣❡❝✐❛❧❧② t❤❡ ❝✉r✈❛t✉r❡ ❤❛✈❡
❝♦♥s✐❞❡r❛❜❧❡ r♦♦♠ ❢♦r ✈❛r✐❛t✐♦♥ s♦ ❧♦♥❣ ❛s t❤❡② st❛② ✏❜♦✉♥❞❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❛t ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞✳✑
❚❤✐s r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ t❤❡♦r❡♠ ❤❡♥❝❡ ❣✐✈❡s ✉s ❛ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢
❞❡t❛✐❧s✲❢r❡❡ ✇❛② ♦❢ ✉♥❞❡rst❛♥❞✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs❡ ♣♦♣✉❧❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ♦✉r r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
❝❧❛ss❡s (XǫGR)ǫ∈(0,s)✳ ■♥ ❡✛❡❝t t❤❡ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❤✐❣❤❧✐❣❤ts t❤❛t ❢♦r
❡❛❝❤ XǫGR ❝❧❛ss✱ t❤❡r❡ ❡①✐sts ❛ ♣❛rt✐❝✉❧❛r δ✲❜♦✉♥❞ ❛r♦✉♥❞ ❛ ❧✐♠✐t ♠❡tr✐❝ ✇✐t❤ s♦♠❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝
❛♥❝❤♦r γ s✉❝❤ t❤❛t ❛♥② ❜♦❞② ❝♦✉♣❧✐♥❣ t♦ ❛ ♠❡tr✐❝ t❤❛t st❛②s ✇✐t❤✐♥ t❤❛t ❜♦✉♥❞ ✭✐♥ ❛❞❞✐t✐♦♥
t♦ r❡♠❛✐♥✐♥❣ s♣❛t✐❛❧❧② ❝❧♦s❡ ❡♥♦✉❣❤ t♦ γ) s❛t✐s✜❡s t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ♣❛rt ♦❢ t❤❡
r❡q✉✐r❡♠❡♥ts ❢♦r ♠❡♠❜❡rs❤✐♣ ✐♥ XǫGR✳ ❇✉t ❛s ✇❡ ❥✉st ❡♠♣❤❛s✐③❡❞✱ ❢❛❧❧✐♥❣ ✉♥❞❡r t❤✐s δ✲
❜♦✉♥❞ ❞♦❡s ♥♦t ✐♠♣♦s❡ s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ❝♦♥str❛✐♥ts ♦♥ t❤❡ ❞❡t❛✐❧❡❞ ✈❛❧✉❡s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t❛
♦r ♠❡tr✐❝ ✜❡❧❞s✳ ■♥ ♦t❤❡r ✇♦r❞s✱ ♠❡♠❜❡rs❤✐♣ ✐♥ t❤❡ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ❛s
❧♦♥❣ ❛s t❤❡ ❜♦❞② ✐s ❛ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ s♦❧✉t✐♦♥ t♦ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s✱ ❛♥❞ ✐ts ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❡✛❡❝t
❛♥❞ ❡①t❡♥t ❛r❡ s✉✣❝✐❡♥t❧② ❜♦✉♥❞❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ r✐❣❤t ✇❛②✱ ❜✉t ❜❡②♦♥❞ t❤❡s❡ r❡q✉✐r❡♠❡♥ts t❤❡
s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ❞❡t❛✐❧s ❝♦♥❝❡r♥✐♥❣ ✏✇❤❛t t❤❡ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❡✛❡❝t ❞♦❡s ❜❡❧♦✇ t❤♦s❡ ❜♦✉♥❞s✑ ❛r❡
✹❋♦r ♣✉r♣♦s❡s ♦❢ ❡①♣♦s✐t✐♦♥✱ ✇❡ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡ t❤❡ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣ ❛s ❛♥ ✏ǫ✲δ r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s❤✐♣✱✑ s✉❣✲
❣❡st✐♥❣ t❤❛t t❤❡ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss r❡❧❛t✐♦♥s ✐♥ q✉❡st✐♦♥ ❤❛✈❡ ❜❡❡♥ q✉❛♥t✐✜❡❞✱ t❤❡ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ r❡s✉❧t ✐s
❢♦r♠✉❧❛t❡❞ ✭♣r✐♠❛r✐❧②✮ ✐♥ t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ t❡r♠s✳ ❙❡❡ ✭●r❛❧❧❛ ❛♥❞ ❲❛❧❞✱ ✷✵✵✽✱ ➓✸✲✺✮ ❢♦r ❛ ♠♦r❡ ❡①♣❧✐❝✐t❧②
q✉❛♥t✐✜❡❞ ❛♣♣r♦❛❝❤✳
✶✸
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✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t✳ ❍❡♥❝❡✱ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❊❤❧❡rs✲●❡r♦❝❤ t❤❡♦r❡♠ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥s
❤♦✇ t❤❡ ǫ✲❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♥❡❛r ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦rs ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ ❞❡s♣✐t❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ❞✐✛❡r❡♥❝❡s ✐♥ t❤❡
❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t❛ ♦❢ ♦✉r ♥❡❛r✲❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s✿ ❙♦ ❧♦♥❣ ❛s t❤❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s✬ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧
✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡s ❛r❡ ❜♦✉♥❞❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ r✐❣❤t ✇❛② t❤❡✐r ✭♣♦s✐t✐✈❡✮ ♠❛tt❡r✲❡♥❡r❣② ❝❛♥ ✈❛r② ❛s ♠✉❝❤
❛s ✇❡ ❧✐❦❡ ✉♥❞❡r t❤♦s❡ ❜♦✉♥❞s✳
✹ ❊①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥ ✇✐t❤♦✉t ❘❡✐✜❝❛t✐♦♥
❇❡❢♦r❡ ❝♦♥❝❧✉❞✐♥❣ t❤❡r❡ r❡♠❛✐♥s ❛ ♣♦t❡♥t✐❛❧ ❝❤❛❧❧❡♥❣❡ ❝♦♥❝❡r♥✐♥❣ ❤♦✇ ✇❡ ❝❛♥ ❡♥❞♦rs❡ ❛♥②
❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✏✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✑ t❤❡s✐s ✐❢ t❤❡ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♠♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ✐s
✐♥❝♦♠♣❛t✐❜❧❡ ✇✐t❤ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✳ ❘❡❝❛❧❧✱ ✇❤✐❧❡ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥✐♥❣ ❤♦✇ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss❡s XǫGR ✇❤♦s❡
r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ❛r❡ ✏ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡✑ t♦ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ♠♦❞❡❧s ❝♦✉❧❞ ❜❡ s♦ ❞✐✈❡rs❡✱ ✇❡
♥❡❡❞❡❞ t♦ t❛❦❡ t❤❡ ✏❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t✑ ♦❢ t❤❡ ♠❡tr✐❝s ( g
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N ❝♦✉♣❧✐♥❣ t♦ t❤❡ ❊●✲♣❛rt✐❝❧❡s
( T
(i,j)
ab)i,j∈N ✐♥ ❛❝❝♦r❞❛♥❝❡ ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s ✭✷✮✳
✺ ❇② t❛❦✐♥❣ s✉❝❤ ❛ ✏❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t✑ t♦
✐❞❡♥t✐❢② t❤❡ ❞✐✈❡rs✐t② ♦❢ ♦✉r XǫGR ❝❧❛ss❡s✱ ❤❛✈❡♥✬t ✇❡ ♠❛❞❡ ❛♥ ✏❡ss❡♥t✐❛❧✑ ❛♣♣❡❛❧ t♦ t❤❡
❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ♠♦❞❡❧s ♣r❡❝❧✉❞❡❞ ❜② ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ✜❡❧❞ ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s❄
❚❤❡ ❛♥s✇❡r t♦ t❤✐s ❝❤❛❧❧❡♥❣❡ ✐s t❤❛t t❤♦✉❣❤ ❛♣♣r❡❝✐❛t✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ǫ✲δ ✐♥t❡r♣❧❛②
✐♥ t❤❡ ❛♣♣r♦♣r✐❛t❡ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞s ♦❢ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t ✇❛s ❡ss❡♥t✐❛❧ t♦ ♦✉r ❡①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥
♦❢ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ t❤❡ r♦❧❡ ♣❧❛②❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧ ❞♦❡s ♥♦t
r❡q✉✐r❡ ✉s t♦ r❡✐❢② t❤❡ ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥ ♦r ♠❛❦❡ ✐t r❡♣r❡s❡♥t❛t✐✈❡ ♦❢ ❛♥② ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s②st❡♠ ✐♥
❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✳ ❊✈❡♥ t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡r❡ ❛r❡ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥t ❝♦♠♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥s ❛ss♦❝✐❛t❡❞ ✇✐t❤ ✇❤❛t
❤❛♣♣❡♥s ❛t t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t ✭✶✮ t❤❡ ǫ✲δ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ t❤❡ s②st❡♠s ❤❛s ❛ ✇❡❧❧✲❞❡✜♥❡❞
♠❛t❤❡♠❛t✐❝❛❧ str✉❝t✉r❡ ✭t❤❡ C 1 t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❡s ❞❡✜♥❡❞ ❢♦r ❡❛❝❤ s♣❛❝❡t✐♠❡ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞ ♦❢
γ✮ ❞❡s❝r✐❜✐♥❣ t❤❡ ❛♣♣r♦❛❝❤ t♦ t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t✐♥❣ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧✱ ❛♥❞ ✭✷✮ t❤❡ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ t❤❡
♠♦❞❡❧s ✐♥ XǫGR✱ ✇❤✐❝❤ ❛r❡ ✏❝❧♦s❡ ❜✉t ♥♦t ✐❞❡♥t✐❝❛❧ t♦✑ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧✱ st✐❧❧ ♦❜❡②
❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s t❤❡♦r②✳ ❆ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧ ❡st❛❜❧✐s❤❡s ✭❛s t❤❡ ♥❛♠❡ s✉❣❣❡sts✮ ❛ ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢
❛♥❝❤♦r ❢♦r t❤❡ ✭t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧✮ ♥❡✐❣❤❜♦r❤♦♦❞s ✇✐t❤✐♥ ✇❤✐❝❤ t❤❡ ❡❧❡♠❡♥ts ♦❢ t❤❡ r❡s♣❡❝t✐✈❡
✺◆♦t❡✱ t❤♦✉❣❤ t❤❡ ((i,j)gab)i,j∈N ❝♦♥✈❡r❣❡ t♦ ❛ ✇❡❧❧ ❞❡✜♥❡❞ ✏❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐t✑ ✭✐♥ t❤❡ C
1 t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❡s✮
t❤❡ ❝♦✉♣❧❡❞ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠ t❡♥s♦rs ((i,j)T ab)i,j∈N ♠❛② ♥♦t✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ❡✈❡♥ ✐❢ t❤❡② ❞♦ ❝♦♥✈❡r❣❡ ✐♥ ❛
♣❤②s✐❝❛❧❧② s❛❧✐❡♥t ❛♥❞ ✐♥❞❡♣❡♥❞❡♥t❧② ✇❡❧❧✲❞❡✜♥❡❞ ✇❛②✱ ❛t t❤❡ ❧✐♠✐t t❤❡② ♠✉st ❡✐t❤❡r ❢❛✐❧ t♦ ♦❜❡② ✭✷✮ ♦r
✈❛♥✐s❤✳ ❋♦r ❛ ❞❡t❛✐❧❡❞ ❞✐s❝✉ss✐♦♥ s❡❡ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✱ ➓✹✮✳
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XǫGR ❝❛♥ ❜❡ s❛✐❞ t♦ ❝❧✉st❡r✳ ❍♦✇❡✈❡r✱ ✉s✐♥❣ t❤❡s❡ ♠♦❞❡❧s ❛s ❛♥❝❤♦rs t♦ ✐❞❡♥t✐❢② t❤❡ ♣♦✐♥ts
❛r♦✉♥❞ ✇❤✐❝❤ t❤❡ ❛❝t✉❛❧ s♦❧✉t✐♦♥s t♦ ❊✐♥st❡✐♥✬s ❡q✉❛t✐♦♥s ❝❧✉st❡r ❞♦❡s ♥♦t r❡q✉✐r❡ t❤❛t t❤❡
❛♥❝❤♦rs t❤❡♠s❡❧✈❡s ❜❡ ❛❞♠✐tt❡❞ ✐♥ XǫGR✳
■♥ ❝♦♥tr❛st t♦ ♠♦r❡ tr❛❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ✏✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s✱✑ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ❛r❡ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡
❣r♦✉♣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ XT ♥♦t ✐♥❞✐✈✐❞✉❛❧ s②st❡♠s✳ ❋♦r ♥♦♥✲✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s
s❡✈❡r❡ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❡s ❝❛♥ ❜❡ ❞❡tr✐♠❡♥t❛❧ ❜❡❝❛✉s❡ t❤❡② r❡♥❞❡r t❤❡ s♦❧❡ ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❡❞ ♠♦❞❡❧ t❤❡♦✲
r❡t✐❝❛❧❧② ✐♥❛♣♣♦s✐t❡✳ ❲✐t❤ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ❤♦✇❡✈❡r✱ t❤❡ ❡①✐st❡♥❝❡ ♦❢ ❛ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧❧② ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❡❞
♠♦❞❡❧ ✏❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❜✉t ❡①❝❧✉❞❡❞ ❢r♦♠✑ ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧❛ss ♥❡❡❞ ♥♦t ❡♥t❛✐❧ t❤❛t ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ t❤❡
❝❧❛ss ❛r❡ ❧✐❦❡✇✐s❡ ♣♦♦r❧② ❜❡❤❛✈❡❞✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ✐❢ ❛ t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ✏♥❡❛r t♦✑ ❛♥ ✐❞❡❛❧✲
✐③❡❞ ♠♦❞❡❧ ❤❛s ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s✐❣♥✐✜❝❛♥❝❡ ✭❛s ✇✐t❤ t❤❡ C 1 t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❡s✮✱ s✉❝❤ ♣r♦①✐♠✐t② ♠❛② ❛❧❧♦✇
✐♥❢❡r❡♥❝❡s ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ✇❡❧❧✲❜❡❤❛✈❡❞ ❝❧❛ss❡s ✇✐t❤♦✉t ♠♦❧❡st✐♥❣ t❤❡✐r ❛❞♠✐ss✐❜✐❧✐t② ❛❝❝♦r❞✐♥❣
t♦ t❤❡ ❧❛✇s ♦❢ T ✳
❚❤✐s ✐s ♣r❡❝✐s❡❧② ✇❤❛t ♦❝❝✉rs ✇✐t❤ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✳ ▼❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ ❛ ❝❧❛ss XǫGR ❝❛♥
t❛❦❡ ❛❞✈❛♥t❛❣❡ ♦❢ t❤❡✐r ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t♦ t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧s ✇✐t❤♦✉t ✏❝♦♥tr❛❝t✐♥❣✑ t❤❡
♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❡s ♦❝❝✉rr✐♥❣ ❛t t❤❡ ❛❝t✉❛❧ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❧✐♠✐ts✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ✇❡ ✇❡r❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥
s✉❝❤ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ❜② ❛♣♣❡❛❧✐♥❣ t♦ ✇❤❛t ✇❡ ❝❤❛r❛❝t❡r✐③❡❞ ❛s t❤❡ ✏s♣❡❝✐✜❝ ❞❡t❛✐❧s ✐rr❡❧❡✈❛♥t✑
δ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ✐♥ t❤❡ C 1 t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❡s✳ ❙✐♥❝❡ ✇❡ ❛r❡ t❛❧❦✐♥❣ ❛❜♦✉t ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ✇❡
❛r❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ✐♥❢❡r ❞✐r❡❝t❧② ❢r♦♠ s✉❝❤ ǫ✲❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss t❤❛t t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ❜♦❞✐❡s ♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ ❜② t❤❡
♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ XǫGR ❛r❡ ❝❧♦s❡ t♦ ❢♦❧❧♦✇✐♥❣ ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✐♥ t❤❡ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ s❡♥s❡s ❞❡✜♥❡❞
✇❤❡♥ ✇❡ ❝♦♥str✉❝t❡❞ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss❡s✳
✺ ❈♦♥❝❧✉s✐♦♥
❲❤✐❧❡ t❤❡ ✐♥❝♦♠♣❛t✐❜✐❧✐t② r❡s✉❧t ♦❢ ✭❚❛♠✐r✱ ✷✵✶✷✮ ❡♥t❛✐❧s t❤❛t t❤❡ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ str✐❝t❧②
✐♥t❡r♣r❡t❡❞ ♠✉st ❜❡ r❡❥❡❝t❡❞ ❛t t❤❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ ❧❡✈❡❧✱ ✐♥ t❤✐s ♣❛♣❡r ✇❡ ❤❛✈❡ ❛r❣✉❡❞ t❤❛t
r❡✐♥t❡r♣r❡t✐♥❣ t❤❡ r♦❧❡ ♦❢ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❛s ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② t❤❡s✐s ✐s ❜♦t❤ ✈✐❛❜❧❡ ❛♥❞
❝♦❤❡r❡♥t ✇✐t❤ ❝♦♥t❡♠♣♦r❛r② ❣❡♥❡r❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✳ ❇② ❞❡✈❡❧♦♣✐♥❣ ❛♥ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②
♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ✐♥ ♣❤②s✐❝s✱ ✇❡ s❛✇ t❤❛t t❤❡ ✇✐❞❡s♣r❡❛❞ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ ❛ r✐❝❤ ✈❛r✐❡t②
♦❢ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣✱ ❢r❡❡✲❢❛❧❧✱ ♠❛ss✐✈❡ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ♦❜s❡r✈❡❞ ✐♥ ♥❛t✉r❡ q✉❛❧✐✜❡s ❛s ❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥♦♥✳
✶✺
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◆♦t ♦♥❧② ❝❛♥ t❤✐s ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❞②♥❛♠✐❝s ❜❡ r❡❝♦✈❡r❡❞ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❢♦r♠ ♦❢ s✉❝❤
❛ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② t❤❡s✐s✱ ❜✉t ❜② r❡❝♦♥s✐❞❡r✐♥❣ t❤❡ ✐♠♣❧✐❝❛t✐♦♥s ♦❢ ❧✐♠✐t ♦♣❡r❛t✐♦♥
♣r♦♦❢s ♦❢ t❤❡ ♣r✐♥❝✐♣❧❡✱ ✇❡ ✇❡r❡ ❛❜❧❡ t♦ ❣❡♥❡r❛t❡ ❛ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❡①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥ ❢♦r ✇❤② ✇❡ ❝❛♥
❡①♣❡❝t s✉❝❤ ❛ r❡♠❛r❦❛❜❧❡ ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣ ♦❢ t❤❡s❡ ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♥❣ ❜♦❞✐❡s ❞❡s♣✐t❡ t❤❡ ❢❛❝t t❤❛t ❢r♦♠
t❤❡ ♣❡rs♣❡❝t✐✈❡ ♦❢ t❤❡✐r ♠♦r❡ ❢✉♥❞❛♠❡♥t❛❧ r❡❧❛t✐✈✐st✐❝ ❞❡s❝r✐♣t✐♦♥s ✭t❤❡ ❡♥❡r❣②✲♠♦♠❡♥t✉♠
✜❡❧❞ ❛♥❞ ✐ts ❣r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ✐♥✢✉❡♥❝❡✮ t❤❡② ♠❛② ❜❡ ✐♥❝r❡❞✐❜❧② ❞✐ss✐♠✐❧❛r✳ ❲❡ ❝♦♥❝❧✉❞❡❞
✇✐t❤ ❛ ❞❡❢❡♥s❡ ♦❢ ♦✉r ❛♣♣❡❛❧✐♥❣ t♦ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❣❡♦❞❡s✐❝ ❛♥❝❤♦r ♠♦❞❡❧s ✐♥ ❡①♣❧❛✐♥✐♥❣ t❤❡
✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❝❧✉st❡r✐♥❣✳ ❯♥❧✐❦❡ ♠♦r❡ tr❛❞✐t✐♦♥❛❧ ❢♦r♠s ♦❢ ❛♣♣r♦①✐♠❛t✐♦♥ ♦r ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✱
❛s r❡✈❡❛❧❡❞ ❜② t❤❡ ✭❯P✮ ❛♥❛❧②s✐s✱ ✇❤❡♥ ✐t ❝♦♠❡s t♦ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ♣❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛✱ t❤❡ ❝❧❛✐♠ ✐s
❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ❣r♦✉♣ ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r ♦❢ ❡♥t✐r❡ ❝❧❛ss❡s ♦❢ ♠♦❞❡❧s✱ ♥♦t ✐♥❞✐✈✐❞✉❛❧ ✐❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s✳ ❍❡♥❝❡✱ ✐♥
t❤❡ ❝❛s❡ ♦❢ ✉♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t②✱ ✐t ✐s ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ t♦ t❛❦❡ ❛❞✈❛♥t❛❣❡ ♦❢ r❡❧❡✈❛♥t t②♣❡s ♦❢ ♠❛t❤❡♠❛t✐❝❛❧
♣r♦①✐♠✐t② t♦ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❛♥❝❤♦rs ✇✐t❤♦✉t ❛❝t✉❛❧❧② ✐♥❢❡❝t✐♥❣ t❤❡ ♠❡♠❜❡rs ♦❢ t❤❡ ❝❧❛ss ✇✐t❤
t❤❡ ✐❧❧✐❝✐t ❜❡❤❛✈✐♦r✳ ▼♦r❡♦✈❡r✱ ✇❤❡♥ t❤❡ r✐❣❤t ❦✐♥❞ ♦❢ ✭t♦♣♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧✮ ❝❧♦s❡♥❡ss ✐s ❡♠♣❧♦②❡❞
✐t ♠❛② ❜❡ ♣♦ss✐❜❧❡ t♦ ❞r❛✇ ✐♥❢❡r❡♥❝❡s ❛♥❞ ❣❛✐♥ ❦♥♦✇❧❡❞❣❡ ❛❜♦✉t t❤❡ ♣❤②s✐❝❛❧ ♣r♦♣❡rt✐❡s ♦❢
♠♦❞❡❧❡❞ s②st❡♠s t❤❛♥❦s t♦ t❤✐s ♣r♦①✐♠✐t② ♦❢ t❤❡✐r ♠♦❞❡❧s t♦ t❤❡ ♣❛t❤♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❛♥❝❤♦r✳
❘❡❢❡r❡♥❝❡s
❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥✱ ❘✳✱ ✷✵✵✷✳ ❚❤❡ ❉❡✈✐❧ ✐♥ t❤❡ ❉❡t❛✐❧s✿ ❆s②♠♣t♦t✐❝ ❘❡❛s♦♥✐♥❣ ✐♥ ❊①♣❧❛♥❛t✐♦♥✱
❘❡❞✉❝t✐♦♥✱ ❛♥❞ ❊♠❡r❣❡♥❝❡✳ ❖①❢♦r❞ ❯♥✐✈❡rs✐t② Pr❡ss✱ ❯❙❆✳
❇❛tt❡r♠❛♥✱ ❘✳✱ ✷✵✵✺✳ ❈r✐t✐❝❛❧ P❤❡♥♦♠❡♥❛ ❛♥❞ ❇r❡❛❦✐♥❣ ❉r♦♣s✿ ■♥✜♥✐t❡ ■❞❡❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥s ✐♥
P❤②s✐❝s✳ ❙t✉❞✐❡s ■♥ ❍✐st♦r② ❛♥❞ P❤✐❧♦s♦♣❤② ♦❢ ❙❝✐❡♥❝❡ P❛rt ❇✿ ❙t✉❞✐❡s ■♥ ❍✐st♦r② ❛♥❞
P❤✐❧♦s♦♣❤② ♦❢ ▼♦❞❡r♥ P❤②s✐❝s ✸✻ ✭✷✮✱ ✷✷✺✕✷✹✹✳
❇❡rr②✱ ▼✳✱ ✶✾✽✼✳ ❚❤❡ ❇❛❦❡r✐❛♥ ▲❡❝t✉r❡✱ ✶✾✽✼✿ ◗✉❛♥t✉♠ ❈❤❛♦❧♦❣②✳ Pr♦❝❡❡❞✐♥❣s ♦❢ t❤❡
❘♦②❛❧ ❙♦❝✐❡t② ♦❢ ▲♦♥❞♦♥✳ ❆✳ ▼❛t❤❡♠❛t✐❝❛❧ ❛♥❞ P❤②s✐❝❛❧ ❙❝✐❡♥❝❡s ✹✶✸ ✭✶✽✹✹✮✱ ✶✽✸✳
❊❤❧❡rs✱ ❏✳✱ ●❡r♦❝❤✱ ❘✳✱ ✷✵✵✹✳ ❊q✉❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ▼♦t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ❙♠❛❧❧ ❇♦❞✐❡s ✐♥ ❘❡❧❛t✐✈✐t②✳ ❆♥♥❛❧s ♦❢
P❤②s✐❝s ✸✵✾ ✭✶✮✱ ✷✸✷✕✷✸✻✳
✶✻
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❋❡✐❣❡♥❜❛✉♠✱ ▼✳✱ ✶✾✼✽✳ ◗✉❛♥t✐t❛t✐✈❡ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❢♦r ❛ ❈❧❛ss ♦❢ ◆♦♥❧✐♥❡❛r ❚r❛♥s❢♦r♠❛t✐♦♥s✳
❏♦✉r♥❛❧ ♦❢ ❙t❛t✐st✐❝❛❧ P❤②s✐❝s ✶✾ ✭✶✮✱ ✷✺✕✺✷✳
●❧✐♥t♦♥✱ ❘✳✱ P❛r✉❝❤✉r✐✱ P✳✱ ❙❝❡rr✐✱ P✳✱ ❙②❝❛r❛✱ ❑✳✱ ✷✵✶✵✳ ❙❡❧❢✲❖r❣❛♥✐③❡❞ ❈r✐t✐❝❛❧✐t② ♦❢ ❇❡❧✐❡❢
Pr♦♣❛❣❛t✐♦♥ ✐♥ ▲❛r❣❡ ❍❡t❡r♦❣❡♥❡♦✉s ❚❡❛♠s✳ ❉②♥❛♠✐❝s ♦❢ ■♥❢♦r♠❛t✐♦♥ ❙②st❡♠s ✹✵✱ ✶✻✺✕
✶✽✷✳
●r❛❧❧❛✱ ❙✳✱ ❲❛❧❞✱ ❘✳✱ ✷✵✵✽✳ ❆ ❘✐❣♦r♦✉s ❉❡r✐✈❛t✐♦♥ ♦❢ ●r❛✈✐t❛t✐♦♥❛❧ ❙❡❧❢✲❢♦r❝❡✳ ❈❧❛ss✐❝❛❧
❛♥❞ ◗✉❛♥t✉♠ ●r❛✈✐t② ✷✺✱ ✷✵✺✵✵✾✳
●✉❣❣❡♥❤❡✐♠✱ ❊✳✱ ✶✾✹✺✳ ❚❤❡ Pr✐♥❝✐♣❧❡ ♦❢ ❈♦rr❡s♣♦♥❞✐♥❣ ❙t❛t❡s✳ ❚❤❡ ❏♦✉r♥❛❧ ♦❢ ❈❤❡♠✐❝❛❧
P❤②s✐❝s ✶✸✱ ✷✺✸✳
❍✉✱ ❇✳✱ ▼❛♦✱ ❏✳✱ ✶✾✽✷✳ P❡r✐♦❞ ❉♦✉❜❧✐♥❣✿ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ❛♥❞ ❈r✐t✐❝❛❧✲♣♦✐♥t ❖r❞❡r✳ P❤②s✐❝❛❧
❘❡✈✐❡✇ ❆ ✷✺ ✭✻✮✱ ✸✷✺✾✳
❑❛❞❛♥♦✛✱ ▲✳✱ ✷✵✵✵✳ ❙t❛t✐st✐❝❛❧ P❤②s✐❝s✿ ❙t❛t✐❝s✱ ❉②♥❛♠✐❝s ❛♥❞ ❘❡♥♦r♠❛❧✐③❛t✐♦♥✳ ❲♦r❧❞
❙❝✐❡♥t✐✜❝ P✉❜❧✐s❤✐♥❣ ❈♦✳
❑❛❞❛♥♦✛✱ ▲✳✱ ◆❛❣❡❧✱ ❙✳✱ ❲✉✱ ▲✳✱ ❩❤♦✉✱ ❙✳✱ ✶✾✽✾✳ ❙❝❛❧✐♥❣ ❛♥❞ ❯♥✐✈❡rs❛❧✐t② ✐♥ ❆✈❛❧❛♥❝❤❡s✳
P❤②s✐❝❛❧ ❘❡✈✐❡✇ ❆ ✸✾ ✭✶✷✮✱ ✻✺✷✹✕✻✺✸✼✳
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Abstract 
Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even 
in physics. This is due in large part to James Woodward’s influential argument that a wide 
range of explanations (including explanations in physics) are causal, based on his 
interventionist approach to causation. This article focuses on explanations, widespread in 
physics, involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, yet they do 
not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes. I argue that 
causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as Woodward and 
others maintain. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even 
in physics. In part this is because the major alternative, deductivist approaches to 
explanation, have fallen on hard times (Hempel 1965; Kitcher 1989). Problems of 
explanatory irrelevance and explanatory asymmetry (recall hexing spells and flagpoles) have 
motivated many to pay more attention to the role of causation in explanation. Preeminent 
among recent work on causal explanation is James Woodward’s influential argument that a 
wide range of explanations, including explanations in physics, are causal explanations, based 
on his interventionist approach to causation (Woodward 2003; Woodward 2007). After 
reviewing Woodward’s approach (Section 2), this paper argues that causal relations are 
insufficient for explanation because they do not account for the key feature of explanatory 
integration in physics (Section 3). Further, causal relations are unnecessary for explanations, 
widespread in physics, involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, 
yet they do not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes 
(Section 4). This constitutes a significant limitation on the scope of causal explanation in 
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physics that neither Woodward nor any other proponent of causal explanation has 
recognized. Causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as 
Woodward and others—such as Wesley Salmon, Phil Dowe and Michael Strevens—maintain 
(Salmon 1984; Dowe 2000; Strevens 2008). 
2. Woodward on causal explanation 
For Woodward, causal relations are captured in counterfactual claims about what would 
happen to an effect Y if an intervention on another variable (or set of variables) X were to 
occur. Causal explanations in turn appeal to these “interventionist” counterfactual 
dependencies. Woodward is clear that his account of causation is non-reductive, in the sense 
that it does not aim to give an account of causation exclusively in non-causal terms. 
Explanation is also non-reductive, for Woodward. He allows that not all causal explanations 
need be in terms of fundamental physics, and indeed that fundamental physics is an area in 
which explanations seem to be predominantly non-causal. He emphasizes that macro causal 
claims can often be more explanatory than causal claims about their micro realizers, and that 
these macro causal claims can be explanatory while offering only an approximate description 
of the relevant features of the target physical system. 
Consider an explanandum consisting of the statement that some variable Y takes a 
particular value. For Woodward, 
(1) [A] successful [causal] explanation will involve a generalization G [in the explanans] 
and explanans variable(s) X such that G correctly describes how the value of Y would 
change under interventions that produce a range of different values of X in different 
background circumstances (2003, 203). 
What makes the causal generalization G explanatory is that it can answer a relevant range of 
“what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and it does this by supporting the correct 
counterfactuals about what would happen under scientifically relevant interventions on the 
explanans variable X. To do this, G must be invariant (roughly, describe the same sort of 
dependence of Y on the X) under the relevant range of interventions and in a range of 
relevant background conditions. Unlike deductivist approaches, successful explanations are 
not just nomologically sufficient, that is, they cannot just subsume the explanandum under a 
regularity and thereby show it is to be expected given the truth of the statements in the 
explanans. Rather, they must also describe relevant dependency relations—they must show 
how this explanandum would change if the intervention or background conditions were to 
change. Explanation locates the explanandum within a space of relevant alternative possible 
explananda. 
We have seen that on Woodward’s account, causal explanation requires counterfactuals 
describing possible interventions and possible covariation in changes in the values of 
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variables, and a notion of scientifically relevant possibility guiding the selection of 
interventions, dependencies and alternative possible explananda. The other key component of 
his account, of course, is an account of causal relations, including the cause-effect relation 
between variable X in the explanans and Y in the explanandum. For Woodward, if some 
intervention on X produces a change in the value of Y, then X is a token direct cause of Y. 
Roughly speaking,  
(2) An intervention I is a hypothetical experimental manipulation on X such that,  
(i) I causes X, 
(ii) I changes the value of X in such a way that the value of X does not depend on the 
values of any other variables that cause X, and  
(iii) I changes the value of X in such a way that if any change occurs in the value of Y, 
it occurs only as the result of the change in X and not from some other source. 
(See Woodward 2003, 98-107 for a more detailed account.) Woodward’s notion of 
intervention is not limited to what humans can actually do with physical systems. Rather, it is 
defined in terms of possible or hypothetical manipulations of values of variables within a 
model. 
Woodward rightly emphasizes that only some changes in the explanans and only some 
contrasts between the explanandum and its alternatives are of causal and hence explanatory 
relevance. As he puts it, “It is also true that if a large meteor had struck my office just as I 
was typing these words, I would not have typed them, but again, we are reluctant to accept 
the failure of the meteor to strike as part of the explanation for my writing what I did” (2003, 
226). The problem here is not that causal omissions can never figure in genuine 
explanations—Woodward is clear that sometimes they can—but rather that in this context a 
meteor intervention is not what Woodward dubs a “serious possibility.” Scientists approach 
empirical phenomena with a large stock of shared beliefs about which of the interventions or 
dependency relations are potentially causally and explanatorily relevant, and which 
alternatives to the explanandum are relevant as well. Woodward is clear that what counts as a 
causal factor is relative to a particular choice of variables and also to a particular range of 
values of these variables (Woodward 2003, 55-56). Different models—in Woodward’s terms, 
different sets of structural equations, variables and directed graphs—result in a different set 
of causes and hence a different explanation.  
So far explanation, causation and intervention have been defined in terms of statements 
about variables, values and dependency relations within a model. But not every 
transformation or modification one can perform on a model corresponds to a hypothetical 
manipulation on the physical system itself (in Woodward’s sense), and only those that do so 
correspond can underwrite causal claims. Causation requires that the values and dependency 
relations of variables in the model represent physical features of the target system. As 
Woodward puts it, successful causal explanation requires that the statements (about 
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counterfactuals, dependency relations, values of variables, causal relations and so on) in the 
explanandum and in the explanans be true or approximately true of the target system (2003, 
203). Without the truth or approximate truth of the explanandum, it fails to be an explanation 
of any physical phenomenon at all. Without the truth or approximate truth of the explanans, 
the statements about the model simply cannot describe any real causal relations in the target 
system. 
For example, the period of a pendulum may be approximately derived and explained in 
terms of its length, in a fixed gravitational field, by appealing to counterfactual claims about 
the behaviour of an idealized pendulum model satisfying Galileo’s pendulum law. The law 
states that the period of a pendulum is proportional the square root of its length: 
(3) T α √l   
The relevant counterfactual claim is: if the length l were increased to l*, in a fixed 
gravitational field, then the period T of the model pendulum would have increased to T*, in 
accordance with (3). However, the model does not support an explanation of the length of the 
pendulum in terms of its period, because the relevant interventionist counterfactual is false of 
the model: it is false that if the period were increased to T*—for instance by moving the 
pendulum to a weaker gravitational field—the length of the pendulum would have changed. 
Woodward uses this example to illustrate how his causal model of explanation solves the 
problem of explanatory asymmetry that bedevils deductivist approaches (2003, 197). For our 
purposes, the important point is that the interventionist counterfactual doing the explanatory 
work (and described in the explanans) is true of the model and is also approximately true of 
the target system. For Woodward, the fact that the dependency relations in the model 
approximate “what the real dependency relations in the world actually are” is fundamental to 
his account of causal explanation (Woodward 2003, 202). 
3. Causal relations are insufficient for explanation 
I contend that a consequence of Woodward’s account is that causal relations are insufficient 
for explanation in physics, and in two steps. First, some causal derivations fail to be 
explanatory. They may satisfy (1) and (2) above, and they may have significant predictive or 
heuristic value, but they do not explain. Second, where a causal derivation is explanatory, it 
is never merely by virtue of satisfying (1) and (2); rather, explanation requires that the causal 
story be integrated with a global model of broad scope and explanatory power. 
According to Woodward, what makes the causal generalization G in (1) explanatory is 
that it answers “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and it does this by supporting 
the correct counterfactuals about what would happen under interventions. Consider 
Woodward’s example of the explanation of the period of a pendulum, but this time prior to 
Galileo’s theoretical advances. Taking liberties with the actual historical order of events, 
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imagine (counterfactually) that Galileo had conducted his years of painstaking experimental 
observations of pendulums first, in advance of any other work on his new science of 
mechanics. Had he arrived at his pendulum law (3) and his idealized pendulum model this 
way, we would be inclined to say that his argument deriving the period of a pendulum is not 
explanatory. The pendulum model on its own supports a relevant and approximately correct 
set of counterfactual claims about interventions on a physical pendulum. Nonetheless, it 
would be merely a phenomenological or data model, as contemporary physicists would put it. 
It fits a given set of data well, and it may describe the correct dependency relations in an 
isolated model, but fails to connect with other, more global models. These sorts of models 
may have predictive and heuristic power, but they do not underwrite explanations in physics.  
Unfortunately, Woodward’s account yields the result that many phenomenological 
models do come out as explanatory, and this cannot be right. Woodward posits a base 
threshold of explanatoriness, above which stands a continuum running from less deep or 
good explanations to deeper and better ones (2003, 368). The worry is that (1) and (2) set the 
threshold very low indeed: generalizations that are invariant under any intervention at all 
exceed the threshold because they answer a “what-if-things-had-been-different” question 
(2003, 369). So Woodward would certainly view the counterfactual Galileo’s standalone 
pendulum model as underwriting a bona fide explanation of the period of the pendulum. But 
we have good reason to maintain that it does not, nor do the plethora of other 
phenomenological models in physics that capture some of the dependency relations in their 
target physical systems. 
As a matter of historical fact, the pendulum law is significant for Galileo precisely 
because it is a key step in his route to the fundamental laws of his new science of mechanics. 
Galileo measured the elapsed time of an object’s vertical fall over a distance equal to the 
length of the pendulum, for various pendulum lengths (Drake 1989, xxvii). He obtained a 
constant ratio of free-fall times to time for the pendulum to swing to vertical. With the 
pendulum law and that ratio, Galileo could calculate the times for other distances of free-fall 
and then, removing pendulums entirely from the calculation, write down his famous law of 
motion: that all objects fall at the same rate, regardless of their composition or mass, and that 
objects starting at rest accelerate uniformly as they fall, i.e. their speed is proportional to the 
square of the elapsed time of fall. He found the law fit well his previous measurements of 
descents along inclined planes.  
This suggests that the idealized model pendulum gets its explanatory power by its 
integration into Galileo's new science of mechanics. In this case, it is integration of a 
particularly simple sort: Galileo took his pendulum law to follow from his more general law 
of free fall, and the idealized model pendulum is simply a special case of a more general 
model covering falling objects in general. Newton’s subsequent achievement was greatly to 
increase this integration by explaining the motions of bodies in terms of the forces acting on 
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them and providing a unified framework for all gravitational systems. The important point 
for our purposes is that it is not sufficient that the idealized pendulum model approximate the 
correct dependency relations in a physical pendulum for it to be explanatory.  
Woodward does say that successful causal explanation must include relevant dependency 
relations and answer a relevant range of “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, and 
that scientists share an understanding of which interventions and which dependency relations 
are explanatorily relevant. Woodward seems to recognize that merely describing local causal 
relations is not sufficient for explanation, while perhaps not fully appreciating the 
consequences for the role of causation in explanation. The challenge is not to rule out an 
explanatory role for the absence of falling meteors. Rather, the challenge is to underwrite the 
explanatory role of dependency relations in the local pendulum model. And this can be done 
only in the context of a wider integration with a global model in physics—here Galilean (or 
even better Newtonian) mechanics.  
The point is not just that some causal derivations satisfying (1) and (2) fail to be 
explanatory, as in the contrary-to-historical-fact Galilean account of the pendulum. It is also 
that no causal derivation is explanatory merely by virtue of satisfying (1) and (2). This is 
because what makes the dependency relations described in the explanans relevant (i.e., 
explanatorily relevant) is the integration of the local model described in the explanans with a 
global model of broad scope and explanatory power. Without such integration, the local 
model will generally fail to be explanatory, no matter how accurately it represents causal 
relations in the target physical system. And as we shall now see, with such integration the 
local model will generally be explanatory—even if it fails to represents any causal relations 
in the target physical system. 
4. Causal relations are unnecessary for explanation 
Woodward allows that not all explanations in physics need be causal and notes that 
fundamental physics is an area in which explanations seem to be predominantly non-causal. 
What Woodward has in mind, in these and other sorts of physics explanations he calls non-
causal, are cases in which the notion of an intervention on a physical system is incoherent or 
inapplicable. This includes global applications of fundamental physics to the whole universe 
or to large portions of it, where the notion of a local intervention is inapplicable (2007, 91); 
explanations that appeal to alternative situations not plausibly characterized as an 
intervention, e.g., altering the dimensionality of space-time (2003, 220); and situations that 
lack the invariance or stability properties needed to define an intervention on the system 
(2007, 77). These sorts of cases, however, are merely the tip of a very large iceberg of non-
causal explanation in physics. 
The issue is that, aside from explanations in textbooks (from which Woodward’s 
examples seem to be drawn), much of the explanatory practice in physics does not fit 
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Woodward’s characterization. These are cases in which the idealized models that underwrite 
putative explanations are largely non-representative of target physical systems. So while they 
approximately model the explanandum behaviour, they do not approximate aspects of the 
physical system described in the explanans. Moreover, these models are not corrigible, in the 
sense that they cannot be refined in a theoretically justified, non-ad hoc way to bring them in 
closer agreement with the target system. The point is that these are cases of explanation in 
which physicists view the scientifically relevant claims about interventions and systematic 
patterns of dependency relations that figure in a potential explanans to be statements about a 
highly idealized model, statements that are not even approximately true of the target system 
containing the phenomenon to be explained. If the explanatory practice of contemporary 
physics is taken seriously, there are highly idealized models of significant explanatory value.  
Valuable work has been done by philosophers of physics on the possible explanatory 
roles of highly idealized models (Rueger 2001; Batterman 2002; Bokulich 2008; Batterman 
2010; Bokulich 2011). Alisa Bokulich, for instance, has argued that “fictional models” can be 
explanatory if they meet certain conditions. Bokulich focuses on semi-classical models, 
which mix classical and quantum features. These models are known not to represent 
successfully the physical system because, for example, they include quantum particles 
following definite classical trajectories. The earliest and most well-known of these models is 
Niels Bohr's model of the hydrogen atom. As Bokulich puts it, "I want to defend the view 
that despite being a fiction, Bohr’s model of the atom does in fact explain the spectrum of 
hydrogen" (Bokulich 2011, 42). Robert Batterman is interested in how highly idealized 
models explain the universality of structural features, such as the common characteristic 
shape of droplets at breakup when water drops fall from a dripping faucet. 
We can explain and understand (for large scales) why a given drop shape at breakup 
occurs and why it is to be expected. The answer depends essentially upon an appeal to the 
existence of a genuine singularity developing in the equations of motion in a finite time. 
It is because of this singularity that there is a decoupling of the breakup behaviour 
(characterized by the scaling solution) from the larger length scales such as those of the 
faucet diameter. Without a singularity, there is no scaling or similarity solution. Thus, the 
virtue of the hydrodynamic singularity is that it allows for the explanation of such 
universal behaviour. The very break-down of the continuum equations enables us to 
provide an explanation of universality (Batterman 2009, 442-443). 
Asymptotic analyses that systematically abstract away from micro details enable idealized 
models to explain underlying structural or universal features. Batterman calls these 
“asymptotic explanations” (Batterman 2002, Ch. 4). 
One option for Woodward and other proponents of causal explanation is simply to reject 
any role for highly idealized models in explanation. These are putative explanations that fail 
to meet Woodward’s requirement for causal explanation, nor do they fall under his class of 
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non-causal explanations in physics. These models are simply highly inaccurate 
representations of the physical world. One could argue that highly idealized asymptotic and 
semi-classical models have great heuristic and predictive value, but do not underwrite 
explanations. They can play no part in underwriting the true causal premises needed in an 
acceptable explanation. In my view, this kind of wholesale rejection of any role for highly 
idealized models in explanation would be a mistake. A closer look reveals a more nuanced 
and complex set of considerations.  
In the case of the Bohr model and other semi-classical models, there is no consensus 
among physicists that these models are explanatory, and rightly so. Clearly, their explanatory 
merits need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. At the very least, we have good reason 
to be skeptical that the Bohr model of the atom has any explanatory value, especially in light 
of the quite impressive explanations of the hydrogen spectrum given in terms of relativistic 
quantum theory.  
The situation with respect to asymptotic models is somewhat different. On the one hand, 
a case can be made that at least one of these models may be eliminated (in principle at least) 
in scientific explanation (Redhead 2004; Belot 2005). On the other hand, these sorts of 
models are used widely and are regarded as underwriting among the best explanations on 
offer in physics today. In addition to analyzing the use of asymptotic models to explain drop 
formation in hydrodynamics, Batterman has explored the use of asymptotic models to 
explain critical phenomena in thermodynamics and to explain the rainbow in catastrophe 
optics (Batterman 2002). Similar sorts of highly idealized, asymptotic models are accepted as 
explanatory in many areas of physics beyond those that are the focus of Batterman (and his 
critics). For instance, these sorts of models are taken to underwrite explanations of a wide 
variety of non-linear dynamical systems, from a damped, driven oscillator model of the 
human heart to gravitational waves ([self-reference omitted]).  
The gravitational waves case is particularly interesting. Physicists take themselves to 
have explained gravitational waves using Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR). 
However, even in the simplest models of binary systems that produce gravitational waves, 
the Einstein Field Equations (the equations of GTR) cannot be solved directly. The reason is 
that these are a set of coupled, nonlinear equations governing the relation between the 
distribution of matter and energy in the universe and the curvature of space-time (of which 
gravitational waves are one feature). An attempt to solve the Einstein Field Equations 
directly by applying regular perturbation methods results in divergences (infinities) in values 
for the properties of gravitational waves observable from earth. So physics takes what is by 
now a familiar strategy: replace the intractable original problem with a tractable one, called 
the post-Newtonian approximation, that makes essential use of singular perturbation theory 
and asymptotic models. The empirical results are predictions and explanations of 
gravitational wave phenomena. These phenomena have not been observed (at the time of 
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writing), but a handful of large gravitational-wave detectors should soon reach sensitivities 
high enough for direct detection of gravitational waves (Pitkin, Reid et al. 2011; [self-
reference omitted]).  
We have good reason to accept, at least provisionally, explanations in physics based on 
highly idealized models. However, I am not claiming to have presented a conclusive 
argument for doing so. Obviously, much work remains to be done. Further analysis of the 
details of Bokulich’s and Batterman’s examples is needed, and vastly more cases of putative 
explanation via highly idealized models in physics need to be examined in detail. The 
question that needs to be asked of each case is: does explanation of a phenomenon 
ineliminably require appeal to a highly idealized model in this case? Nor am I claiming that 
“model explanation” or “asymptotic explanation” are adequate normative accounts of 
explanation in physics that can underwrite this sort of explanatory practice. Rather, I am 
claiming that philosophers have good reasons to take seriously the fact that the explanatory 
practice of physics includes a large class of explanations based on highly idealized models, 
explanations that are clearly not causal on Woodward’s (nor any other plausible) account. I 
should also note that rejecting these sorts of cases wholesale as explanatory failures has as a 
consequence that physicists are massively mistaken about the explanatory merits of their 
theories and about the scope of their understanding of the natural world. This runs counter to 
Woodward’s own project of offering an account of explanation that has normative and 
descriptive elements in reflective equilibrium, an account “significantly constrained by prior 
usage, practice and paradigmatic examples” (2003, 8). 
The best option is to accept these sorts of cases as explanatory and recognize that the 
explanations fall outside the scope of causal explanation in physics. We have seen how 
Woodward allows that explanations in physics may be noncausal where the notion of an 
intervention is incoherent or inapplicable. Explanations appealing to highly idealized models 
constitute a new way in which the notion of an intervention is inapplicable. In these 
explanations, the correct counterfactual dependencies between I, X and Y may well obtain 
such that Woodward’s conditions (2)(ii) and (2)(iii) are satisfied. In other words, these cases 
fit very well Woodward’s central idea that explanations include statements of counterfactual 
dependencies describing the results of a hypothetical manipulation of variables in a model. 
However, the explanation is not causal because (i) is surely false: I does not cause X, because 
the dependency relations in the model do not correspond to or represent—even in an 
approximative way—physical dependency relations in the target system. Choosing this 
option is to acknowledge that there is a distinct, large and important class of non-causal 
explanations that have not been recognized by Woodward, nor, I suggest, by other 
proponents of causal explanation in physics. 
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5. Conclusion 
Recall that for Woodward, the notion of an intervention plays the crucial roles of 
underpinning both the truth and explanatory relevance of generalization G in the explanans 
of a successful causal explanation (1). In the context of physics, I have argued, “intervention” 
is simply not the right concept to play these roles. Even in cases where the notion of an 
intervention is coherent and applicable, it is not sufficient to meet the threshold of genuine 
explanatoriness in physics. As we have seen, what makes the dependency relations described 
in the explanans explanatorily relevant is the integration of the local model described in the 
explanans with a global model of broad scope and explanatory power. In other cases the 
notion of intervention is wholly unnecessary to underpin the truth of G, because G can be 
made true by facts about dependency relations in a model. These dependency relations are 
clearly not causal, because they are features of an idealized model that do not accurately 
represent corresponding features of the physical world.  
Among the many virtues of Woodward’s account of explanation are that it is explicitly 
model-based and that it makes explanation trace systematic patterns of dependencies rather 
than simply describing nomologically sufficient conditions. However, the argument given 
above that much successful explanation in physics involves highly idealized models counters 
Woodward’s claim that many (non-fundamental) explanations in physics are causal. I suggest 
that the argument against Woodward’s causal account tells equally strongly against other 
prominent defences of causal explanation in physics (e.g., Salmon 1984; Dowe 2000; 
Strevens 2008). There is good reason to believe that outside of textbook presentations, causal 
explanation is not as widespread in physics as its proponents have claimed. This point likely 
generalizes to other areas of science in which complex non-linear dynamical systems are 
modeled, such as biology and chemistry. These areas seem to have the same sorts of non-
reductive explanations appealing to highly idealized, partially non-representative models. If 
this is right, causal concepts are not as useful in scientific explanation as many philosophers 
currently believe, and certainly causal theories of explanation are not as successful as the 
current consensus holds. Perhaps deductivist approaches to explanation merit renewed 
interest.  
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